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ABSTRACT
CARING CHOICES:
DECISION MAKING FOR 
CATASTROPHICALLY ILL NEWBORNS
BETTY WOLDER LEVIN
Decision making for catastrophically ill newborns has recently 
emerged as a social issue. Advances in biomedical technology and 
practice, and changes in other economic, social and political factors 
have led to controversy about norms to guide treatment choice. While 
much has been written on how such decisions should be made, there has 
been little social science research on how such decisions are actually 
made.
The purpose of this dissertation is to elucidate the way that 
clinicians think about treatment decisions for catastrophically ill 
newborns. The focus is on decision making with respect to the 
limitation of treatment in those situations in which clinicians feel 
that an infant is terminally ill and/or severely impaired. The aim is 
to place the issue in its broad social context, explicate how clinicians 
categorize information, examine how clinicians utilize these categories 
in making decisions, investigate the process of decision making in the 
context of social change, and elucidate some of the ethical and policy 
questions.
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A major finding of this research is that treatment of 
catastrophically ill newborns is heavily influenced fay the way that 
clinicians conceptualize the issues involved in treatment choice.
Rather than a clear cut choice "to treat" or "not to treat," decision 
making is a complex process in which clinicians, and sometimes parents, 
make decisions about which treatments are appropriate to give at a 
particular point in time. Clinicians conceptualize this as a choice 
about "the aggressiveness" of treatment. A model is derived to explain 
clinician decision making. Clinicians are seen to categorize 
characteristics of patient condition along the dimensions of quality of 
life, uncertainty, critical condition and social value; treatments are 
categorized according to aggressiveness, ordinary/extraordinary means, 
withholding and withdrawing treatment and passive/active euthanasia.
Each of these dimensions is culturally determined. There is variation 
in clinician conceptualization of characteristics of patient condition 
and treatment, the goals of treatment, and the norms for decision 
making.
The primary mode of research for this study was participant 
observation in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). Treatment choices 
in routine and problematic cases were observed and clinicians were 
interviewed to elicit information on factors relevant to the decision 
making process. In addition, clinicians from other NICUs were 
interviewed and meetings and conferences were attended. Documents in 
the clinical, legal, bioethical, social science, and popular literature 
were analyzed and a survey on treatment choice for catastrophically ill 
newborns was conducted.
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CHAPTER ONE
CARING CHOICES: INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in biomedical technology and practice have 
dramatically increased the ability to prolong the lives of critically 
ill patients. Although, in most cases, the use of life saving 
technology is seen as clearly beneficial, in some cases its use has been 
seen as inappropriate for it leads to suffering on the part of patients 
and their families. Clinicians, bioethicists and others have felt that 
traditional medical ethics have been inadequate to deal with the new 
technologies. Yet, daily, clinicians, patients, and families have had 
to made choices about the care of the critically ill.
While clinicians, philosophers, theologians and legal scholars 
have written much on issues concerning medical ethics and the care of 
the critically ill, social scientists have done little research on this 
topic (Fox 1984). As a result, much has been written on how decisions 
should be made, but relatively little research has been done on how 
decisions are actually made. Such research is important in at least two 
respects. It can contribute toward the development of social theory by 
providing a context in which to study the effects of rapid technological 
change on cognitive systems and behavior. Second, by providing an 
analysis which critically examines assumptions usually made in 
discussions concerning the care of the critically ill, it can contribute 
towards a resolution of ethical issues and the development of social 
policy.
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Background to the Problem
This dissertation will focus on decisions in neonatology, the 
specialty which provides care to critically ill newborns. Much of the 
bioethics literature concerns treatment decisions in neonatology, for 
these decisions exemplify the ethical issues which arise from rapid 
changes in medical technology and practice. Recent developments have 
enabled neonatologists to save the lives of many previously non-viable 
newborns. While most of these newborns will have no lasting 
impairments, others will have severe disabilities. For still others, 
treatment can do no more than prolong the dying process. Decisions to 
limit treatment lead to the death of some babies, and the limitation of 
treatment affects the timing of death for others.
While the limitation of treatment has been an issue of concern to 
clinicians and bioethicists for over fifteen years, it has only recently 
emerged as a salient political and social issue, following the 
announcement of the Baby Doe Directives. These directives, issued first 
in the Spring of 1982, and subsequent revisions, represent the first 
attempt by the Federal Government to regulate treatment of the 
critically ill. Now, such questions as: "Which Babies Shall Live?" and 
"Who Should Decide?" are being widely discussed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
While much has been written concerning how decisions should be 
made in neonatology, there has been little examination of the basis on 
which decisions are actually being made. Most of the literature on the 
choice of treatment for the catastrophically ill infants has concerned 
ideal norms that the authors have felt should guide behavior, rather 
than the behavior norms which are important in guiding actual practice. 
(For a review of such work, see the President's Commission Report 1983; 
Weir 1984.)
For example, even those articles written by clinicians, based on 
series of cases (e.g. Duff and Campbell 1973), do not analyze the 
factors which have affected decision making, but rather are primarily 
concerned with recommendations for policy to affect future cases. 
Articles by philosophers have done much to explicate and evaluate the 
values and principles which underlie various positions (c.f. Arras 
1985), Those by legal scholars present a range of positions concerning 
the applicability of laws pertaining to homicide, manslaughter, child 
neglect and discrimination against the handicapped (c.f. Robertson 
1975; Ellis 1982). However, no previous study has examined the way that 
perspectives from the bioethical or legal domains have been incorporated 
into the process of clinical decision making to affect decisions in 
actual cases.
There is an extensive and growing social science literature on 
death and dying (Riley 1983; Palgi and Abramovitch 1984), on technology
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in medicine (Fox 1976; Reiser 1978) and on clinical decision making 
(Elstein et al. 1982) but relatively few studies have focused on 
decisions to limit treatment. The most comprehensive study, by Diana 
Crane (1977), indicates that physicians' norms are changing; they are 
moving away from a purely physiological definition of life to one based 
on a social definition. "The treatable patient is one who, if treated, 
is capable of resuming his social roles even minimally and temporarily" 
(p. 11). In some cases, in which patients can't resume their social 
roles, treatment is withheld. Although not discussed in much detail in 
her book, Crane's data shows that even when some treatments were 
withheld, other treatments are provided (Crane 1975). Christina M.
Mumma and Jeanne Quint Benoliel (1984) found that even when patients had 
conditions labeled by their physicians as either grim or terminal, and 
had been designated "no code" (they would not be resuscitated if their 
hearts stopped), they still received cure oriented treatments.
From research based primarily on participant observation in two 
neonatal intensive care units, Renee Anspach (forthcoming) found that 
"physicians and nurses, because of their [differential] experience in 
the intensive care nursery, differed systematically in their views of 
the infant's prognosis." These differences in views of prognosis affect 
their evaluations of future quality of life for the babies, and, in 
turn, their attitudes toward life and death decisions. No other study 
has focused on the conceptualization of such treatment decisions. 
Recently Guillemin and Holmstrom (1986) have published a study on 
neonatal decision making. It examines the social relations of parents
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5and staff in the unit and places the development of neonatal intensive 
care within the context of the American medical system.
Medical anthropologists have studied the relationship of 
conceptualizations about illness and treatment behavior of healers in 
many Non-Western societies and the relationship of those 
conceptualizations and behavior to economic, political and social 
factors. Recent work by medical anthropologists and other social 
scientists interested in the social construction of medical work have 
begun to examine biomedicine as a sociocultural system. For example, 
Gaines and Hahn write:
Concepts, explanations, and prescribed reactions to conditions of 
health and illness are constructed in social interactions, both 
collaborative and conflictual; that is suffering, welfare, and 
responses to them are socially defined. These same conditions 
(and reactions to them) are also socially affected in another way: 
they are produced or caused by human social interactions which 
distribute the members of society and (other) resources in time 
and space and by activity. Pathogenic sources and resources for 
their amelioration are distributed in the same sociocultural 
process.
(Gaines and Hahn 1985:9)
Studies looking at biomedicine both in the clinical and wider societal 
context have looked at how clinicians and other members of society use 
cultural symbol systems "both as models of and for reality and action as 
well as examining how the material and social conditions of society 
shape the models (Gaines and Hahn 1985). As material and social 
conditions change, so too does the ideology and practice of medicine" 
(Colombotos and Kirchner 1986; Baer 1982).
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A recent concern of some anthropologists has been to develop an 
understanding of the cognitive processes used in making decisions in 
various contexts. They have emphasized the limitations of using formal 
models of decision making to account for decisions made in natural 
settings. Instead, they have stressed the need to examine the 
structuring of decision choices, the organization of knowledge into 
meaningful cultural categories, the goals involved, and the contexts in 
which the decisions are made. They find that variation along these 
dimensions can be used to account for variations in behavior (Young 
1983; Mathews and Nardi 1983).
Background to the Study
The research for this dissertation began in 1977 when I was 
invited to work for the "Task Force on Ethical and Value Issues in 
Neonatology." This interdisciplinary task force was composed of 
clinicians from the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) of Columbia- 
Presbyterian Medical Center and academics from other parts of Columbia 
University. My work involved observing in the NICU and participating on 
the task force. I had very little previous knowledge about bioethics or 
experience in clinical settings, none in critical care. I had come with 
a background in anthropology and interests in reproduction, ethnicity 
and other subcultural differences, and technological and social change.
From a brief introduction to the bioethical literature and the 
popular media, where there had recently been many articles on Karen Ann
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Quinlan, I thought that the ethical problems would involve decisions 
about "pulling the plug." I pictured this as a choice between giving 
"treatment" —  using all possible means to promote survival —  and "no 
treatment" —  the cessation of all treatment. I was perplexed to find 
that all treatments were never withheld; rather, for some babies who 
were catastrophically ill, some treatments were given which would 
increase the babies' chances for survival, while others were withheld. 
While I couldn't understand why only some treatments were being given, 
the physicians and nurses working in the unit seemed to feel that such 
partial treatment decisions were perfectly natural. When they explained 
what they were doing, they sometimes talked about patients, treatments, 
and choices in a way that I couldn't comprehend.
I hypothesized that not only, as Crane had found, were norms 
changing concerning which patients would be treated, but other norms and 
concepts were changing as well. In fact, I felt that I was dealing with 
a different subculture.^ Clinicians seemed to have an elaborate 
cognitive system to deal with the complex issues they dealt with daily, 
using concepts and norms which were somewhat different from those shared 
by most members of the larger society.
Here was a situation in which technology was changing very 
rapidly. Traditional norms were felt to be inadequate guides to
The ideological system used by philosophers, bioethicists, and 
others professionals who discussed the ethics of decision making in 
neonatology seemed to comprise yet another subculture in which questions 
were framed, and concepts were used in a way which seemed to be 
different from both those of the clinicians and those shared more widely 
by members of the culture.
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8behavior. Yet, clinicians had to make decisions about how to act.
Their behavior was relevant to and, I assumed must be shaped by ideas 
about, some of the most critical concerns of our society including life, 
death and disability, suffering and mercy, parental and professional 
responsibility, the uses of science and technology, and the role of God 
and of human action.
Research in the neonatal intensive care unit seemed to provide an 
ideal setting in which to study sociocultural change in the wake of 
changing technology. My entree into the NICU also seemed to provide an 
excellent opportunity to study the ways that the people who had the most 
experience in dealing with deciding about care for catastrophically ill 
newborns thought about the factors involved.
Statement of the Problem
The research questions addressed in this dissertation are: How do 
clinicians conceptualize choices about limiting care in an NICU? What 
factors affect these conceptualizations? More specifically: How 
do clinicians choose which treatments to give and which to withhold from 
the range of possible treatments, in caring for catastrophically ill 
newborns? How do material and social factors affect the way that 
clinicians think about treatment choices?
In this dissertation, the manner in which clinicians structure 
decision choices, how they organize information into culturally relevant
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categories and what norms and goals they use to guide treatment behavior 
will be explicated. This cognitive system, used to make treatment 
choices for catastrophically ill newborns, will be looked at as it takes 
place within the larger sociocultural system.
The dissertation reports on research which has investigated 
material and social conditions which may impact on neonatal care, in 
general, and those factors that pertain to the development and use of 
medical technology in particular.
More generally, this dissertation illuminates issues relevant to 
anthropological research on decision making, intracultural variability, 
and social change. It is also intended to provide substantive 
information on decision making about the critically ill which may be of 
use to clinicians, bioethicists, and others interested in critically 
evaluating clinical practice and developing social policy.
Discussion of Terms 
Catastrophically 111 Newborns
The dissertation concerns the treatments of catastrophically ill 
infants, babies who are ill and whose illness or condition is socially 
defined as a catastrophe, (a disaster, calamity or serious unfortunate 
occurrence) by his or her family and/or professional caretakers).
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That term is used, as opposed to other terms sometimes used to 
refer to such infants, such as anomalous, damaged, deformed, defective 
or disabled, because those terms seem to imply that it is the physical 
state of the child which defines the problems. Catastrophically ill 
defines a social rather than a physical state, as the term "illness" may 
be used to refer to a social entity in contrast to a "disease" which may 
be defined as a biological entity (Fabrega 1979).
A child may be defined as "catastrophically ill" because of the 
presence of a serious illness, prematurity, and/or present or future 
expected impairment. Not all children with the same physical conditions 
will be defined as catastrophically ill. Catastrophically ill infants 
include, but is not limited to, infants who are critically ill. It also 
includes, but is not limited to, those infants for whom caretakers 
consider the limitation of treatment.
Treatments
In this dissertation, the term treatment is used broadly to refer 
to anything that a clinician does to promote the health of a patient.
It includes such things as therapeutic and diagnostic medical and 
surgical procedures, drugs, provision of fluids and nutrition, use of 
isolettes or dressings to maintain a sterile environment, and social 
interaction intended for the benefit of the patient.
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Clinicians
The term "clinicians," when used without qualification in this 
dissertation, refers to the physicians and nurses who work in neonatal 
intensive care. It is used to refer to individuals who share a 
knowledge base as a result of socialization in these medical and nursing 
specialties - neonatologists and neonatal nurses. It is also used to 
refer to other physicians (e.g. residents, pediatric surgeons) who work 
with catastrophically ill newborns).
The clinical model
The focus of this dissertation is the development of a model for 
use in elucidating clinicians' conceptualizations of treatment choice. 
Clinicians do not appear to use a single conceptual model. The model 
developed here can be used to understand the range of factors felt to be 
important by clinicians, their norms and their goals.
It is an analyst's model used to understand the actors' cognitive 
system. It was derived from observation of clinicians' behavior, 
including treatment choices and explanations of why those choices were 
made. It includes concepts meaningful in other domains, such as law, 
religion, and bioethics, as they are significant to clinicians. The 
model is comprehensible to clinicians and acknowledged to be a 
representation of relevant factors.
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Methodology and description of the site
This dissertation is based on data collected by a variety of 
methods. The principle source of data has been participant observation, 
mostly in one neonatal intensive care unit. In addition, a survey of 
attitudes about neonatal decision making was conducted, and documents 
were examined from the clinical, bioethics, legal and popular 
literature. A more detailed account of aspects of methodology appears 
in the appendix.
Description of the Site
Most of the research for this dissertation was conducted in the 
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical 
Center. It is one of the most modern looking areas of the hospital 
complex. Formerly a small, dark unit on the second floor of the aging 
pediatric hospital, the unit was moved into newly renovated quarters on 
the top floor in 1974. In 1983, the other half of the floor was 
renovated and the labor and delivery area was moved from another floor 
in an adult wing of the hospital to be adjacent to the NICU.
From the large windows surrounding the neonatal unit, one can look 
out over much of Northern Manhattan, Harlem and the South Bronx, home to 
many of the families of babies who are admitted to the unit. Other
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
babies' families come from other areas of New York City and Northern New 
Jersey, Westchester, and Southern Connecticut. About 55 babies a month 
are admitted to the unit, about 60% born in the hospital, 40% from other 
hospitals in the City and suburbs. About half of the infants are 
private patients, the other half are "service," usually Medicaid, 
patients.^ As is typical of the New York City patient population, most 
of the private patients are White, many of the service patients are 
Black or Hispanic; some of the service patients are the children of very 
young mothers.
The unit is built in two main sections, a nine bed acute care unit 
for infants needing maximal care, and a twenty-four bed semi- acute unit 
for infants discharged from the acute section and other babies needing 
less acute care. The unit usually runs "over census;" all of the beds 
are usually filled, with additional babies sometimes sent down to other 
floors where the normal newborn nurseries are located. On "the floor" 
(the term used to refer to the entire unit) there are additional rooms
 ^ All specific figures and descriptive information refers to the 
period of most intense field work, the "ethnographic present" for this 
study, 1982. Over the course of the research period, there were some 
changes in organization and structure. For example, work patterns of 
house staff and nurses changed as did the administrative structure of 
the hospital. The number of admissions rose from about 500 per year in 
1977 to about 700 per year in 1985). None of these institutional 
changes had major significance for the problems addressed by this 
research.
During the period of research, there were some significant changes 
in the treatments available and their use. After the completion of the 
primary data collection period, in the Spring of 1983 the Baby Doe 
Regulations were widely publicized; in December of 1983, a Neonatal 
Ethics Review Committee was established. Each of these may have had a 
significant impact on the way that decisions are conceptualized and/or 
made. When the time of data collection is significant, it will be noted 
in the text.
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for physicians and nurses offices, a social worker's office, a staff 
lounge, research labs, offices for a follow-up study, a parent lounge, a 
breast feeding room, and utility rooms. One room in the labor and 
delivery suite, a "transitional nursery" for care of infants immediately 
after birth, is also part of the neonatal service.
The acute care unit is a single large room separated by walls and 
doors from the rest of the floor. The room is built around a central 
nurses station. The sickest babies are admitted to this section first. 
Almost all babies are in isolettes, plastic walled "incubators" with 
port holes on the side through which clinicians can provide care and 
their parents can touch them. Some of the babies can be taken out and 
held by nurses or parents for feedings or rocking, but most babies in 
this unit are very sick and remain in their isolettes, lying still most 
of the time, dressed in only a diaper or nothing at all.
The majority of the babies admitted to the unit are premature 
(below 37 weeks), many are very premature, very low birth weight (under 
about three pounds), some with less than 25 of the normal 40 weeks 
gestation. There are also a number of babies with cardiac conditions, 
with other congenital conditions, and infants who have suffered birth 
accidents or for other reasons are seriously or critically ill.
All of the babies are attached to monitors which continually beep 
and frequently sound alarms when there are irregularities in a baby's 
heart beat or quirks in the machinery. Most of the babies need
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respiratory support and are attached by tubes to machines, respirators3 
(sending bursts of air to the baby's lung) or CPAP (delivering a 
continuous flow of positive pressure air to assist breathing). Most of 
the babies have IVs, some more than one. Many of the infants have 
stuffed animals, other toys, pictures of family, or religious objects 
that their parents have placed in their isolettes.
Numerous times each day, nurses draw blood by pricking the babies' 
heels or doctors draw blood by IV which is checked in a small lab 
adjacent to the unit or sent downstairs for more elaborate tests. 
Technicians wheel portable X-ray equipment into the unit so that the 
conditions of baby's lungs and the placement of tubes can be examined. 
Portable ultra-sound equipment is also used frequently to see if the 
babies have had bleeding in the brain. Almost all of a baby's 
treatment, including minor surgical procedures, takes place in the unit. 
As results of tests come in, they are noted and discussed and 
adjustments are made in the care of the babies.
The semi-acute section is more crowded. While some of the babies 
are also very sick and are in isolettes, attached to monitors, 
respiratory support and IVs; others are not as sick and are in open 
basinettes, dressed in tee shirts and wrapped in blankets. Most of 
these babies can be held for feedings. Although the babies in the acute 
section rarely smile or cry, these healthier infants are more animate. 
Some of the babies started in the acute section, others are larger
3 The correct term for such machines is "ventilator", but they are 
commonly called "respirators". They will be referred to as respirators 
throughout this dissertation.
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premature infants, children of addicted mothers, babies who are stable 
awaiting or recovering from surgery, or who have other conditions that 
generally are not as critical as those of babies in the more acute 
section. Occasionally, a terminally ill baby might be on the semi-acute 
side if it is not felt that more intensive care would be of benefit.
The average baby stays about 19 days. Premature babies generally 
stay until close to their due date (i.e. three months for a baby born at 
27 weeks). Much of the time is spent "growing" on the semi-acute side. 
If a baby has serious complications, however, the stay can be much 
longer. In rare cases, babies have lived for years in the NICU and then 
have died there. The mortality rate for the entire floor is about 8%, 
or about one death per week. The vast majority of babies go home with 
no significant problems. The costs of care are approximately $1000.00 a 
day.
While the first impression that strikes a visitor is probably the 
high technology character of the floor, the atmosphere is not cold or 
stark, but bright and busy. There are many people involved in providing 
care to each baby. Though the unit is busier during the day, many 
clinicians are there each night, weekends, and holidays. The nurses and 
the house staff (residents and neonatal fellows) deliver most of the 
direct care.
The clinicians working in the NICU care very deeply about the well 
being of the babies. They realize that many of the decisions they make 
each day could be crucial in determining a baby's future health and/or
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survival. The majority of decisions are seen as "medical" or "nursing" 
decisions, but the clinicians are keenly aware that many are "ethical 
decisions" as well. Many clinicians are involved at various levels in 
making decisions about the care of each baby. Most routine decisions 
are made by the house staff and nurses, attending physicians establish 
the standards and either make or sanction the majority of the most 
important decisions. Most doctors and nurses who work in the NICU are 
very dedicated to their work; many spend innumerable hours beyond that 
officially required, watching over and caring for critically ill babies.
There are about 100 nurses on staff. A nurse can take care of 
only one or two babies at a time in the acute care unit; they can 
usually care for three or four on the semi-acute side. The nurses 
monitor the babies condition, do some tests, give medications, feed and 
clean the babies, and provide support to the parents. The nursing 
leadership on the floor is comprised of a nursing care coordinator, two 
head nurses, assistant head nurses and an educational coordinator.
Nurses make independent nursing care decisions and carry out 
doctors' orders concerning medical management. Many of the neonatal 
nurses are highly trained and have worked for many years in neonatal 
intensive care. They often know more about neonatal conditions and 
treatment modalities than some doctors, especially the residents, and 
frequently know more about the families. Although they are not licensed 
to make medical decisions, their knowledge is usually respected and they 
are sometimes very influential in decision making.
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Two second year residents are "on rotation" each month to care for 
the babies in the acute unit. One third year resident and three first 
year residents care for the babies on the semi-acute side. At least one • 
resident is present to take care of the babies on each side round-the- 
clock. They devise the everyday care plans for the babies, in 
consultation with more senior physicians. They write the orders and 
carry out most medical procedures. They also care for sick babies 
immediately after birth in the delivery room. In addition, at all times 
at least one of the eight neonatal fellows (doing 2 years post residency 
training in neonatology) is working on the floor or helping to transport 
sick babies to the unit. They perform some routine and many of the more 
complicated procedures both in the nursery and at delivery. They help 
to teach and supervise the care given by the residents. Both residents 
and fellows talk to parents about the care of their infants.
One or two of the ten attending neonatologists are "on service" 
each month. They may leave the hospital, but an attending is always "on 
call"; they frequently return in the middle of the night. They are the 
people primarily responsible for overseeing the clinical care on the 
floor. While the more junior physicians make most of the routine 
decisions, except in an emergency situation,, attendings play a major 
role in making major decisions.
Although parents may choose another doctor, the attending 
physician on service becomes the private doctor for most patients 
admitted during the month. Service patients, as well as private 
patients, have an attending physician. While the care provided by the
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nurses, residents and fellows is the same for private and service 
patients, attendings frequently are more closely involved in following 
the care of their private patients and frequently spend more time 
talking to their parents.
In addition to the neonatologists, physicians from other services 
are involved in the care of the infants. Columbia is relatively unique 
among neonatal units in having a full time anesthesiologist who oversees 
the respiratory care of the infants. As in other centers, physicians 
from Cardiology, Cardiac Surgery, Pediatric Surgery, Infectious Disease, 
Neurology, Neurosurgery and other services, are frequently involved in 
the care of infants. Sometimes babies are the patients of doctors from 
other services, then these doctors may make major decisions, more often 
they serve as consultants to the neonatologists who are the primary 
decision makers. Neonatologists often serve as consultants to 
obstetricians who make decisions before a fetus is born. Once the baby 
is born, typically the obstetricians are not involved in the baby's 
care.
A full time social worker is assigned to the unit. She provides 
psychological support to parents and helps them obtain services. In 
some units social workers are very involved in decision making. At 
Columbia, at the time I did field work, the social worker didn't become 
involved at all in treatment decisions. Numerous technicians also are 
involved in the infants' care, taking X-rays, doing EKGs, etc. They 
too, do not play a role in decision making.
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Officially, parents have the legal right and responsibility to 
make health care decisions for their children. The ideology of the unit 
strongly supports the importance of parental decision making. In actual 
practice, however, since the parents typically have little previous 
knowledge about their baby's conditions and the options for treatment, 
they are very dependent on information from the clinicians; the ways 
that clinicians frame treatment decisions are very important in 
determining what treatment choices are made. In general, parents did 
not spend more than a few hours a day in the unit, many were there much 
less.
Research Strategy
In conducting field work, my primary research strategy was to 
observe and record ongoing behavior. I watched and recorded information 
as nurses and physicians delivered direct care to the babies and 
conducted diagnostic tests. I read and recorded information from the 
hospital charts, the nurses'Kardex, and other unit records. I followed 
the physicians as they conducted work rounds and sign off rounds, as 
they twice daily discussed the care of each baby. I attended the nurses 
"report" where they discussed the care of each baby at the change of 
each shift. I observed daily teaching rounds where the care of a 
particular baby or for a particular problem were discussed, weekly 
perinatal and social service rounds, and monthly mortality and morbidity 
rounds. I attended special meetings of physicians and nurses called to 
discuss the care of infants who presented particular problems. I
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
watched approximately 15 births and observed care in the transitional 
nursery immediately after birth for at least twice that number of 
babies. I attended a memorial service. I observed minor and major 
procedures including surgery and cardiac catheterization. I observed in 
the follow up clinic and attended "alumni" days when babies who 
"graduated" from the unit returned for a yearly picnic. I spent a lot 
of time in the staff lounge, and in other settings, where informal 
conversations about the babies took place.
Early in my research, I decided that I would focus on the behavior 
and conceptual system of clinicians. I decided not to conduct regular 
interviews with parents or plan to observe private conversations between 
parents and clinicians. At the suggestion of clinicians, I did conduct 
long interviews with three mothers and had shorter conversations with a 
few others. In the course of my observations, I did overhear and 
observe numerous conversations with parents and other family members in 
the unit. I conducted extended interviews with some parents I 
encountered through personal connections who had infants cared for in 
other intensive care units.
When I first started my research, I felt that I know too little to 
impose on families who were going through such a traumatic time; later I 
realized that many parents would like an opportunity to talk with 
someone about their experience. By then, however, I had decided to 
concentrate on understanding the perspective of the clinicians. Working 
with parents would have changed the nature of the research.
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Over the course of fieldwork, from 1977 to 1985, I spent 
approximately 1300 hours in the unit at Columbia. Most of time I wore a 
white lab coat, the type worn by fellows, attendings and the nursing 
leadership as well as research scientists. Sometimes I would "hang out" 
at the nurses station in the acute unit, reading charts, going over to 
listen as a group of clinicians would discuss a case. Other times I 
would follow a single clinician as he or she worked. When I talked to a 
new clinician, I would introduce myself as an anthropologist interested 
in studying how decisions were made in neonatology. I wore a name tag 
that had my name on it and "Division of Sociomedical Sciences." At 
times, I became a familiar fixture in the NICU, fading into the 
background of familiar faces in white coats. Often, when X followed a 
clinician to another location or a new person came into the unit, they 
probably assumed I was a doctor, nurse, visitor, student, or one of the 
many other types of observers common in the teaching hospital.
Despite my efforts to keep a low profile, and to make it clear 
than I was interested in understanding behavior, not judge it, my role 
was often misunderstood. I was sometimes referred to by terms such as 
"the ethics lady." For years, one attending, not really joking, 
referred to me as a "spy." Sometimes as I would walk into the unit, 
someone would say "Here's a real case for you" or something else that 
would make clear that I represented the gaze of "ethics;" generally, 
however, I think that the clinicians ignored my presence and did 
basically what they would have done if I wasn't there. They were very 
busy and had important work to do.
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Sometimes I would sit down and have long conversations with a 
clinician about a particular case or issue. Over the years, the 
director of the nurseries, two attending physicians, an assistant head 
nurse (who now works in another NICU), a clinical nurse specialist, the 
educational coordinator, the nursing care coordinator, and a former NICU 
nurse/Assistant Professor at the Nursing School became my key 
informants. Their help has been invaluable in exploring the issues in 
neonatal decision making in depth.
I was fortunate in that my observations in the unit had started at 
the invitation of the task force; in the words of Charles Bosk, I was an 
"invited guest" (Bosk 1985). I was never denied access to any situation 
I asked to observe. I promised that I would not reveal the individual 
identities of clinicians or babies I observed. For years, the staff 
tolerated my presence before I revealed my own opinions about the issues 
about which I had interrogated them. I gave the first real feed back on 
my observations in 1983, after I had finished the most intensive part of 
my field work. I had assumed I would use a pseudonym for the hospital. 
When I showed a paper I had written, to the Director of the unit, in 
which I had used vague terms to refer to the hospital, he requested I 
identify it in my papers; academic medicine is exactly that - academic 
as well as medicine.
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Significance
While the cognitive processes involved in decision making have 
been studied extensively in the laboratory by psychologists and others, 
there has been relatively little research on the cognitive processes 
used by people to inform behavior in natural settings (Mathews and Nardi 
1983). There has been even less research on variation in cognitive 
systems in natural settings. Although there have been many studies of 
social change, both in the situation of culture contact (e.g. Spicer 
1961), and evolutionary change in sociocultural systems (e.g. Steward 
1955), there has been little research on relatively small scale 
indigenous social and technological changes and variation and change in 
cognitive systems. This research is intended to provide data and 
analysis of variation in a natural setting in the use of norms, 
categories and goals. It is also intended to investigate the impact of 
material and social changes in the larger context on changes in 
conceptual systems.
During the past few decades, issues of biomedical ethics have 
emerged from relative obscurity to become a "primary medium through 
which fundamental aspects of our social, cultural, and cosmic way of 
thinking, feeling, and believing about ourselves, our society, this 
planet, and the universe are gradually being altered" (Fox 1980:45).
The current debate about treatment for catastrophically ill newborns 
reflects unresolved issues in our culture concerning ethics and values 
in regard to the definition of life and personhood, the value of 
children, obligations to dependent persons, and the appropriate use of
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technology. This study provides information on aspects of treatment 
choices for the critically ill which have received little attention but 
which have crucial individual and societal implications.
It is intended to be of use in trying to resolve the ethical and 
value issues concerning the care of the catastrophically ill. The 
current level of biomedical technology creates a situation in which 
decisions must be made concerning the prolongation of life and the 
timing of death for many critically ill patients. As the power of the 
technology increases, the potential economic and social costs can only 
increase. The implications of the situation have not been fully faced 
by many clinicians, nor by society at large. Information on how such 
decisions are made may help to clarify the conscious and unconscious 
basis for decision making in clinical practice and can be useful in the 
profession and public debate on these issues.
Outline of the Dissertation
The second chapter of this dissertation examines the issue of 
treatment choice for adults. It provides cross cultural and historical 
information on the withholding of medical treatment and a review of the 
legal, ethical and sociological literature on the issue.
The third chapter examines the development of care for newborns. 
It provides a brief cross cultural and historic survey, and examines 
factors leading to the development of neonatal intensive care. Factors
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leading to concern about the issue of withholding treatment from 
newborns are presented and the legal, ethical and sociological 
literature is discussed.
The fourth chapter examines categorization, goals, norms and 
decision making. Theoretical concepts are discussed and examples drawn 
from medical and other settings are provided. The use of these concepts 
to examine neonatal decision making is introduced.
In the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters, the conceptual system 
of clinicians is examined in detail. Clinicians' conceptualization of 
characteristics of patient condition, characteristics of treatments, and 
goals and norms for care are presented. General areas of consensus and 
controversy are explicated. Examples drawn from participant observation 
and from the survey are discussed.
In the eighth chapter, recent changes in the conceptualization of 
decision making and treatment behavior are explored in more depth. Then 
the first published debate on decision making for newborns, variation in 
the treatment infants, changes over time in the treatment of infants 
with spina bifida and those who are premature are discussed.
Perspectives on the Baby Doe regulations and clinicians interpretations 
of the regulations are presented and general trends in changes in 
decision making are discussed.
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In the final chapter, the dissertation is summarized and 
conclusions are presented. Theoretical and substantive implications of 
the study are presented as part of a discussion of problems for future 
research, and of decision making and social policy.
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CHAPTER TWO
UNPLUGGING THE MYTH: 
BACKGROUND TO WITHHOLDING TREATMENT
The ethical issues involved in withholding medical treatments from 
critically ill patients are often presented as a new problems attributed 
to amazing progress in the ability to support life which has occurred 
during the past thirty years, or, to declining social values. The issue 
has certainly gained salience, and there are new dilemmas due to new 
technological developments. Questions concerning the aggressiveness of 
treatment for critically ill patients, however, have probably been 
raised as long as there have been efforts made by humans to prolong 
life. Questions have been debated in the Western medical and 
philosophical traditions prior to the recent medical advances.
This chapter will begin with an historical sketch of some of the 
issues pertaining to choices about the aggressiveness of treatment for 
adults. Information on laws and current practices will also be 
presented. Participant observation and chart review studies of the care 
of the care of the terminally ill and surveys of decision making about 
the withholding of treatment will also be reviewed.
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Euthanasia - Cross Cultural and Historical Perspectives
In every culture, healers and or family members make decisions 
about how to care for critically ill patients. Each culture has a range 
of available techniques and must decide which are appropriate in a given 
situation. Although systematic cross cultural data on this issue is 
scarce (Kunstadter 1980), it seems reasonable to suppose that healers 
and family members may consider such factors as the potential risks, 
suffering, and resource use (as culturally defined) in making decisions 
about how to treat patients (Christine Paddoch, personal communication 
1983; Young 1983).
Decision making about withholding treatment can be thought of in 
the context of possible acts toward a critically ill patient. One can 
consider four types: l) acts to prolong life, for the benefit of the 
patient, 2) acts to end life, for the benefit of the patient, 3) acts to 
prolong life, to harm the patient, and A) acts to end life, to harm the 
patient. Those that fall in the second category, those intended to 
bring about death for the benefit of the patient, either by acts of 
omission or commission, can be thought of as euthanasia, that is, a 
"good death."
In many primitive cultures, shamen were seen as functioning both 
to heal and also to harm, in some instances, causing death. In some 
situations, healers may have used preparations to hasten and or ease 
deaths which could not be prevented. The fact that the Hippocratic Oath 
dictates that physicians shall not do anything to actively bring about
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death, probably means that such requests were made, and that healers in 
other contemporary traditions were perhaps engaging in such practices.
According to David Amundson (1974), the Hippocratic Corpus defines 
medicine as having three goals: l) Doing away with suffering of the ill,
2) Lessening the violence of their ailments, and 3) Refusing to treat 
those who are overmastered by their diseases. Decisions were often made 
not to treat based on the belief that the medical arts could not be of 
help, and might even lead to patient suffering or hasten death. The 
option to treat or not to treat was up to the physician. Decisions were 
based primarily on prognosis. Prolonging the life of an individual who 
could not ultimately recover was seen as unethical.
The conceptions of death have been very different in different 
cultures and through time in the Western Cultural tradition. For 
example, while in the contemporary Western imagination death is often 
seen as a deep violation against the proper order of things, rather than 
as part of that natural order, other cultures have a very different 
view. (Carse 1978; Palgi and Abramovitch 1984). The meaning of efforts 
to extend life will vary with beliefs about death as well as with 
changes in political, economic and social changes in society.
A distinction between ordinary and extraordinary treatments have a 
long history. In the 16th and 17th centuries, Catholic theologians, 
such as St. Alphonsus and Paul Laymann held that "no one is held to 
extraordinary and very difficult means to preserve his life, such as the
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amputation of a leg, unless his life be necessary for the common good 
(O'Donnell 1956:57).
A traditional role of the physician was often to provide comfort 
and assistance to the dying. In part, this involved recognizing the 
point in time at which the patient could be said to be dying so that the 
patient could deal with unresolved social or spiritual issues. From 
that point when the patient was defined as dying, the physician was not 
to do anything which might be seen as causing suffering. Host often, 
deaths were the result of infectious diseases or accidents, and occurred 
rapidly (Aries 1974; Reiser, Dyck and Curran 1977; Gruman 1978).
19th century issues relating to euthanasia
Fry, in his article on the history of euthanasia, traces the 
change in the use of the term "euthanasia." At first it was used for 
"spiritual euthanasia" referring to the state of mind at the time of 
death. Between 1870 and 1890 the current connotation emerged; since 
then it has been used for the giving or omitting medical treatments to 
bring about "a good death" to relieve suffering. Yet even earlier, 
"euthanasia" was sometimes used to refer to decisions to forego 
treatment. There had been debate about the use of "heroic" medicine in 
the early 19th century. Fry paraphrases a paper published in 1829 by 
C.F.H. Marx entitled "De euthanasia medica prolusio," in which the 
physician author urged his peers to:
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... accept responsibility for his patient's 'spiritual 
euthanasia.' This is to be accomplished by providing physical and 
moral comfort and by avoiding the use of heroic medications which 
are likely to be worthless.
Yet Marx clearly differentiated this from acts meant to hasten 
death, which he felt would not be consonant with the physician's 
mission to save life.
(1978:494-5).
In addition to stopping the useless treatment of terminally ill 
patients, within the medical profession, earlier technological 
developments have also led to situations in which practitioners have had 
to deal with questions concerning conflicts between the traditional 
medical goals of relieving suffering and preserving life.
Before anesthesia was developed, surgeons had to consider the 
ethical issues involved in deciding if the benefits of surgery would 
justify the pain. When anesthesia was first introduced, and its use was 
very risky, there were debates about the ethics of risking death for the 
relief of pain. It was resolved by what Pernick refers to as a 
"moderate utilitarian measurement to pros and cons, a calculus of 
suffering" (1983). The end of the 19th century through the 1930's saw a 
debate on the issue of active euthanasia which was advocated by some 
physicians (Reiser, Dyck and Curran 1977). A majority of physicians 
rejected the notion that their role should be to actively end life. The 
debate concerning the ethics of giving pain medication for the purpose 
of relieving suffering which, as an unintended but not unforeseen 
consequence might shorten the life of the patient, extended past the 
middle of the 20th century (Fry 1978; Reiser, Dyck and Curran 1977; 
Williams 1957).
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Rise of the Technological Imperative: the Battle Against Death
The debate concerning active measures taken which would cause 
death did not involve a significantly different situation in earlier 
periods than it does today. As a result of recent technological 
developments, however, questions concerning the cessation of treatments 
intended to prolong life do take place in a significantly different 
context. In the past, the power of clinicians to actually prolong the 
lives of critically ill patients was very limited. In this century, 
especially since World War II, the power of medicine to significantly 
prolong life has increased greatly. Whereas, in the past the 
withholding of life saving treatment made little difference, it can now 
have a significant effect on survival.
Although much of the reduction in mortality actually occurred 
because of improvements in diet, sanitation and other preventive health 
measures, the great reduction in mortality rates from infectious 
diseases led to great faith in the power of scientific medicine. There 
was optimism that medicine could conquer disease, and hope that a new 
cure to many diseases lay just around the corner. The aggressive 
application of life saving and life prolonging techniques became the 
rule, often with the hope that if a patient could be kept alive long 
enough, a new cure would be found.
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Indeed, during the post World War II period, the widespread use of 
recent medical advances have greatly increased the ability to prolong 
the lives of patients, with the use of such low technology interventions 
as antibiotics and blood transfusions, as well as, resuscitation and 
life support techniques. A "technological imperative" developed. 
Physicians generally accepted the ethic that what ever could be done, 
should be done (Silverman 1980; Aries 1974; Carse 1978). Medicine was 
seen as a battle against disease. Militaristic metaphors were used 
frequently (conquer death, win the war against cancer, magic bullets, 
etc.) Death became increasingly defined not as a natural event, but as 
was a technological failure. For example, in 1972, Moser wrote:
To the physician, death is the enemy -- the implacable ultimate 
foe —  the symbol of failure, ever lurking in the wings, ever 
hovering near the critically ill patient. The missed diagnosis, 
the resistant microorganism, the hidden malignancy, the 
irreversible degenerative lesion —  all represent familiar 
catacombs. As physicians we accept commitment to the life long 
conflict. Every instinct, drive and desire -- every intellectual 
and emotional sinew, has been trained to defeat death.
(Moser 1972:43)
Death was seen as a "'medical defeat1 either for the physician 
personally or for the 'state of the art1" (Parsons, Fox and Lidz 
1972:396; Levine and Scotch 1970:211).
Anecdotal reports suggest that even during this most aggressive 
period, in fact, at times, less than the most aggressive means were used 
(see Chapter III). The questions of which therapies were appropriate 
have always been culturally determined. Generally, however, the axiom
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that the physicians' role was to "preserve life" went unchallenged. At 
the structural core of contemporary medical ethics was an absolutizing 
of the value of preserving life (Parsons, Lidz and Fox 1972:395). What 
was later perceived as a contradiction between the goals of preservation 
of life and relief of suffering was not recognized as an issue.
While the debate continued about active euthanasia, "passive 
euthanasia" was not yet seen as a particularly troubling problem. For 
example, based on a series of lectures he delivered at Columbia 
University Law School, Glanville Williams wrote about four types of 
euthanasia:
1) fatal injection, enabling the patient to commit suicide,
2) administering a fatal dose of a drug intended to relieve pain,
3) aiding suicide, and
4) omitting treatment.
Out of 39 pages of text, only one paragraph addresses the fourth
type:
(4) We come finally to the problem of killing by inaction.
"Mercy killing" by omission to use medical means to prolong life 
is probably lawful. Although a physician is normally under a duty 
to use reasonable care to conserve his patient's life, he is 
probably exempted from that duty if life has become a burden to 
the patient. The morality of an omission in these circumstances 
is conceded even by Catholics [reference to Joseph V. Sullivan: 
Catholic Teaching on the Morality of Euthanasia (Washington, D.C., 
1949 p. 64 J.
(Williams 1957: 326)
Very soon after Williams' lecture series, questions about 
"omitting treatment" were to emerge as a major social issue.
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The Crumbling of the Technological Imperative;
Cultural Contradictions and Technological Choice
A number of factors contributed to the emergence of concern about 
withholding treatment as a social issue. It developed, in part, because 
of a perceived contradiction between the goal of medical treatment to 
save life, and the goals to relieve suffering and to do no harm, seemed 
to come into contradiction when patients were saved, only to have a poor 
quality of life. The problem came to be seen as one of inappropriate 
use of technology. The ethics of limitation of treatment began to be 
debated in the clinical, legal, and philosophical arenas. The roots of 
this issue lie both in the technological changes and ideological 
currents of this period.
Changing Definitions of Death
One often sees the emergence of ethical issues about withholding 
treatment attributed to technological developments in the ability to 
provide life support. While not the only factor, it was certainly one 
of the most important. Previous developments of other new treatments 
which saved patients with conditions which had been terminal (such as 
giving insulin to save a patient in a diabetic coma) has also been 
perceived as bringing a patient "back from death" (Parsons, Fox and Lidz
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1972: fn on 399). The development of techniques of resuscitation, 
however, has an unrivaled effect for they led to the transcendence of 
the traditional, universally accepted, definition of death.
Since the invention of the stethoscope in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, controversies about the determination of death had 
been laid to rest. (Pres. Comm 1981:14-15) Death was defined as "the 
apparent extinction of life, manifested by absence of heart beat and 
respiration" (Dorland's Medical Dictionary 1965:387). The development 
of artificial means to support cardiopulmonary function, such as the 
respirator, pacemaker and the development of drugs and other forms of 
stimulation for cardiac resuscitation, was felt to make such traditional 
definitions obsolete.
Efforts were made to develop new definitions. For example, 
"clinical death ... when the heart or the lungs or both cease to 
function" was differentiated from "biological death" which was thought 
to occur when irreversible changes in the organism lead to the 
disintegration of vital cells and tissues" (Wasmuth and Wasmuth 
1969:352). The feeling developed that, in certain circumstances, 
efforts to postpone such biological death should cease and be replaced 
with "more fitting and respectful behavior when a patient has become a 
dead body" (Pres. Comm. 1981:24). According to Wasmuth and Wasmuth, 
the question became not "When is the patient dead?" but rather, "When 
shall 'treatment' and 'more critical support' be withdrawn?" (p. 352).
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Although not the main impetus, another important factor compelling 
the need for a new definition of death, was the development of the 
capacity for organ transplantation using cadaver organs (kidneys in the 
1950s and hearts in the 1960s). (Pres. Comm. 1981:23)
In 1959, several French neurosurgeons coined a phrase, "coma 
depasse, translated as "beyond coma" to refer to the condition of some 
respirator dependent patients in which there was a permanent loss of 
brain function and physiological changes in brain tissue. Since then, 
numerous criteria and guidelines have been developed for defining and 
certifying "brain death." One of the most influential was the "Harvard 
Criteria," published in 1968. (Ad Hoc committee of the Harvard Medical 
School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death 1968).
Dialysis and Questions About Chronic Life Support
In addition to seeing resuscitation or life support as detrimental 
in those circumstances where life is prolonged after "brain death" had 
occurred, the benefit of heroic treatment was questioned in other
situations as well. For example:
As one physician from the Seattle dialysis program reflected 
'Doctors now find themselves able from time to time to enter a 
grey, limbo-like area where they are able to prolong life without 
however, being able to cure the disease or heal the injury ... 
the first great anxiety, then, that one faces in approaching the
question of hemodialysis is whether from the patients point of
view the whole procedure will turn out to be a blessing or merely 
a labored and painful hanging onto life.* [C. E. Norton, 1967]
(Fox and Swazey 1974:203)
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Now the ability to provide chronic treatment for what had been terminal 
conditions created a new class of chronically ill patients who were 
maintained by what has come to be called "artificial life support."
In part, the perception of a class of treatments as "artificial" 
and of questionable benefit may be due to the rapid rate of medical 
developments and their invasiveness. While the first artificial kidney 
had been developed in the 1940*s, hemodialysis could only be used on a 
short term, intermittent basis. Later, cannulas (tubes) were implanted 
allowing chronic dialysis in 1960. When the first center opened in 
1962, it only functioned on an experimental basis. This new technology 
could only be made available to a few of the potential patients. A 
combination of medical and social criteria were used by centers to judge 
the suitability of candidates such as willingness to cooperate in 
treatment regimen, medical suitability, and absence of other disabling 
disease (Fox and Swazey 1974:230). Although the procedure of using a 
committee with non-clinician members to select patients and the 
publicity about decision making was a radical departure from past 
practices, the idea of selecting patients who were felt to have the best 
chance of benefiting from a new "radical" procedure was usual for 
utilizing an experimental procedure. As more facilities were developed, 
and especially after federal support for kidney dialysis was obtained, 
selection thresholds were lowered and people who would not have 
initially been seen as candidates, were treated.
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Even during the early selection period, however, some patients who 
were recommended as appropriate candidates, declined treatment and 
others choose to discontinue after a period of dialysis (Fox and Swazey 
1974 [1978]:260-65). Such refusal of treatment forced physicians and 
others to confront the fact that some people including some who would 
not be terminally ill with treatment, would choose to forego treatment 
and die, rather than live with the assistance of chronic treatment.
Public Concern With the Management of Dying
The late 1960s and early 1970s brought a growing public awareness 
of the changes which had taken place in the nature of medical treatment 
and the social context of dying. Social commentators noted that "death" 
had become a "taboo subject." Many felt there was a need to reexamine 
"death and dying" It became a subject for social inquiry, leading to 
such classic works as those by Feifel (1959), Sudnow (1967), Glaser and 
Strauss (1965 and 1968), Brim et al. (1970), Kubler-Ross (1969), Aries 
(1974), as well as hundreds of articles, lectures, and conferences.
This led some to comment that like "sex," this "taboo subject" had 
become focus of widespread attention.
One of the major changes in the social situation surrounding death 
was that increasingly, people were dying in hospitals and other 
institutions, rather than at home. While in 1949, slightly less than 
half of all deaths occurred in institutions, by 1967, almost three 
quarters (73.1%) of all deaths occurred in institutions (Lerner 1970:22-
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23). By the mid 1980's, 80% of deaths occurred in institutions (Malcolm 
1986).
There was also growing awareness that the reduction in the rate of 
death from infectious disease which led to a longer life span, led to an 
increase in survival with chronic conditions. Lerner wrote that people 
"survive today to a much later age, only to succumb in due time to their 
degenerative conditions (Lerner 1970:16). Such conditions were 
recognized as the new leading causes of death and were seen to 
compromise the quality of life.
With chronic diseases and life supports, terminally ill patients 
could be kept alive for long periods of time, although not forever.
This led to concern about the "management of dying" (Levine and Scotch 
1970). The then common practice of concealing prognosis from the dying 
patient was challenged and changed (Noyes, et al. 1977). Dealing with 
the dying patient as more than the bearer of a disease, and instead, as 
a whole person, was encouraged. This was done not only for the benefit 
of the dying patient who could then be helped to deal with the 
anxieties, hopes and fears of the last stage of life, it was also 
encouraged for the benefit of the living, who it was felt could learn 
about the functioning of the human mind and about the essence of human 
existence (Kubler-Ross 1969). The notion of "death with dignity" became 
a positive image of death to contrast with the negative image of death 
as always representing a failure.
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The increased role of technology in the care of the dying was seen 
as an issue. At first, it was seen primarily as a medical problem: How 
far should the physician go in keeping the patient alive? Such 
decisions, however, could not be made on physiological grounds alone. 
Either implicitly or explicitly, social definitions of life and social 
characteristics of patients were playing an increasingly important role 
in decision making about treatment for the critically ill (Crane 1975).
As the psychological, social, and economic implications of the use 
of technology were realized, it increasingly was seen as a social 
problem. Issues of the psychological state of the patient who loses 
control, implications for the relationship of the patient to his 
physicians and family, the increasing costs of care, and questions of 
the allocation of resources between categories of patients were all seen 
as problematic (Levine and Scotch 1970).
Wider Social Concerns Impacting on 
the Use of Life Prolonging Technology
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were other issues of wide 
social concern which were to have an impact on the care of the dying. 
Three of the most important will be discussed below. The first was a 
concern about the power of professionals versus individuals to make 
decisions which affect those individuals' lives. The second was a 
concern about the use of technology. The third was a concern about 
rising costs of health care.
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Concerns about Professional Decision Making
During the 20th century, the "professional expert" had come to 
play a central role in many areas of life. Whereas previously, the 
family and religious leaders had played most of the key roles in such 
areas as socialization of the young and care of the sick, in the 20th 
century, professionals in education and medicine had come to make major 
decisions affecting the lives of many more individuals. Professionals 
in industry and the military were making decisions affecting millions. 
Up until the 1950s, the benefits of professional expertise generally 
went unquestioned. However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, perhaps 
as an outgrowth of the civil rights movement, there was a wide spread 
challenging of traditional authorities in such diverse areas as the 
anti-war movement, movements for community control of schools, ecology, 
increased power for students, laity in the churches, consumers, and 
welfare mothers. The slogan "Power to the People" characterized 
movements for social change to give many who had previously been 
subjected to professional authority, more autonomy in decision making.
One area where the questioning of traditional authority was to be 
focused was "patient's rights." In the health arena, there was the 
beginning of the women's health movement, abortion rights, and the 
natural childbirth movement. Medical research, which had previously 
been largely dependent on the discretion of the researcher, became 
subject to review both by other researchers and by "outsiders."
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Paternalistic practices which sanctioned the withholding of information 
from patients was challenged. The medicalization of deviance control 
and the treatment of the mentally ill was questioned. The basic 
assumption guiding much of the behavior of physicians and patients, that 
patients should put their trust in physicians who would 
paternalistically make decisions for the good of the patient was 
challenged from a number of perspectives (e.g. Szasz 1961; Duff and 
Hollingshed 1968; Illich 1976; Barber 1978; Ehrenreich 1978).
There was a call for "demedicalization" for a number of 
populations such as the behaviorally or physically deviant, and those 
passing through critical life transitions such as birth and death. In 
part, this was tied with a demand for "deinstitutionalization" reflected 
such practices as the release of thousands of mental patients, the 
mainstreaming of the physically and developmentally disabled, and the 
call for home birth and hospice care. In addition to a change in 
locale, it reflected a demand for change in the power relations between 
professionals and their clients (as they increasingly came to be 
called). Individual were demanding a role, in some cases the sole 
right, to be making decisions affecting their own lives and those of 
their family members.
In some circumstances, some professionals welcomed the opportunity 
to share decision making about matters about which they felt they had no 
unique expertise (Graham 1981:269). In general, however, professionals 
resisted any but token intrusion into what they saw as basically a 
technical area. In some situations, there was an accommodation of
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changes in professional practice (as in the management of childbirth) or 
inclusion of clients in the decision making process. Questions of 
professional versus individual or family authority for medical decision 
making became a major issue in the management of the care of the 
critically ill and general, and the care of critically ill newborns in 
particular.
Concerns About the Use of Technology
A second area of societal concern which affected public attitudes 
toward the use of medical technology was a growing apprehension about 
risks and dangers of many aspects of science and technology. Whereas in 
the preceding decades, science was generally endorsed as the key to 
progress, by the late 1960s, and early 1970s, the benefits of technology 
were being questioned in a number of areas including the dangers of 
nuclear war, pollution to the environment, exhaustion of natural 
resources, threats to civil liberties through computer networks, 
electronic surveillance, etc.
By that period, there was public concern about a number of aspects 
of the use of biomedical technology including the effect on social 
values of the development of an effective contraceptive (the pill), side 
effects of diagnostic or treatment techniques (such as X- rays), dangers 
of pain relief medication or mind altering drugs, and changes in the 
nature of the patient practitioner relationship related to the use of 
technology (Sidel 1971).
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At first, the issue of use of technology for treating the 
critically ill had relatively little salience. In a 1971 article on 
"New Technologies and the Practice of Medicine," in which the issues 
outlined above were discussed, Victor Sidel barely mentions the use of 
"life support" except to raise the issues involving allocation, cost, 
use of scarce resources, and problems involving following unusual 
religious dictates (e.g. Christian Scientists). During the 1970s, 
burdens associated with the use of technology for some critically ill 
patients was of increasing societal concern until "artificial life 
support" became a paradigmatic issue for illustrating negative effects 
of the use of technology.
In Between Science and Human Values, Loren Graham presents a 
framework for explicating concern about the use of science and 
technology. It can be used to examine concerns people have had about 
the treatment of critically ill patients. These can be seen to fall in 
virtually all of the categories.
I. Concerns about Technology
A. Concerns about the physical 
results of technology
Destructive Technology
B. Concerns about the ethical 
results of technology
1. biomedical ethics
Slippery Slope 
Technology
C Concerns about the economic 
results of technology
Economically Exploit­
ative Technology
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II. Concerns about Science
A. Concerns about research on 
human subjects
Human Subject Research
B. Concerns about distortions in Expensive research 
allocation of resources for 
science
C. Concerns about certain kinds 
of fundamental knowledge
1. knowledge itself Subversive Technology
2. knowledge "inevitably" Inevitable Technology 
leading to technology
D. Concerns about accidents in 
the research itself
Accidents in Science
E. Concerns about the use of
science to excite racial, 
sexual, or class prejudice
Prejudicial Science
F. Concerns about certain 
modes of knowing
Ways of Knowing
(1981:219)
According to Graham, the first concern that people have is fear of 
"destructive technology" - negative physical results of its use. An 
example of this would be the use of chemotherapy in the treatment of 
cancer, or of neurosurgery to treat a brain lesion, where the effects of 
treatment may be worse than those of the disease. A second category is 
"slippery slope technology" where it is feared that the use of the 
technology may destroy the ethical system. There is fear that decisions 
to cease using sophisticated biomedical technology to prolong life, 
would lead down a "slippery slope" to eugenics and active euthanasia. 
Critics evoke the specter of Nazi medical experimentation and death 
camps as the ultimate depth of the slippery slope. Changes in 
biomedicine, particularly the use of life prolonging technology, leads
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
to increased concern of both clinicians and non-clinician with the 
ethics of medical practice.
Graham's third area of concern is "economically exploitative 
technology." Enormous costs are involved in the development and use of 
some life prolonging technology which will benefit few people. Some 
question whether so much money should be spent on technology for those 
in critical condition. They feel that more money should be spent on 
research and technology that will benefit more people.
The fourth area is "human subject research." Here the goal of 
therapy is secondary to the acquisition of information. In some 
situations, patients are not primarily treated for their own benefit 
(because the chance of success is too small). In such cases, the 
patient may be treated in hopes that the knowledge gained during 
treatment may be used to help others with similar conditions in the 
future. Some people feel it is inappropriate to use dying patients for 
such research.
Another area of concern is "expensive research." They fear that 
there will be distortion in the allocation of societal resources which 
will prevent allocation of resources for research in other area of 
medicine and to meet other human needs.
Graham also discusses "subversive technology," fundamentally new 
knowledge that is seen as conflicting with the theories of ruling 
authorities. For example, Galileo's theories, which were seen as
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demoting the place of man from the center of the universe, were felt to 
challenge church teaching. Today, knowledge that human decisions can 
lead to prolonging dying or to not sustaining life are sometimes seen as 
challenging the world view of some individuals. They fear rational 
decision making about life and death matters that should be determined 
by "God" or "Nature."
The seventh issue is fear of "inevitable technology." The fear is 
that "anything that can be done, will be done." There has been fear on 
the part of some that once technologies are developed, people will not 
feel that they have the option not to use them.
Eighth is a concern with "accidents in science." The use of life 
prolonging technology does not raise the specter of mass threat to 
public safety, such as that feared with the use of atomic energy or 
recombinant DNA. But, there is fear of unintended moral and economic 
consequences of "prolonging dying" both for the public at large and for 
the individual patients and their families.
"Prejudicial science," which exacerbates racial, ethnic, sexual or 
class prejudices are another area. Some fear that unequal access to 
expensive life prolonging technologies will exacerbate the racial and 
social class differentials in survival which already exist. Problems 
many also arise between members of different religious groups who have 
different definitions of what constitutes the definition of "death" or 
what treatment should be given to critically ill patients. For example, 
there is potential for strains between members of some religious groups
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who don't accept "brain death" definitions of death and others who don't 
want to pay for heroic care for brain dead patients.
Finally, Graham discusses fears about scientific developments 
changing "ways of knowing." It is argued that the epistemological basis 
of science is so limited that it is unprepared to handle significant 
modes of reality and, at worst, is fundamentally alienating to the human 
spirit. Some would claim that clinicians who use life support to 
prolong the circulation and respiration of an individual beyond the time 
when that individual could be capable of human interaction, has limited 
the focus to a physiological, rather than a social or a spiritual 
reality, since the first is the only one which science is able to deal 
with.
Concern with Rising Costs of Medical Care
Finally, a third theme that had an impact on the conceptualization 
of life prolonging technology was concern about the rising costs of 
social programs in general, and medical care in particular. Both had 
rising prominence as national issues in the 1970s. The prosperity of 
the 1950s and 60s led to confidence that "the richest nation" in the 
world could and should spend resources to provide a decent quality of 
life for all citizens, particularly in the area of health; it was seen 
as a means to demonstrate the benefits of the "American Way." (The 
Nation's Health 1965)
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By the 1970s, however, as the country entered a period of economic 
recession, there was concern about the rapidly rising expenditures for 
social welfare, particularly health care. Significant increases in the 
percentage of the GNP devoted to health care were acknowledged [4.5% in 
1950; (Rosenberg, lecture notes 1985) 5.3 in 1960, 7.6 in 1970, 9.4 in 
1980 and 10.6 in 1984 (U.S Bureau of the Census 1985:96)]. The costs of 
Medicare and Medicaid were escalating rapidly. The focus of concern 
switched from questions of access to questions of cost. The Nixon 
administration, using the rhetoric of "crisis," predicted a breakdown in 
the medical system within a few years unless changes were made (Starr 
1982).
In particular, the proliferation of critical care facilities and 
advances in biomedical technology and practice, such as renal dialysis 
units and intensive care units, and expensive intervention such as open 
heart surgery and transplants, were identified as adding much to the 
cost of health care. In place of concern about problems in trying to 
provide "enough" health care to those with medical need, the public 
concern switched to a focus on containing the high cost of health care 
as a medical problem.
Concern about the rising costs of health care and issues 
concerning the use of life support technology have always had an 
ambiguous relationship. On the one hand, many have argued that, at 
least at the level of individual patient, choices should never be made 
between dollars and lives. It is said that physicians should be able to
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provide whatever treatments are of benefit to a patient, especially 
acute, life saving treatment, without regard to costs.
On the other hand, critics have pointed to the very high cost of a 
number of life support technologies. They feel that there are limited 
benefits to "half way technologies," which may support life but are 
unable to cure the underlying condition, and may in some cases merely 
prolong dying. They therefore feel that societal resources might be 
better spent for other social needs. In order to accomplish this, some 
have advocated public policy decisions to limit resources for expensive 
medical technologies. The relevance of financial factors in decisions 
affecting the care of individuals has been even more controversial.
While some advocate the cessation of certain types of care so as not to 
deplete family resources, others felt that such reasons are never 
justified.
Along with concerns about the rights of individuals to make 
decisions, and about the use of technology, thus concern about the 
rising costs of health care and other social programs contributed to 
concerns about the treatment of the critically ill.
Rising Concern with Bioethics
Since the early 1970s, in part because of the reasons discussed 
above, there has been a proliferation of works dealing with bioethical 
concerns. This has included a multitude of books and articles, the
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founding of Institutes for the study of biomedical issues, numerous 
conferences, and the establishment of centers, courses, and ethics 
rounds at many medical centers. The explosion of interest is perhaps 
best illustrated by the increase in specialty journals. Whereas, 
previous to 1970, the only journal devoted to articles on medical ethics 
was the Linacre Quarterly, published since 1932 by the National 
Foundation of Catholic Physicians, since 1970 the following journals 
have started publication: The Hastings Center Report (1971), Ethics in 
Science and Medicine (1973), Journal of Medical Ethics (1975), Kennedy 
Institute Quarterly Report (1975), Man and Medicine (1975), Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy (1976), IRB: Review of Human Subject Research 
(1979). and Journal for Philosophy and Methodology of Medicine (1980). 
(Goldstein 1985)
There has also been a flourish of new journals dealing with 
Medicine and the Law. Although there have long been journals on 
forensic medicine, only recently have there been journals devoted to 
medical jurisprudence. A precursor in the field was Lex and Sciencia, 
started in 1964, which dealt extensively with medical issues. In the 
1970s and 80s, Medicolegal News (1972) (which combined with Nursing Law 
and Ethics to become Law, Medicine, and Health Care), The Journal of 
Legal Medicine (1973), The American Journal of Legal Medicine (1975), 
and The Journal of Health Politics, Policy and the Law (1976), started 
publication (Frey 1982).
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Decision Making about Withholding Treatment:
A Brief Review of the Literature Concerning Adults
Since the early 1970s, there has been a plethora of books and 
articles dealing with various aspects of decisions to withhold treatment 
from the critically ill. Many have concerned a number of legal cases, 
including Quinlan, Saikowitz, Fox, Storars, Conroy and Brophy, which 
have been covered extensively in the popular and professional 
literature.
The Law and Legal Cases Concerning the Withholding of Treatment
The legality of actions concerning the withholding of treatments 
has not been determined by a clear cut set of laws enacted to deal with 
the issue. Rather, understandings of the legal status of various 
actions has evolved over time largely as a result of legal decisions in 
a number of landmark cases. In this section, I will briefly review some 
of the major cases and statutes.
The principle that competent adults have the right to refuse 
treatment had been established long before the 1970s. For example,
Judge Cardozo stated in 1914:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who 
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an 
assault, for which he is liable in damages" [Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital, 211, N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92 
(1914)].
(in the Matter of Clair Conroy 1985:19)
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A number of cases affirmed the right of a competent adult to make 
an informed choice to refuse treatment. For example, in the 1962 case 
of Erickson v. Dilgard, the right of a Jehovah's Witness to refuse a 
blood transfusion was upheld even though refusing treatment was likely 
to lead to death (Beauchamp and Childress 1979:83). In some cases, 
however, the courts have ruled that the right to refuse treatment is 
outweighed by other interests, such as the interests of the State in 
seeing that care is provided to minor children. For example, in "the 
Georgetown College Case," blood transfusions were required for the 
Jehovah's Witness mother of a 7 month old child (Beauchamp and Childress 
1979:84). In general, however, the right of a competent adult to refuse 
treatment has been "broadly construed" (Ackerman and Pope 1982:212).
The issues have been more complex in cases concerning incompetent 
patients. As discussed above, since the 1960s, there has been an effort 
to allow the withholding of treatments from patients who are "brain 
dead." Although there is still controversy in some quarters about 
aspects of ascertaining brain death, and many states, including New 
York, do not yet have clear statutes providing a definition of death 
based on brain function, the acceptance of withholding treatment from 
individuals with no brain function has been widely accepted in clinical 
and legal circles.
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Since the early 1960s, a number of cases and proposed statutes 
have dealt with withholding treatment from incompetent patients who were 
not "brain dead."
Issues in the Case of Karen Ann Quinlan
The best known case, and in many respects the most significant, is 
the case of Karen Ann Quinlan, a young woman who suffered brain damage 
which left her in a chronic and persistent vegetative state. She did 
not meet the criteria for "brain death, yet she had no hope for 
recovery of cognitive function. Her parents requested that her 
respirator be removed; her physician refused, and her parents brought 
her case to the Courts in the State of New Jersey.
In the seminal decision in the case of Karen Ann Quinlan, the 
Court declared that "a right of personal privacy exists ...[that is] 
broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical 
treatment under certain circumstances" In re Quinlan, quoted in the 
Pres. Comm. 1983:31).^
The Courts concluded that Karen's right should not be denied 
simply because she was not herself competent to exert them. They stated 
that her "guardian and family" should be permitted to "render their best
1 Some people question the framing of these issues in terms of 
constitutional rights (Pres Comm 1983:31).
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judgment ... as to whether she would exercise it in these 
circumstances" (Annas 1976:30).
In their decision, the judges wrote: "We think that the State's 
interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as 
the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. 
Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome 
the State's interest [in preservation and sanctity of life] (quoted in 
Ackerman and Pope:215).
In part, the Courts decision was based on the fact that there was 
considered to be no "reasonable possibility" of Karen's emerging from 
the coma to a cognitive sapient life. The court therefore wanted 
confirmation of that prognosis by her attending physician. The Court 
also stated that it wanted concurrence in the prognosis by an "ethics 
committee."
In discussing the "ethics committee," the Court quoted at length 
from a 1975 article by pediatrician Karen Teel in the Baylor Law Review. 
In it, she suggested the formation of "ethics committees" to share 
responsibility with the physician for life and death decisions, in part 
to relieve the physician of legal liability. She suggested membership 
from such professions as medicine, social work, law and theology. In 
seeking confirmation of prognosis, the Court might have more 
appropriately suggested review by a "prognosis committee" composed of 
medical experts. However, the Court mandate of the review by an "ethics 
committee" in the Quinlan decision, led to widespread discussion of, and
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in some hospitals establishment of a mechanism for multidisciplinary 
review of some cases involving ethical issues. More recently, the 
concept of ethics committees was endorsed by the President's Commission 
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research (1983) and the U. S. Congress (Congressional 
Record 1984).
One of the most significant aspects of the Quinlan decision was 
that it mandated decision making by family and physicians for 
incompetent patients with review only by a hospital based committee.
The decision explicitly stated that it would be inappropriate for the 
Court to review each decision involving the withholding of a life saving 
treatment (Ackerman and Pope 1982:216).
The Quinlan decision had a profound affect on public and 
professional discourse and debate about the issue of withholding 
treatment from the critically ill. It served to educate the public 
about the issue both by raising the question of whether all possible 
technological interventions should be utilized to prolong life and, if 
not, who should make such decisions. It set precedents concerning 
criteria which could be used for making decisions to withhold treatment 
and it suggested a mechanism for reviewing such decisions. For some 
physicians, and other health care professionals, it provided the first 
significant social sanction for discontinuing extraordinary care in some 
circumstances when the patient was not brain dead, a practice which was 
to be much discussed over the following decade.
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Beyond the initial Court decision, the Quinlan case has served to 
educate the public further about issues surrounding decisions to 
withdraw treatment. Although some experts in neurology had suggested 
that Karen might live after she was taken off the respirator, most 
people expected that if "the plug was pulled," Karen would die. Her 
survival for nine years after removal of the respirator vividly 
illustrated the uncertainty of medical prognosis and raised further 
questions about the issues in decision making for the critically ill.
The popular image of "withdrawing life support" involves a 
literal "pulling the plug" of the respirator or pulling out tubes to 
stop all treatment. In fact, in a clinical setting, many aspects of 
care are continued even though certain other more aggressive treatments 
may be discontinued or modified (see Chapter VII), In Karen's case, she 
was gradually weaned from the respirator, while other forms of 
respiratory support was provided. She was fed through a nasogastric 
tube and received excellent nursing care such as frequent repositioning 
to prevent bed sores. While at first surprising, her continued 
existence served to educate the public to the fact that withdrawal of 
extraordinary life support and death are non synonymous, Within the last 
few years, her treatment has been one of the cases frequently examined 
in discussions about the provision of more routine care for hopelessly 
ill patients (for example, see Capron 1984).
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Other Legal Cases Pertaining to Withholding Treatment
It is important to remember that there is no clear federal basis 
for law involving the provision of care to the critically ill. While 
some decisions, such as the Quinlan decision, rests on constitutional 
questions, no "right to die" case has been adjudicated by the Supreme 
Court. Therefore, decisions in one case provide no binding legal 
precedents for rulings in others jurisdictions. There have been a 
number of other cases dealing with the care of the critically ill adult. 
While some decisions have complemented the judicial reasoning of the 
Quinlan case, others have not. Some of the most significant cases 
involving adults will be reviewed here; legal cases specifically 
involved with the care of newborns will be reviewed below (Chapter III).
Contrary to the decision in the Quinlan case, a number of courts 
have rejected delegating decision making authority to family and 
physicians without approval by the Courts. For example, in the case of 
Saikewicz in 1977, the Massachusetts Court ruled that Court approval was 
necessary before removal of life support from incompetent patients. 
Subsequently, in the Case of Earl Spring, in 1980, the Court outlined a 
number of factors to be considered before deciding if a case had to be 
referred to the courts. The decision, however, did not provide clear 
guidance about which combination of factors would necessitate prior 
court approval. (Ackerman and Pope 1982:). Despite the Court decisions 
which suggest mandatory Court Review, many individuals and 
organizations, such as the House of Delegates of the American Bar 
Association, share the opinion that "existing law allows extraordinary
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life support systems to be disconnected from terminally ill comatose 
patients without judicial interventions" (Wallace-Barnhill 1982:60).
It is worth noting that reported cases may be biased in favor of 
those decisions for which the Courts felt that judicial review was 
necessary. In other situations, where cases were referred to the legal 
system and determinations were made that rulings by the Court were not 
necessary, decisions may have only been made at a lower Court level, and 
these may be not discussed much in the literature.
Whereas, court decisions have indicated procedures which differ 
significantly from the non-involvement of the Courts recommended in the 
Quinlan decision, the legality of a decision to remove "extraordinary 
treatment" (e.g. the use of a respirator) from a terminally ill, 
comatose patient has been affirmed by subsequent Court decisions (e.g. 
Eichner, 1980). There has been variation, however, in decisions about 
other, more ordinary, treatments. In the 1981 Storars case, for 
example, the N.Y. Court of Appeals refused to permit discontinuation of 
transfusions for a profoundly retarded man of 52 who was being treated 
for bladder cancer (Annas 1981). In the 1985 Conroy decision, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court ruled distinctions between treatments themselves 
were not important, and that in some cases it is permissible to withhold 
any treatment, including feedings (In the Matter of Claire Conroy 1985). 
In the 1985 decision of a probate court in the case of Brophy, the judge 
did differentiate between treatments in ruling that most treatment, 
including antibiotics could be withheld from this patient in a
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persistent vegetative state, but that tube feedings would have to be 
continued (Levin and Powderly 1985).
In addition to differentiations on the basis of treatments, the 
courts have also differentiated on the basis of knowledge of the 
incompetent patient's wishes, before the patient was incompetent. For 
example, in the case of Father Fox, the Court felt that his prior 
expressed view that he would not want his life to be continued with 
extraordinary means, was an important factor in deciding that his 
respirator support could be discontinued (Annas 1981). In the Conroy 
case, the Court suggested that different standards would be relevant in 
decision making about withholding treatment depending on the amount of 
knowledge of the wishes of the patient (In re Conroy 1985). While most 
of the legal cases involving the withholding of life saving treatment 
have been civil cases, there have been a few cases involving criminal 
charges of murder. It appears that in ALL CASES charges were dropped or 
the defendant was acquitted (Pres Comm. 1983). In the most recent case, 
concerning the death of Clarence Herbert in 1982, two physicians were 
charged with murder after discontinuing a respirator and intravenous 
fluids. The Courts sanctioned joint decision making by the family and 
physicians and consideration of quality of life, as well as the duration 
of life, in their decision to acquit (Lo 1984).
In examining the legal basis for decision making regarding the 
withholding of life saving treatment, some people believe that the 
current laws are appropriate. For example, the members of the 
President's Commission concluded that there is adequate discretion in
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the criminal law to allow for good decision making while the threat of 
prosecution provides an appropriate protection against abuse (1983:SA­
BS). On the other hand, others have expressed fears that the current 
ambiguity in the law leads physicians to practice defensive medicine and 
sustain treatment even when they feel it would be better to stop 
according to their medical and ethical judgments (Lo 1984:284). Some 
people have proposed that State legislatures enact legislation:
granting immunity from civil and criminal liability to all persons 
who help to effectuate cessation of an extraordinary life support 
system sustaining a comatose, terminally ill patient, provided 
such decision is made in good faith with the consent of family 
members of the patient.
(Wallace-Burnhill, et al. 1982:60)
In recent years, a number of state legislatures have adopted laws
dealing with aspects of withholding treatment. The first and best know, 
the 1976 California "natural death act", expressly states that
withholding treatment is not to be construed as homicide or suicide
(Pres. Comm. 1983:40). Many states, however, including New York, have 
yet to adopt such legislation. At the present time (1986), the New York 
State Governor's Commission On Life and the Law is considering proposals 
concerning recommendations for legislation on definition of death, "Do 
not resuscitate" (DNR) orders, and decision making about withholding 
other treatments.
In sum, although during the past ten years, legal precedents have 
supported a number of termination of life support decisions, the legal 
status of many treatment choices remain uncertain.
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Some Bioethical Issues Pertaining to the Withholding of Treatments
In the past two decades an enormous literature has developed in 
the bioethics and clinical literatures on the subject of withholding 
treatment, particularly from terminally ill patients. It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to present a comprehensive review. The 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research did a masterful job at presenting an 
overview of the issues in their volume Deciding to Forego Life- 
Sustaining Treatment (1983). I will briefly discuss some of the 
literature concerning differentiations between treatment choices, for 
this will be a topic of concern in Chapters VI, VII and VIII. The 
literature on treatment choice for children and newborns will be 
discussed in Chapter III.
One of the main ways that distinctions have been made between 
treatments is in terms of "ordinary" versus "extraordinary" means. For 
example, in 1973, the American Medical Association issued this 
statement:
The cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong 
the life of the body when there is irrefutable evidence that 
biological death is imminent is the decision of the patient and/or 
his immediate family. The advice and judgment of the physician 
should be freely available to the patient and/or his immediate 
family.
(cited in Kuhse 1981:117)
In differentiating between ordinary and extraordinary means, those who 
use the terms, generally are attempting to distinguish those treatments
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that would be obligatory and those that would be optional. In general, 
the distinguishing criteria between obligatory and optional treatments 
has been seen to be whether or not the treatments would be of benefit to 
the patient. In addition, the terms ordinary and extraordinary means 
are also used to refer to a distinction between treatments that are 
simple and those that are complex, and between treatments that are usual 
and those which are unusual (Pres. Comm. 1983:82-87).
Critics have objected to use of the distinction for two main 
reasons. First, there has often been confusion between the various 
definitions (Pres. Comm. 1983:88). Not all simple or usual treatments 
are seen to be of benefit for some patients. Second, the distinction 
between treatments that would be of benefit and those that would not, 
begs the question of what is of benefit. In general, a treatment is 
seen as beneficial when it sustains a life that is worth prolonging. 
Therefore the distinction depends on the quality of life of the patient, 
rather than on the means used to sustain life (Kuhse 1981).
Another distinction that is also made differentiates acts of 
omission from acts of commission -- whether the behavior under question 
was an action or a failure to act. One way that this contrast is used 
is to differentiate between withholding (not starting) and withdrawing 
(stopping) treatment. Many critics have argued that there is no moral 
significance to this distinction, but rather it is the intention of the 
action and/or the outcome, rather than whether it involves a action or 
conscious decision not to act that is morally significant (Pres. Comm. 
1983:60-77).
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A distinction is also made between active and passive euthanasia. 
This is also sometimes discussed in terms of acts of omission and 
commission. Acts which cause death are referred to as active 
euthanasia, positive euthanasia, or mercy killing. Acts which allow a 
natural death to occur are referred to as passive euthanasia or negative 
euthanasia. There is debate about whether the withholding of "ordinary" 
means, such as nutrition, would constitute active or passive euthanasia 
(Capron 1984) and about whether it would ever be ethical to use a dose 
of a lethal drug to cause death directly. It appears that the 
bioethical mainstream and most clinicians now accept the notion of 
passive euthanasia; there is much controversy about the status of 
withholding nutrition. Although supported by a number of prominent 
ethicists (e.g. Rachaels 1975; Kuhse 1981), it appears that most 
bioethicists see direct killing as u n e t h i c a l .  ^ (Pres. Comm. 1983:60- 
88; Veatch 1976; Steinbock 1976).
The Clinical Literature on Withholding Treatment
Clinicians have written numerous articles about when to give or 
withhold certain treatments; most have concerned the care of terminally 
ill patients and/or cardiac resuscitation (stimulation to the heart if 
it stops or is about to stop). For example in 1976, the Clinical Care 
Committee suggested a four category classification system for hopelessly
 ^ This is differentiated from a decision by a terminally ill 
competent patient to choose to take a lethal drug. It appears to be 
more acceptable than active euthanasia for an incompetent patient; 
whether it should be socially sanctioned is very controversial.
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ill patients in the intensive care unit. The physician in charge was to 
make classifications, to be based on prognosis: A) Maximal therapeutic 
effort; B) Maximal therapeutic effort with daily evaluation; C)
Selective limitation of measures (with a detailed care plan and 
resuscitation status recorded); D) All therapy can be discontinued 
(comfort measures given).
More recently, Wanzer and his associates (1984) issued a statement 
about the physician's responsibility toward hopelessly ill patients.
They wrote "the patient's role in decision making is paramount, and a 
decrease in aggressive treatment of the hopelessly ill patient is 
advisable when such treatment would only prolong a difficult and 
uncomfortable process of dying" (p. 955). They differentiated four 
levels of care to be considered and discussed by the clinicians, and the 
patient and/or patient's family: (1) emergency resuscitation; (2) 
intensive care and advanced life support; (3) general medical care, 
including antibiotics, drugs, and surgery, cancer chemotherapy, and 
artificial hydration and nutrition; and (4) general nursing care and 
efforts to make the patient comfortable, including pain relief and 
hydration and nutrition as dictated by the patient's thirst and hunger, 
(p. 958)
Numerous articles have also been written on establishing 
guidelines for issuing "Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders" (e. g. Miles, 
Cranford and Shultz 1982). (Such orders are also frequently referred to 
as DNR, no code, or no arrest page.) Many clinicians have stated that 
DNR is not synonymous with no treatment, and that clinicians, patients,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and families should discuss both the DNR order and the appropriate level 
of care, and the level of care should be clearly documented in the chart 
and communicated to other clinicians.
There are often problems in implementing guidelines (Lo and 
Steinbrook 1983). Resuscitation may be withheld without consulting the 
patient or family; older patients, those with functional impairments, 
(especially the senile, demented or mentally retarded), those 
transferred from a nursing home, and those with chronic- obstructive 
pulmonary disease or malignancy, are less likely to be resuscitated (Lee 
and Cassel 1984; Farber, Bowman Major and Green 1984). Physicians who 
are taking care of another physician's patient, sometimes misinterpret 
the intention of the orders (Uhlmann, Cassel and McDonald 1984). In 
addition, decisions are sometimes made to do a "slow code," that is 
delay an attempt to resuscitate and/or do it in a slow or inefficient 
manner for patients who have a poor prognosis but have not been 
officially classified as "no code." (Basson, Dantzker, and Benjamin 
1981).
Recently there have been a few studies in which series of actual 
cases have been reviewed to investigate the factors involved in 
decisions not to resuscitate. Younger and his associates found that 14% 
of the patients admitted to one medical ICU were designated DNR, 9% 
survived hospitalization. Severity of illness, age and prior health 
were associated with DNR designation while race and socioeconomic 
factors were not (1985). Levy, Lambe and Shear also found that age, 
sex, ethnicity and pay status were not associated, while residence in a
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nursing home, and not being alert and oriented on admission were 
associated with DNR orders (1984). Such factors as patients having 
cancer, dementia, incontinence, being non-ambulatory, divorced,separated 
and unemployed were all more likely to be associated with DNR orders. 
(Ulmann, McDonald and Inui 1984).
Centers differ in how long patients have been the the ICU before 
DNR orders are issued (Zimmerman et al. 1984). Lo and his associates 
found that 4% of all patients admitted to medical services at three 
teaching hospitals were designated DNR. In most cases consultations 
with patients and/or their families took place. Sometimes, however, 
when patients or families did not agree, "limited DNR" orders were 
issued (1985). At another center, in many cases, there was no 
documentation of discussions with families; this was attributed to fear 
of litigation (Ireland and Puri 1984) although the clinicians wish to 
avoid confronting the issue directly with the family may also have been 
a factor.
There have been even fewer studies to document the withholding of 
other life saving treatments beside resuscitation. There are some 
reports that discuss examples of the withholding of more ordinary 
treatments, such as blood transfusions (e.g. Lo and Jonsen). As far as 
I know, there is only one systematic study that reports the association 
of non-physiological factors with the withholding of less aggressive 
treatments. In that study, Brown and Thompson report that decisions not 
to give active treatments (e.g. antibiotics) to residents of nine 
extended-care facilities showed a significant relation to diagnosis,
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mental status, mobility, pain, narcotics prescribed, size of the 
facility, relation of the physician to the patient and medical-record 
statements documenting the patient's deterioration or plans for non­
treatment in general. 59% of the patients, who were not actively 
treated, died.
Surveys and Sociological Studies of Decisions to Withhold Life Saving 
Treatments
Although there has been much written by social scientists on 
aspects of care of the critically ill (e.g. Glaser and Strauss 1965; 
1968; Sudnow 1967; Bluebond-Langer 1978), on the use of high technology 
in medicine (e.g. Fox 1976; Reiser 1978), and on social factors 
affecting medical care (e.g. Gaines and Hahn, 1985; Wright and Treacher 
1982; Atkinson and Heath 1981) social scientists have done few in depth, 
observational studies on decision making about the aggressiveness of 
treatment. Studies on decision making about the care of newborns 
(Anspach forthcoming; Guillemin and Holmstrom 1986), the only in depth 
observational studies I know of (beside this study), will be reviewed in 
Chapter III).
In an address entitled "Reflections and Opportunities in the 
Sociology of Medicine," Renee Fox (1985) lamented the fact that, unlike 
the 1950s and 1960s, there have been few recent ethnographic studies of 
hospitalized patients or of physicians or nurses working in hospital 
settings. She also noted the limited participation of social scientists
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in the field of bioethics. She quoted from her own recent article with 
Judith Swazey (1984), comparing "medical morality" in China and 
"Bioethics" in the United States, and called for more social science 
research on issues in bioethics. Beside the work of Fox and Swazey, 
there has been little work by social scientists which has looked at the 
field of bioethics in its broad societal context.
Numerous surveys have been conducted to investigate clinicians 
attitudes and behavior regarding the withholding of treatment from 
critically ill patients using survey research methodology. As early as 
1961, Levinsohn, who conducted a survey at a medical convention, found 
that 61% of the physicians present believed that euthanasia was being 
practiced by members of the profession. Another survey, conducted in 
1968, found that 72% physicians polled would not perform dialysis on all 
patients with chronic uremia. Williams (1969) found that among "leaders 
of medicine" 87% favored negative euthanasia, and 80% had practiced it, 
while 15% favored "institution of therapy that is hoped will promote 
death sooner than otherwise."
One of the most quoted surveys was conducted by Travis, Noyes, 
and Brightwell (1974). Their 1971 survey of Iowa physicians indicated 
that nearly half of the respondents frequently omitted life-prolonging 
procedures or medications in the care of terminally ill patients but 
most objected to a change in social attitudes which would permit 
physicians to hasten death. A follow-up survey (Noyes et al 1977) 
revealed that support for the omission of life- prolonging treatments
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was increasing; opposition to the use of death hastening measures 
remained strong.
More recent surveys of clinician attitudes found that clinicians 
distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary treatments (Carey and 
Posavac 1978; Micetich, Steinecker and Thomasma 1983) and there is 
variation in beliefs about prognosis, information felt to be important 
as well as in treatment recommendations (Pearlman, Inui and Carter 
1982). Farber and his associates found patient's social as well as 
physiological factors to be important in decisions about cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation (1984; 1985). In making decisions to withhold treatment, 
some physicians state that they would override the wishes of patient, 
family, hospital or community (Blum 1982).
A survey in dtarsing Life found that 97% of nurse respondents 
favored "withholding all life-sustaining treatment for dying patients 
who don't want it" and 61% had "seen a slow code." Youngjer, Jackson and 
Allen found that professional role (physician or nurse) was more 
important than gender or religion for attitudes about the decision 
making process, but, in general, there was more variation among 
physicians and nurses than between professional groups (1979).
In studying attitudes of non-clinicians, Jorgenson and Neubecker, 
who conducted a national survey of attitudes found a general favorable 
attitude toward euthanasia. 64% of respondents approved of "termination 
of life" for a patient with an "incurable disease." Pro-euthanasia 
attitudes were found to be associated with being white and being male,
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while strong religiousity and living in a rural environment was 
associated with anti-euthanasia attitudes (1981). A Gallup Poll, 
conducted shortly after the Conroy decision in 1985, found 81% 
supporting a "right to die," 13% were opposed (New York Times 3/17/85).
The most comprehensive study of physicians decision making is the 
study by Crane, The Sanctity of Social Life: Physicians Treatment of 
Critically 111 Patients (1975). In her study, based primarily on a 
survey of physicians, Crane elucidated criteria used by physicians in 
making treatment decisions. She found that physicians no longer used a 
purely physiological definition of life. Instead, physicians used a 
social definition. First the physician attempted to decide if the 
patient is "salvageable." Second, the physician considers the patient's 
future quality of life - the extent of physical or mental damage. 
Together, the salvageability of the patient and the degree of 
irreversible damage indicates the capacity to resume social roles.
Crane found that a norm is evolving to guide treatment decisions based 
on the capacity to resume social roles and to interact meaningfully with 
others.
In general, Crane found there was most agreement to treat 
salvageable patients with physical impairment and not to treat 
unsalvageable patients with severe mental impairments. There was more 
controversy surrounding treatment decisions about unsalvageable patients 
with physical damage and salvageable patients with severe brain damage 
(Crane 1975; 1975a).
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Crane also reviews the general issues involved in decision making 
about the critically ill and terminal patients and explores 
institutional and background factors associated with variations in 
physician attitudes.
Crane's study was based on a survey composed primarily of 
hypothetical vignettes and questions about whether the respondent would 
be likely to perform a number of tests and treatments. Among others, 
there are items which asked physicians "how actively" they would treat a 
patient with a particular condition. The marginal responses to the 
questionnaires indicated that in many situations, physicians would 
provide some treatments while withholding others (personal communication 
1981 - see Chapter III) In some of the analysis, Crane distinguished 
types of treatments (e.g. "comfort therapy", "diagnostic" or "minor 
treatment", "heroic treatment", and "resuscitation". She notes:
A continuum ranging from comfort therapy to diagnostic procedures 
to emergency surgery to resuscitation can be discerned with 
physicians being least likely to withdraw the first and most 
likely to refuse to perform the last."
(1975:70)
In most of the analysis, responses concerning a number of treatments 
were combined into a "scale of activism," which was then used to examine 
variations associated with characteristics of patients and respondents. 
Differences between characteristics of treatments was not a main focus 
of Crane's study. Crane also did not seek respondents' attitudes 
concerning the social prognosis for the patients in the vignettes;
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rather, the categorizations about the capacity of patient's to resume 
social roles were made by the analyst.
Finally, Benoliel conducted a retrospective chart review study of 
the care of patients in three teaching hospitals on the day of death.
She compared data collected for 2,879 patients who died in 1966 and 1971 
and concluded that "shifting medical norms were shown by increases in 
heavy recovery and life support treatments. Influence of technology was 
shown by increases in critical care wards and increases in work effort 
activity for all types of dying" (n.d.:v, also see 1977).
Further analysis was conducted on data from the charts of 184 
adults who died in one urban teaching hospital. A "work effort index" 
was devised using points for medical consultations, surgical procedures, 
medications, medical treatments in identified categories, and cardio­
pulmonary resuscitation. The analysis showed that "the medical 
treatment orientation was overwhelmingly toward the cure end of the 
care/cure continuum, despite the fact that the majority of patients had 
been designated no code (non-use of cardiopulmonary resuscitation) and 
had conditions labeled by their physicians as either grim prognosis or 
terminal" (Mumma and Benoliel 1984).
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CHAPTER THREE
TREATING BABIES: 
BACKGROUND TO CARE FOR 
CATASTROPHICALLY ILL NEWBORNS
As with questions about the aggressiveness of treatment for 
patients in general, questions about the aggressiveness of treatment for 
infants has a long history. Many of the issues have always been similar 
to the issues raised for adults. In addition, however, because of the 
unique feature of being newborn and the degree of dependence on adults 
some issues arise in the care of infants which are different from those 
raised in the care of older patients. As with adults, the dramatic 
recent advances in technological medical capacity has led to a new focus 
on questions about the aggressiveness of medical treatment. Perhaps 
because of the complexity of related ethical issues and because of the 
perceived relationship to the abortion issue, questions related to 
treatment for newborns have been debated and politicized even more 
extensively than similar decisions for older patients.
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Cross Cultural and Historic Perspectives on
Infanticide and Non-treatment Decisions
Some people see non-treatment of newborns in the NICU as the modern day 
version of infanticide, the intentional killing of infants.*- For 
example, Robert Weir starts his book, Selective Nontreatment of 
Handicapped Newborns, with a chapter on infanticide. It begins:
The contemporary practice of selective nontreatment of 
handicapped newborns is, in many aspects, a continuation of 
historical practices of infanticide. The settings and 
circumstances vary from historical patterns, but infant deaths 
brought about in neonatal intensive care units (NICUs) often 
provide parallels to acts of infanticide in earlier times and 
places.
(1984:3)
A number of other recent books on non-treatment of newborns have either 
approached the issues primarily as the same as those of infanticide, or, 
at least included a chapter drawing links to practices of infanticide in 
other cultures and/or the history of Western Civilization (Kohl 1978; 
Horan and Delahoyde 1982; Tooley 1983; Kuhse and Singer 1985; Lyons 
1985).
In some cases, there are parallels with infanticide as it was 
practiced at other times and in other places. What characterizes 
infanticide generally is that it entails killing of newborns who are not
*• Infanticide can also refer to death caused by neglect or less 
support than the family might be able to provide, and less than family 
members know should be provided (Scrimshaw 1982).
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seen as an acceptable addition to the social group. The infant's lack 
of acceptability may be due to one or more of a number of factors.
These factors may be identified as attributes pertaining to the infant - 
such as gender or appearance, to the birth - such as twins (Williamson 
1978) or breech (Sargent 1982), to the social situation of the mother - 
such as illegitimacy (Cohen n.d.; Langer 1974) or age (Tsing 1986), or 
to the social group - such as captive populations (e.g. first born sons 
of Jewish children in Egypt at the time of Moses) or population control 
(Scrimshaw 1982; Hausfater and Hrdy 1984). In most cases, infanticide 
takes place at a point of time earlier than that when the child is 
recognized as a member of the social group (Morgan 1983). The theme of 
rejecting the baby as a potential member of the social group is the 
dominant theme in some decisions to withhold treatment from infants with 
impairments in the NICU.
In most cases of non-treatment, however, there is no question that 
the family wants to accept the baby as a new member into the social 
group. The child is considered to be a member of the family. Decisions 
about care involve other issues, more similar to those involved in 
making treatment choices for critically ill older people. These are 
fundamentally different from infanticide decisions for they are focused 
on the presumed value of treatment for the benefit of the patient, not 
for the benefit of others. As will be discussed below, some decisions 
involve elements of both themes.
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Many authors have claimed that infanticide of newborns with 
disabilities was the norm in "primitive societies." For example, 
Williamson concludes:
Infanticide may be widespread in a society or happen only 
occasionally, but it has very few, if any, exceptions with one 
class of infants, that is, deformed infants. The reasons for 
eugenic infanticide seem obvious; unwillingness or inability to 
assume the burden of caring for such an infant, whose future at 
best would be unsure. The same is true of infants who are clearly 
"different," as, for instance, those with unusual skin color, too 
light or too dark."
(1978:64-65)
Such statements reflect our ethnocentric assumptions about disability. 
As Scheer and Groce state in their paper on "Impairment as a human 
constant:11
...the category 'the disabled' is a cultural artifact which varies 
cross-culturally ...
As ethnographers of the disabled, we have observed that 
given the cultural latitude to do so, the vast majority of 
individuals with impairments can contribute and function in a much 
wider variety of ways than would be expected by American social 
norms. It is our position that the cultural expectations and 
social arrangements which accompany the category 'disability' 
circumscribe the life of each disabled individual to a greater 
extent than an individual's particular physical or mental 
impairment. Furthermore, we suggest that throughout human 
history, culture has defined what does and does not constitute a 
handicap or impairment and that these definitions have changed 
from one society to the next, from one historic period to another, 
and of course vary to a degree within subcultures and 
socioeconomic classes.
(1985:1)
They cite a study by Weiss, who used the HRAF (Human Relations Area 
File) to review the 47 groups where disabled individuals were mentioned. 
Of these, 13 groups practiced infanticide of disabled infants. Eight of
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the 13 practiced infanticide on other newborns as well. They conclude, 
"It is our impression that societies in which disabled infants are put 
to death and those where they are not exist in equal proportion" (Scheer 
and Groce 1985). The fact that groups that practice infanticide have 
members with congenital impairments that would have been obvious at 
birth, proves the fact that the "deformed" were not always killed 
(Jessica Scheer, personal communication, 1986).
All cultures develop customs to care for pregnant women, and for 
mothers and infants at the time of birth. These include means to care 
for infants born not breathing, sick or premature (Jordan 1978; Kay 
1982). Mothers, other family members, and/or other birth attendants 
assessed the physical condition of infants and made judgments about how 
to care for infants. In general, decisions were made to care for 
infants in such as way as to maximize chances for survival, but in some 
situations, the assessment led to decisions not to try to promote 
survival or even to take actions which might bring about death.
For example, Soranus, an ancient Greek physician who wrote a text, 
Gynecology, describes how a midwife may recognize an infant "worth 
rearing:"
...the infant which is suited by nature for rearing will be 
distinguished by the fact that its mother has spent the period of 
pregnancy in good health, for conditions which require medical 
care, especially those of the body, also harm the fetus and 
enfeeble the foundations of its life. Second, by the fact that it 
has been born at the due time, best at the end of nine months, and 
if it so happens, later; but also after only seven months. 
Furthermore by the fact that when put on the earth it immediately 
cries with proper vigor; for one that lives some length of time 
without crying, or cries but weakly, is suspected of behaving so 
on account of some unfavorable condition. Also by the fact that
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it is perfect in all its parts, members and senses; that its 
ducts, namely of the ears, nose, pharynx, urethra, anus are free 
from obstruction; that the natural functions of every <member> are 
neither sluggish nor weak; that the joints bend and stretch; that 
it has due size and shape and is properly sensitive in every 
respect. This we may recognize from pressing the fingers against 
the surface of the body, for it is natural to suffer pain from 
everything that pricks or squeezes. And by conditions contrary to 
those mentioned, the infant is not worth rearing.
(1956 ed.: 79-80)
Cohen, in her paper on the treatment on impaired newborn in 
American history, documents how, as the medical profession developed, 
physicians gained the authority to determine whether anomalous infants 
were monsters who should be killed or infants who were entitled to the 
same careful treatment as other infants (n.d).
Until the recent developments leading to the practice of giving 
birth and special care to infants with problems in hospitals, most birth 
attendants and physicians would have encountered relatively few infants 
with congenital impairments in the course of their life's work. Rather 
than a well defined class to be treated in a culturally prescribed 
manner, physicians and family would make decisions about the care of 
each child.
Development of Medical Treatment Capabilities for Newborns
Until recently, in the United States, there was relatively little 
that could be done for babies who were born more than a few weeks 
premature or for those who were born with severe abnormalities. Most
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babies were born at home, and sick infants were generally cared for 
and/or died at home into the beginning of this century. There was a 
high child mortality rate both immediately following birth and later in 
the first years of life. For example, in 1885, for every 1000 live 
births, 273 infants died (Pawluch 1983). Most were the result of high 
rates of infectious disease reflecting both the undeveloped state of the 
medical sciences (including lack of preventative methods such as 
immunizations), and poor nutrition and sanitary conditions. Deaths of 
premature infants were seen as part of high reproductive wastage 
(MacMullen and Bruckner 1986). While the rate of newborns who were born 
critically ill because of prematurity [rate of prematurity estimated at 
16 - 20% in 1900 (Kretchmer 1964)] or congenital impairments was 
probably high, in general, it was not seen as a separately identified 
social problem.
The Beginnings of the Development of Modern Technology to Care for 
Critically 111 Newborns
As recounted by W. A. Silverman (1979), the beginnings of modern 
attempts to improve the survival of prematurely born infants can be 
traced to France, following the great loss of life resulting from both 
military action during and famine following the Seige of Paris in the 
Franco-Prussian War (1870-71). In 1878, Dr. E. R. Tarnier, a leading 
Paris obstetrician observed a warming chamber for the rearing of poultry 
devised by Odile Martin of the Paris Zoo. At his request, Mr. Martin
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built an incubator which was the first warm air incubator. It was used 
at the Paris Maternity Hospital in 1880.
A former pupil of Tarnier, Pierre Budin, wrote about the care of 
premature infants in 1888. Influenced by Madame Henry, a midwife, Budin 
established a special department for "weaklings" in 1893, which became 
the first center in the world to specialize in the care of premature 
infants. In 1900, Budin established basic protocols for the care of the 
prematurely born. This included instructions 1) to maintain an 
appropriate, warm environment by use of an incubator, 2) to provide 
human milk feedings (if the baby was unable to suckle, milk was 
expressed in a trickle into the mouth), fed by spoon into the mouth or 
nose, or introduced directly into the stomach by intermittent gavage, 3) 
to take precautions against infection by use of such techniques such as 
isolation, sterilization and cold storage of milk. Over time, other 
nurseries adopted these techniques.
While incubators and other aspects of special care may have slowly 
spread in medical circles, the early use of incubators for the care of 
premature babies became best known through their exhibition by Dr. 
Martin A. Couney. He exhibited first at the Berlin Exposition of 1896, 
and later at Earl court in the United Kingdom in 1897. He was probably 
the first to use incubators to care for premature infants in America 
when he brought his exhibit to Omaha, Nebraska in 1898 and Buffalo in 
1901. He was unhappy that his exhibit was placed in the amusement 
section in Omaha, but was pleased when it was placed in the scientific 
section in Buffalo and received serious attention from such journals as
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the Scientific American. Following the show, the Children's Hospital of 
Buffalo purchased incubators by the same manufacturer. Couney 
immigrated to America, settled on Coney Island, and exhibited premature 
infants there each summer for almost forty years. He was respected by 
New York obstetricians, who sent their babies to Coney Island for 
skilled care. In 1937, he was honored by the New York Medical Society. 
Silverman writes that the reasons that no one else established a center 
to care for infants commercially was the great expense of such care - 
$15.00 a day. Couney charged admission for spectators, and did not 
charge parents for the care of their infants.
Julius H. Hess, who later became the leading American expert on 
the subject of prematurity, paid tribute to Couney when he wrote his 
text, Premature and Congenitally Diseased Infants. (Silverman 1979). 
Hess organized the U.S. first hospital-based specialized premature 
infant center at Michael Reese Hospital in Chicago in 1920. After 
Couney exhibited in Chicago in 1933-34, he donated his equipment to Hess 
and gave his ambulance to the City of Chicago, which became the first 
U.S. metropolitan infant transport vehicle (Silverman 1979).
Couney returned to New York and exhibited premature babies at the 
World's Fair in 1939. Vital Statistics from the babies cared for at the 
Fair were published in the Journal of the American Medical Association 
in 1940. Arnold Gesell, a contemporary authority on infant behavior, 
studied the infants at the Fair. (Silverman 1979). The show, however, 
was a financial disaster. After the fair, Couney returned to Coney 
Island, but soon after, when the first premature station in New York
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
City opened at Cornell's New York Hospital, Couney closed his show for 
good.
Maternal and Child Health Care Before 1945
In the early part of the 20th century, as scientific medicine 
began to develop, hospitals came to be seen as an appropriate place for 
others, beside the destitute, to receive care. In addition to the care 
of the sick, the hospital came to be seen as the appropriate place to 
give birth.
Before 1900, less than 5% of American Women delivered in 
hospitals, but the percentage increased greatly during the first half of 
the century. More than half the births in large cities took place in 
hospitals by 1921 (Cone 1983). [By 1950, 93% of whit; births and 58% of 
non-white births took place in hospitals (Cone 1983).] Rather than 
receiving care at home, sick babies began to be cared for in hospitals. 
Most care to newborns, however, was still delivered by the general 
practitioners, midwives, or obstetricians who delivered the babies. 
During the first three decades of the twentieth century, there were few 
American specialists in Pediatrics. In the 1930s, many pediatric 
training programs started; in 1933 the American Board of Pediatrics 
introduced certification (Thompson 1984).
Hess, in his 1922 text, Premature and Congenitally Diseased 
Infants stated
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Hippocrates, in his writings of 460 B.C. ... [wrote] 'No fetus 
coming into the world before the seventh month of pregnancy can be 
saved.1 We note that the literature of our day records only a 
limited number of exceptions to these conclusions that infants 
born before the end of the twenty-eighth week are viable.
(p.205)
Hess, and other pediatricians, worked on developing safe methods to 
artificially feed infants. They also started to apply medical 
interventions originally developed for the care of older patients, to 
the care of infants. It is very easy for us to take for granted very 
basic medical interventions which were not in use even a comparatively 
short time age. For example, in the 1920s and 1930s, for the first 
time, infants were given blood transfusions (without knowledge of blood 
typing) and supplemental oxygen. By the 1940s, techniques were 
developed enabling surgery for some congenital impairments (such as a TE 
fistula - see Baby Doe, below). The general philosophy guiding the care 
of premature infants was to protect them from infection and support them 
with as little interference as possible. Parents were generally not 
allowed to enter the nursery. The major efforts of the time to reduce 
infant mortality, however, did not concern premature or sick infants, 
but rather concerned the care of normal babies in the community and the 
care of mothers at birth.
At the end of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the 
twentieth century efforts were made to decrease the rates of infant 
mortality and improve the health of young children. Most of the 
programs focused on preventative public health rather than acute care 
measures. There were major reduction in the infant mortality rate which
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fell from almost 30% in cities like New York in the 1880s to less than
4% in the 1940s (Rosen 1958; Lesser 1985).
In the 1930s, the first major move towards improving maternal and 
child health measures focused on the safety of mothers. In 1935, 
maternal mortality was almost 6 per thousand. With the war time 
development of antibiotics which enabled treatment of puerperal 
infection and blood banking which enabled treatment of hemorrhage, and 
improvements in training in obstetrical techniques and anesthesia, 
maternal mortality fell sharply to less than 1 per thousand by 1949 
(Divitt 1977). This reduction of risk for the mothers and changes in 
the medical care system which took place after World War II led to a 
shift in focus to more concern with the care of infants.
Post World War II Changes in the American Medical Care System which
Affected the Care of Infants.
Following World War II, efforts to improve the nation's health was 
seen as an important component of the the Cold War strategy because it 
would build up America's strength and would demonstrate humanitarian 
concern. Proposals for a National Health Insurance Program were 
seriously considered, but were then defeated by a campaign which labeled 
them as "socialistic" (Starr 1982). Instead, the "war against disease" 
used the same means that had brought America's victory in war, the 
"massive mobilization of enormous material assets and a rapid increase
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in technological development" (Silverman 1980). Science was "the new 
frontier."
Previously, the federal government had spent little on health 
expenditures; after World War II, the government began to invest 
millions and then billions in the health field. The 1946 Hill-Burton 
Act provided money for hospital capital expenses and encouraged 
investment in expensive hospital equipment (Richmond 1969; Starr 1982). 
Some of the federal money was spent on preventive health programs and 
the delivery of primary health services, but the major thrust of the 
funding furthered the emphasis on technologically oriented acute care 
and research. It primarily stimulated research on hospitalized, 
critically ill patients. The size and significance of teaching 
hospitals and medical schools within the medical care system increased. 
(Starr 1982: Richmond 1969). There were much greater rewards for 
developing technologies which produced new solutions to unsolved 
problems than to develop less costly methods to solve problems with 
existing solutions (Warner 1978).
With the success of the polio vaccine in the 1950s and the 
technological advances such as life support techniques in the 1960s, the 
general public optimism toward the benefit of the application of 
scientific research in medicine grew even further. With this public 
support and the medical research lobby, the federal medical research 
budget became the fastest growing component of national health 
expenditures reaching 1.5 billion by 1965 (Richmond 1969) [exceeding 4 
billion dollars annually by 1983 (Science 1983)]. As will be discussed
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below, research on catastrophically ill newborns, about which little was 
previously known, flourished (Silverman 1980).
Trends in Efforts to Reduce Infant Mortality - 1945-1965
During the first half of the twentieth century, there had been 
dramatic reductions in infant mortality rates. In New York City, for 
example, deaths under one year fell from 136.7 per thousand in 1898 - 
1900 to 26 per thousand in 1946 - 50 (New York City Dept, of Health 
1982). Despite the great reductions, however, people realized that 
infant mortality was still a major cause of death. A study at the time 
noted that for every two soldiers who had been killed overseas during 
World War II, three babies under one year had died at home. Studies 
were conducted to identify causes of mortality and programs were 
initiated in efforts to reduce mortality rates (Corwin 1952).
After the war, a new system of record-keeping was initiated in 
which both length of gestation and birthweight were recorded. This led 
to the realization that although deaths in children above one month had 
been sharply reduced, deaths in newborns under one month had hardly 
changed at all (Corwin 1952), and most of the deaths occurred in 
premature, low birthweight babies (under 5 1/2 pounds). The development 
of glass walled incubators, which allowed clinicians to observe the 
troubled respiratory efforts of unswaddled premature infants, and the 
new statistical awareness, led to both a literal and statistical
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visibility of the problem of prematurity (Silverman 1980:70-71; Wallace, 
et. al. 1949).
The problem was addressed by efforts to centralize the care of 
such babies in special premature centers, some built with the help of 
Hill Burton funding. Some cities, such as New York, organized infant 
transport systems and subsidized care that then averaged $400.00 for 
each infant to discharge. Although premature babies had been cared for 
earlier at the Columbia University Medical Center, the first special 
center for the care of premature infants, a 23 crib unit, opened at 
Babies Hospital in 1949, the forerunner of the unit in which participant 
observation research was conducted for this study. Daily costs for New 
York City to take care of premies were $14 - 17 a day (Wallace, et al. 
1950).
Previously, most newborn care was delivered by general 
practitioners, obstetricians, and general pediatricians (Budetti et al.
1981). At the premature centers, some pediatricians started to specialize 
in the care of the newborn. Along with funding from the federal and 
municipal governments and the growth of academic medicine, the 
concentration of babies with similar problems encouraged research both 
to improve the treatment techniques and to gain understanding of basic 
physiological processes. Efforts were made to improve treatment by the 
application of advances from other fields of contemporary medicine, such 
as antibiotics. In addition, there were applications derived from 
research in chemistry, physics, and engineering, such as the use of 
plastics (Graham 1981) that had an important impact on the ability to
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deliver care. While overall, there were major improvements in treatment 
during that period, some interventions had disastrous consequences.
The non-interventionist philosophy which had dominated the care of 
sick newborns changed as physicians tried to apply newly developed 
techniques. For example, during the late 1940s and 50s, babies were 
regularly fed with indwelling tubes, newly discovered antibiotics were 
used, infants were given high concentrations of oxygen for the first 
time and new surgical techniques were developed to shunt fluid from the 
ventricles of infants who had hydrocephalus.
Iatrogenic Diseases of the 1940s and 1950s
Some of the treatment choices had drastic effects. For example, 
physicians acted on a theory that infants should be fed nothing by mouth 
for several days after birth. The smallest babies (under 2 lbs.) were 
not fed for 4-5 days, 3 days for 3 lb. babies, 1-2 days for babies over 
four pounds. Although it was debated, the first detailed clinical study 
of the delayed feeding did not occur until the 1960s. Drillien showed 
that during the delayed feeding period, three-quarters of infants 
weighing less than 1,367 grams at birth (3 pounds) developed severe 
neurological handicaps, while infants born earlier or later had a much 
lower (about 30%) rate (Cone 1983:19-20).
Cone quotes a lead article in the Lancet (1974) "the years when 
modern neonatal iatrogenesis reached a peak when almost every major
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error in newborn care was widely practiced for at least a time." Many 
infants who were given high concentrations of oxygen were blinded by 
retrolental fibroplasia (RLF). By 1945, 12% of premature infants born 3 
pounds or less were blind - primarily in the larger, better equipped 
hospitals. Other iatrogenic diseases included kernicterus (brain 
damage) as a result of sulfisoxazole given to prevent bacterial 
infections and "gray syndrome," a lethal condition, caused by excessive 
doses of chloramphenicol (Cone 1983:24-26). Other interventions 
included keeping the infants body temperature low and restricting fluids 
(Cone 1983:24-26; Silverman 1980).
Although clinicians were concerned about each complication, these 
problems did not appear to have been perceived as part of a more general 
social issue about the iatrogenic consequences of aggressive treatment. 
When studies were suggested to test the effects of various 
interventions, many clinicians objected that it would be unethical to 
deprive infants in the control group of their benefits (Silverman 1980). 
According to Dr. James, a young researcher at the time (now director of 
the Division of Perinatology at Columbia) during the 1950s, as 
clinicians were getting more aggressive in treatment, they thought that 
the chance of cerebral palsy, blindness or deafness was greater than 
70%, which had been the statistics shown by studies of the effects of 
treatment for infants under 2500 grams (about 5 1/2 pounds). The 
impairment rates for those less than 1000 grams he reported at 90%, 
those under 1500, 85% during 1948-52. He said that the "driving force" 
for neonatologists at that time was to improve care.
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Even as the beneficial treatments were separated from those with 
serious iatrogenic effects, the capabilities were still very limited by 
today's standards. For example, Patrick Bouvier Kennedy, 2100 grams (4 
1/2 pounds), delivered by Caesarean section five and one half weeks 
before his due date, in 1963 (the only child of a US President born in 
office this century) died on the second day of life of respiratory 
distress syndrome (Cohen and Stevenson 1983:13).
Despite the developments in treatment practices, during the 1950s 
and 1960s there was little decline in rates of infant mortality. The 
infant mortality rate of industrialized societies is largely determined 
by the birth rate of premature babies (Lee et al. 1980) which, in turn, 
is highly correlated with measures of social class. Premature babies 
continued to be born at a high rate and most did not receive special 
care. The U.S. infant mortality rate fell to sixteenth among 
industrialized nations, 24.7 in 1965.  ^ This was seen as an indication 
of problems in the health care system, since infant mortality rates had 
become a popular indicator of the quality of a nation's medical care and 
the health of a society (Richmond 1969; Newland 1981; Miller 1985).
President Kennedy and other members of his family, concerned about 
preventable mental retardation and better services for the retarded, and 
President Johnson, citing the embarrassingly high rates of infant
 ^ Infant mortality rates are indicated by a number of deaths per 
1000 live births unless otherwise noted
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mortality, called for efforts to improve the care of infants as part of 
their "Great Society" programs in the 1960s.
Trends in Efforts to Reduce Infant Mortality - 1965-Present
Since the mid-1960s, there has been a dramatic improvements in 
the care of critically ill infants. This has resulted in a significant 
decrease in the overall infant mortality rate and reductions in the 
level of physical and mental impairment for many surviving infants.
This is due to a number of factors including biomedical advances, 
changes in the organization of services, such as "regionalization," and 
an increase in third party coverage. However, there has been little 
change in the rate of birth of premature infants, so that the U.S. 
infant mortality rate remains higher than that of many other nations.
Organizational and Technological Changes: the Development of Neonatal 
Intensive Care
The association of poverty and infant mortality had long been 
acknowledged (Baird 1952; Antonovsky and Bernstein 1977) as well as 
regional variation in facilities. The solution to these problems was 
sought in improvements in the accessibility of medical services through 
medicaid and regionalization. Little was done to identify and remedy 
the factors associated with poverty which lead to more premature births. 
The programs had relatively little impact on the rate of babies born at
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risk. Both the medicaid program and regionalization were intended to 
and did provide both primary and acute services, their greatest impact
was in improving access to acute services (Starr 1982).
Changes in third-party (from sources other than the patient or the 
patient's family, or the provider) payments from Medicaid, Blue Cross 
and other private companies were very important for the development of 
neonatal intensive care. They provided funds that allowed the 
development of sophisticated and expensive equipment and methods to 
treat catastrophically ill infants. In the past, health insurance 
programs often did not cover the costs of newborn care. Pediatricians 
lobbied and, in the 1970s, obtained law to require plans to cover care 
from the first day of life (Thompson 1984:805). The costs of care were 
not limited to what the family could afford to pay.
From 1940 to 1980, the percentage of the medical expenses paid by
third-party plans increased from under 20% to over 70% of which more
than half came from government sources (National Center for Health 
Statistics 1984). In some states, Medicaid subsidized neonatal care for 
others beside the poor because infants can become Medicaid eligible 
without their families having to deplete their resources to poverty 
level in order to qualify. The structure of third-party payments has 
provided relatively little for preventative services, and moderate 
amounts for ambulatory care, but has been most comprehensive for acute, 
hospitalized care, such as intensive care. One study found that third- 
party payers covered 85% of the costs for neonatal care, hospitals
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absorbed an additional 11%, and individual families paid only 4% of the 
costs (Budetti 1981).
Intensive care units developed when the organizational and 
technological innovations of post-surgical recovery rooms and 
respiratory care units were combined with the capacities of the special 
care nurseries in the early to mid-1960s. The use of respirators, 
electronic monitoring, analysis of small blood samples, and the training 
of specialized staff of highly trained nurses, that characterize 
intensive care, all contributed to the survival of small infants.
In addition, other life saving developments of the period included 
the development of techniques of cardiac surgery for infants, the 
availability of chromosome tests for clinical use, intravenous feeding 
for premature infants, other improvements in the ability to deliver and 
monitor oxygen, better ability to regulate temperature, and application 
of pharmacological advances to the care of the NICU patients.
Physicians, nurses, respiratory therapists, and social workers and 
others coordinated their efforts.
Regional networks were organized to coordinate services for 
obstetrical and newborn care. Regional centers developed services 
specializing in high risk births and the care of sick infants. Mothers 
and infants were transferred to these centers for tertiary care. These 
centers were also responsible for training clinicians from community 
hospitals and specialists in neonatology (Committee on Perinatal Health
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1976). Some centers developed special expertise in the care of infants 
with certain conditions such as cardiac lesions or spina bifida.
Neonatology became a Board Certified Subspecialty in 1975. By 
1981, 200 neonatal training programs were established nation wide. 
(Budetti 1981). Neonatologists developed and used even more 
sophisticated technology. Some physicians sought further specialized 
training in both neonatology and other specialties such as neurology or 
surgery. Private companies selling specialized equipment and supplies 
began to aggressively market products for use in the NICU. Because 
Americans have traditionally looked toward technological solutions to 
problems, hospitals which had the latest equipment were able to attract 
staff and patients who wanted the "best" facilities.
Current capabilities of neonatal intensive care
The vast majority of infants admitted to NICUs are premature 
babies. The capacity to treat infants with birth injuries and 
congenital anomalies have developed along with care for the premature 
infant.
Premature Infants
Premature infants are defined as those infants who are born before 
completing the 37th week of gestation (of the normal 40 weeks).
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Survival rates for premature infants rose dramatically as further 
development of respirators and other respiratory support devices, of new 
methods of feeding, and other techniques, revolutionized their care.
The change was most striking for the treatment of very premature 
infants. Infants born after less than twenty-eight weeks used to be 
considered "non-viable fetuses" and were usually classified as 
miscarriages; now they are considered "live births" and many premature 
babies born between twenty-four and twenty-eight weeks have been 
successfully treated (Budetti 1981; Driscoll 1982; Stahlman 1984). (See 
Table III - 1, Infant Survival by Birth Weight Group.)
In 1985, at some of the major centers, over 50% of all infants 
500-750 grams ( 1 - 1 1 / 3  pounds) survive, over 70 % in the 750 - 1000 
grams range and more than 90% of babies of 1000-1500 grams (Driscoll, 
n.d.).
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grams
<1000
1001-1500
1501-2000
2000-2500
> 2500
TABLE III - 1 
INFANT SURVIVAL (Z) BY BIRTHWEIGHT GROUP
New York City 1950 - 1980
WEIGHT YEAR
approx. lbs. 1950 1960 1970 1980
< 2 1/A 3.2 6.8 18.9 39.0
2 1/4-3 1/3 53.7 52.4 64.6 83.6
3 1/3-4 1/2 82.3 82.5 88.1 94.4
4 1/2-5 1/2 95.1 95.6 96.7 97.9
> 5 1/2 98.9 98.9 99.2 99.4
TOTAL 97.5 97.4 97.8 98.4
SOURCE: Unpublished Statistics, 
NYC Dept, of Health n.d.
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Although infants who are born very premature and survive have 
higher rates of impairment than infants who are not born at risk, most 
are healthy. For example, a follow-up study was conducted of the 25 
infants who weighed less than 1000 grams who were cared for in the NICU 
at Columbia in 1977 and 1978. Two infants died after discharge, one of 
sudden infant death, the second due to BPD (a chronic lung condition 
associated with prolonged dependence on a respirator). At three years 
of age, 17% of the 23 survivors had neurological defects and 13% had 
intellectual defects. Of the four who were abnormal neurologically, two 
had spastic quadriparesis, one static encephalopathy, and one 
hydrocephalus secondary to intraventricular hemorrhage (Driscoll et al.
1982).
A more recent study of 33 school-aged children, who had weighed 
1250 grams or less at birth, three were in classes for children with 
major handicaps whereas 30 were found to be comparable to their 
classmates by teachers and/or test scores. About half of the thirty 
were receiving remedial instruction and/or specialized instruction, but 
with that help they were performing at grade level and were reported to 
"compare favorably with their peers" (Eilers et al. 1986).
With continued improvement in techniques to care for very 
premature infants, the rates of impairment for infants of a given 
birthweight can be expected to decrease. As new efforts are made to 
save yet smaller and smaller infants, these new NICU patients may have 
relatively high rates of impairments. Even at the lowest weight ranges,
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however, well over half of the survivors do not appear to have serious 
impairments.
New medications to treat women who are threatening to deliver 
prematurely and other advances in neonatal care are likely to save more 
infants. Although some have suggested that medicine is approaching a 
theoretical limit beyond which developments in acute care may be unable 
to lower infant mortality, such a limit has not yet been demonstrated. 
The last 20 years have shown a continued ability to save premature 
infants formerly thought to be untreatable.
Treatment for Infants with Other Conditions
Surgical techniques were developed to enable treatment of babies 
born with many congenital anomalies. Open heart surgery and new drugs 
enabled treatment for infants with many cardiac defects. For babies 
born with severe spina bifida (a defect in the formation of the spinal 
column causing damage to the spinal cord and other anomalies), 
neurosurgical techniques were developed to close the spinal lesion and 
shunt excess fluid from the brain. There have been increased 
capabilities, in general, to perform surgical techniques for smaller and 
smaller infants. For example, surgery can be performed to repair many 
complex intestinal conditions.
Progress in respiratory therapy enables better treatment not only 
for infants who are premature but also for asphyxiated babies who have
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suffered from lack of oxygen before, during or immediately after birth. 
Improvement in pharmacological techniques has led to a greater ability 
to handle infections, circulatory problems, and other conditions.
Greater ability to support infants with total parenteral nutrition 
enables clinicians to sustain infants who cannot tolerate oral feeding 
for a long period of time.
A new, still experimental, technological apparatus, ECMO (extra- 
corporeal membrane oxygenation), enables treatment for some babies who 
formerly could not have been saved. It is a device which oxygenates the 
blood, by-passing the lungs and heart, in a manner somewhat similar to 
the heart/lung pumps used for shorter periods of time during open heart 
surgery. It can be used in the treatment of infants with a 
diaphragmatic hernia, persistent fetal circulation, or who are badly 
asphyxiated (who have suffered from lack of oxygen). A baby on ECMO 
needs at least 24 hours of care from both surgeons and nurses each day. 
Infants have been sustained on ECMO for as long as two weeks. Only a 
few centers in the country are now using this device; Columbia is the 
only center with ECMO between Boston and Washington, D. C.
In addition to saving the lives of many critically ill infants, 
NICU care has prevented impairments for many others who would have 
survived even without intensive care, but who would have had 
disabilities. Although infants who were in an NICU have an higher 
incidence of impairments than other children, the vast majority of NICU 
survivors have no lasting impairments (Shapiro, et al. 1983; McCormick 
1985).
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Over two billion dollars is spent each year on the provision of 
care for the six to seven percent of all babies born in the U.S. who 
are admitted to close to 600 NICUs each year (Budetti 1981; Institute of 
Medicine 1985). In 1983, there were 545 NICUs, with 8,067 beds, an 
average of 14.8 per unit (up from 413 units and 6,187 in 1980) (Richards 
1985:67).
Recent information on infant mortality
The overall U.S. infant mortality rates have been sharply reduced 
from 24.7 in 1965 to 10.9 in 1983 (Miller 1985). Part of the reduction 
is due to greater availability of family planning and abortion services 
which have lowered the rate of birth to high risk mothers (Lee et al. 
1976), but most of the reduction results from better treatment of 
premature and other acutely ill infants (Budetti 1981).
Despite the improvements in acute care which has led to tremendous 
strides in the ability to treat prematurely born infants, relatively 
little has been done to correct those factors which led to a high rate 
of birth of premature infants. 6.8% of all babies born in the U.S, in 
1981 were low birth weight. Therefore, despite advances in technology, 
which greatly increased the rate of survival for low birth weight 
babies, the U.S. infant mortality rate still ranks 17th among 
industrialized nations (Miller 1985).
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The association of socioeconomic factors, including race and 
social class, with the rate of birth of preterm and low birthweight 
infants has been well documented (Antonovsky and Bernstein 1977; Miller 
et al. 1985; Institute of Medicine 1985). Infant mortality rates among 
Blacks, at 19.6 per thousand, are nearly twice as high as among whites. 
In 1982, 124 of each 1000 black babies were of low birth weight while 
the rate for whites was only 56 per 1000. In some areas, the 
sociodemographic difference is even more striking. For the primarily 
poor residents of Central Harlem, the 1983 infant mortality rate was 
21.2, while for the primarily prosperous residents of Manhattan's Upper 
East Side, the rate was only 7.2 (NYC Dept, of Health 1983).
Because of the primary thrust of expenditures for health care has 
been to cure rather than to prevent, less has been done to prevent the 
births of infants at risk than to cure them once they are born. While 
social and health services have not been adequate to significantly 
affect the risk of low birthweight associated with sociodemographic 
characteristics (Institute of Medicine 1985), high quality of neonatal 
intensive care has been made available to infants of all social classes. 
A study showed that in New York City, once a baby was born, the chance 
of surviving the neonatal period for babies in a given weight category 
did not vary significantly with socioeconomic factors (Paneth, et al. 
1982).
Sociodemographic characteristics are strongly associated with post 
neonatal infant mortality rates. For example, the 1983 death rate of 
infants 1 month to 1 year was only 1 per 1000 on the Upper East Side,
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but 11.7 in Central Harlem (New York City, Dept, of Health 1983).
Recent increases in infant mortality rates in some areas have been shown 
to be associated with cut backs in programs for mothers and children and 
increased economic stresses (Newland 1981; Miller 1985; Miller et al.
1985).
Studies have shown that increased use of prenatal care would be 
cost effective by reducing later health care expenditures for low 
birthweight infants (Institute of Medicine 1985). Improvements in the 
standard of living and the provision of better primary health care 
services services for babies would also decrease the infant mortality 
rate.3
Mortality rates especially for small premature infants declined 
rapidly. Neonatal units became showcases for the power of modern 
medicine.
3 The clinicians who deliver neonatal intensive care do not usually 
have the choice of giving more preventative and other primary care. 
Rather, the resources available for different types of care are now 
determined primarily by public policy decisions governing the 
availability of medicaid and other third-party payments, and to a lesser 
extent, by funds for research, training, and social service programs.
It is important to realize that acute interventions and preventative 
measures need not be conceptualized as mutually exclusive choices. 
Further reductions in infant mortality would probably result from more 
investment in each of these area.
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Concerns About the Aggressiveness of
Treatment for Catastrophically 111 Newborns
Despite the overall feelings of pride, new concerns began to 
emerge. For the first time, large numbers of infants with similar 
problems were brought together and cared for by specialists. Many 
centers provided post~neonatal care for children with impairments. Some 
specialists came to see severely impaired babies not as isolated cases, 
but as part of a group of cases for which newly developed techniques 
were doing more harm than good. Whereas previously, an isolated 
practitioner and/or family might have privately decided to allow an 
individual baby to die, practitioners at some regional centers now began 
to discuss some treatment decisions as part of a new problem brought on 
by technological advances.
The concern with the ethics of neonatal decision making arose in 
the context of a growing concern with biomedical ethics in a number of 
arenas. These included concern with the protection of human subjects, 
with abortion, and with decisions about the cessation of treatment 
prompted, in part, by questions about the use of cardiac resuscitation, 
respirators and organ transplantation (Pres. Comm. 1981) and the 
increased interest in "death and dying" (Kubler-Ross 1969). These led 
to a questioning of the major assumption guiding medicine in the 
preceding period -- that death should be "fought" with aggressive 
treatment. It also occurred, in part, because of wider social trends in 
American Society which involved questioning of professional authority, 
not only in the health arena (exemplified by IRBs and the natural
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childbirth and women’s health movements) but in such areas as 
educational reform and the peace movement (Barber 1978; Rothman, lecture 
at Columbia 1984). The ecology movement was growing, with fear about 
the inappropriate use of technology. In addition, there was increased 
concern with mental retardation and disability rights. The late 1960s 
and early 1970s was also a time of much public debate about over 
population, birth control and abortion.
The Beginning of the Debate About Selective Non-treatment
Those who write about withholding medical treatment from newborns 
often assume that the debate on the issue began in the early 1970s with 
the publication of articles by Lorber (1971), and Duff and Campbell 
(1973). There is evidence from multiple sources, however, that even 
when there was the capacity to do so, infants were not always given 
maximum treatment to prolong life. For example, in 1921 an opponent of 
euthanasia quoted an advocate as writing:
In one instance, in the case of a child suffering from 
hydrocephalus and beyond hope of cure, only the most constant 
attention could keep him alive; the matron finally somewhat 
relaxed her vigilance in seeing that he was cared for, and 
indigestion carried him off. ... death is brought on by neglect 
rather than by administering a drug.
(Spaulding 1921:235-6)
The extent to which clinicians intentionally allowed death to 
occur through withholding treatment is unclear since physicians rarely
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wrote about such practices. Even during the beginning of the aggressive 
period of neonatal treatment such practices and discussion about them 
evidently continued. In a 1961 editorial in the Journal of Pediatrics, 
Veeder wrote:
One of the present day medical "ethical conflicts" revolves 
[around] ... the "prolongation of death" by the use of recently 
developed techniques, such as transfusion, intravenous feeding, 
fluid therapy, and the cardiac pacemaker, along with the 
development of such drugs as the antibiotics.
(p. 604)
He goes on to discuss the treatment of a condition he refers to as 
"mongolian idiocy" noting that the causative mechanism was only 
discovered within the last two years. He states that "nature" had 
provided a "compensating abnormality ... low resistance to infection" 
which usually led to death but that with the use of "modern techniques 
and the newer drugs ... the Mongol continues a vegetative existence, 
worthless to himself and a burden to his family and society." He asks 
if "the use of 'miracles of modern medical science1" and "interference 
with the process of nature [is] justified in this condition?" He states 
that "the brilliant development of cardiac surgery" during the last few 
years, adds to the problem.
In reference to attitudes towards use of these treatments, he 
states "opinion is divided. There is one group with a decided 'yes' 
answer and another with a decided "no." A third group believes in 
selective judgement." He concludes that ethical problems are matters 
which cannot be decided by majority vote, rather, each physician "has to 
decide for himself [sic.]."
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In 1963, a group of physicians agreed to withhold treatment when 
a mother (who was a nurse) and father refused to give consent for 
corrective intestinal surgery for an infant with Down's syndrome. The 
physicians felt that the Courts would not order the surgery over the 
objections of parents (Gustafson 1973).^
Although many authors assert that aggressive treatment for infants 
born with Spina Bifida became the norm only after modern neurosurgical 
techniques were developed in the late 1950s, some surgeons advocated 
aggressive treatment even earlier (Ingraham and Hamlin 1943; Bluestone 
and Deaver 1953). Even some of the early supporters of aggressive 
treatment felt that it was sometimes appropriate to withhold treatment 
for medical or social reasons. For example, in 1961, two British 
physicians wrote:
In deciding his attitude to the problem of spina bifida cystica, 
the neurosurgeon must obviously consider first the conflicting 
claims of all the various types of disorder, both congenital and 
acquired, in adults as well as in infants and children, with which 
he is called upon to deal, together with the resources in terms of 
hospital beds, operating time and the like, to which he has 
access. There is also the question of whether it is likely that 
adequate after-care, both from the medical and from the social 
point of view, can be provided for children with varying degrees 
of physical, and possibly mental, handicap. The prospects of this 
will undoubtedly vary considerably between countries, perhaps from 
industrial to rural areas in the same country, according to the 
attitudes and financial status of the parents, and to some extent 
to the size and potential helpfulness of the family unit.
(Doran and Guthkelch 1961:342)
 ^ This case, which has come to be known as "The John Hopkins Case" 
has been widely discussed in the debate on the treatment of newborns 
(see below).
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Some physicians in the United States (Bucy 1960, Matson 1968), 
England (Hide, Williams and Ellis 1972), Scotland (Stark and Drummond 
1973) and Australia (Medical Journal of Australia 1971) practiced 
selective non-treatment throughout the 1960s.
Commonly, people who write about the issue of withholding 
treatment from newborns, date the beginning of the debate with articles 
by Lorber and Duff and Campbell in the early 1970s. There were, 
however, many early articles and letters in the clinical literature 
about withholding neurosurgery from some infants with Spina Bifida. 
(Forrest 1964, 1965, 1967; Sweetnam 1965; Eckstein 1965; Sharrard, 
Zachary and Lorber 1967; Zachary 1968a, 1968b; Sanders 1968; Wickes 
1968; Fernandez-Serrats, Guthkelch and Parker 1968; Matson 1968; Zachary 
1969; Bluestone 1969; McCann 1969; Shillito 1969; Katzen 1971;
Lightowler 1971; MacKeith 1971; Lorber 1971; Medical Journal of 
Australia 1971; Slater 1971; Freeman 1972; Cooke 1972; Hide, Williams 
and Ellis 1972; Eckstein, Hatcher and Slater 1973; Hunt, Lewin, Gleave 
and Gairdner 1973; Lorber 1973; and Freeman 1973) withholding surgery 
from infants with other conditions, (Rickham 1969; Hesse 1971; Shaw 
1973), withholding resuscitation (Veghelyi 1970) and/or other treatments 
(Crocker and Cushna 1972; Engelhardt 1973; Gustafson 1973; Harris 1973; 
Duff and Campbell 1973) from some infants with impairments (see Chapter 
VIII for a more detailed examination of the published debate on the 
issue following an article by Zachary (1968).)
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In October of 1971, the Joseph P Kennedy Jr. Foundation held an 
International Symposium on Human Rights, Retardation and Research. The 
symposium began with a film, Who Shall Survive?. about the John Hopkins 
case. The case was discussed by prominent ethicists, lawyers, and 
social scientists, as well as clinicians. The symposium was written up 
in the Boston Globe (Crocker and Cushna 1972). An article by pediatric 
surgeon Anthony Shaw, appeared in the New York Times Magazine Section on 
withholding surgery from infants. Another article about a case in which 
a hospital obtained a Court order to treat an infant with Down's 
syndrome after parents refused surgery appeared in Life magazine (Harris 
1973).
Despite over twenty-five articles, including a few in the popular 
press, published by 1973, many date the inception of the debate on non­
treatment of newborns to the publication of two articles in the early 
1970s. The first article was published in England by Lorber in 1971; 
the second was published in the United States by Duff and Campbell in 
1973. One can speculate as to why these are seen as the landmark 
articles. Although Lorber, and Duff and Campbell, might have advocated 
withholding treatment in more cases than many other clinicians would 
have, it appears that selective non-treatment per se did not run contra 
to professional norms. Rather, it might be suggested that what was most 
controversial about their approaches was the manner that each advocated 
for making selective non-treatment decisions.
It appears that most clinicians at the time saw non-treatment 
decisions as essentially medical decisions to be made by physicians on a
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case by case basis. Both Lorber's and Duff and Campbell's positions ran 
counter to these norms, though in radically different ways. Lorber 
advocated the use of explicit standardized criteria to be used in all 
cases. Duff and Campbell advocated parental decision making which could 
be expected to vary from case to case. Perhaps it was these positions 
which were most controversial. Or, perhaps, political or personality 
factors may have influenced the reactions.
Ethical and Social Concerns About the Treatment 
for Catastrophically 111 Newborns, 1973 - 1982
For the following decade, clinicians and bioethicists continued to 
debate questions about the care of newborns. The debate had two main 
dimensions 1) Should all babies be treated? If not, which babies shall 
live?, 2) Who should decide? Starting in the mid-1970s, there were 
numerous articles, conferences, and research groups both in clinical and 
academic settings; the papers presented at some of the conferences were 
published as edited volumes (Jonsen and Garland 1976; Roy 1978; Swinyard 
1978). Selective non-treatment of infants with impairments became one 
of the most prominent issues to be addressed by philosophers, lawyers, 
clinicians and others interested in bioethical issues.^ Virtually all
 ^ Robert Weir, in his monograph Selective nontreatment of 
handicapped newborns (1984) and the chapter on newborns in the 
President's Commission Report (1983) both provide excellent overall 
reviews of clinical, legal, and ethical perspectives on the issues 
involved in decision making about the treatment of newborns.
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of the issues of 1973-1982 continue to be debated. (Some additional 
issues are now part of the debate as well, as will be discussed below).
An article entitled "Infants" from the Encyclopedia of Bioethics 
(Infants 1978) provided one the best contemporary reviews of the issues. 
Hempill and Freeman began their section on "Medical aspects and ethical 
dilemmas:11
The ethical dilemmas in the medical care of infants are 
primarily the consequences of several developments: an increased 
ability to save the lives of infants who formerly would have died 
directing concern toward their future quality of life; 
improved capability in diagnosing disease and disability in 
advance of their manifestations; and an attitude which takes 
seriously the dilemma of decision making by others on behalf of 
the infant.
This article will delineate the highly complex issues 
involved in decision making in infant care as seen from a medical 
perspective, including birth defects; problems when the outcome is 
unpredictable, experimentation with infants; and the management of 
infants selected for nontreatment.
(Infants 1978:717)
Similar to the issues in the care of the critically ill adults 
(see Chapter II), clinicians and bioethicists discussing the care of the 
newborn considered the type of problems —  mental or physical, 
progressive or static, terminal or not terminal. In addition, 
unpredictability of the outcome, which is even more common for newborns 
than for older adults was seen as an issue. Options in the management 
of children who were not to be treated were also discussed. 
Differentiations were made between active and passive euthanasia. The 
goals of "preserving life" and "doing no harm" were seen to conflict 
(Infants 1978:717-722).
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The roles of possible conflicting interests of the infant 
(interests in both sanctity of life and quality of life), of the family, 
of the health personnel and of society were considered. Since infants 
cannot make decisions about their own care, and they have no personal 
history on which to base decisions, there was debate about who should be 
empowered to make decisions on behalf of the patient. Decision making 
by parents, by physicians, joint decision by parents and physicians, and 
decision making by committees was advocated by various parties.
Questions were raised about the appropriateness of court review, or a 
priority of responsibilities in decision making (Infants 1978:722-724, 
738-39).
Also in the Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Reich and Ost wrote a 
section on ethical perspectives on the care of infants. In outlining 
the ethical theories applied by philosophers and theologians, they 
listed the following:
... (a) traditional deontological positions: (b) contemporary
positions emphasizing a rethinking of the concept of "person"; (c) 
consequentialist; and (d) approaches rejecting the "humanhood" 
standard and proposing either an ethic of care or an ethic of 
avoiding harm (a negative formulation of the consequentialist 
positions).
(1978:724)
Deontological or rule based principles for decision making 
included views of human life as a sacred trust, to be protected, both by 
not deliberately killing an innocent human being, and an obligation to 
sustain human life, especially on the part of those who have the
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responsibility of caring relationships (Infants 1978:726- 727). In 
addition, as for adults, distinctions were made between ordinary and 
extraordinary means, omission and commission, and prolonging life and 
prolonging dying. Some philosophers advanced consequentialist, or 
utilitarian positions, challenged those distinctions, advocating 
instead, consideration of the effects of choices both for the baby and 
for society. Some philosophers advocated active euthanasia, in order to 
spare infants the pain and suffering which could result from the 
withholding of treatment (Infants 1978:726-735).
While consideration of the meaning of life and the definition of 
personhood or humanhood have been an element in discussion of care of 
critically ill adults, it has been an even more important issue in 
discussions about treatment for infants. For example, Joseph Fletcher 
proposed 20 elements of "humanhood," including cerebration, self- 
awareness, intelligence, self-control, control of existence, and 
communication." He felt that babies who did not possess these elements 
(e.g. infants with Down's syndrome and/or IQ below 40 - questionable, 
below 20 - not a person). Others have supported a much more inclusive 
definition of infants who should be treated. For example, McCormick 
suggested as a criterion, the potential for human relationships (Infants 
1978:732-735).
Another concern of those discussing ethical issues pertaining to 
neonatal decision making was the high cost of care and the allocation of 
health care resources (Infants 1978:739-40). Frequently, comparisons 
were made between the high cost of intensive care and the benefits that
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could result from an equal investment in preventative and primary care. 
A Hastings Center research group formed to examine issues related to 
NICU care; allocation of resources was a major issue.
Throughout the 1970s and early 80s occasional articles or stories 
appeared in the popular media on decision making in neonatology. One 
that was widely cited by clinicians "On the death of a baby." It 
appeared in the Atlantic Monthly in 1979. It was written by Peggy and 
Robert Stinson, parents of a very premature infant. Their son, Andrew, 
had been treated for months in an intensive care unit and died after 
suffering many iatrogenic complications.
Many of the clinicians who worked in neonatal intensive care were 
familiar with the perspectives of bioethicists and other clinicians; 
they were aware of the feelings of parents, such as the Stinsons, who 
had objected to NICU care for their children. Some neonatal units 
established ethics rounds or had discussions about ethics in regular 
teaching rounds. Courses on ethics and values were established in many 
medical schools, schools of nursing and other health sciences programs. 
Most included discussion of the issues involved in decision making about 
catastrophically ill newborns.
Another area of social concern, which did not appear to have much 
salience with clinicians until the 1980s, was the linking of neonatal 
decision making with the issues surrounding abortion and the "right to 
life." Some anti-abortion activists saw non-treatments of infants as a
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second step on a path from abortion, through infanticide to euthanasia
and genocide. For example, one activist said:
Speaking as the official American witness at the Nuremberg 
doctors trials, Dr. Leo Alexander commented on the genesis of the 
medical atrocities revealed during the proceedings. "What ever 
proportions these crimes finally assumed, it became evident to all 
who investigated them that they had started from small beginnings. 
The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shift in emphasis in 
the basic attitudes of physicians. It started with the acceptance 
of the attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement, that there is 
such a thing as a life not worthy to be lived.Today we can see 
the same shift in attitude occurring in American medicine. We can 
see the substitution of a "quality of life" ethic for a "sanctity 
of life" ethic and a discarding of our Hippocratic traditions in 
favor of the cost-benefit morality of the new technology.
(Diamond 1982:55)
One strong proponent of such a position was Everett C. Koop, later to 
become Surgeon General of the United States. In 1982, he wrote:
Infanticide is the killing of a born infant by direct means or by 
withholding something necessary for its survival. This practice 
in the United States is extraordinarily important to those who are 
interested in the sanctity of human life because infanticide might 
never have come about had it not been for abortion on demand.
When I read, in the months following the January 22, 1973 decision 
of the Supreme Court in Roe v Wade, various references to Justice 
Blackmun's majority opinion in that case, my blood ran cold. You 
will remember that he considered the Hippocratic Oath which 
forbids abortion to be irrelevant. He spurned whatever morality 
he might have gleaned from the Judeo- Christian heritage of this 
country and turned instead to the pagan religions of Rome, of 
Greece, and of Persia. Although those countries practiced 
abortion, it was infanticide and euthanasia which were more 
important inhumanities in their cultures.
(Koop 1982:90)
Alexander, "Medical Science Under Dictatorship," 
241 New England J. Med. 39, 44 (1949)
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In the 1980s, Disability Rights activists also began to be 
concerned about neonatal decision making, both for the sake of the 
newborns, and also a concern with the implications of selective non­
treatment for social value setting concerning society's attitudes for 
people with disabilities (Anne B. Swanson, personal communication
1984). For example, Asch and Fine state:
Unacknowledged by those who deny treatment is ... 
discrimination against people with disabilities. Such prejudice 
is found throughout the population and thus it is no surprise 
although quite dismaying to see people who decry discrimination on 
the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation or social 
class urging that public policy embody their fears, terrors, 
revulsion and ignorance of disability and people with 
disabilities. Millions of citizens with biological limitations 
would assert that their main obstacles to fulfilling lives stem 
not from these limitations but from a society which stresses 
mental and physical perfection and rugged individualism, that 
often rejects, isolates and segregates them, assuming that 
disabled people are unpleasant, unhappy, helpless, hopeless and 
burdensome.
Such stereotypes lead inevitably to the first of three major 
arguments given for non-treatment: that the child's quality of 
life will be intolerable. We ask: intolerable to whom? How do we 
know? And, if that child's quality of life is less than someone 
else's, how much do we as a society contribute to its 
impoverishment by denying needed health care, education, 
independent living, rehabilitation and social supports to ensure a 
better life? We do not know what the lives of any children will be 
when they are born. People who decide that Down's Syndrome or 
spina bifida automatically renders the children or adults 
"vegetables" or "better off dead" simply know nothing about the 
lives of such people today -- much less what those lives could be 
in a more inclusive, person oriented society.
(Asch and Fine 1984:52-53)
Over the past two decades, the debates by clinicians and 
bioethicists on issues of neonatal decision making have only become more 
intense.
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The Law and Legal Cases Concerning the 
Withholding of Treatment From Newborns
The applicability of various laws to the treatment of 
catastrophically ill newborns has never been clear. A number of 
different bodies of law have been seen as appropriate to the regulation 
of treatment decisions by various legal scholars. These include states 
laws pertaining to child abuse and neglect (Shatten and Chabon 1982), 
civil liability (Ellis 1982) and criminal law pertaining to murder 
(Ellis 1982). In addition, some have asserted that federal law 
proscribing discrimination against the handicapped (DHHS 1983) and 
constitutional law pertaining to the rights to privacy, equal protection 
and due process are applicable to decision making about the care of 
newborns.
At the time that I did the majority of the field work on which 
this study is based, as well as during the time since then, the 
clinicians whom I studied, like many others who sought a sophisticated 
understanding of the law, were not sure about the legal status of 
various clinical decisions to withhold treatment. In this section, I 
will briefly review some of the more important cases and events 
pertaining to the law and non-treatment of newborns. No attempt will be 
made here to reach conclusions about the constitutionality of any of the 
decisions or the legal basis of the laws. More thorough reviews of the 
law pertaining to newborns have been written by Shatten and Chabon
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(1982), Taub (1982), The President's Commission (1983), Weir (1984), and 
appear in Bowen v The American Hospital Association (1986).
Some legal scholars assert that decisions to withhold treatment 
from catastrophically ill newborns fit the legal definition of murder; 
they believe parents and clinicians could face charges ranging from 
manslaughter to murder. Murder is the "deliberate killing of one person 
by another." First degree murder is "willful, deliberate and 
premeditated killing" (Ellis 1982:402). Ellis asserts that such factors 
as good motives, active or passive euthanasia, and/or the terminal 
illness of the infant would not provide a defense against a charge of 
first degree murder. Although theoretically possible, no parents or 
physicians have ever been found guilty of criminal charges because they 
withheld or withdrew treatment from a catastrophically ill newborn.
In one case in Danville, Illinois, parents and a physician were 
charged with attempted murder and thirteen other charges when they were 
accused of withholding treatment from conjoined (Siamese) twins who were 
born in May of 1981. The mother of the twins, Pam Mueller, was a 
registered nurse; the father was an emergency room physician in the 
hospital where the twins were delivered. When the twins were delivered, 
joined with a single trunk below the waist, and sharing three legs (and 
internal organs), the obstetrician decided not to resuscitate; the 
parents concurred. The twins started to breathe spontaneously. An 
order —  "Do not feed in accordance with the parents' wishes" -- was 
written on the medical chart.
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An anonymous caller reported the case to the Illinois Department 
of Children and Family Services. The department filed a petition of 
neglect against the parents, temporary custody was granted to Family 
Services, and the children were moved to another hospital for 
evaluation. On June 11th, when the infants were five days old, the 
parents and the attending physician were charged with conspiracy to 
commit murder. When a hearing was held, no witnesses were willing to 
give testimony linking the parents and physician directly to the order 
to withhold food from the twins. The charges were dismissed. Four 
months later, custody of the twins (who could not be separated) was 
returned to the parents. They were brought home. Although they were 
only expected to live for a few months, five years later they are still 
alive. (Material on this case derived from Taub 1982; Weir 1984).
The case in Danville received much national publicity. Although 
criminal charges have been threatened in other cases, I believe that the
case in Danville remains the only one in which criminal charges have
actually been made. Some clinicians and parents fear that decisions to
withhold treatment will lead to criminal charges.
The body of law that has more regularly been applied to cases 
involving non-treatment of newborns has been the child abuse and neglect 
statutes. According to Shatten and Chabon (1982), in general, the law 
has granted deference to the rights of parents to make decisions for 
their children, including medical decisions. Parents have a legal duty 
to care for their children. There is a legal presumption toward giving 
life saving treatment. If the parents refuse consent for treatment, and
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the child is found to be dependent or neglected, the Court can order 
treatment. Shatten and Chabon state:
Resolution of dependency and neglect cases requires more 
than mere factual findings; in all but the most obvious cases it 
required the court to balance competing interests. This balancing 
reveals an effort by the courts to refrain from interfering in 
socially, emotionally, medically, and legally private matters, yet 
to ensure that children, whose parents really are not acting in 
their best interests, will not remain uncared for. The line 
between matters reasonably subject to state intervention and 
private family matters is often difficult to draw.
(1982:63)
There have been a number of cases in which physicians have gone to 
Court when parents have refused to give consent to treatment. Decisions 
have been made both to require treatment and to permit parents to refuse 
treatment. Therefore, there seems to be no clear legal precedent on the 
basis of state law pertaining to child abuse and neglect.
For example, in 1974, a baby boy named Houle was born at the Maine 
Medical Center. He had no left eye, a rudimentary left ear, and a 
tracheoesophageal fistula (necessitating IV feedings and allowing fluid 
to enter the lungs, bringing about pneumonia) among other defects.
Brain damage was suspected. One physician stated that he didn't think 
that the baby should be treated, but the attending physicians and 
pediatric surgeon did. When the parents refused to give consent for 
surgery, the physicians initiated a neglect case. The judge ordered 
surgery saying "the existence of the child herein gives the court 
equitable jurisdiction to fulfill the responsibility of government in 
its character as parens patriae to care for infants and protect them 
from neglect." Despite the surgery, the baby died the next day (Weir
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1984:93). Similarly, the Court ordered surgery for a baby girl who was 
born with meningomyelocele in New York City in 1979 (Taub 1982).
In other cases, however, the Courts have upheld the parents' 
decisions to refuse consent for medical treatment. For example, in 
1972, physicians from John Hopkins were unsuccessful when they sought to 
obtain a Court order for corrective surgery for a child with Down's 
syndrome and an intestinal obstruction (Ellis 1982). Physicians were 
also unsuccessful in obtaining orders for treatment in what was to 
become the most famous non-treatment case concerning the infant who 
became known as "Baby Doe."
Baby Doe was born in Bloomington, Indiana on April 9, 1982. He 
had Down's syndrome and an esophageal atresia with associated 
tracheoesophageal (TE) fistula. At the time of his birth, he was also 
thought to have an enlarged heart. His physicians were divided about 
his care. Without surgery, he could not take nutrition by mouth. Some 
of his doctors argued that surgery to correct the defect had an 85 -90% 
chance of success, while others argued that the chances of success were 
only 50-50. His parents refused consent and surgery was not performed.
He was not given IV nutrition or fluids; he was given sedatives.
The administrators of Bloomington Hospital sought legal advice on 
the possibility of legal intervention to require surgery. In an 
emergency hearing, a circuit judge ruled that the parents had the right 
to withhold treatment. The judge appointed the Monroe County Welfare 
Department as guardian ad litem; they decided not to appeal the judge's
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ruling. The next day, the county prosecutors intervened and the judge 
encouraged an appeal of his own ruling by appointing one of the 
prosecutors as guardian ad litem. He filed an emergency petition with 
the circuit court which failed. The prosecutors then appealed to the 
Indiana Supreme Court which conducted an informal hearing. The justices 
voted three to one not to intervene. According to Weir, they were 
apparently concerned about second- guessing physicians on medical 
matters.
After the Supreme Court decision, the prosecutors flew to 
Washington in an attempt to bring the case to the Supreme Court. They 
planned to raise the issues of whether the child had a right to continue 
living under the 14th amendment, was denied Due Process, and/or if the 
child was denied Equal Protection because of his handicap. While they 
were en route to Washington, Baby Doe died. (Material on Baby Doe is 
derived from Pless 1983; Weir 1984; Lyon 1985.)
This case received much national publicity. In response to the 
case, President Reagan instructed Richard Schweiker, Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services to notify health care providers 
that recipients of federal funds are forbidden "from withholding from 
handicapped citizens, simply because they are handicapped, any benefit 
or services that would ordinarily be provided to persons without 
handicaps" (Weir 1984:131). Such a notice was sent in May of 1982. It 
informed health care providers that they risked losing federal funds if 
they did not comply. Other efforts were begun to pass laws in Congress
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to involve the federal government in selective non-treatment decisions; 
that year, the efforts were unsuccessful (Weir 1984:132).
When I did the most intense period of observation in the neonatal 
unit in the Fall of 1982, federal efforts at intervention had little 
visibility. Most of the clinicians had been aware of the Baby Doe and 
Danville decisions. Many were aware of other neonatal cases. There was 
growing public awareness of neonatology because of these cases, and 
occasional TV shows and articles in the popular press. The issue of 
neonatal decision making was primarily conceptualized as an ethical 
issue of concern to bioethicists, clinicians, and the parents of 
catastrophically ill newborns. In the following year the public 
awareness of the issue of neonatal decision making was to rise 
dramatically.
In the Spring of 1983, President Reagan announced plans to enforce 
the 1982 regulations issued by the Department of Health and Human 
Services by requiring signs to be hung in every nursery, obstetrical 
unit, and pediatric unit, installing 'a toll free hotline for reporting 
cases to the federal government, and establishing mechanisms to 
investigate reported cases. The regulations, opposition from the major 
health organizations and others, and related court decisions and 
revisions received much national publicity.
Also in the Spring of 1983, the President's Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Biomedicine and Behavioral Research 
published an influential report, Decisions to Forego Life-sustaining
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Treatment. It promoted the use of a standard based on "the best 
interests of the baby" for making neonatal decisions. The Commissioners 
believed that in some cases, those interests were best served by 
decisions to forego life saving treatment. They recommended review of 
such decisions by hospital-based ethics committees (Pres. Comm. 1983). 
The report received much attention from the media.
In 1983 decision making for catastrophically ill newborns had 
become a public issue. The issue remained prominent in the Press 
throughout 1983 when there was extensive media coverage concerning court 
cases about the care of a child with spina bifida, known as "Jane Doe," 
who was born in New York that Fall. The case of Jane Doe is discussed 
in Chapter VII; the Baby Doe Regulations, including federal child abuse 
regulations, are discussed in Chapter VIII.
Research on Neonatal Decision Making
Although there has been much written on clinical decision making 
about neonates, especially during the past two years (including such 
books as Frohock 1986; Gustaitis and Young 1986; Kuhse and Singer 1985; 
Lyon 1985; Magnet and Kluge 1985; Murray and Caplan 1985; Weil and 
Benjamin forthcoming; Weir 1984) there has been little systematic social 
science research on the topic. There have been a number of surveys of 
attitudes of clinicians. Social scientists have conducted research on 
neonatology, including two in depth observational research studies on
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neonatal decision making (Anspach forthcoming; Guillemin and Holmstrom
1986), which will be reviewed briefly in the following section.
Surveys
Between 1970 and 1982, there have been at least eight surveys of 
pediatricians' and other clinicians' attitudes about treatment for 
catastrophically ill newborns (Crane 1975; McKilligin 1976; Johnson and 
Garland 1976; Shaw, et al. 1977; Todres et al. 1977; Singer, et al.
1983; Levin 1985). An additional study is currently nearing completion 
(Guillemin 1985).
I will try to draw some general conclusions, although it is 
difficult to make comparisons because there were major differences in 
the design and phrasing of questions on the surveys. On each of the 
surveys, most clinicians expressed support of selective non-treatment 
for some cases. On the three surveys where clinicians were specifically 
asked if there were circumstances in which it is appropriate not to 
sustain life, 83% to 100% of the respondents agreed that for some 
infants, some aggressive treatments are not mandatory (Jonsen and 
Garland 1976; Shaw et al. 1977; Singer et al. 1983).
Respondents expressed less consensus when asked about treatment in 
specific cases. For example, when asked about treatment for infants 
with Downs syndrome and other complicating conditions, which would be 
routinely treated for newborns without impairments, four of the surveys
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from the 1970s indicated that approximately half the clinicians would 
treat aggressively (Crane 1975 [based on combined data on two 
vignettes]; McKilligin 1976; Todres et al. 1977; Shaw et al. 1977). On 
a survey conducted shortly after the announcement of the first "Baby Doe 
Directives" in 1983, almost 90% of the respondents said they would 
recommend intestinal surgery for a baby with Down's syndrome (Levin
1985).
On those surveys which asked about treatment of infants with 
meningomyeloceles at various levels and with various social and medical 
complications, 33% to 73% responded that that would recommend 
neurosurgery (Crane personal communication; Shaw et al. 1977; Todres et 
al. 1977).
Although selective non-treatment is often thought of in terms of 
"giving treatment" or "withholding treatment," in a modern hospital, a 
patient is virtually never "not treated" in the sense that no treatments 
are given. Rather, decisions about both giving and withholding 
treatment involve decisions about which treatments to give and which to 
withhold from the range of possibilities. Therefore, the important 
questions include not only: "Who should be treated?" and "Who should 
decide?" but "Which treatment should be given and which should be 
withheld?"
Since clinicians give patients some treatments while they withhold 
others from the same patients, they make distinctions based on 
characteristics of the treatments as well as characteristics of the
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patients. Such distinctions have been made for a long time and 
characterize decision making at least in the English speaking medical 
community. When Singer and his associates surveyed Australian 
pediatricians in 1981-82, more than three-quarters responded that they 
felt that it was important to distinguish between ordinary and 
extraordinary means of preserving life.
Variations in the rate at which clinicians would recommend 
withholding different treatments was reflected in the marginal data from 
Crane's survey, conducted in 1970-71 (see table III - 2).
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TABLE I I I  -  2
TREATMENT OF CONGENITAL ANOMALIES AND 
SEVERE BIRTH DEFECTS IN NEWBORNS
% who would give 
each treatment 
Yes Maybe No
1. INFANT WITH HYPOPLASTIC LEFT HEART
Intravenous fluids for maintenance 63 20 16
Medical management of congestive heart 
failure (i.e. digitalis, diuretics, oxygen) 77 10 12
Catheterization for diagnosis 60 17 21
Antibiotics for infection 52 20 25
Bag-breathing for respiratory distress 22 29 46
Respirator for respiratory distress 16 24 58
Resuscitation for cardio-respiratory arrest 17 13 66
2. INFANT WITH HIGH LUMBAR MYELOMENINGOCELE 
(20 y.o. parents, not H.S. grads)
Local antibiotic for myelomeningocele 41 14 40
Operation - early closure of defect 53 22 23
Manage urinary tract infection 72 14 12
Perform crede massage on the bladder 44 22 28
Shunt if hydrocephalus developed 47 21 28
If meningitis developed, would you treat? 60 18 20
If cardiac arrest, resuscitate? 20 15 62
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TABLE III - 2 (cont.)
% who would give
each treatment
Yes Maybe No
3. 1500 gm. INEANT WITH DOWNS' AND RESPIRATORY DISTRESS
(35 y.o. Mom wants child, limited financial resources)
Perform appropriate cultures (blood, CS 73 12 15
Treat with antibiotics 72 15 12
Correct acidosis 83 10 7
Pneumothorax, aspirate chest? 65 20 13
Stops breathing 2 min., bag breathe 2-3 hrs? 20 22 58
Respirator if apneic spells continue? 21 26 53
Resuscitate if cardiac arrest? 19 14 66
Based on responses from national sample of 232 pediatricians. 
Unpublished data from a larger study (Crane 1975).
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Observational Studies of Neonatal Intensive Care
A number of social scientists have conducted studies in neonatal 
intensive care units. Some have focused on the reactions of parents 
(Barnett et al. 1970) or their perceptions of their infants, on 
communication and interactions between staff and parents (Bogden, Brown 
and Foster 1982; Sosnowitz 1984), or on ethical issues involving 
families from different subcultures (Clausen 1985). Two social 
scientists reported their own experiences, and those of their older 
daughter, following the birth of their catastrophically ill newborn 
(Scrimshaw and March 1984). Some have examined the environment for 
infants (Newman 1980; Glass 1985). Other have looked at social factors 
pertaining to staff interactions with other staff members and patients 
(Weiner et al. 1979; Brody and Klein 1980).
There have been two major studies of neonatal care based primarily 
on participant observation. The first, by Renee Anspach, examined life 
and death decisions in two neonatal intensive care nurseries. She 
examined decisions from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge, 
relating decision to the social context in which they took place. A 
major finding is that attending physicians, residents and nurses, 
because of their experiences in the intensive care nursery, differ 
systematically in their views of infants' prognosis. She also discusses 
such issues as uncertainty in medical decision making, negotiations 
between parents and practitioners and negotiations among staff (Anspach 
forthcoming).
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Guillemin and Holmstrom (1986), in a new study just published on 
neonatal intensive care, report on their participant observation 
research in a neonatal intensive care unit and visits at fourteen other 
units in the U.S. and six other countries. They report on professional 
roles and responsibilities, the process of clinical decision making, and 
on the family in the NICU. They situate decisions within the larger 
context of the national organization of health care. They were struck 
by the similarities in organization and behavior from unit to unit in 
all of the NICUs they studied.
Although there are some differences between the units studied by 
Guillemin and Holmstrom and Anspach and the unit at Columbia, much of 
the process of decision making they describe is similar to that which I 
observed. Accounts in both studies reflect the importance of 
clinicians' conceptualizations of characteristics of patients and 
treatment. As I found at Columbia, there is variation in the 
categorizations of particular patients and/or treatments; overall the 
categorizations are similar. The decision making appears to be guided 
by the same norms and goals as those that will be discussed below.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CHOICE THOUGHTS:
CULTURAL CATEGORIES AND DECISION MAKING
The choices concerning the aggressiveness of treatment for a 
catastrophically ill newborn involve (1) the evaluation of 
characteristics of the patient condition and characteristics of the 
treatment options (2) in relation to the goals of treatment (3) guided 
by norms about clinical decision making. In order to make such choices, 
information about the patient, treatments and goals are evaluated 
according to culturally relevant categories. Disagreements about 
appropriate treatment decisions may result from differences between 
clinicians about the categorization of particular patients and 
treatments into the culturally relevant categories, variation concerning 
the goals of treatment, or differences in the norms to guide decision 
making.
In this chapter, I will briefly discuss some of the literature on 
decision making. Then I will present discussion of a cognitive model 
for decision making. Finally, I will present a model for making 
decisions about the care of catastrophically ill newborns. I do this to 
set the ground work for a discussion of how clinicians themselves think 
about the factors they find relevant in decision making. Much of what 
has been written on clinical decision making uses abstract categories 
defined outside the clinical context. These discussions often miss much
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of the complexity of actual clinical decision making. The complexity of 
categorization of patient condition, treatments and goals as well as the 
norms for decision making will be discussed in more detail in Chapters V 
through VII.
Review of the Medical Decision Making Literature
The model of decision making presented here draws primarily on 
work in the anthropological literature on decision making in natural 
settings. It is based on work done by cultural anthropologists and 
cognitive psychologists. Most of the work on medical decision making 
has been focused on developing formal analytic models of how clinicians 
should made decisions, the aim of this research, however, is to explore 
the concepts clinicians themselves use in decision making and to place 
those conceptualizations within the larger economic, political and 
social environment.
Most research on medical decision making has used quantitative 
methods. Much is prescriptive, intended for use by clinicians in making 
more rational diagnoses or treatment choices (Lusted, 1968; McNeil,
Keeler and Adelstein 1975; Pauker 1982). For example, Kassirer 
developed a model for use in determining if a patient suspected of 
having a particular condition, subphrenic abscess, should have surgery.
He builds a decision tree based on probability values and assigned 
utility values for the value of various outcomes (100 for no surgery and
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spontaneous recovery, 65 for correction after serious surgical 
complications, and 0 for death) (Kassirer 1976).
Other quantitative work investigates the impact of various 
sociological factors on decision making by clinicians including 
characteristics of the patient, characteristics of the clinician, the 
clinician's interaction with his profession and the health care system 
and the clinician's relationship with the patient (Eisenberg 1979).
Such factors as the number of physicians in a geographic area (Wennberg 
and Gittelsohn 1982), the nature of the practice setting (Fink, 
Colombotos and Barr 1984) and the medical specialty (Greenwald et al. 
1984) have been shown to affect medical decision making.
Some of the research on clinical decision making has focused on 
psychological factors (Elstein et al. 1982). For example, Elstein and 
his colleagues have sought to discover the cognitive processes used by 
clinicians in making decisions. They have examined the steps used by 
experienced and novice clinicians in diagnosis (Elstein, Shulman and 
Sprafka 1978). Wallstein examined sources of bias in decision making 
(1981).
Although there are exceptions, almost all of the research on 
clinical decision making assumes that the usual goals of treatment, cure 
and the preservation of life, are the goals of the decision makers.
While they are the primary goals in most medical decisions, decision 
making about the aggressiveness of treatment for catastrophically ill 
infants involves decision making ii\ those situations in which cure is
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not felt to be possible or probable and the value of the continuation of 
life is brought into question.
Studies on decision making in those situations where the value of 
preserving life is questioned was reviewed in Chapters II and III. In 
sum, there has been relatively little social science research in this 
area. The major work remains the study by Crane (1975) based primarily 
on a large scale sample survey of physician attitudes. A recent study 
examined what treatments residents intended to have withheld when they 
wrote no-code (do no resuscitate) orders for actual patients, and 
compared them with the interpretation of other residents who took care 
of the same patients. They found "both the intention and interpretation 
of no-code orders were characterized by variability, and interpretation 
of the orders was characterized by uncertainty as well" (Uhlmann, Cassel 
and McDonald 1984).
There is some work which has endeavored to devise models to 
incorporate value considerations into formal, prescriptive models for 
decision making. Some of the research has looked at differences in the 
way people value various types of risks (Pochin 1982; McClain 1983). 
Studies have also examined preferences for various outcomes (Eraker and 
Sox 1981; Berwick and Weinstein 1985) including some in which the 
benefits of survival are weighed against other values (McNeil, 
Weichselbaum, and Pauker 1981; McNeil and Pauker 1979). However, there 
has been little work on this area. Most of it has, out of necessity, 
had to delimit the factors examined which might influence decision 
making in order to use quantitative methods.
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Most of the work on clinical decision making has been based on 
chart review or consolidated quantitative data about treatment decision, 
procedures, admissions, discharge data etc. or the use of surveys or 
formal interview schedules. While informed by the current research on 
clinical decision making, the methods and aim of the research reported 
in this dissertation lies closer to the work of medical anthropologists 
and sociologists who have used participant observation, historical and 
document analysis and interview techniques.
The purpose of the work is to explore the complexity of factors 
influencing clinical behavior. In some ways, it was inspired by and 
builds on the work of those who used participant observation to study 
clinicians' behavior towards the critically ill, such as Glaser and 
Strauss (1965; 1968), Sudnow (1967), Fox and Swazey (1974) and Bluebond- 
Langer (1978), and on the work of others who have done participant 
observation research in clinical settings such as Bosk (1979). It is 
also related to research on the social construction of medical work 
(Foucault 1975; Hahn and Gaines 1985; Wright and Treacher 1982; Atkinson 
and Heath 1981). A few qualitative studies have examined clinical 
decision making. These include decision making pertaining to prenatal 
diagnosis (Rapp 1986; Rothman 1986), a study of decision making by 
surgeons (Katz 1985), and a study of differences in decision making in 
different specialties (Burkett and Knafl 1974).
As reviewed in Chapter III, there have been two major participant 
observation studies of neonatal intensive care (Anspach forthcoming;
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Guillemin and Holmstrom 1986). While Anspach examined clinician's 
conceptualization of prognosis, neither has utilized the frameworks 
developed by cognitive anthropologists who have worked on decision 
making in natural settings.
Work of anthropologists working on decision making in natural 
settings has been useful in providing a frame work with which to 
research clinical decision making. Their work had dealt with decision 
making in a variety of settings. Some of it has concerned decision 
making in relation to economic activities such as agricultural decision 
making (Barlett 1980) and shopping decisions (Murtaugh 1984) and 
conflict resolution (Quinn 1976). There has been research on medical 
decision making in natural settings but it has generally concerned 
choice between medical systems or within a traditional medical system 
(Kleinman 1980; Young 1981). Some of the understandings of cognitive 
anthropologists about categorizations, goals, and norms and their use in 
the process of decision making will be presented in the course of this 
chapter.
A Decision Making Model
The model that I will later use to describe clinical decision 
making about the aggressiveness of treatment in intensive care is based 
on a more general model of decision making (see Figure IV - 1). This 
model is based in part on work by Spradley (1972) and other cognitive 
anthropologists. According to that model, in order to act, an
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individual must organize information about factors relevant to the 
problem being addressed. Cultural knowledge systems function to "(1) 
provide a scheme for the storage of knowledge in memory, (2) to select 
appropriate knowledge for problem solving; and (3) to supply a logic for 
solution of a problem" (Nardi 1983:697-98). Sensory stimuli which are 
perceived by the individual are cognitively organized into categories. 
Categorization involves deciding how a particular case fits into a class 
of similar entities. Norms (or cultural rules) indicate relationships 
between categories and provide prescriptive guides about behavior on a 
cognitive level which are then translated into concrete behavioral acts 
and performed. The categorization of stimuli, the norms, and 
translation from categories to acts are all influenced by the context -- 
political, economic, social, technological and ideological factors from 
the environment at both microsocial and macrosocial levels.
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MODEL OF DECISION MAKING
Political, Economic, Social, Ideological, and Technological Environment
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Perception Cognition Behavior
Perception and Categorization
When humans behave, they make choices (conscious or unconscious) 
between possible behavioral options based on categorizations of 
perceived phenomena. While perceptions are in part determined by the 
physical stimuli, perception also depends on the interpretation of the 
observer and are, in part, culturally determined. (Berlin and Kay,
1969) In order to be acted upon, such perceptions must be organized
cognitively. One way the quantity of stimuli is simplified is by
division of aspects of the perceptual stream into categories. For
example, rather than differentiating each shade, a variety of shades may 
be referred to as "red" in some circumstances. Sometimes there may be 
finer distinctions reflected in more differentiation within categories. 
For example, tones such as "crimson," "wine," and "rose," may be 
differentiated within the "red" category. Criteria for categorization 
may be physical traits alone, or may involve subjective dimensions.
Multifactorial Categorization
While some categorizations are made on single traits, others 
involve many dimensions. Categorizations may be based on emotional 
quality such as "scary" versus "comical" to categorize movies, or may 
involve complex moral evaluation of behavior such as "forthright" versus 
"underhanded" acts. Multifactorial categorization may be used to 
simplify very complex phenomena. Such categorization is used in 
clinical settings. For example, a judgment may be made that an infant
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is "at risk" for neurological impairment on the basis of results of 
ultrasound data, electronic tests of brain activity, lab tests, as well 
as "soft signs" of tone, activity, etc.
Discrete and Overlapping Categories
Much of the ethnoscientific work in anthropology has concerned the 
explication or classification of biological species and diseases that 
are presumed to form discrete categories, often hierarchically arranged 
(Casson 1981:75-91). For example, Frake studied the diagnosis of 
disease among the Subanun of Mindanao. He found that disease terms 
formed a taxonomic hierarchy comprised of different sets of contrasting 
categories. The categories of any one level were included in the 
category at the next level. For example, at one level a "sore" was 
distinguished from a "bite," while at the next level they were both 
categorized together as "skin disease" (1961:117-118). Similarly, much 
of the clinical decision making literature has focused on discrete 
choices such as making a diagnosis (assumed to be a discrete entity) or 
whether to order a test or do a procedure such as surgery.
Ranked and Relational Categories
Beside models based on hierarchically arranged, discrete 
categories, however, other model of categorizations can be designed. 
Rather than simply discrete categories, categories may refer to a
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collection of points on a ranked or continuous dimension. For example, 
Galdwin and Murtaugh, in a study of car choice, used four 
"transportation requirement" categories: (l) cars for a large family, 
(2) cars for a small family, (3) limited family use car, and (4) single 
person car (1984:218).
Relative as well as absolute features can also be used to form 
categories (Casson 1981:86). For example, in some situations a color - 
"color A" - may not be categorized as "purple" but as "more blue" or 
"less blue" than another color, "color B" The fact that such a 
categorization is relative, is illustrated by the fact that (the less 
blue) "color A" shade may be considered "more blue" than yet another 
color, "color C". On an ordered dimension, there may be clear, 
operationalized, breaking points between categories or there may be no 
clear divisions.
Most of the cognitive anthropological work on categorization may 
be seen as pertaining to noun categories (e. g. disease categories, 
species, color names). Th'ese are seen as discrete entities. A number 
of features may be used to define each category having to do with form, 
function etc. Criteria are used to determine which category an entity 
belongs in and theoretically, each entity would only belong in one such 
category at the same hierarchical level. There may be variation in how 
an item is categorized because individuals may use different criteria 
for categorization (Kempton 1978).
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Other categories may be thought of more as adjectival or 
adverbial. They are used to identify characteristics of things or 
actions. While color terms can be looked at as "nouns" themselves, they 
can also be used to refer to aspects of other things - for example, they 
can be used to describe furniture. A red chair, a blue chair, etc.
Other categorical judgments can be make about the same entities in 
another domain. For example, in describing the appearance of a chairs, 
one could talk about them as hard or soft. One could also look at 
another domain, for example, having to do with value. One could make 
judgments about price, about whether it was a name brand or not, etc.
In trying to make a decision about which chair to buy, one could 
consider characteristics of chairs in two domains, "Appearance" and 
"Value":
CHAIRS
CHARACTERISTICS OF APPEARANCE
color
texture
material
CHARACTERISTICS OF VALUE 
price
workmanship
brand
Some elements significant in determining the category in one 
domain may be relevant in making categorization in another. For 
example, the material that a chair is made of (if it has gold trim), may 
be part of what determines price. Likewise, workmanship, in part, is 
related to appearance, as well as value. But, if one wanted to discuss 
how people think about making a decision about which chair to buy, you 
could discuss considerations about characteristics in each of these two
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domains. Entities can be categorized on all characteristics from each 
domain (although all may not be relevant for a particular decision).
Some categorizations describe a relationship between attributes. 
For example, one could refer to a purchase as extravagant. This 
categorization would depend not only on the price of the chair, but 
would also depend on the relationship of the price to other domains, 
like the purchaser's budget, which could be seen as forming part of the 
context of the decision.
Some of the categories that I will refer to as characteristics of 
patient condition and treatment are relational categories. For example, 
I will discuss categorizations of treatments as ordinary and 
extraordinary. These are defined by clinicians both by characteristics 
of the treatments and by their benefits to patients. Categorization of 
blood pressure provides a clinical illustration of such categorizations. 
Blood pressure is sometimes discussed as "high," "normal" or "low" blood 
pressure as if it fell in discrete categories (although it is based on a 
continuous dimension). A patient whose blood pressure measures a given 
amount may be seen as having "high blood pressure" or "low blood 
pressure." The categorization does not depend on the value of the blood 
pressure measurement alone, however. Such factors as age, whether or 
not the patient is pregnant, will affect how the blood pressure is 
categorized. Therefore, a value which is seen as "high" blood pressure 
for one patient, may be seen as "normal," or even "low" for another.
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Variations in Categorizations Between Individuals
Categorization about some phenomena may be universally shared by 
all members of a culture. Sometimes, however, categorizations vary 
among individuals of different social groups or even between individuals 
within a social group (Mervis and Rosch 1981). This may occur because 
of differences in the perceptions about the stimuli which are considered 
in making the categorization (either because of physical differences - 
one person may see red while someone who is partially red/green color 
blind may see black, or because one person may have learned to 
discriminate shocking pink from coral while another has not), because 
there are differences in opinions about what is important in defining 
the category (one may discriminate more on brightness while another on 
hue when categorizing as purple or pink), or differences concerning the 
cut off points between categories (some may define aqua as green while 
another may see it as blue).
Returning to a clinical example, clinicians may vary in how they 
interpret an X-ray. A number of physicians may examine the same x- ray 
but may come to different conclusions about the diagnosis of the patient 
because of differences in equipment or eye sight, differences in 
training or differences in criteria used in making a diagnosis. (For 
fuller discussion of physician variation see Eddy 1984.)
There also may be differences because clinicians disagree about 
the criteria to use. For example, one clinician may feel that for an 
adult male, a diastolic blood pressure of 95 is normal, while another
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clinician may feel that it is abnormal and prescribe antihypertensive 
medication.
Categorizations in Cultural Contexts
Categorizations may also vary for the same individuals when asked 
to make categorizations in different contexts. For example, in many 
indigenous medical systems, foods are categorized as "hot" or "cold". A 
food which is considered hot in one context, such as healing, may not be 
considered "hot" in another (Mathews 1983). This is true as well in the 
clinical situation; a heart rate which may be high at rest, may be 
normal after exercise.
Attentive and Preattentive Categorizations
Categorizations may be made consciously by an individual when 
confronted with a new situation or a categorization may be preattentive 
- made unconsciously according to previously learned criteria (Murtaugh 
1980). For example, if shopping for dining room chairs, one might 
categorize a number of chair as falling in the category of dining room 
chairs preattentively, without consciously thinking about whether they 
were the appropriate height, material, etc. If one encountered one, 
however, that wasn't clearly a member of the category, one might 
consciously consider whether or not it was a member of the category 
"dining room chairs."
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Similarly, in the clinical context, a nurse in the emergency room 
screening incoming patients could make a preattentive categorization 
that a patient who was bleeding heavily from a gun shot wound was a 
"seriously ill patient," while she might have to consciously evaluate 
the criteria to decide if a child who arrive with abdominal pain was 
"seriously ill."
Norms
Norms have been defined a number of ways by anthropologists and 
sociologists. According to Cancian, a typical definition of norms is a 
combination of "two elements (1) shared rules or beliefs about how a 
person should behave (2) that are backed by sanctions, or are the 
criteria for reward and punishment" (Cancian 1976:357). Social 
scientists have varied in the extent to which they use "norm" to refer 
to the ideal prescription about how people should behave as opposed to 
using "norm" as a behavior rule that provides guidance for real 
behavior. In this dissertation, I am using the concept of norm to refer 
to cultural rules that guide behavior, or provide "patterns for action" 
(Schneider 1976). More abstract ideals providing prescriptive guides 
about how people should behave, as well as other types of desirable 
ends, will be discussed in terms of "goals" (see below).
An example of a behavioral norm is "Stop at the corner when you 
see a red light. When the light turns green, drive through
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"intersection and wait until the light turns green." Norms guide 
clinical behavior as well. For example, clinicians are explicitly told 
to do a throat culture before giving antibiotics for a mild sore throat. 
If it is a protocol they follow, then for them it is a behavioral norm. 
Other physician follow a norm which dictates that they should let the 
patient feel they are "doing something" when they come for an office 
visit. Guided by that norm, a physician may order antibiotics without a 
throat culture. There are other informal norms to orient clinical 
practice. For example, Scheff (1963) identified a norm that guides 
physician behavior that it is better to judge a well person sick, than a 
sick person well. Bosk (1979) identified a norm in relation to surgical 
mistakes - "To forgive and remember."
Changes in Norms by Context
Cultural rules may vary by context (Wallace 1972). For example, 
the rules about stopping at a red light may be generally true, but may 
vary by context. For example, it may apply in most circumstances, 
however, it may not guide the behavior of some individuals if the light 
has just turned red. For others, who generally obey the rule, the rule 
may be modified late at night if there is no policeman present. In that 
context, they may follow a rule such as, "drive up to the intersection, 
look both ways, then drive through." Or, the rule may not apply if the 
actor is in a particular role, for example, an ambulance driver in an 
emergency situation. In the clinical situation, as the cultural norm to 
treat may be modified in the situation in which the treatment itself is
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very risky and the likelihood of lasting problems from the condition is 
small. As will be discussed in Chapter VIII, both norms and the meaning 
of norms for decision making about newborns have varied as conditions 
from the larger context have changed.
Goals-*-
Behavior may vary according to the goal. "Goals comprise the aims 
and aspiration, whether object or actions, that a person values and 
strives after" (Nardi 1983:689). For example, if one's goal is to go 
straight ahead, one may have to stop at a red light before going through 
an intersection. If, however, one want to turn right, in some contexts, 
one may be able to turn after a full stop.
Actors act in order to achieve certain goals. One can look at a 
set of goals at a number of levels of abstraction. For example, at one 
level, the usual goal of driving a car is to get somewhere. A 
subsidiary goal may be to exhibit one's new sports car. At another 
level of abstraction, one can look at goals in terms of the desire to 
earn money; driving to work contributes towards that goal. At yet more
-*- One can use the concept of goals to encompass the concepts 
sometimes referred to as norms, when norm is used for ideal prescriptive 
statements. For example, in some models "Honor thy mother and father" 
would be considered a norm. In this model, it would be a goal. "Don't 
use foul language in front of your parents," or would be an example of a 
norm, a prescriptive statement about behavior oriented toward achieving 
the abstract, ideal goal. "Don't use language in front of your parents 
that they wouldn't use" would be an example of a norm that changed, 
although the underlying goal of respect for parents could remain the 
same.
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abstract levels, one can look at such goal as satisfying basic needs 
(e.g. hunger, thirst) or to achieve sense of self esteem. An 
individual may be able to achieve the same goal a number of different 
ways in the same context, or there may be constraints on options.
One can look at goals at different levels of abstraction in the 
clinical context too. For example, at a low level of abstraction, one 
may want to increase the level of oxygen in the blood and therefore 
increase the rate, pressure or concentration of oxygen on respirator 
settings. At a higher level, the same behavior can be seen as working 
toward the goal of preserving the life of the patient. At a still more 
abstract level, the goal may be to continue the existence of a socially 
active member of a family.
Sometimes goals may come into conflict. For example, the desire 
to show off a new sports car may come into conflict with the goal of 
driving safely. Similarly, the goal of trying to minimize the chance of 
brain damage (from too little oxygen) may conflict with the goal of 
trying to minimize the chance of eye damage (from too much oxygen). At 
other times, goals from different levels of abstraction may conflict.
For example, the goal of minimizing the chance of infection may conflict 
with the goal of maximizing the chance of an older sibling to establish 
a good relationship with a newborn.
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The Process of Decision Making
In making a decision, one considers what to do about a situation, 
based on perceptions, by categorizing phenomena, and acting according to 
norms in order to satisfy goals.
Some parts of the decision making process take place consciously, 
however, much of the decision making process may take place at an 
unconscious or preattentive level. For example, in making a choice 
about what to eat for lunch, an individual may unconsciously eliminate 
foods which are culturally defined as inappropriate food choices (cat 
food) and those which are inappropriate in a given context (e.g. 
cheerios which is a "breakfast food" or filet mignon which is a "dinner 
food.") One can think of these in terms of choices governed by norms 
about the appropriate categories of food choices: "Eat food which is 
appropriate for human consumption" and "Eat food appropriate to the time 
of day."
In the clinical context, there are many potential options which 
are never consciously considered. For example, artificial insemination 
provides an opportunity for a woman to give birth to a healthy child 
even if both she and her husband carry a rare recessive gene with a one 
in four risk of occurrence. Although her husband would be the child's 
social father, he would not be the biological father. Some genetic 
counselors do not routinely raise the possibility of donor insemination 
to the carriers of genetic diseases presumably because they don't think
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that the couple would find it an acceptable option (Barbara Katz 
Rothman, personal communication).
Next the actor may preattentively or unconsciously consider which 
culturally appropriately options are alternatives by an approach known 
as elimination by aspects. (Tversky 1972) First, a set of criteria are 
generated to use in making choices. Possibilities may be reviewed in a 
hierarchical fashion (Galdwin et al. 1984). They may be judged on one 
criteria first, and only those that rate as acceptable on that criteria 
may be considered in relation to the next. Those possibilities which do 
not meet certain criteria, such as easy availability (no tuna in the 
cupboard) are eliminated. There may be a number of criteria by which 
alternatives are serially evaluated. After one criterion, availability, 
the actor may consider others one at a time, or the advantages and 
disadvantages of a number of possibilities may be considered at once 
according to a number of criteria (e.g. baloney, salmon, fried eggs 
may all be considered at once in terms of utility values such as cost, 
ease of preparation and taste). Each possibility is also considered in 
relation to larger goals (to satisfy hunger, to have a pleasant 
experience, to return quickly to work).
Similar processes take place in a clinical context as well. For 
example, suppose a patient presents in the clinic complaining of 
abdominal pain. The clinician hopes to discover the diagnosis. Certain 
types of diagnostic procedures are ruled out as inappropriate 
preattentively in a Western medical setting, such as divination. Other 
potential methods of diagnosis, such as those that are very costly
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and/or involve the use of sophisticated technology, such as use of a CAT 
scan or NMR that may be appropriate in some contexts, would not be for 
first presentation with mild abdominal pain. Such alternatives are 
eliminated without conscious thought. Other alternatives such as 
ultrasound, a lower GI series, liver function tests or an IVP may be 
evaluated in terms of such criteria as staff time, cost, availability of 
equipment, discomfort for patient, future risks, etc.) The utility 
values of various choices in relation to various goals will be 
considered. The goals of trying to cure the patient, bringing relief 
from pain to the patient, educating the student, finishing quickly in 
order to help as many other clinic patients as possible or leave early, 
or discovering a patient with an unusual condition, may all be 
considered in evaluating diagnostic procedures. Such decision making, 
or parts of the decision making process, may be 1) standardized by use 
of a protocol, 2) may be learned in the process or socialization or 
through repetition, or 3) may take place consciously in a particular 
case. Through an elimination of aspects, a decision might be made that 
a liver scan is too expensive, an IVP is too risky, and a few particular 
tests, such as a lower GI series and an ultrasound may be ordered.
The Context of Decision Making
Numerous factors from the larger social, political, economic and 
technological environment affect the process of decision making. They 
both enable choices and establish constraints on behavior. For example, 
consider clinicians in an emergency room. Options are determined in
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part by the level of technological development of the society, and also 
by equipment available at the institution. The costs of use of the 
equipment, determined by factors outside of the institution, and the 
policies concerning use of the equipment within the institution affect 
it's use. The sanctions exerted for over or under utilizing tests, the 
possibility of a malpractice suit as well as the relationships 
established with patients, the patients' past history and current living 
situation, and clinicians' training and personality may affect decisions 
made. Although the cognitive approach can help in understanding the 
meaning of factors from the larger environment to the actors involved - 
how they are perceived, interpreted and utilized - the factors 
themselves must be taken as given.
Decision Making About the Aggressiveness of Treatment
The model of decision making has proven useful in studying how 
decisions are made about the aggressiveness of treatment for 
catastrophically ill newborns. In order to make choices concerning 
treatment behavior, clinicians must evaluate the suitability of various 
possible treatment options for particular patients. Such decisions 
involve the categorization of characteristics of patient conditions and 
treatments and also involve evaluations about which choices would 
further the achievement of desired goals.
For example, a decision might be made that a patient should have 
heart surgery because she would be able to enjoy a good quality of life.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In another case, a decision might be made that a patient should not be 
put on a respirator because such extraordinary treatment would be 
undesirable for a patient who is terminally ill. Such decisions cannot 
be reduced and made on the basis of physiological criteria alone but 
involve categorizations into culturally defined categories such as "good 
quality of life," "terminal illness" and "extraordinary treatment". For 
example, categorizations about the "quality of life" depend not only on 
the physiological findings but also on ideas concerning the 
stigmatization of those with disability and the societal circumstances 
which facilitate or impede realizing satisfactions with a disability.
Treatment decisions also depend on value judgments about what 
types of behaviors and outcomes are desirable —  these clinical norms 
and goals are also culturally defined. For example, one goal may be the 
preservation of life. The cultural definition of life and death (see 
Chapter II) will, in part, determine the meaning of the goal.
In making treatment decisions, I have found the following model 
useful for understanding how clinicians make decisions and how 
clinicians categorize patient condition and treatment characteristics. 
(This is not a model that is consciously used by clinicians. While it 
can be used to represent the dimensions discussed by clinicians, it does 
not purport to be the only model, or necessarily an actual model, used 
by clinicians for conceptualizing this issue.)
As I will discuss below, although categorizations of particular 
patient conditions or treatments may be described as if each category
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was dichotomous, each of these dimensions of patient condition and 
treatment characteristics can be seen as forming a continuum.
While, on the whole, there is agreement among clinicians that each 
of these dimensions are relevant in decisions making, there is variation 
in how particular patient conditions and treatments are categorized on a 
given dimension and on the importance of each dimension.
In the following chapters, I will discuss each of these 
characteristics of patient condition and treatment and illustrate the 
ways in which they are culturally determined. I will describe each, 
discuss the dimensions involved in defining the characteristics, and 
present areas of consensus and variability among clinicians. I will 
explain how these relate to elements of the wider clinical and societal 
context of decision making.
Although each of these dimensions may be discussed separately for 
analytical purposes, they are, in the context of neonatal decision 
making, interrelated. In some cases, the categorizations on one 
dimension may be heavily influenced by categorizations on other 
dimensions. Examples of this will also be discussed below. (Please see 
Figure IV - 2, next page.)
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MODEL OF DECISION MAKING
START WITH COLLECTION OF DATA
"Data" are collected about the condition of the infant. 
Information consists of perceptions collected through the senses 
(physical features, skin color, tone) and through such means as lab 
test, radiographic exams, electronic monitoring. Information on the 
patient's history, social situation, etc.
Information is also selected that is culturally defined as 
relevant about the patient's condition and treatment options from 
previous clinical studies and past experience (e.g. natural history of 
disease, outcome, equipment and staff time involved in treatment, pain 
etc).
Selective collection and attention to data are informed by 
socialization and cultural norms. While some of the data collection is 
consciously done, some is preattentive.
CATEGORIZE INFORMATION INTO CULTURALLY RELEVANT CATEGORIES
Information is translated into culturally meaningful terms by 
organizing data in relation to characteristics of patient conditions and 
treatments. The following categories can be used to represent the 
culturally meaningful categories.
PATIENT CONDITION CHARACTERISTICS
Quality of life 
Uncertainty 
Nature of the Critical Condition 
Social Value
TREATMENT CHARACTERISTICS
Aggressiveness 
Ordinary/Extraordinary 
Withholding/Withdrawing Treatment 
Active/Passive Euthanasia
These categorization are, in part, based on the data collected 
above but also involve subjective evaluations informed by the socially 
determined values of the decision makers.
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CONSIDERATION OF THE GOALS OF TREATMENT
The condition of the patient and the treatment options are 
considered in terms of the goals of treatment:
GOALS
To cure 
To Care 
To Preserve Life 
To do no harm
DECISION MAKING ABOUT HOW AGGRESSIVE TO BE IN TREATMENT GUIDED BY 
CLINICAL NORMS
It is this step in the decision making process which is usually 
thought of as THE DECISION. It involves making the principle decision 
about how aggressive to be in treatment. A decision is made about which 
goal(s) will be maximized and how they will be achieved in a manner 
which is appropriate given the patient and treatment characteristics.
The decision is guided by the norms of clinical decision making.
TRANSLATION OF DECISION FROM CATEGORIES TO BEHAVIOR
The decision is meaningful in cultural terms but does not specify 
behavioral acts. The decision has to be translated from a decision at 
an abstract level to "preserve life," or to "give ordinary treatments 
but not extraordinary ones" into a decision about what specific 
treatments to give and which to withhold.
TREATMENT BEHAVIOR
Actions are performed to provide treatment to the infants.
CONTEXT
The entire decision making process occurs within the context of 
technological, ideological, social, economic, and political factors. 
Technological factors include the high technology of neonatal intensive 
care. Ideological factors include the traditions of medical ethics and 
societal values related to children, death, and impairment. The social 
factors include the attitudes and relationships of families and 
caregivers, and the health care system. Economic factors include the 
systems of third party supports and the larger capitalist system which 
supports the NICU. Political factors include larger political issues 
concerned with the rights and duties of families and the state, and 
legal definitions of life and death. All of these, plus many other 
aspects of the larger environment shape norms and categorizations and 
help determine the decisions which take place.
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Summary
After a brief review of the literature on decision making, a model 
was outlined for use in examining decision making in natural settings. 
The importance of cultural factors in perception, was discussed. 
Multifactorial, discrete and overlapping, and ranked and relational 
categories were explicated as well as variation in categorizations 
between individuals, categorizations in cultural contexts and attentive 
and preattentive categorization. Norms, goals and the process of 
decision making was discussed. Finally, a model for the examination of 
treatment decisions in neonatology was introduced.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EXAMINING BABY DATA: CHARACTERISTICS OF PATIENT CONDITION
As discussed in the previous chapter, decision making about the 
aggressiveness of treatment for newborns involves the evaluation of 
characteristics of patient conditions and treatments and classification 
into culturally defined categories. In this chapter the cultural 
categorizations of characteristics of patient conditions will be
discussed. The main dimensions to be discussed are quality of life,
uncertainty, nature of the critical condition, and social value. Other 
patient condition characteristics categories sometimes used by 
clinicians are discussed under these main headings.
Quality of Life
Quality of life has been defined a number of ways. (Pres. Comm. 
1983:299; Njaman and Levine 1981; Van Dam, Sommers and Van Beck-Couzijn 
1981; Arras forthcoming).
According to Wenger, Mattson, Furberg and Elinson:
Quality of life may be defined in terms of 3 major
components: functional capacity, perceptions and symptoms
and their consequences. Functional capacity has 5 
subcomponents: the ability to perform activities of daily 
life, social function, intellectual function, emotional 
function and the often-resultant economic status.
Perceptions are a person's views and value judgment of the
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components; of concern are perceptions of general health 
status, level of well-being and satisfaction with life. 
Symptoms of the disease, whether induced by treatment or 
concurrent illness, or reduced or abolished by the 
intervention are the third major component. They may 
influence functional capacity and perceptions; in fact, all 
3 are interrelated.
(1984:908)
A working definition of quality of life may be taken to be the 
overall balance of positives (pleasure, satisfaction, etc.) versus 
negatives (pain, sadness, etc.) experienced by an individual over a 
period of time. In the present study, when not otherwise specified, 
"quality of life" is used only to refer to considerations of the quality 
of life as judged from the perspective of the individual patient. 
Considerations pertaining to the future quality of life for others, such 
as family members, will be referred to as "social value" considerations 
(these will be discussed below, at the end of this chapter).
In addition to quality of life, a variety of terms have been used 
when referring to considerations along this dimension. These include: 
"prognosis" (Crane 1975), a "best interest standard," (Arras 1985) or 
the "amount of pain and suffering" (Murray, 1984). Each of these 
domains will be discussed here in the section on quality of life.
Quality of life is the first dimension usually considered by 
clinicians in decision making concerning the possibility of withholding 
treatment. In the neonatal intensive care unit, if a clinician feels 
that a baby has a significant chance of enjoying an acceptable quality 
of life, then a decision will usually be made to provide all treatment
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necessary in order to maximize the probability of survival. The only 
major exceptions occur in situations which involve very experimental 
and/or expensive treatments including those which involve a very rare 
resource (e.g. a liver or heart transplant) (see Chapter VII).
The vast majority of infants admitted to NICUs, are felt to have a 
significant chance of having at least an acceptable quality of life.
Most are expected to be "normal" and have a good capacity to have a 
good quality of life. Usually this evaluation is made without conscious 
consideration; for most babies, the possibility of limiting treatment is 
not considered.
The next largest category of babies admitted to an NICU is 
comprised of those babies who are terminally ill, and who could not 
survive for long no matter what treatment decisions were made. While 
decisions are often made to withhold treatments from such babies, such 
decisions are not usually seen as ethically problematic or as involving 
quality of life considerations. (For a discussion of the complexity of 
such decisions and the way in which they do involve quality of life 
considerations, see below, section on the critical condition).
1 Murphy (1966) has written about the fact that "normal" entails 
more than a notion of a statistical norm. It must also encompass 
philosophical dimensions about the meaning of deviations from a 
statistical norm. "Normal" as used by the clinicians in the NICU 
usually refers to an infant who will have no, or only minor, 
impairments. Clinicians vary in where they draw the line between 
"normal" and "abnormal."
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When clinicians think about ethically problematic decisions to 
withhold treatments, they are usually thinking about decisions for a 
third category of infants —  those who could survive with certain 
treatments but who would be expected to have a very poor quality of 
life. It is in these cases that clinicians may consciously consider 
withholding treatment.
Quality of life involves a number of components. In making 
decisions in the NICU, quality of life is usually thought of primarily 
in terms of the degree of physical and/or mental impairment. Quality of
life is also sometimes discussed in terms of the amount of pain and
suffering experienced by the baby. Clinicians also sometimes talk about 
a quality of life worth living as one in which a person can interact
meaningfully with others, sometimes described as having the capacity to
give or receive love.
In the survey I conducted in 1983 on attitude about neonatal 
decisions (see appendix), the respondents, the majority of whom were 
clinicians working in neonatal intensive care or other health care 
professionals, were asked to express their opinions about the basis for 
decisions by indicating which of 21 factors they felt should be 
important when deciding about the care of individual newborns. About 
two thirds of the respondents indicated that they felt one of the 
quality of life considerations - severity of intellectual impairment, 
severity of physical impairment, amount of prolonged pain and suffering, 
or capacity to give and receive love - should be the most important 
factor. Among respondents, there was consensus that severity of
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intellectual impairment and amount of prolonged pain and suffering 
should be among the important factors considered in decision making. In 
addition, parents' wishes, which some clinicians used to indicate that 
parents should be able to make quality of life decisions, and 
uncertainty about the extent of impairment, which also relates to 
quality of life, were circled as most important by an additional sixth 
of respondents (see Table V-l).
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TABLE V - l
IMPORTANCE OF SPECIFIC FACTORS FOR DECISION MAKING
n = 249 Percent who Percent who
thought thought
it should be it should be 
THE MOST AN
important important
Factor factor factor
Severity of intellectual impairment 29 87
Amount of prolonged pain and suffering 20 77
Severity of physical impairment 15 72
Parents1 wishes 15 69
Capacity to give and receive love 4 30
If chance of successful treatment is
small 3 47
Uncertainty about extent of impairment 3 42
If non-treatment would be active
euthanasia 3 21
Impact on parents 2 49
If treatments are heroic 2 33
Danger of lessening the "value of life" 2 25
If treatments are already started 2 18
Long term cost of caring for disabled
child and adult 0 38
Financial burden to the family 0 33
Impact on siblings 0 30
Availability of resources for other
sick children 0 26
Ability of the parents to have other
healthy children 0 20
Cost of neonatal intensive care 0 20
Availability of resources for other
medical care 0 19
Availability of resources for other,
non-medical social needs 0 18
Feelings of staff caring for baby 0 15
Other factors 1 6
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Although both physicians and nurses indicated that they felt that 
quality of life considerations should be the most important, they 
differed in the rates at which they cited individual factors. More 
neonatologists cited the amount of intellectual impairment (45% vs 25%), 
whereas more neonatal nurses thought that the amount of prolonged pain 
and suffering should be the most important factor (28% vs 3%).
Prognosis related to degree of impairment
The elements described above which are seen as indicating future 
quality of life all have to do with the physical and intellectual 
capacity of the infant. The impairment alone does not determine quality 
of life, for it is also determined by the meaning of the impairment for 
the individual in a given social environment.
In general, clinicians feel that the type of impairment that would 
have the most devastating impact on the future quality of life is mental 
impairment, especially if it is severe. In most cases where the 
withholding of treatment is considered, there is thought to be a 
significant neurological impairment. In the survey, about a quarter of 
the respondents, (almost half the neonatologists) felt that the severity 
of intellectual impairment should be the most important factor in 
decision making. In addition, a few respondents indicated that the 
capacity to give and receive love should be most important, which is 
also related to the degree of neurological impairment. There was a
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clear consensus with almost nine out of ten respondents indicating 
intellectual impairment as one of three most important factors.
Some of the infants who are cared for in an NICU have devastating 
mental impairments that leave them unaware of their surrounding. Almost 
all clinicians would agree that such infants should not be treated 
aggressively. Some others are left minimally aware of their 
environment, including the attention of caretakers. While a few 
clinicians feel that even minimal awareness (being able to enjoy rocking 
and attention from parents, for example) does provide a quality of life 
worth living, it appears that most do not.
Others babies, of course, have more moderate or even mild 
impairments. In talking about intellectual impairments as a factor to 
consider in decision making, most clinicians are concerned about severe 
impairments. Some clinicians would consider non-treatment for an infant 
with more moderate impairments, such as someone who as an adult would 
have the intellectual capacity of a baby, toddler, or preschool child. 
Other clinicians would not consider non-treatment for such infants.
Most clinicians are disturbed at the thought that someone would withhold 
treatment because of mild mental retardation. A number of the children 
who leave the NICU have mild mental impairments including learning 
disabilities. Many clinicians believe that the majority of their 
critically ill infants could be considered at risk for such problems 
(although only a minority develop significant ones). They are not 
considered grounds for non-treatment.
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About a seventh of the respondents listed the severity of physical 
impairment as the most important factor, while almost three quarters 
reported that it should be an important factor in decision making. Even 
if a physical impairment is fairly severe, if there is not thought to 
also be intellectual impairment, treatment will usually be aggressive.
An exception may occur in the most extreme cases. For example, in the 
case of the Danville Twins (see Chapter III) treatment was withheld from 
Siamese twins even though there was no suggestion of retardation.
Quality of life may be discussed as if it formed a dichotomy (a 
"good quality of life" versus a "bad quality of life,") but it is often 
conceptualized by clinicians as if it formed a continuum. At one end of 
the continuum are cases of permanently comatose and anencephalic babies 
(babies born without a brain). Such babies may even be thought to lack 
those qualities which define a human existence (see discussion, Arras 
1985). The only time that I heard clinicians who worked regularly in 
the NICU refer to a patient as "it", (rather than "he" or "she") was in 
reference to an baby who was thought to be anencephalic.
Philosophers have written a great deal about the concept of 
personhood; there is debate about whether a newborn,
especially a severely impaired one, does or does not have the same 
claims as older individuals, or is actually a "person" with all the 
rights which come with personhood (Khuse and Singer 1985). Clinicians 
don't appear to think about it at all in these terms. With the possible 
exception of an anencephalic baby, they seem to see each infant as fully
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human - their questions concern appropriate treatment choices for their 
human patients.
Another issue related to personhood, however, that is relevant to 
clinicians, concerns the beginning of life. While some people who do 
not work regularly in the NICU, may see very small premature babies as 
less than human - living fetuses - that is not true for the people who 
do work with them regularly. All babies in the unit are seen as people. 
However, there is a point of division between live birth and non-viable 
fetus. The dividing line has changed during the past 10 - 20 years. It 
used to be generally though to be at about 28 weeks. When I started 
field work, in 1977, about 25-6 weeks was considered to indicate the 
divide between miscarriage (not a person) and newborn (a full person). 
Now it is lower. There are indications that new technology may be 
pushing the divide still lower so that some people seem to consider the 
fetus/patient still in utero who can be monitored, visualized with 
ultrasound, and treated with fetal therapy to be a person.
In the case of anencephalic babies, there is consensus about 
withholding aggressive treatment by virtually all clinicians including 
such staunch "right to life" advocates as Surgeon General Koop. In 
response to questions on the survey, there was clear consensus to 
withhold most treatments from the anencephalic baby (see Table V - 2).
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TABLE V - 2
TREATMENTS RESPONDENTS WOULD RECOMMEND 
n = 2492
CONDITION AND TREATMENT % WHO WOULD RECOMMEND
BABY WHO IS ANENCEPHALIC
Feedings by mouth 76
Tube feeding 56
Antibiotics 32
Resuscitation in the delivery room 13
Cardiac catheterization 3
Arrest page 2
Open heart surgery 2
BABY WHO HAS MULTIPLE ANOMALIES 
(BEFORE CHROMOSOMAL ANALYSIS)
Nutrition and fluids 90
Antibiotics 81
Resuscitation 76
Respirator 65
BABY WHO HAS MULTIPLE ANOMALIES 
(AFTER CHROMOSOMAL ANALYSIS 
INDICATES TRISOMY 13)
Nutrition and fluids 85
Antibiotics 60
Respirator 24
Surgery for cleft palate 14
Cardiac catheterization 13
Arrest page 10
Open heart surgery 8
2 For the Baby with trisomy 13, and for questions on resuscitation 
in the delivery room and an arrest page for the anencephalic baby, n = 
119; actual base varies slightly depending on the number of ineligible 
answers (in all cases, ineligible answers less than 5% of total n.)«
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TABLE V - 2 (cont.)
CONDITION AND TREATMENT % WHO WOULD RECOMMEND
A SMALL PREMATURE BABY WITH 
AN IVH
Nutrition and fluids 93
Suctioning 92
resuscitation in delivery room 64
Increased respiratory settings 53
Pressors 39
Arrest page 26
Kidney dialysis 13
A BABY WITH DOWN'S SYNDROME 
AND DUODENAL ATRESIA
Intravenous feedings 91
Antibiotics 88
Surgery for intestinal defect 87
Cardiac catheterization 71
Open heart surgery 59
Kidney dialysis 28
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Many clinicians also believe that aggressive treatment would not 
be appropriate for other infants who would also be expected to have an 
extremely poor quality of life such as those with intracranial bleeds 
and some very premature babies. These categories were given as examples 
of babies who did not require treatment under the first revised version 
of the Baby Doe Regulations (DHHS 1983b).
Sometimes, when it is suggested that treatment should only be 
withheld in such circumstances, it is said that such decisions are made 
because treatment would be "futile;" it is claimed that such decisions 
are not being made on the basis of quality of life. (DHHS 1983b) Such 
decisions, however, do reflect a consideration of quality if life, even 
if at an extreme. As long as it is possible to prolong physiological 
life, and a decision is made that the condition of the person or the 
short span of time before death does not warrant treatment, treatment is 
being withheld on the basis of a quality of life consideration (For a 
discussion of this point, see Rhodan and Arras 1985).
There are also other conditions for which there is general 
agreement against aggressive treatment by most clinicians including 
situations where there is profound brain damage and genetic anomalies 
such as trisomy 13 or 18 (which are usually associated with a short life 
span and always associated with numerous physical defects and severe 
retardation). For example, on my survey, three quarters of the 
respondents answered that they would not recommend aggressive 
respiratory support for a baby who was diagnosed as having trisomy 13 
(see Table V - 2).
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At the other end of the spectrum lie those cases with the smallest 
amount of impairment thought significant enough to raise the question of 
withholding treatment. There is much controversy surrounding this end 
of the continuum. Indeed, among clinicians, as among other members of 
society, there is much variation in opinion concerning what constitutes 
handicap and concerning the implications of particular physiological 
conditions for quality of life. The Disability Rights Movement has done 
much to challenge prevalent assumptions about the quality of life of 
those with disabilities. Almost nine out of ten clinicians would 
recommend intestinal surgery for an infant with Down's syndrome and an 
intestinal defect, (see Table V-2)
It is not deviations from physiological norms, in and of 
themselves, which determine quality of life. Rather, the 
interdependence of cultural factors (such as the degree of stigma 
and architectural barriers) which interact with individual 
background characteristics of the person who has impairments, which 
determines the quality of life.
There is debate about the extent to which factors pertaining to 
the future environment of the newborn should be considered in making 
treatment decisions. The significance of factors in the general social 
environment for all people with certain disabilities, such as financial 
assistance to provide mobility aides or the quality of care in long term 
care institutions, is one set of issues under debate. There is also
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controversy about the relevance of the financial and emotional resources 
for an individual infant from his or her family.
One article which has become a focus of the debate on the 
relevance of family characteristics is a report of an Oklahoma study in 
the October, 1984 issue of Pediatrics. It reported on the use of a 
formula to determine the future quality of life of infants with spina 
bifida which included contributions from the family and from society 
(Gross et al. 1984). Both this group, and Shaw (1977), who wrote the 
article from which the formula was derived, used the formula in a 
schematic way as a model of factors to consider in decision making.
Many, however, interpreted the article as if the formula was used to 
determine a numerical estimate of the "quality of life."
The degree to which family and societal contributions determine 
quality of life is a very controversial area. While some people believe 
that having a loving family who is able to to accept the child is the 
most important factor, others believe that such social factors should 
not be considered in decision making.
The role of the economic resources of the family and society is 
even more controversial. Some have argued that consideration of the 
financial contribution of the family could lead to double discrimination 
against the poor, since poor mothers have higher rates of prematurity 
and other factors associated with risk factors for disabilities. 
Referring to consideration of economic resources from society, others 
have argued against considering such factors as the quality of care in
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institutions because such decisions would serve as a disincentives for 
improving the quality of care in such institutions. (Arras, 1985)
There is a high degree of agreement among clinicians that certain 
deviations from the norm do not significantly alter a baby's chances of 
a good quality of life. In one case in which a decision about complex 
heart surgery was being discussed, it was noted that the infant, Maria, 
also had features which are associated with Turner's Syndrome, an XO 
deletion syndrome which is associated with mild retardation, short 
stature, certain physical stigmata and infertility. A senior 
neonatologist, Peter, noted that Turner's syndrome is not something that 
affects "quality of life" and is not relevant in making non-treatment 
decisions.
When clinicians feel that a condition will clearly not prevent an 
infant from enjoying an acceptable quality of life, even if the parents 
objected to certain treatments, all treatments thought necessary to 
preserve life will be given. If necessary, clinicians will seek a court 
order to obtain custody in order to be able to make decisions. 
Frequently, upon threat of losing custody, parents agree to treatment.
For example, upon seeing his child who had a cleft palate, a 
father said "shouldn't a monster like that be killed." The clinicians 
would not allow consideration of non-treatment in such a case. They 
felt that their role as caregivers was to provide counselling to help 
the parents adjust after an emotional reaction to an unexpected outcome.
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Within hours, the father was able to begin to relate positively to his 
new baby.
In a 1982 interview, Dr. Raymond Duff, one of the most outspoken 
proponents of parental decision making, spoke about a baby who was born 
with cosmetic deformities of the hands and face. The baby's parents 
wanted to withhold treatment and allow the child to die. Dr. Duff said 
that they couldn't do that and, if necessary, he would go to Court in 
order to obtain permission to treat. After discussions with the staff, 
the parents agreed to treatment.
Norms have developed among clinicians which lead to a high degree 
of consensus that some conditions lead to such a bad quality of life 
that treatment is futile and that other conditions enable a good quality 
of life so that non-treatment decisions are out of the question. For 
other conditions, such consensus has not developed and there is 
disagreement about future quality of life.
For example, the spina bifida task force of the Project on Ethics 
and Values in Health Care (see appendix) interviewed two physicians who 
had very different views of the quality of life of Ellen, a child with 
spina bifida. Her lesion had caused her to be paralyzed and to lack 
feeling from approximately her umbilicus (belly button) down.
Her urologist believed that she would have a good quality of life. 
He believed that she was bright and capable and would be able to handle 
such things as catheterization for urinary incontinence necessitated by
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her condition. Although she would never have genital sensation, he said 
she was a bright girl with an active imagination, so she could have an 
active sex life. He thought, perhaps, she would become a mother and 
would be able to be employed.
Her neurosurgeon, on the other hand, felt that because she would 
be unable to learn to walk, unable to control bladder and stool, (he 
characterized her as "sitting in her own urine and feces,11), she would 
face social stigma. Although she was a happy child at 6, he felt that 
as an adult "she would regret that she survived."
Not all clinicians agree about which cases are clear-cut and, 
therefore, to them, involve medical criteria alone, and which involve 
ethical dilemmas. This is due to at least three factors. First, based 
on personal background characteristics and experiences, clinicians 
differ about which impairments they believe can be compatible or 
incompatible with a good quality of life. Second, differences exist 
because of uncertainty about outcome (see section on uncertainty). 
Finally, some variation in decision making reflects differences in 
assessment of prognosis based on differences in attention to various 
types of information about the infants. Anspach found systematic 
variation in assessment of prognosis among nurses, house staff, and 
attending physicians. This occurred because the work environment 
differentially structured access to information for each professional 
group.
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To parents who are not socialized in the clinical subculture, with 
inadequate understanding of the medical situation, and/or who have very 
different values than the clinicians, a judgment may be made which 
differs radically from clinician assessments. In such situations 
clinicians often see their role as one of educating parents, since 
decisions they see as clear-cut are conceptualized as "medical 
decisions." This differs from those situations that they do not see as 
clear-cut that they conceptualize as "ethical decisions." They also may 
define cases as involving "ethical decisions" in which they acknowledge 
that differences of opinion may reflect valid variations in values 
rather than lack of information or irrational thinking on the part of 
parents.
Pain and Suffering
Another component which people often consider in relation to 
quality of life is the amount of pain and suffering. For example, in 
response to the question on my survey concerning factors considered 
important in making treatment decisions, about three quarters of the 
respondents indicated that they thought the amount of prolonged pain and 
suffering should be an important factor and a fifth responded that it 
should be the most important factor.
Neonatal nurses (28%) were significantly more likely to consider 
the amount of pain and suffering to be the most important factor as 
opposed to neonatologists (3%). Some of the nursing leadership were
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surprised and upset that so many nurses felt that this should be the 
most important factor. It may have been more characteristic of newer 
nurses who had not yet been socialized to share the philosophy of the 
unit. Some people have hypothesized that nursing has traditionally been 
more concerned with providing "comfort" and attracts individuals more 
concerning this nurturing, while medicine, has been more focused on 
cure, and attracts individuals more concerned with the capacity for 
intellectual achievement.
Although the amount of pain and suffering is a frequently 
mentioned factor, especially by non-clinicians, there are relatively few 
neonatal conditions which themselves lead to long range physical pain. 
Most of the pain and suffering which would diminish quality of life 
comes from two sources: emotional or psychological pain from limitation 
of function and/or stigmatization, or, pain engendered as part of 
medical treatments to correct congenital problems or treat subsequent 
complications.
Assessments of clinicians about future pain and suffering probably 
vary even more than about prognosis for degree of future impairment.
For example, some physicians have said that children with spina bifida 
who have mental impairments suffer more because they cannot learn to use 
crutches and other aides. Others feel that children with spina bifida 
who are not retarded suffer more because they are aware of what they 
cannot do because of their condition.
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Some non-clinicians are so disturbed about the pain and suffering 
experienced by babies during an NICU admission, that they sometimes feel 
that infants should not be subjected to painful treatments. For 
example, some of the strongest advocates of "natural childbirth" would 
prefer a less intensive level of care to NICU care even if it there is 
more risk to survival. Clinicians who work in NICUs, on the other hand, 
virtually never consider the pain and suffering associated with a 
treatment to be severe enough to justify non-treatment in an infant who 
can be saved and enjoy a good quality of life. Usually this is also 
true for those situations for which a good outcome is uncertain or 
unlikely.
For example, some non-clinicians may be concerned about such 
issues as the suffering of an infant because of separation from the 
mother. Some fear that the experience of hospitalization and separation 
may cause a significant diminution in quality of life. Clinicians, 
however, because of their familiarity with hospitalization, are rarely 
concerned with separation per se. Clinicians rarely seem to acknowledge 
the pain associated with routine procedure, perhaps because of its 
familiarity, and perhaps a need to build defenses in order to work in 
the environment. The pain associated with procedures appears to be seen 
as an accepted part of a beneficial intervention rather than as a focus 
of concern. Clinicians may not even appear very concerned about pain 
associated with more invasive procedures, such as insertion of chest 
tubes or cardiac catheterization (which is sometimes done without 
anesthesia), and very invasive procedures (such as open heart surgery).
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Many clinicians believe that newborns don't suffer with pain the same 
way that older people do (Murray 1985).
While the pain of routine procedures is rarely considered 
significant for any patient, pain from the more invasive procedures is 
considered important for patients when there is felt to be little hope 
of benefit from treatment. For example, if a baby is dying, efforts may 
be made to minimize procedures which would cause discomfort. Opinions 
vary about the degree to which pain and suffering should be considered 
in making treatment decisions for infants who have little chance for 
long range survival.
For example, many clinicians believe that an infant with a heart 
defect which can probably not be corrected should not be subject to the 
pain of open heart surgery. Clinicians expressed mixed opinions about 
the care of Andrew Stinson, a premature baby whose parent wrote a book 
about his treatment. He suffered many complications (some iatrogenic) 
and died after 6 months in a NICU. (Stinson and Stinson 1979) Some 
believed that it was appropriate that his physicians continued to try to 
treat him as long as they felt he had a chance at survival. Others 
believed that he was treated much too long after it seemed likely that 
he would die and that treatment should have been stopped earlier to ease 
his suffering.
While clinicians in neonatology rarely consider the pain and 
suffering involved in treatment during the newborn period, they do 
sometimes consider the pain and suffering associated with repeated
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medical treatments throughout childhood. For example, the need for 
repeated surgery will often be mentioned as a significant problem 
associated with severe spina bifida or very severe, complex cardiac 
lesions. They are even more likely to consider pain and suffering 
associated with permanent dependence on life support equipment such as a 
respirator or TPN (total chronic intravenous feeding) or kidney dialysis 
(which are also associated with a shorter life span).
While most clinicians do not seem as concerned with the pain or 
suffering associated with treatment, as non-clinicians, they often seem 
to be even more sensitive to pain and suffering associated with non­
treatment. For example, non-clinicians may be more likely to feel that 
an infant with a lethal condition should not receive treatments such as 
intravenous fluids which may cause pain while many clinicians are more 
likely to feel that discomfort will be associated with the lack of 
fluids.
Diana's care provides another example. Diana was a child who had 
already been in the NICU for over a year, chronically dependent on a 
respirator. She had very bad lung disease leading to virtually no hope 
of long term survival and had been classified as no arrest page (she was 
not to be given emergency treatment if her heart stopped). One day she 
had and received received vigorous aggressive treatment for what was 
characterized as a "respiratory arrest" (bronchial spasms), including 
numerous emergency drugs and was "bagged" or given artificial respirator 
by hand for over an hour. Without the treatment, she probably would 
have died in minutes. It appeared that the clinicians felt that they
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had to treat the respiratory arrest, otherwise she would suffocate which 
"would be a horrible way to go."
In the case of an infant who could survive, clinicians often find 
the pain and suffering associated with non-treatment to be all the more 
disturbing. In at least some of the "non-treatment" cases involving 
babies with Down's syndrome, surgery was not performed and therefore the 
infants could not eat but they were given fluids by IV and sometimes 
sedated (see John Hopkins case, Chapter III). While it prolonged the 
dying process, it was considered to lead to a more humane death. In the 
1982 case of Baby Doe of Bloomington, Indiana, fluids were not given 
(Lyons 1985). To most clinicians, especially nurses, the thought of not 
giving fluids is extremely disturbing. Beyond the concern about the 
original non-treatment decision, upset caused by withholding fluids may 
have been part of what compelled the nurses to report the case of Baby 
Doe to the authorities.
Uncertainty
The concept of uncertainty has received a considerable amount of 
attention in the literature on Medical sociology (e.g. Fox 1957; 1980; 
light 1979; Atkins 1984), and in the literature on decision making (e.g. 
Tversky and Kahneman 1974; McNeil, Keeler and Adelstein 1975; Eddy 1984) 
Chibnik, in discussing agricultural decision making, cites Cancian's 
distinction between risk and uncertainty. In risky situations decision 
makers can form intelligent guesses about the odds for or against
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desirable outcomes from a given course of action while in uncertain 
situations they have difficulty making these estimations. Chibnik 
points out that risk/uncertainty can be thought of as a continuum rather 
than as a dichotomy as presented by Cancian.
Decision makers in neonatology face both risky situations in which 
statistics are available for infants who had a similar condition, and 
other situations in which there is uncertainty because it is a rare 
conditions and the risks or not known, or because there is a new 
treatment and there has not yet been time for follow-up.
There are at least two components of uncertainty which are 
important in neonatal decision making. The first concerns uncertainty 
about the severity of the impairment. The second concerns uncertainty 
about the existence of impairment. In considering how aggressive to be 
in neonatal treatment, there is consideration of both the existence and 
severity of impairment. When the probability is high that the pat-ient 
will not be "normal", then there may be consideration of withholding 
treatment. Then the severity of the impairment is considered. However, 
a high probability of severe impairment alone is not usually thought to 
be grounds for withholding treatment in the NICU, if there is also a 
chance that the baby could be "normal." (See note on "normal," in 
section on quality of life.)
This contrasts to the concern in prenatal diagnosis where 
possibility of severe impairment is often thought enough to justify a 
selective abortion even if the probability of impairment may not be
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high. For example, in cases of fetal exposure to Rubella, many 
clinicians would counsel a selective abortion even when the risk of 
anomalies is only 25% because the defects could be very severe. After 
birth, most clinicians would never consider non-treatment in a situation 
in which there was a only a 25% chance of severe impairment if there was 
also a good chance that there would be no impairment. For example, 
there are cases in which infants have had bleeding in the brain which 
would be expected to result in severe damage but if there is also 
thought to be a significant chance of the child being normal, the child 
will receive aggressive treatment.
How much chance of being normal is necessary to justify aggressive 
treatment in the face of a high probability of severe impairment varies 
from clinician to clinician. Some clinicians will say even if there is 
a 5% or a 10% chance that the baby will be normal, the baby should be 
treated aggressively. Others will say things like "even if the chances 
are one in a million" the baby should be treated. Some clinicians will 
say, "this baby could be another Einstein or Beethoven" to explain the 
rationale for treatment in those cases where treatment seems futile.
I believe that it is the emphasis on the uncertainty that a baby 
could be normal that has led to a focus in the literature on ethical 
issues in neonatology on treatment decisions concerning infants with 
Down's syndrome and Spina Bifida. These are conditions where the level 
of impairment is often not likely to be as severe as in some other NICU 
patients but the existence of at least a minimal level of impairment is 
certain.
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In some neonatal cases, such as trisomy 13 or short bowel 
syndrome, there is no uncertainty that a child will not be normal and 
will in fact have severe defects. In some such cases, even advocates of 
aggressive treatment, such as Surgeon General Koop, will sanction the 
withholding of aggressive treatments. In many other cases, however, 
critics of withholding treatment will cite examples of children with 
spina bifida or very small premature babies who turned out to have much 
greater capacity than predicted, even when limits were thought to be 
known.
The Critical Condition
The third factor which clinicians consider is the nature of the 
condition which, if untreated, could lead to death. The severity of the 
condition, if the condition is acute or chronic, if it involves a unique 
discrete episode or will have repeated critical episodes, can all affect 
treatment decisions.
Crane, in The Sanctity of Social Life, examined the implications 
of "salvageability" (1975). Crane treats salvageability as a 
dichotomous category. In the clinical context, I think it may be more 
useful to think in terms of "the critical condition." It can be seen as 
forming a continuum. At one end of the continuum, one can identify 
patients who by old criteria could have been said to be "dead" (because 
they have no heart beat or because they have stopped breathing) (see
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Chapter III). Others at the most critical extreme are premature babies 
born at the border or viability and "fresh still born" babies, born 
without a heart beat but possibly able to be resuscitated. Close to 
this end of the continuum are patients with terminal conditions, 
conditions which despite treatment will lead to death.
At the other end of the continuum, one can say that everything 
that is alive is in a critical condition for all life will end in death. 
While the concept that life is a critical condition has become almost 
trite, it is useful in this context to think of everyone as having a 
potentially critical condition. Life as a critical condition usually 
refers to acknowledging that life does not last an unlimited time. In 
this context, it is also useful to think about life as being a critical 
state if certain needs are not met, such as the needs for nutrition, 
fluids, oxygen, warmth. While we usually do not question provisions for 
these needs, in certain circumstances, choices about giving or 
withholding treatments pertain to these needs. Relevance to medical 
decision making will be discussed below.
Virtually all of the infants admitted to the neonatal unit fall in 
between the two ends of the continuum. They need some treatment beyond 
that necessary to sustain most newborns. Some have very serious, life- 
threatening conditions, some of which are terminal. In general, all 
other things being equal, the more critical the condition, the more 
likely that questions about the aggressiveness of treatment will arise. 
In this section, the role of the nature of the critical condition for 
treatment decisions will be discussed.
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Unsalvageability and Non-treatment
Although the debate concerning non-treatment has focused primarily 
on those infants who are considered salvageable, non- treatment 
decisions are also very important concerning babies who are considered 
unsalvageable. This is true for two reasons. First, some of those 
babies who are expected to die, live if they are given particular 
treatments. Second, the choice of treatments may affect the timing of 
death and the nature of death.
Patients in a modern hospital virtually never receive no 
treatment. Even if a patient is felt to be dying, that patient will 
generally be fed, open lesions will be kept sterile, etc. Even more 
aggressive treatments may also be given for a baby for whom "nothing 
more can be done." For example, a baby may be given antibiotics and the 
acid/base balance may be aggressively managed (requiring frequent blood 
tests and injections), a baby may be given powerful drugs to maintain 
blood pressure, chest tubes may be inserted through the chest wall, a 
baby may be given massive blood transfusions, and/or may be on a 
respirator even when "nothing more can be done." In some cases, with 
this support, despite the expectation of death, the patient may survive. 
Whereas, if such support had been withheld, the patient would have died. 
In some cases, this may be clearly beneficial, as when a baby with 
serious cardiac lesions, who is felt to be unsalvageable, is given 
experimental surgery and is successfully treated. However, in other
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cases, it is sometimes felt to be a tragedy when treatment prolongs 
dying or a very poor quality of life. This will be illustrated by a 
discussion about the treatment for Devon in Chapter VI.
A second way that decisions about withholding care from 
"unsalvageable" babies becomes important is in terms of the timing of 
death and the costs (financial and emotional) of care. Even though the 
care provided may not lead to long term survival, it may lead to 
survival for a period of time - it may be only minutes or it may be 
weeks, or months after the patient is classified as "unsalvageable."
In some cases, the timing of death may be "managed" consciously by 
clinicians. For example, a decision may be made to remove a baby who is 
unsalvageable from the respirator, but the actual act of taking the baby 
off the respirator may be delayed to give the parents an opportunity to 
deal with the fact that the baby is about to die and to give the parents 
an opportunity to hold their baby while he or she dies if they want to.
If parents do not want to be there when life support is discontinued,
such actions may be postponed until after they leave.
Sometimes there is conscious management of the timing of death for 
the benefit of health care professionals. For example, a particular 
person may want to examine a baby before the baby dies or they may want 
to wait until a quiet time in the unit before discontinuing life 
supports. There are reports that on some occasions, terminally ill
babies may have been removed from life supports when there was a
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shortage of space or equipment in the NICU.
While the "last bed in the ICU" is a problem frequently discussed 
in the ethics literature, I never saw life supports removed from a 
terminally ill infant because of equipment shortage during the course of 
my observations. Such actions, if they occur at all, are very rare 
events. Such problems may be rarer in neonatal intensive care than in 
other types of intensive care. Since NICUs frequently have a less acute 
section, and the service may include facilities in the labor and 
delivery area, it provides an opportunity to care for a greater number 
of critically ill children than the theoretical capacity of the unit.
For example, at Columbia, when the unit was full, critically ill infants 
could be cared for in the transitional nursery until it was possible for 
a space to be made. Over the years, sicker and sicker children were 
cared for in the semi-acute unit.
In many units, the critical resource is not beds, or respirators, 
but staff time, particularly nursing time. On occasion, when a unit is 
extremely busy and staff time is short, there may be tension between 
trying to give adequate attention to the infants who are unsalvageable, 
and those who are terminally ill. The staff members may feel that not 
enough time is being spent devoted to the care of critically ill infants 
who are salvageable, but such "competing needs" issues are likely to 
affect micro-allocation issues, not life and death decisions about 
discontinuing care.
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Although sometimes the timing of death is consciously managed to 
achieve certain goals. More often treatment decisions are made which 
also affect the timing of death, but the management of the timing of 
death is not consciously addressed. For example, a baby might be sent 
for cardiac catheterization for diagnosis of a cardiac lesion. If the 
lesion is found to be incurable, the baby may be removed from 
respiratory support, or such support may be continued; powerful heart 
medications may or may not be continued, if there is an arrest, there 
may or may not be resuscitation. Different decisions about these 
treatment options might mean the difference in days of survival; 
sometimes value questions relating to the timing are addressed, other 
times such decisions are seen as technical "medical" decisions and the 
goals of treatment, when cure is no longer the goal, are not consciously 
addressed. (See Chapter VII, discussion on norms for decision making.)
There is a norm that it is better to see infants as salvageable 
who are unsalvageable, than to see infants who are salvageable as 
unsalvageable. In some ways this seems to be the reverse of the norm 
discussed by Sheff that it is better to define a well person as sick 
than a sick person as well (1963). Sheff's norm assumes that the 
patient is sicker, while this norm assumes that the patient is 
healthier. Yet, both norms support more treatment, and more chance for 
physician activism.
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Social Value
The last dimension involved primarily with patient condition 
characteristics, for lack of a better term, I will label Social Value. 
This term is sometimes used to refer to aspects which I have referred to 
as quality of life. Some people speak of the social value of life for 
the baby. I use this term, however, only to refer to the value of 
treatment or non-treatment to persons other than the baby.
Some would argue that considerations concerning this dimension are 
unacceptable because every human life is uniquely sacred and of equal 
value; no other values may be weighed against the value of a single 
human life (Koop 1983). Some state that all decisions must be made only 
in the best interests of the child (e.g. Pres. Comm. 1983). Others, 
however, feel that the net costs and benefits of survival and continued 
treatment to others beside the baby may also be considered (Khuse and 
Singer 1985). Most, though not all, who take this position feel that 
the interests of the baby in life are great, and the quality of the 
baby's life would have to be very poor, and the costs to others would 
have to be very great, to outweigh the baby's interest in survival.
The social value connected to treatment decisions may be thought 
of not only in terms of the benefits to others of the death of the baby 
despite the baby's interest in survival, but also the benefits to others 
of the survival of the baby, despite the potential that the baby's death 
might be in the babies best interest. The social value of treatment or 
non-treatment can be looked at from at least three perspectives - those
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of the f a m i l y ,  ^the health care professionals involved in caring for the 
baby, and society at large.
Social Value to the Family
Many clinicians believe that impact on the family should be 
considered in making decisions and even more feel that the parents 
wishes should be considered. In the survey, almost half said that the 
impact on the family should be considered and almost three quarters 
thought that the parents' wishes should be important in decision making. 
Sometimes the clinician's assessments of the implications of treatment 
for the family are based on extensive, open conversations with the 
family. At other times, however, clinicians judgments may be based on 
general or stereotyped assumptions about the parents' wishes.
For example, clinicians sometimes assume that upper middle class, 
educated parents would be less likely to want a mentally retarded child 
to survive than working class parents. While this may be true in many 
cases, it is not true for all parents. Sometimes such basic beliefs are 
taught through stories that become legends of the unit. One story, 
repeated many times, recounted the case of a doctor, who upon learning 
that his child was born quite premature, said that he didn't want the 
child treated unless the doctors caring for her could guarantee that she 
would be normal. (Despite persistent objections from the father, they
3 As noted in the introduction, I did not interview family members. 
Here I report primarily on clinicians' view of social value for the 
family.
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stalled for time, continued treating, and the child survived with no 
major problems.) On the other hand, other educated, articulate parents 
have expressed anger about the assumptions that clinicians have made 
that they would not want their children to survive, when they very much 
wanted everything possible done.
While some people have said that working class families are more 
upset about impairments which affect physical ability and educated 
parents are more disturbed by impairments which affect mental ability 
others feel such statements are based on prejudicial attitudes and that 
working class parents have as much concern about the mental ability of 
their children as more educated parents (personal communication, Raymond 
Duff 1982).
The degree to which clinicians can accurately perceive the social 
value of the infant to the family is dependent on a number of factors. 
One is the degree to which the beliefs and values of the family are 
similar to those of the physicians. Similarities and differences in 
social class, religion or ethnic background, education, or socialization 
in the medical subculture may affect the degree to which the clinicians 
can understand the beliefs and values of the parent.
Such background characteristics also indirectly affect 
communication. The degree to which the clinician feels he or she can 
communicate with the parents may influence what information is imparted, 
and how information is shared. Those parents who are felt to be 
"medically sophisticated,11 usually the more educated, may be given more
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information. It is probably no coincidence that a number of well known 
cases, such as the "John Hopkins case" and the case of the Danville 
Twins, both involved children of doctors/and or nurses who were familiar 
with the options as defined by the medical subculture and were able to 
get clinicians to act on their wishes.
Clinicians sometimes feel that a baby has special value to a 
family because of the family's reproductive history. Referred to as a 
"premium" baby because of the advanced age of the mother, infertility 
problems, multiple miscarriages or neonatal deaths, such an infant is 
assumed be especially wanted. It is felt that if such a baby were to 
die, it might not be possible to "replace" the baby by another 
pregnancy. For example, extra efforts may be made to resuscitate an 
extremely premature baby born close to the edge of viability (around 24 
weeks of gestational age) to a mother who had 5 previous pregnancy loses 
and no living children, while such vigorous efforts might not be made 
for the third child of a young woman with no previous losses.
In part this occurs because of a perspective focused not on the 
neonate about whom one is making a decision as unique individual but 
rather as a constituent piece of a family. One area of concern is 
whether, if this child dies, can he or she be "replaced" in the family.
In some cases clinicians may talk about whether the family had to be 
concerned with reoccurrence of the same problem or, if they are likely 
to have a healthy baby if this baby dies.
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I have heard clinicians talk of a child as a "replacement" for one 
who died, and talk about babies who were not born because of the 
survival of a child with impairments. They believe that if an impaired 
baby dies, the parents will have another child, while if a baby 
survives, and is severely impaired, the parents will not have another 
child because they will be so distressed and/or burdened by the 
handicapped child (Khuse and Singer 1985). It is as if the goal of 
reproduction was the production of healthy "children." A child with an 
impairment doesn't count as a "successful pregnancy outcome." In some 
cases, however, the reverse may be true. Rather than preventing a 
subsequent pregnancy, parents may choose to have an additional child if 
one or more of their children has a handicap.
One concern expressed by clinicians is about the impact of 
severely impaired child on the functioning of the family. The studies 
are inconclusive, some showing a higher divorce rate, others showing no 
increase, and still other studies showing a higher divorce rate 
following neonatal death. In addition to concern for family 
integration, there is also concern about emotional impact on both 
parents and siblings. Although rarely, one also hears concern about 
members of the extended family as well. For example, the reproductive 
choices of an aunt or uncle may be affected by a bad neonatal 
experience.
Some people speak of how meaningful raising a handicapped 
child has been for some families, others speak of how stressful and 
still others talk about both joys and hardships. Many clinicians
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believe that the impact on the family is dependent to a great extent on 
the nature of the society and available resources. In most places in 
the U.S. today, information and referral systems, and coordination of 
services for children with disabilities and not as well developed as 
clinicians think they should be. Clinicians express anger at federal 
government regulations that require treatment at the same time that the 
federal government has been cutting support services.
In opposition to all the negatives, clinicians often recognize the 
value of these babies to their parents and believe parents are firmly 
committed to their well being. I have heard clinicians comment on the 
fact that even for a child who is dying or who has major visible 
anomalies, parents will notice and get pleasure from features like their 
own or like members of their families. While some parents have trouble 
becoming attached to a child with problems, others are able to bond 
immediately, or are able to continue bonds which formed before birth.
Sometimes, especially when the child has very serious problems, 
clinicians are more able to perceive the distress and do not fully 
recognize the positive attachments of a family to a baby nor how great 
the loss would be from the child's death. Other times, especially when 
the baby has a problem which is minor by NICU standards, some clinicians 
are unable to understand why the family is having trouble adjusting.
Both parents and clinicians generally feel that they are genuine 
advocates for the babies. Parents sometimes mistrust the motives of the 
clinicians, and clinicians sometimes mistrust the motives of parents.
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Both find it hard to understand how the other could feel that they could 
not be interested in the well being of the baby.
Diana Crane, in The Sanctity of Social Life, writes that the
capacity to perform social roles is an important determinant of
treatment. Since even a severely impaired neonate has the capacity to 
perform the social role of being a baby, it may be more likely that such 
an infant will be treated than an older person with a similar condition, 
if the focus is on the ability to perform immediate social roles. For 
example, incontinence may not be thought of as a very serious problem 
for a baby who would not be expected to be toilet trained for 2 or 3
years anyway, while it is a very difficult problem for families to
handle for the elderly.
If the focus is on the ability to perform social roles through 
life, however, then the infant may not be treated for the newborn with 
impairments may not be able to carry out social roles of adulthood, such 
as reproduction or employment, may not be able to take care of parents 
or care for him or her self after the parents have died, and may 
therefore, be less likely to be treated.
Sometimes parents desire treatment choices that differ from those 
of the clinicians. Sometimes the parents want more aggressive 
treatments than the clinicians would recommend because they want the 
baby's life sustained despite the chance of severe handicap. Other 
times they are not ready to accept the fact that the baby is dying or 
they feel that the baby's life should be sustained for as long as
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possible, even if the baby is dying. If the parents want a baby to get 
treatments, then the clinicians will give them, while sometimes also 
trying to persuade the parents to accept their recommendations.
In other cases, parents don't want treatments to be given that the 
clinicians believe the baby should have. Most often the reasons for 
non-treatment are not seen as acceptable to the clinicians. Sometimes 
parents beliefs are seen as determined by religious convictions that the 
clinicians do not feel should determine treatment choice. For example, 
Jehovah's Witnesses believe that having a blood transfusion will prevent 
a person from going to heaven. They may therefore refuse permission for 
a blood transfusion. In such a case, clinicians will go to court to 
obtain permission for transfusions, even if the chances for saving the 
baby's life are small.
In other cases, clinicians see parents' refusal as resulting from 
the parents' emotional problems or inability to understand the risks to 
the baby. In one case, a father wanted to take him still very sick baby 
home from the acute unit; the clinicians called security to prevent him 
from doing so. Clinicians see such cases as problems, but not as 
ethically problematic. They try to manage what they see as irrational 
behavior on the part of parents, and go to court, if necessary, to 
obtain authority to treat.
Sometimes parents want to have treatment withheld from infants 
because they feel that the quality of the life for their baby will be so 
poor that treatment shouldn't be given, while the baby's clinicians feel
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that treatment is in the baby's best interests. At Columbia, these 
cases have been managed though discussions between the parents and 
clinicians. When decisions have not been seen to clearly violate in the 
best interests of the baby, parents have been able to make choices to 
withhold treatment. There seems to be recognition of a fairly wide 
range of treatment choices as not being clear-cut, which may reflect a 
fairly wide range of beliefs among the physicians who work in the unit. 
It may also result from the persuasive powers of the clinicians who were 
able to convince hesitant parents to continue treatment. As far as I 
know, neither clinicians nor parents have seriously thought about 
bringing such a case to court from Columbia. At other centers, such 
cases have been brought to the courts, both by parents and by 
clinicians.
Social Value to Health Care Professionals 
and the Health Care System
There are a number of ways in which variations in the treatment of 
patients may have particular costs and benefits to the health care 
professionals who care for that patient and to the health care system as 
a whole.
First, for doctors and nurses who care for a patient, the primary 
professional goal is usually to cure, or, if that is not possible, to 
provide care. The socialization of the practitioners in an intensive
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care unit generally has rewarded the aggressive use of available medical 
technology.
Personal and professional satisfaction is usually derived from 
intervening and treating. (See further discussion under goals in 
Chapter VII.) Many doctors and nurses have spoken of how difficult it 
is not to treat aggressively because of the extent to which it goes 
against their socialization. Often health care practitioners have seen 
death as a "failure" and have trouble acknowledging its inevitability.
On the other hand, some health care professionals, particularly some 
physicians, also often see chronic illness or disability as a failure 
and sometimes find dealing with chronic impairments as a continuing 
confrontation with failure. They may feel that continuing an activist 
role in prolonging a poor quality of life is worse than passively 
letting death occur.
Many clinicians and others, however, feel strongly that, in order 
to avoid undermining the morale of health care professionals and their 
value system, that they should continue to treat aggressively, or at 
least not play a active role in causing death.
On a crude level, "success" is often measured in terms of 
mortality statistics. The overall infant mortality rate, or the weight 
or disease class mortality rate may sometimes be taken as a measure of 
the success of a unit.
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Often practitioners also derive satisfaction from being able to 
study an unusual case, sometimes referred to as a "fascinoma" (Shem 
1971). They may derive status from describing a new clinical entity, 
gaining a new understanding of an existing one, or in performing new 
experimental procedures. Prestige often comes from being able to do 
something which was never done before, or by conducting a clinical 
trial. Fascinomas are also useful as teaching cases.
The benefits to the clinicians from being able to work with a 
fascinoma are generally seen as secondary to the benefits for the 
patient, and the patients family. Occasionally, the benefits for the 
clinicians may assume priority. For example, a baby who is thought to 
be unsalvageable may be intubated (have a tube inserted in the 
respiratory passages) to allow a student to be able to practice 
intubation in a non-emergency situation. I was told about a case in 
which a baby who was believed to be unsalvageable was intubated "for 
practice" in the emergency room. To everybody's surprise, the baby 
survived as a result of the intubation and did very well.
In addition to benefits of aggressive treatment for professionals, 
however, there are also costs. For one, the intensive care unit is 
usually very busy. Staff members often feel that they do not have 
enough time to do all of what they should to do for some of their 
patients. For example, clinicians often said that they would like to 
spend more time with the families of their patients. They sometimes 
feel frustrated if they think they are putting time and energy into a 
hopeless situation when the time and energy would be better spent for
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other patients with a better prognosis. In some situations, staff 
members may find that they are making "triage" decisions about how to 
best utilize their time which may lead to less aggressive care for one 
patient in order to provide more care for another.
While one hears neonatal staff members express frustration at 
efforts to provide aggressive care for the terminally ill, when they 
have other critically ill infants to care for, they derive satisfaction 
from working with most of their NICU patients. Staff members who 
generally work in other settings, however, may express frustration at 
having to care for infants who have impairments when they could be 
providing care to other patients.
For example, a primary care pediatrician apologized for being late 
for a routine office visit explaining that he had to take care of an 
emergency situation for a baby who had just been born with 
hydrocephalus. He continued to complain about having to take care of 
"that kind of baby." In a similar situation Morgan, in her book, the 
making of a woman surgeon, complained about having to care for a child 
with hydrocephalus (1981). Neonatologists sometimes have trouble 
getting physicians from other specialties to perform procedures promptly 
for some of their patients, if those practitioners don't want to work 
with patients who may have severe lasting handicaps.
If clinicians feel that they are actually "doing harm" by 
treating, by prolonging the dying process or causing pain for the 
patient without compensating benefit, providing treatment is an
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emotional burden for them as well. This situation can occur for a 
junior physician or nurse who must follow the orders of a more senior 
physician, or for any clinician who follows parents directives for 
aggressive treatment, although they feel it would be in the baby's best 
interest for treatment to be limited.
Space is also often at a premium in the ICU; aggressive treatment 
may keep an infant in an acute ICU bed when some staff may feel that 
such a bed would be better utilized by another patient. While the 
"classic," ethics hypothetical of an infant who is about to die, being 
denied emergency care because there are no more beds in the ICU 
virtually never occurs; babies are cared for in less intensive settings 
sometimes who could benefit from placement in a more acute setting, 
because the more acute setting is filled to capacity.
Sometimes the costs and benefits of particular treatments to 
different providers may vary. For example, traditionally doctors are 
more oriented towards "cure" and may find fewer rewards when "cure" is 
not possible, while nursing has be characterized by more concern with 
"care" and relief of suffering. Therefore, nurses may get more 
professional satisfaction out of treatments which provide "comfort care" 
while physicians may be frustrated by the fact that the same treatment 
is not going to lead to a cure.
Frequently, clinicians, particularly primary nurses who care for a 
baby daily, themselves develop emotional attachments to the baby. On 
occasion, it has appeared that some babies may have received more
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aggressive care than they otherwise would have because of the attachment 
of a particular nurse who would have wanted treatment. Although I never 
heard of a case in which it appeared to lead to less aggressive 
treatment, sometimes, in the case of an infant who seems to be 
suffering, the clinicians who are most attached to the baby may be in 
favor of less aggressive treatment.
Finally, the costs and benefits of providing care for 
catastrophically ill newborns varies greatly depending on the 
particulars of the patient and treatments and on one's perspective in 
the system. For example, more utilization of certain diagnostic 
machinery and laboratory equipment may lead to greater profit for the 
hospital (in an era of retrospective payment) while labor intensive care 
of an "chronic" ICU patient may lead to greater costs than reimbursement 
(especially under prospective payment mechanisms). While financial 
considerations are important factors in the budgeting which determines 
the equipment and staffing for the NICU, considerations of the financial 
cost for the health care system appear to have little effect on the 
decisions made about the care of individual newborns.
One hears a position articulated which states that the clinicians 
caring for particular patients should only be advocates for their 
patients, and should not consider the costs of care. Clinicians, in 
fact, are often unaware of the costs of particular treatments. Many 
have said that the period of financial naivete may be ending with the 
end of retrospective payments.
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Indirectly, financial factors do strongly affect decisions that 
are made. While they do not affect conscious choices made about the 
care of individual infants, they do set the options or context in which 
decisions are made. There may only be a limited number of particular 
pieces of equipment available for use. For example, when there was only 
one monitor capable of continuously measuring the level of oxygen in a 
baby's blood through the skin, only certain types of babies were seen as 
candidates for monitoring with such a system. When more such monitors 
were available, infants with a greater range of conditions were 
monitored with the equipment.
While for those directly involved in decision making the economic 
costs and benefits of treatment may not be considered important, clearly 
neonatal care helps to support aspects of the health care system 
including a large biomedical equipment and supply industry. Large 
amount of specialized equipment is developed and aggressively marketed 
for use in the NICU. Overall, intensive care units are often profit 
centers for hospitals and help to support less profitable services.
Social Value for Society
Much has been written about the implications of decisions making 
for catastrophically ill newborns for "society." The concept of "the 
society" in these discussions is vague; for the purposes of this study I 
will use it to mean anybody beside the neonate whose care is under
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question, the neonates family, and those health care professional 
involved in the care of the baby.
Some discussions of "social value" refer to the need of society to 
maintain certain standards. For example, while it may be in the 
interest of a baby to die quickly and therefore put a quick end to 
suffering, it may be said that active euthanasia should not be performed 
in order to protect society from undermining a central value which 
forbids the direct killing of innocents. Arguments are also made that 
tolerance of and caring for dependent peoples is an important attribute 
for society (Fiedler 1985) and that not to do so would undermine the 
caring for other dependent peoples and/or others who are "different" in 
society (Horan and Delahoyde 1982). Although clinicians talk about the 
implications of neonatal decision for societal values, it does not 
appear that these concerns actually affect their decisions for 
individual newborns.
The presence of efforts for handicapped newborns may be very 
important ideologically in order to demonstrate the humanitarian 
concerns of society and technological expertise. On the other hand, 
some of those who object to the level of investment in NICU care, do so 
for they feel it diverts resources from other humanitarian concerns, 
including the prevention of the birth of low birth weight infants or the 
birth of infants with impairments. There is also concern about the 
overall costs to society of neonatal care. It is usually discussed in 
terms of two aspects. The economic costs of care and the burden caused
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by treatment leading to the survival of people with impairments and/or 
severe impairments.
Neonatal care is very expensive. It has been estimated that the 
cost of neonatal care in 1981 was approximately 1.5 billion dollars a 
year (Budetti, et al. 1981), with both inflation and new technology, 
costs have undoubtedly increased. While non-neonatal clinicians 
sometimes talk about how some of the money could be better spent for 
other, non-medical needs, the neonatal staff rarely seemed to consider 
economic cost, except perhaps in terms of comparison with preventive 
health care to prevent the types of problems they were treating.
In the survey, some of the factors least likely to be considered 
important in making treatment consideration were the availability of 
funds for other medical care and for other, non-medical social needs, 
each of which was chosen by fewer than one fifth of respondents. (Many 
of the respondents who did indicated agreement, checked all of the other 
factors as well). Furthermore, although such factors might be mentioned 
in conversation, they appeared to play no part in actual decisions made 
about individual newborns.
There is concern among clinicians about the effect of NICU care on 
the prevalence of impairment. While risk of impairment for the 
individual is considered in making individual treatment decisions, 
clinicians focus on their own patients; the number of impaired 
individuals in the population is not considered an important factor in 
making decisions about individual newborns. Both economic costs for
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society and the prevalence of impairment in the population may be 
important in determining the macro-allocation decisions determining the 
resources available to clinicians for treating individual newborns, but 
they are not consciously considered in decision making about individual 
cases.
Summary
Chapter V discussed characteristics of patient condition. 
Clinicians consider the quality of life (for the baby) to be a very 
important factor in decision making. Quality of life is influenced in 
part by physical and/or mental impairment, the capacity to give and 
receive love, and the amount of pain and suffering. There is debate 
about the degree to which the influence of family and societal factors 
about the quality of life should be considered. Clinicians also 
consider risks and uncertainty both about whether an infant will be 
normal, about the severity of impairment, and about the likelihood of 
success with a particular treatment. The critical condition -- what the 
infant needs to stay alive -- is also an important factor. Finally, 
clinicians talk about the social value of treatment or non-treatment for 
others -- family, clinicians and the health care system, and the larger 
society, the social costs and values to society seem to play a small 
role in the decision making process about individual newborns.
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CHAPTER SIX
EXTRAORDINARY CARE? 
CHARACTERISTICS OF TREATMENTS
As discussed in Chapter IV, decision making about treatment for 
catastrophically ill newborns involves not only consideration of 
characteristics of patient condition, but also involves consideration of 
the characteristics of possible treatments. This is illustrated by the 
fact that clinicians give patients some treatments while withholding 
others from the same patient. For example, in the much publicized case 
of Baby Jane Doe, a child with spina bifida, her parents and clinicians 
chose to withhold neurosurgery to repair her spinal lesion, but they 
administered antibiotics when she developed meningitis. While each 
treatment could be considered a life saving intervention, the two 
treatments differed in a number of respects (See Chapter VII for a 
discussion of this case).
Decision making about which treatments to give and which to 
withhold involves the categorization of possible treatments along a 
number of culturally defined dimensions. In this chapter, I will 
discuss the dimensions of aggressiveness, ordinary/extraordinary 
treatment, withholding/withdrawing treatment and passive/active 
euthanasia. Although some of these dimensions may seem to be purely 
objective and/or dichotomous, in fact, like the patient condition
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characteristics, each may be seen to form a continuum and each is, at 
least in part, culturally defined.
Aggres s ivenes s
On the basis of observations of how clinicians talk about 
treatment options and make treatment choices, I concluded that 
clinicians categorize treatments according to what I refer to as a 
treatment's level of "aggressiveness." Treatments which have such 
attributes as a large physiological effect, which are experimental, 
which are not frequently done, which are invasive or involve the use of 
high technology, and/or which are costly in terms of staff time or 
monetary costs, and/or which are risky, are ranked as more aggressive 
than other treatments which do not share those attributes to the same 
degree.
At one end of the dimension of aggressiveness lie those treatments 
which are seen as the most aggressive. These include life support 
treatments that replace organ function such as chronic kidney dialysis, 
or the use of an artificial heart or a liver transplant. At the other 
end are procedures which may be considered so routine that they are not 
even usually considered "treatments" by clinicians. This would include 
such procedures as giving IV fluids, keeping an open lesion covered with 
a sterile dressing, wearing surgical gloves, or keeping a baby in an 
isolette. It is worth noting that some such procedures (such as IV 
fluids) are themselves relatively recent developments, and are not
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routinely done in all parts of the world today; doing or not doing each 
of them can have life or death consequences in some circumstances.
Categorizations about treatments, in terms of their level of 
aggressiveness, are very basic to the way that clinicians think about 
treatments. Because they are so central, however, they are often made 
preattentively -- without conscious thought. Like many core cultural 
concepts for people socialized in a culture, to people socialized in the 
clinical subculture, differentiating on the basis of aggressiveness may 
form part of assumptions about the nature of their world; since the 
assumptions are so basic, they are often hard to articulate. To others, 
not socialized in the cultural system, behavior based on such 
distinctions may seem unintelligible.
I first became interested in what I was later to understand as the 
concept of aggressiveness in 1977 as I was observing treatment decisions 
which were made about the care of an infant whom I will call Sal. Sal 
was born three months premature and weighed two and one half pounds. He 
suffered from respiratory distress syndrome, a severe disease caused by 
lung immaturity. Soon after birth, he was put on a respirator which 
provides high levels of oxygen and can mechanically "breathe" for a 
patient. When I first saw him, he was on a respirator, receiving all 
that modern medicine had to offer to promote his survival.
As his respiratory status improved, he was weaned to CPAP (a 
sophisticated respiratory device which maintains air pressure to help 
keep the lungs inflated and can deliver a high concentration of oxygen
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but, unlike a respirator, does not "breathe" for the baby by delivering 
bursts of air to the lungs). Soon after, his condition took a sudden 
turn for the worse. His muscle tone and movements decreased.
Suspecting a problem, a spinal tap was done (which was the diagnostic 
test routinely used at that time to test for bleeding in the brain). 
Normally the fluid obtained was clear; Sal's fluid contained blood, 
indicating that he might have had bleeding in his brain.
This led to consideration of Sal's condition according to the 
patient condition characteristics discussed in the last chapter. Blood 
in the spinal fluid indicated that he might have suffered brain damage, 
resulting in serious impairment and a severely diminished quality of 
life. There was, however, a high degree of uncertainty because the test 
had low predictive value. (The test itself could have been traumatic 
and led to the blood, the bleeding could resolve leaving no serious 
deficit, or the bleeding could have caused damage in an area of the 
brain which would not have seriously impaired the future quality of 
life.)
The need for sophisticated respiratory support meant that the baby 
was seriously ill, but his condition was not seen to be as critical as 
if he had needed to be on a respirator. Social value, while not the 
central concern, may also have been considered. Potential very high 
costs of care and the impact for his family, could have been thought to 
be too high if, indeed, he did have severe impairments. For whatever 
combination of reasons, Sal's parents and clinicians decided that he 
might be so sick, it might be better if he was allowed to die.
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The next time I returned to the nursery, I was told that a 
decision was made to continue CPAP, but if his respiratory condition 
deteriorated, the decision had been made that he would not be put back 
on the respirator. If his heart stopped, he would not be given cardiac 
resuscitation. Other treatment, such as intravenous feedings, anti­
seizure medications, and continuous monitoring of heart and respiratory 
rate and other forms of intensive medical and nursing care, would be 
continued.
I didn't understand why he was on CPAP yet would not be put on a 
respirator. At that time the treatments looked virtually the same to 
me. Both meant that the baby was hooked up to sophisticated machines 
and both involved tubes into the baby to deliver oxygen. It was 
explained to me that the need for a respirator or cardiac resuscitation 
bore no necessary relationship to his future quality of life. The baby 
could have been severely impaired, yet have had no further respiratory 
or cardiac problems and survived. On the other hand, his cardiac or 
respiratory status might have temporarily been worse, yet he might not 
have had any brain damage. Therefore, because treatments were withheld, 
he might have died even though he could have survived without serious 
impairment. Conversely, he might have survived with the current level 
of treatment, yet have been severely impaired.
I had thought that decisions about treatment were all or nothing 
decisions to "maintain life" or "pull the plug." The decision to 
continue CPAP but not use a respirator didn't seem to make any sense to
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me because I thought that the use of CPAP did not differ in any 
significant way from the use of the respirator. However, for the 
clinicians involved, the use of the respirator, conceptualized by the 
clinicians as a more aggressive treatment, was significantly different.
I asked repeatedly why he was on CPAP but wouldn't be put on the 
respirator. I was repeatedly told that "it wouldn't make sense to put 
him back on the respirator if his quality of life would be poor." Each 
time, I asked, "then why is he still on CPAP?" and was told that "that 
was different." Yet because the conceptualization of why there was a 
difference was felt to be due to variation in the aggressiveness of 
treatment, which reflected such a basic and unconscious assumption, the 
clinicians in the unit had difficulty understanding what I didn't 
understand.
Sal's condition did not deteriorate and he never had need for a 
respirator or resuscitation. At five years of age he had cerebral palsy 
which affected his lower limbs but he has no intellectual impairment.
When making decisions to withhold treatments, clinicians are more 
likely to recommend giving those treatments which are less aggressive 
while withholding those which are more aggressive. This notion of a 
ranking of treatments is widely shared among clinicians both in
1 Another possible factor entering into the distinction between CPAP 
and the respiratory was that stopping CPAP would be withdrawing 
treatment, while not putting the baby on a respirator was withholding 
treatment (see withdrawing/withholding, below). However, even in terms 
of withholding or withdrawing treatments, the level of aggressiveness 
makes a difference for I had been told that if he needed them, Sal would 
be given antibiotics, blood transfusions, and other, not very 
aggressive, types of treatment.
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neonatology and in other clinical specialties. This is evidenced in the 
pattern of responses about treatment decisions on surveys of clinician 
decision making. For example, as part of her research on physicians' 
treatment of the critically ill, Diana Crane asked physicians if they 
would give or not give a series of specific treatments to patients 
described in hypothetical vignettes. The respondents indicated that 
they would give some less aggressive treatments, while withholding 
others which would be more aggressive from the same patients (Crane 
1975; personal communication, 1981 -- see example of survey results in 
Chapter III).
I also found that clinicians were more likely to recommend less 
aggressive treatments and more likely to withhold more aggressive 
treatments in the survey I conducted in the Spring of 1983 (see 
appendix). I presented respondents with a series of hypothetical 
vignettes about catastrophically ill newborns and asked respondents if 
they would recommend or not recommend a series of treatments for each 
baby. In each case, the number of respondents who would recommend each 
treatment, varied from treatment to treatment (see Table VI - l).
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TABLE VI - 1
TREATMENTS RESPONDENTS WOULD RECOMMEND 
AND MEAN ORDINARY/EXTRAORDINARY SCORE
n = 2492
CONDITION AND TREATMENT % WHO WOULD MEAN SCORE
RECOMMEND ORDINARY/EXTRAORDINARY
BABY WHO IS ANENCEPHALIC
Feedings by mouth 76 1.9
Tube feeding 56 2.6
Antibiotics 32 3.1
Resuscitation in the delivery room 13 4.0
Cardiac catheterization 3 4.6
Arrest page 2 4.7
Open heart surgery 2 4.8
BABY WHO HAS MULTIPLE ANOMALIES 
(BEFORE CHROMOSOMAL ANALYSIS)
Nutrition and fluids 90 1.6
Antibiotics 81 1.9
Resuscitation 76 2.0
Respirator 65 2.4
BABY WHO HAS MULTIPLE ANOMALIES 
(AFTER CHROMOSOMAL ANALYSIS 
INDICATES TRISOMY 13)
Nutrition and fluids 85 1.9
Antibiotics 60 2.8
Respirator 24 4.1
Surgery for cleft palate 14 4.0
Cardiac catheterization 13 4.5
Arrest page 10 4.6
Open heart surgery 8 4.7
2 For the Baby with trisomy 13, and for questions on resuscitation 
in the delivery room and an arrest page for the anencephalic baby, n = 
119; actual base varies slightly depending on the number of ineligible 
answers (in all cases, ineligible answers less than 5% of total n ).
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TABLE VI - 1 (cont.)
CONDITION AND TREATMENT % WHO WOULD MEAN SCORE
RECOMMEND ORDINARY/EXTRAORDINARY
A SMALL PREMATURE BABY WITH 
AN IVH
Nutrition and fluids 93 1.6
Suctioning 92 1.7
Resuscitation in delivery room 64 2.3
Increased respiratory settings 53 2.3
Pressors 39 3.5
Arrest page 26 4.1
Kidney dialysis 13 4.6
A BABY WITH DOWN'S SYNDROME 
AND DUODENAL ATRESIA
Intravenous feedings 91 1.3
Antibiotics 88 1.5
Surgery for intestinal defect 87 2.2
Cardiac catheterization 71 2.9
Open heart surgery 59 3.7
Kidney dialysis 28 4.3
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This variation can be seen to correspond to what clinicians would 
consider the aggressiveness of treatments. Less aggressive treatments 
were more often recommended while respondents less often recommended 
more aggressive treatments.
The pattern of responses on the survey indicated a high degree of 
consistency in the rank ordering of treatments to be given or withheld, 
reflecting consistency in categorizations. For each case, a Guttman 
scale analysis yielded a coefficient of reproducibility for the 
treatment recommendations exceeding 0.92. This indicates a high degree 
of correlation which corresponded to rankings along the dimension of 
aggressiveness.
There may be more consistency in the ranking of some treatments 
choices than others. For example, the most consistency in the ranking 
may occur for treatments alternatives that would be given in the same 
situation, the least in ranking treatments given in very different 
situations. To illustrate, responses to the survey indicated that when 
respondents were asked about their recommendations at two points in time 
(in the delivery room and in the ICU) the coefficient of reproducibility 
was lower than when all questions pertained only to treatments in the 
ICU. When only the responses about treatments to be recommended in the 
ICU were considered, the coefficient of reproducibilty was above 0.97 in 
all cases, indicating a very strong degree of ordering according to 
aggressiveness.
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When treatments are close to the same level of aggressiveness or 
involve treatments from different domains, such as diagnostic tests and 
surgical procedures, ranking may also be less consistent. For example, 
while in general, diagnostic tests are seen as less aggressive than 
surgery, very invasive tests like cardiac catheterization or expensive 
tests like CAT scans may be considered more aggressive than minor skin 
surgery.
Although clinicians may speak of questions about which treatment 
to give and which to withhold as questions of "how aggressive to be in 
treatment," it is not a single labeled category recognized by 
clinicians. Indeed, a number of different terms may be used to refer to 
this concept including "heroic" versus "conservative" treatment, or 
"supportive" or "ordinary" care versus "extraordinary" care (See the 
next section for a more complete discussion of the use of the terms 
"ordinary" and "extraordinary.")
In addition, the term "aggressiveness" is also used in a number of 
different ways. It is sometimes used as a synonym for "extraordinary 
treatment" (as discussed below, defined by both patient and treatment 
characteristics). Although rare, it is even occasionally used to refer 
to almost the opposite situation when it is used her to indicate a 
decisive choice to stop a treatment as in the statement "They were 
aggressive in their decision to take the baby off the respirator." 
Although the term is used in a number of ways, when used in context in 
the sense that it is used in this thesis, it is understood by clinicians 
both in neonatology and in other specialties.
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To illustrate, I present the case of Devon, an infant for whom 
questions arose about the aggressiveness of treatment:
Devon was born about eleven weeks before his due date. When she 
was in labor, his sixteen year old mother was crying for her own mother. 
She hadn't used contraception, she didn't really think she would get 
pregnant. She had thought about having an abortion, but her mother 
discouraged her. She, her mother, and her thirteen year old sister 
lived on welfare. Her boy friend was eighteen. Both black teenagers 
had dropped out of school. Neither was working.
The birth was difficult, although Devon weighed only two and one 
half pounds. Stephen, a neonatal fellow had difficulty intubating 
(putting in a tube for oxygen) and asked Martha, a neonatal nurse, to 
call upstairs for Tom, the anesthesiologist from the NICU; by the time 
he arrived Stephen had successfully placed the tube. Apgars were 1/1/5. 
Tom, Stephen and Martha brought Devon to the transitional nursery and 
stabilized him. After about two hours, on their way to the NICU, they 
stopped in the recovery room so that his mother, grandmother and father 
could see him.
His initial course was rocky but not uncommon. He had a PDA 
(problem in cardiac circulation) and was scheduled for closed heart 
surgery. He also had a grade III IVH (bleeding in the brain). Both 
were not unusual for a baby his size. In fact, there had been a number 
of very small babies in the unit; compared to them, he was doing quite
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well. Anne, the resident most involved in his care, commented that the 
four babies she was caring for weighed less than some full term babies. 
His mother and grand mother visited daily, his father often came as 
well.
When he was about nine days old, he developed meningitis, an 
infection of the central nervous system. Although low birthweight 
babies are at risk for developing meningitis, it was much less usual 
than the other complications and its implications were worse. In a baby 
that small, it often leads to severe brain damage or death. His heart 
surgery had to be postponed while he was treated for three weeks with 
powerful antibiotics. Meanwhile, his respiratory condition couldn't 
improve much because he badly needed the surgery. His weight fell to 
less than one and three quarters pounds,
As soon as he finished the three weeks of antibiotics, he was sent
immediately for heart surgery. Unfortunately, by then, his tissues were 
friable and a nick of a vessel led to a massive hemorrhage —  he needed
two times the volume of his own blood supply before he could leave the
operating room.
He returned to the NICU in critical condition. His mother and her 
mother, and his father and his parents came in. He was still bleeding, 
his blood pressure was low, he was on the respirator, with tubes through 
his chest on each side. He wasn't expected to make it. They left, not 
knowing if they would see him alive again.
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Anne and Martha worked on him constantly, sometimes assisted by 
other doctors and nurses as well. They were giving him syringes fill 
with blood to replace the blood lost, as well as bicarb to control the 
acid/base balance in his blood, in an attempt to stabilize his 
condition.
Anne was frustrated. She wasn't sure that he should have had 
aggressive treatment like surgery because of the meningitis. If it had 
been up to her, she might not have sent him. She said that other 
doctors has pushed for the surgery and now they were saying "don't be 
too aggressive." She found it difficult to know what to do for Devon, 
who was probably dying. She said "Some people mean everything but 
intercardiac meds [powerful medications injected directly into the 
heart] while others mean much less when they say don't be too 
aggressive." She thought she might give him dopamine, a powerful drug 
to maintain blood pressure. Anne said, "That's a treatment some people 
wouldn't give if they weren't being too aggressive." " Yet," she said, 
"here he is with chest tubes on each side on a respirator."
She talked to the fellow, Frank; he decided to call the attending, 
Lane, who was covering that night. Lane decided not to come in, but he 
did give specific instructions. He said "don't give dopamine because it 
could increase the bleeding. Don't give adrenaline [to stimulate his 
heart if it stopped]." "But," he said, "keep giving the bicarb." "Give 
one, maybe two more pushes [syringes] of blood if he needs it, but then, 
stop." The feeling was that nothing more could be done, he was dying.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
He only needed blood once more. If he had died that night, no one 
would have considered it a case of withholding treatment. He would have 
been seen as a terminally ill baby who died.
For a few days his condition improved, then deteriorated and he
was again put back on the respirator. His family arranged for him to be 
baptized in the NICU. Anne, Frank and Lane's month on service ended and 
other doctors, Andy, Stephen and Ruth took their places.
Most of the doctors and nurses caring for Devon were disturbed. 
They felt that the bleeding in his brain and meningitis had caused much 
damage. They called in a neurological consult. He found that Devon 
only responded to deep pain; he didn't try to cry. The shape and
movements of his eyes, lack of primitive reflexes, and a general lack of
muscle tone all indicated significant nervous system injury. The 
neurologist wrote in the chart: "The prognosis for normal neurological 
development is very guarded."
The doctors and nurses most involved in his care met to discuss 
his case. Both Stephen and Ruth said that it would be better if he 
died. They talked to his family. His mother still wanted him to be 
treated. His grandmother wasn't sure, but she said it was her 
daughter's baby so she should decide. Some of the nurses thought that 
Devon's mother was denying the seriousness of his illness.
Ruth felt the mother had made a poor decision. She felt the baby 
should be taken off the respirator or at least be "no arrest page" (not
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to have the heart started if it stops). I asked about giving bloods or 
antibiotics. While those choices might have been possible when he was 
dying, now all three doctors, Ruth, Stephen and Karen, another 
neonatologist who was nearby, looked uncomfortable at the thought. Ruth 
said, "I feel alright about disconnecting the respirator, or not doing 
an arrest, but not giving bloods or antibiotics, that's different."
Later Karen said that if he arrested, he probably wouldn't be 
resuscitated.
After that, his respiratory condition did improve, after about a 
month he could be moved to the semi-acute unit. He became somewhat more 
aware and gained weight. About two months after that he went home. He 
continues to be followed and his neurological condition continues to be 
poor.
Ordinary/Extraordinary Treatment
Another dimension on which treatments are classified is the 
ordinary/extraordinary dimension. Unlike the dimension of 
aggressiveness, which in theory depends only on characteristics of 
treatments, in making judgments about whether treatments are ordinary or 
extraordinary, characteristics of both patients and treatments are 
considered.
The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means grows out 
of Catholic moral theology (see Chapter II). The most commonly used
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definition was offered by Father G. Kelly (1958) "Ordinary means" were 
defined as "all medicines, treatments and operations which can offer a 
reasonable hope of benefit for the patient and which can be obtained and 
used without excessive pain and other inconvenience." "Extraordinary 
means," on the other hand, are defined as those treatments that do not 
meet the above criteria. Since the distinction rests on "benefit for 
the patient," considerations concerning issues related to the patient's 
benefit, such as the patient's quality of life, as well as the cost and 
invasiveness of treatment are considered.
When philosophers and theologians use the terms, (reflected in 
virtually all of the philosophical literature written before 1983) they 
usually do so in a manner which indicates that they see ordinary and 
extraordinary treatments as each forming a discrete category. In 
discussing the withholding of treatment, philosophers often used the 
terms with the assumption being that the categorization of treatments as 
ordinary or extraordinary was not problematic.
The terms have been used in the same manner in some court 
decisions. For example, the terms were used in a pair of 1981 cases 
before the New York State Court of Appeals, known as the Father Fox and 
the Storars cases. The decision, issued to clarify policy after the 
death of Father Fox, stated that "ordinary care must be given while 
"extraordinary care" could be withheld. (New York Law Journal 1981:5)
However, in doing field work in the neonatal intensive care unit,
I observed that clinicians often did not use the terms as dichotomous.
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Rather, clinicians seemed to perceive treatments as falling along a 
continuum between "ordinary" and "extraordinary.11 Clinicians would talk 
about treatments being "more extraordinary" or "less extraordinary" than 
another. There was often disagreement among clinicians about whether a 
particular treatment was ordinary or extraordinary in a particular case.
In addition to evaluations based on benefit to the patient, most 
clinicians seemed to be incorporating other elements beside benefit to 
the patient in making categorizations of treatments as "ordinary" or 
"extraordinary." Many clinicians considered how usual or unusual a 
treatment is, whether the treatments were high tech or low tech, 
invasive or non-invasive, and other characteristics, here discussed in 
terms of "aggressiveness" in making distinctions according about whether 
a treatment was ordinary or extraordinary. For example, a clinician 
might say, "it used to be extraordinary to put a baby this small on the 
respirator, but now we do it all the time."
Sometimes clinicians will categorize as ordinary any treatment 
which they feel would be beneficial to a baby and categorize any 
treatment which they don't feel would be beneficial as extraordinary. 
However, clinicians have trouble using the terms without incorporating 
aspects of aggressiveness. Therefore, clinicians will sometimes 
classify as ordinary less aggressive treatments even if they feel they 
will not have benefit for the baby and classify as extraordinary 
aggressive treatments even if they feel they will be of benefit for a 
baby. On the survey I distributed in 1983, I asked respondents to rank 
each treatment option on a scale of 1 (ordinary) to 5 (extraordinary)
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(see appendix). Mean scores for each treatment choice are shown on 
Table VI - 2. The variation in categorization of treatments as 
ordinary or extraordinary was reflected in the responses. The 
respondents' rankings for every treatment on the survey ranged from "1" 
(ordinary) to "5" (extraordinary).
In part the ratings of treatments as "ordinary" or "extraordinary" 
reflected the respondents feelings about the potential benefit of 
treatment for a particular infant. This is reflected in the differences 
in ranking of treatments from case to case and in the correlations 
between rating on the ordinary/extraordinary scale and respondents' 
treatment recommendations (see Tables VI - 2 and VI - 3). The ranking 
along the ordinary/extraordinary scale, however, also reflect the fact 
that respondents* categorizations incorporate characteristics of 
treatments as well as characteristics of patients. This is reflected in 
the fact that the relative ranking of treatments as more or less 
ordinary was consistent from case to case (Table V - 1) and the fact 
that even respondents who would not recommend less aggressive treatments 
would categorize them as more ordinary than more aggressive ones, and, 
even respondents who would recommend more aggressive treatments would 
categorize them as more extraordinary than less aggressive treatments 
(see Table V - 3).
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TABLE VI - 2
COMPARISON OF RATINGS ON THE ORDINARY/ EXTRAORDINARY SCALE 
BY PATIENT CONDITION AND TREATMENT3
RATINGS
TREATMENTS AND ORDINARY EXTRAORDINARY
PATIENT CONDITIONS 1 2  3 4 5
IV FEEDINGS/NUTRITION AND FLUIDS
Down's syndrome and duodenal atresia 83 8 5 2 2
Trisomy 13 with cleft palate 63 16 4 7 10
ANTIBIOTICS
Down's syndrome and duodenal atresia 
Trisomy 13 with cleft palate
71
28
17
18
7
18
2
17
3
19
SURGERY
For duodenal atresia (Down's) 
For cleft palate (trisomy 13)
33
4
33
9
22
18
7
22
5
47
OPEN HEART SURGERY
For baby with Down's syndrome 
For baby with trisomy 13
4
2
9
0
27
6
27
11
33
81
3 Numbers represent the percentage of respondents who would assign 
each treatment a particular rating on the "ordinary/extraordinary" 
scale." For treatments for the baby with Down's syndrome, n = 249.
For treatments for the baby with trisomy 13, n = 119.
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TABLE VI - 3 
RATINGS ON THE ORDINARY/EXTRAORDINARY SCALE 
BY RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING TREATMENTS FOR 
A BABY WITH DOWN'S SYNDROME4
TREATMENTS AND TREATMENT 
RECOMMENDATIONS
RATINGS
ORDINARY EXTRAORDINARY 
1 2  3 4 5
INTESTINAL SURGERY
Would recommend 
Would not recommend
n
n
216
31
37
7
36
10
19
45
6
16
2
23
CARDIAC SURGERY
Would recommend 
Would not recommend
n
n
142
97
15
1
39
9
20
35
19
54
KIDNEY DIALYSIS
Would recommend 
Would not recommend
n
n
67
173
10
1
15
3
21
6
22
16
31
74
4 Numbers represent the percent of respondents within each treatment 
category (recommending or not recommending treatment) who would assign 
the treatment a particular rating on the "ordinary/extraordinary scale."
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Singer, Kuhse and Singer, in a survey of obstetricians and 
pediatricians in Australia, also found that while some clinicians 
classified treatments as ordinary, others categorized the same 
treatments as ordinary (Singer, Kuhse and Singer 1983).
While I had not seen the variation in use of the terms "ordinary" 
and "extraordinary" discussed a few years ago, it has recently been 
discussed in a number of contexts. Critics have suggested that the 
terms are used in so many ways that the distinction is no longer useful 
(Pres. Comm. 1983:88-89). The terms, however, are still frequently 
used by philosophers and in the clinical setting in the context of 
decision making.
Withholding/Withdrawing Treatment
In discussions concerning decision making about the aggressiveness 
of treatment, a distinction is often made between withholding (or not 
starting) and withdrawing (stopping) treatments. While many clinicians 
now feel that the distinction should not have much importance in 
decision making, it continues to play a role in treatment choice.
At first glance, criteria for deciding how to classify a treatment 
on this dimension may seem to be clear cut and objective. Indeed, 
"stopping treatment" or "pulling the plug" are the idioms most often 
used to refer to the subject of limiting the aggressiveness of 
treatment. However, as discussed earlier, plugs are almost never pulled
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and, as with the other dimension of patient condition and treatment 
characteristics, categorizations of behaviors as starting and stopping 
treatment are complex and culturally defined.
In many instances, the categorization of a treatment behavior is 
clear. For example, in choosing not to perform surgery to repair 
duodenal atresia, the decision clearly pertains to a choice about 
starting a new treatment, rather than a decision about withdrawing an 
ongoing treatment. In other instances, however, when a treatment 
modality can be seen as made up either one single treatment composed of 
a number of parts, or a series of individual treatments, the distinction 
between starting and stopping treatment becomes unclear. The following 
anecdote will illustrate the issue.
Ray was born with a spina bifida. He had a high level lesion and 
other anomalies which meant that if he survived he would have multiple 
impairments. At first the exact extent of the anomalies was unclear and 
his parents didn't know what decisions to make. Antibiotics were 
started soon after birth and the child was examined by multiple 
consults. After meetings with physicians, nurses, social workers, and 
others, his parents decided that "treatment should be stopped and the 
baby should be allowed to die."
The following morning at social service rounds, a social worker 
who was involved in the discussion was surprised to find that the baby 
was still being given antibiotics. She said to the resident "you're not 
going to give any more antibiotics then, right?" She felt that adding
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more antibiotics to his intravenous solution would constitute a "new 
treatment." The resident, however, seeing the addition of more 
antibiotics as only part of a single, continuous, seven day course of 
treatment, said he would "finish the seven days and then stop." He 
added "that will give the baby time to declare himself." He felt that 
not to finish the seven day course would be withdrawing treatment; he 
didn't feel that it would be right to withdraw treatment. The social 
worker was disturbed. She would not expect the current IV bottle 
containing medication to be removed, but she didn't think that 
antibiotics would be added to any subsequent IVs. She conceptualized 
that as withholding, not withdrawing treatment.
The preceding example illustrates the fact that treatments which 
require multiple administrations create an ambiguous situation in which 
not providing the treatment may be considered either withholding or 
withdrawing treatment. In addition to administration of continuous 
medication, there may also be differences in categorization when 
treatments are interrupted. If a baby was ever given a treatment for a 
problem, for example a blood transfusion, and the baby again needs a 
treatment for the same problem, not giving the treatment for the problem 
the next time it occurs may either be considered withholding or 
withdrawing treatment. The same is true when something happens to 
interrupt an ongoing treatment. For example, if a baby has been 
intubated (had a tube placed to deliver oxygen) and the tube becomes 
dislodged, in some situations a clinician may consider it withholding 
treatment if the tube is not replaced. Others may feel that not 
replacing the tube would constitute withdrawing treatment.
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Another area in which questions arise about whether a treatment 
choice involves withholding or withdrawing treatment concerns 
respiratory care. Very sick babies are often on respirators. The 
respirators have settings which vary rate, pressure and concentration of 
oxygen in the gas the baby receives. In general, when a baby's 
respiratory status is poorer, higher respirator settings are needed for 
survival. If clinicians feel that a baby is doing poorly, especially if 
they feel that no matter what they do the baby will not be able to 
survive, they may not turn the respirator setting up, even if the baby's 
respiratory status deteriorates. (Pres. Comm. 1983:73- 77) In that 
situation, as in the example of Sal at the beginning of this chapter, 
they may feel that they are letting the baby's condition rather than the 
treatment choice determine survival. (This will be discussed at greater 
length later in this chapter under active/passive euthanasia and in 
Chapter VII.)
Clinicians may also adjust respirator settings in a way that helps 
them feel that they are withholding rather than withdrawing treatment 
entirely if they decide to decrease the aggressiveness of treatment.
For example, if a decision is made that it would be best if a baby dies, 
rather than "pulling the plug" and discontinuing the respirator 
entirely, the settings on the respirator may be lowered. In that 
situation, the respirator may be set in such a way that the clinicians 
know that the baby will die but some clinicians feel that it enables a 
baby to die more comfortably than if the respirator was disconnected
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entirely. In addition, the clinicians are spared having to remove the 
respirator and confront the act of withdrawing treatment as directly.
The distinction between not starting a new treatment and stopping 
a continuing treatment becomes important in the context of the 
distinction between active and passive euthanasia, where stopping 
treatment is sometimes seen as "causing death" and not starting a new 
treatment is seen as "allowing death to occur." This will be discussed 
in more detail below.
A number of people have criticized those who make a distinction 
between between withholding and withdrawing treatment from a number of 
perspectives. Some have written that either it is the outcome or the 
intention rather than the means that is important. Clinicians, such as 
Dr. Driscoll, director of the nurseries at Columbia, has talked about 
the importance of being able to initiate treatment in a situation in 
which the prognosis is very poor or very uncertain in order to be able 
to establish a proper diagnosis, knowing that treatment which is not 
beneficial can be discontinued later. Indeed, fear that a treatment 
once started, could not be stopped has been reported to have prevented 
clinicians from initiating treatment in cases where it could haye been 
beneficial (Pres. Comm. 1983:75-76).
Sarcastically Gorovitz suggests an ingenious way to handle the 
problems:
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There is a timing device used in English apartment-house halls 
which automatically turns off the light after a few minutes. We 
can get devices made to shut off after twenty- four hours, and 
install them between all respirators and their plugs. Then all 
the physician would have to do is —  nothing at all; he could let 
the patient die. of course, each day, before the twenty-four 
hours is up, a decision would have to be made whether the switch 
should be reactivated, thereby to prolong the life. But if it is 
decided not to do anything, then the case ends.
It is obvious that this scheme fails. It fails because 
there is no morally significant distinction between the 
circumstances with the timing device and the circumstances without 
it.
(1978:5)
Extending this concept still further, Father John Paris, a Jesuit 
priest, at a conference for clinicians at Columbia in 1984, suggests 
that each drip of fluid from an IV or each pulse of air from a 
respirator can be considered a unique treatment. Therefore each could 
be stopped at any time. Although, in theory, many of the clinicians 
appreciated the concept, it is harder to accept in real situations.
Despite problems with the operationalization of the distinction, 
and intellectual arguments about the lack of moral relevance of the 
distinction, it is clear that the distinction feels very real and has 
cultural significance to many clinicians. Frequently, clinicians find 
it more difficult to stop a treatment than to not start a new treatment. 
Some feel that by stopping a treatment they would be actively ending a 
life, which is itself a natural process, while by not starting a new 
treatment, they are not prolonging death, or allowing a natural process 
to occur (see discussion under active/passive euthanasia and goals, 
below).
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Beyond the issues of control over the outcome, knowledge of the 
likely outcome, or intention of the decision maker, the physical act of 
stopping a treatment has importance. Those lower in the staff 
hierarchy, for example, are upset if the act of stopping a treatment is 
"dumped" on them. For example, residents are upset if they have not 
been part of the decision making process to discontinue treatment, but 
are asked to extubate a baby (remove the tubes attaching a baby to a 
respirator). Some senior physicians therefore feel that it is their 
responsibility to physically carry out the act of stopping treatment, by 
extubating a baby or turning down the respirator settings, as well as 
take responsibility in decision making.
Sometimes, clinicians who object to a parents wishes about the 
discontinuation of treatment, say "if that's what the parents want, they 
should have to carry it out themselves," feeling that the parents would 
be less likely to stop treatment if they had to do what is seen as the 
"dirty work" themselves. Although clinicians often feel that in the 
long run the decision is in the best interest of a baby, the act of 
discontinuing a treatment is usually seen as a sad event at best, and is 
usually emotionally upsetting to carry out. It is sometimes likened to 
an act of an executioner.
Sometimes efforts may be made to avoid having to stop treatment. 
This may be done by continuing to treat a terminally ill baby. In other 
situations, in which a baby's condition is known to be deteriorating, if 
it is felt that the baby should be allowed to die, ongoing treatments
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will be continued, knowing that new treatments will be needed but will 
not be given.
Passive and Active Euthanasia
Probably the most important distinction in the minds of many 
clinicians in choosing between treatment options is the distinction 
between active and passive euthanasia. Although there is growing 
acceptance both among clinicians and in American society as a whole of 
"allowing death to occur," or "passive euthanasia" there is remains a 
strong taboo against "active euthanasia" or deliberately causing death 
(see Chapter II).
While the considerations of selective treatment may start with 
considerations of quality of life, they will often end with and be 
decided on the grounds of whether a particular treatment choice would 
constitute active or passive euthanasia. In almost all cases, treatment 
choices which might lead to death will only be made if they can be 
thought of as constituting passive euthanasia.
The passive/active distinction is defined in part by some of the 
distinctions discussed above. Passive euthanasia is often thought of as 
not initiating an extraordinary treatment while active euthanasia is 
often thought of as withdrawing an ordinary treatment. To the extent 
that there is lack of agreement about the dimensions of 
ordinary/extraordinary treatment and withholding/withdrawing treatment,
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there is also controversy concerning the operationalization of that 
definition. In addition, there is controversy about whether withholding 
an ordinary treatment or withdrawing an extraordinary treatment 
constitutes active or passive euthanasia.
Part of the philosophical basis and acceptance for a distinction 
between active and passive euthanasia evolves from the distinction 
between omission and commission. Others feel it is not a useful 
distinction because what is important is the responsibility for the 
outcome if one has the ability to control it, and the intention to bring 
about death.
Despite the philosophical criticisms of a distinction between 
active and passive euthanasia, culturally it is a crucially important 
distinction to those who work in neonatal units. Although some 
practitioners may say that the nature of the treatment may not matter, 
and that there is no real difference between not starting or stopping 
treatment, every clinician with whom I discussed the question, including 
a number who would be categorized as in favor of non-treatment in many 
circumstances, felt that certain types of non- treatment choices would 
constitute active euthanasia, and would therefore be unacceptable.
While the norm against active euthanasia is very strong and 
pervasive among clinicians, there is a lot of variation in the beliefs 
about whether or not particular choices would constitute active or 
passive euthanasia. Here the differences in definition between ordinary
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and extraordinary and between stopping and not starting treatments often 
become crucially important.
For example, let's consider the case of Baby Doe of Bloomington 
Indiana. Baby Doe was born with Down's syndrome and a TE fistula (a 
defect in the formation of the trachea and esophagus). According to his 
pediatrician, at the time of his birth, it was also thought that the 
baby might have had an enlarged heart indicating a serious heart defect 
(Pless 1983). The presence of Down's syndrome indicated that the baby 
would be mentally retarded, the TE fistula meant that the baby could not 
take normal feedings. The baby would have needed surgery to correct the 
defect or long term intravenous feedings and fluids in order to survive. 
Baby Doe's parents and obstetrician decided not to operate and not to 
give either intravenous feedings or fluids.
It seems reasonable to suppose that his parents and obstetrician 
considered surgery and intravenous feedings and fluids to be 
"treatments." Indeed, 50 years ago, before the development of modern 
medicine, these treatments which we now think of as routine would not 
have been available. They probably felt that the Down's syndrome, TE 
fistula, and enlarged heart created a situation in which the baby could 
not have a good quality of life. Therefore, any treatments could be 
considered "extraordinary" for they would be without benefit. They 
probably felt that they could therefore choose to withhold these 
treatments, and that such a choice would constitute a decision to allow 
death to occur, or passive euthanasia.
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Other people, including many clinicians, would not consider a 
decision not to do surgery or provide food and fluid for a child with 
Down's syndrome as passive euthanasia. They feel that a baby with 
Down's syndrome can enjoy a good quality of life. Therefore, treatment 
that prolongs survival would be of benefit. Surgery which is commonly 
done, and which is not seen as very expensive, invasive, risky, etc. 
would not be seen as extraordinary. Some people feel that the providing 
food and fluids does not constitute "treatment," and, for a variety or 
reasons, is something which can never be withheld.
Some of the nurses involved in the care of Baby Doe evidently 
shared this view. They felt that withholding surgery and food and 
fluids constituted active euthanasia in the case of Baby Doe and 
therefore felt that it should not be allowed to occur.
The different attitudes toward various treatment options reflect 
differences of opinion about what constitutes active and passive 
euthanasia. In the 1970s, at the beginning of the debate about the care 
of newborns, there were clinicians and bioethicists who argued that the 
choices of treatment made in the case of Baby Doe were acceptable.
(Duff and Campbell 1973) As attitudes towards the developmentally 
disabled, and the political climate about the regulation of medical 
treatment has changed, it is difficult to find any support for that 
position among clinicians in the literature. Many clinicians would 
feel, however, that the withholding more extraordinary treatments from 
an infant with Down's syndrome, such as complex cardiac surgery or
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kidney dialysis, was appropriate (see survey results, Table VI - 1) and 
that it would constitute passive euthanasia.
In the case of Baby Doe, the definition of treatment choice as 
active or passive euthanasia rests primarily on the 
ordinary/extraordinary distinction. In other cases the 
withholding/withdrawing distinction may be the important distinction.
In yet others there may be a combination of factors and both may be 
important. This was the case in a decision about treatment for a very 
small premature baby which I will describe.
Sarah had a grade IV IVH and a cyst (indicating severe brain 
damage). In this case, Christine, a neonatologist who usually advocates 
very aggressive treatment, stated that she agreed with a parental 
decision and would not put the baby back on a respirator, if she needed 
it, after the baby had been weaned to CPAP (less aggressive respiratory 
support). Christine, however, said she would not "feel comfortable" 
actively removing a baby from a respirator who had the same condition.
Another neonatologist, Ruth, felt that the first physician was 
making a meaningless distinction between intubating (putting a baby on 
the respirator) and extubating (taking the baby off the respirator).
This second doctor, however, who has a reputation for advocating the 
discontinuation of aggressive treatment for infants who she feels could 
only have a very poor quality of life, said that she, herself was 
uncertain and uncomfortable about taking the baby off CPAP. She noted 
that although other clinicians agreed that the baby would not be
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reintubated, only the parents really questioned why CPAP was being 
continued. Although a decision to withhold the aggressive treatment, 
the use of the respirator, was acceptable, stopping a less aggressive 
treatment, CPAP, was not acceptable to any of the clinicians, although 
they all acknowledged that the severe brain damage would preclude the 
possibility of meaningful life for the baby.
Although the decision may not be understood analytically, and may 
be operationalized differently in different institutions and among 
different clinicians, virtually all clinicians internalize the 
importance of these distinctions during the socialization process; they 
are strongly felt. One final vignette will illustrate.
Justin, a full term baby, because of a series of complications, 
had a very short intestine. Although for a while it was thought that the 
baby had enough intestine to eventually feed, after further damage, it 
was decided that the baby unfortunately did not have enough intestine to 
ever be able to digest food. Although some babies have been kept alive 
for as long as 2 years with hyperalimentation through a central venous 
line (total IV feedings, also called TPN), no newborn had ever survived 
longer than 2 years. While he survived, most of the time, the baby 
would probably be hospitalized, hooked up to machines, with frequent 
infections, receiving a very expensive treatment. The decision was made 
to stop intravenous feedings.
I asked Sue, a nurse, who was caring for the baby about why Justin 
was no longer getting "hyperal" (the intravenous nutritional fluid).
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She explained that it constituted heroic care for this baby and would 
therefore only prolong the baby's suffering. With it the baby might 
live for weeks, months or maybe years, without it the baby was likely to 
die within the next few days. Then I asked, "Why don't you stop the 
fluids?" which she was, at that point, attaching to an IV in his arm. 
Stopping the fluids would have, in all likelihood, have shortened his 
life span still further. "We couldn't do that," she explained 
emphatically, "that would be murder."
Whereas to someone not socialized in the clinical subculture, the 
difference between the two IV fluids may not seem significant, to 
clinicians socialized in the clinical subculture, there is a crucial 
difference. Even Surgeon General Koop, on of the nation's strongest 
advocated of treatment for handicapped infants, approves the withholding 
of hyperalimentation from infants with no hope of recovering adequate 
intestinal function for feedings by mouth. On the other hand, even the 
strongest clinician advocates of withholding treatment from severely 
impaired newborns, would probably not sanction the withholding of fluids 
from such a baby. To virtually all clinicians, the first treatment 
choice, withholding hyperalimentation, constitutes passive euthanasia, 
while withholding fluids constitutes active euthanasia.
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Summary
In the preceding chapter, a number of ways that clinicians 
conceptualize treatment characteristics when making decisions about the 
aggressiveness of treatment was discussed. One of the most central to 
the clinicians1 conceptual system, referred to here as the aggressiveness 
of treatment, was identified. The distinctions between ordinary and 
extraordinary treatment, withholding and withdrawing treatment, and 
passive and active euthanasia were also examined. While each is often 
presented as a clear dichotomous dimension, they were found to encompass 
complex, cultural defined evaluations. Together with conceptualization 
of patient condition characteristics, conceptualization of treatment 
characteristics provide the data used by clinicians in making treatment 
decisions.
In the following chapter, the goals and principles of decision 
making, used in making treatment choices for catastrophically ill 
newborns, will be discussed in order to explicate the way that the 
categorizations of characteristics of patient conditions and treatments 
are translated into behavioral treatment choices.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
UP TO GOD OR MOTHER NATURE:
DECISION MAKING GOALS, NORMS AND BEHAVIOR
Goals and norms are crucial parts of the decision making process 
leading to behavior. As discussed in Chapter IV, goals provide the 
purposes which orient the decision making process. Norms are 
prescriptive statements about how to relate categories to goals which 
are used to guide behavior. In the following chapter, the goals and 
norms of decision making about the care of catastrophically ill newborns 
will be presented and treatment choice will be discussed.
Goals
The goals of medical treatment, in general, and neonatal decision 
making, in particular, are:
To Cure 
To Care
To Preserve Life 
To Do No Harm
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While these goals at first may seem unambiguous, their definitions, like 
the characteristics of patients' condition and treatment, are culturally 
determined. In most cases, the same treatment choices will further all 
four goals. In some cases, however, they may be contradictory. There 
is variation in how clinicians operationalize each of them, and in how 
important clinicians think each may be in a particular case. In this 
section, each of these goals will be examined and choosing among goals 
will be discussed. The role of conceptualizations about goals will be 
considered in more detail and illustrative examples will be provided in 
the section on norms and neonatal decision making.
To Cure
For most clinicians, the ideal goal in medical treatment is "to 
cure" or to return a patient from an abnormal (pathological) state to a 
"normal" one. For example, the majority of infants admitted to ICU are 
premature babies, in an abnormal state because they were born before the 
end of the normal 40 weeks gestational period. The major goal in their 
treatment is to choose treatments which will maintain their vital 
functions in such a way that they will be able to be discharged able to 
function as any "normal" infant born at full term.
In some cases, clinicians may disagree about whether cure is 
possible. Disagreement can take place in two respects. First, there 
can be disagreement about the ability to produce a given physiological 
outcome. For example, Cindy had a very complex heart condition. There
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was disagreement about whether surgery could be successful in correcting 
the defect. Second, there was disagreement about whether a particular 
outcome would comprise a cure. Peter, one of the neonatologists feared 
that the surgery would leave her a "cardiac cripple" with a limited 
ability to function and would therefore not provide a cure. He 
questioned the benefits of treatment. Christine, another neonatologist, 
on the other hand, though recognizing the possibility of the same level 
of impairment, believed that this surgery would be a cure for her 
(presently more serious) condition and would consider her cured.
To Care
A second goal of medical treatment is to provide care. Providing 
care can involve supporting vital functions (by supplying warmth, food, 
nutrition, etc.), relieving suffering (by removing unpleasant stimuli, 
providing measures to mitigate an unpleasant experience or provide a 
pleasant one), and providing means to maintain or increase other 
functions (e.g. preserving range of motion through physical therapy). 
Karen, another attending, did not feel that the surgery would cure 
Cindy, but she did think that doing it would be appropriate care.
Much of the care given to the babies in the NICU entails 
monitoring and ministering to their vital functions through feeding, 
monitoring and sometimes assisting respiration, monitoring the heart 
beat and, if necessary, regulating it with drugs, etc. Other care 
involves performing procedures or giving medication (such as antiseizure
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medication) to control an abnormal condition which cannot be completely 
cured.
One aspect of "caring" is to help the individual to function as 
much as possible given the limits of his or her condition. For example, 
Sal had bleeding in the brain, leading to cerebral palsy. His 
caretakers will be unable to completely cure him, the main goal will be 
to care for the baby by providing exercises and other physical therapies 
so as to maximize functioning as much as possible.^
Another aspect of caring is to provide comfort - that is to remove 
negative stimuli or mitigate an unpleasant experience and provide 
pleasant ones. For example, Sue, one of the nurses sometimes provides 
comfort care by carrying a baby in a snugglie (baby carrying pouch).
She believes that it both is pleasant for the baby, and, may improve 
future physiological or psychological functioning. In other 
circumstances, care is intended only for the current experience for the 
child. For example, Sue will often hold and rock a dying baby, she says 
"at least it's something I can do for them."
Sometimes, there may be disagreements about what constitutes good 
care. For example, if an infant is going to have a painful procedure, 
such as the insertion of chest tubes through the baby's chest wall and 
into the lungs, some clinicians feel providing good care for such a baby 
may involve giving drugs to reduce the pain. Since such drugs may
1 Those clinicians who use a more functional definition of cure, may 
consider such measures as intended for cure, rather than care.
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depress the infants respiratory status, however, which may result in a 
higher risk of death, some clinicians do not feel that such medication 
is appropriate.
In some cases, it is not clear how to provide the best care. For 
example, treatments that may be best for maximizing care in one respect 
may cause problems in another. For example, high levels of oxygen, 
intended to preserve life and maximize future brain functioning may be 
associated with unintended problems such as chronic lung damage or eye 
disease.
To Preserve Life
A third basic goal of medicine is to preserve life. Even in cases 
where cure is not possible, the minimum goal is usually to enable 
continuation of life. Much has been written on how physicians see death 
as the ultimate failure or defeat (see Chapter II). The ability to 
"defeat death" is the function most recognized as characterizing the 
power which justifies status and power of physicians, in particular, and 
the health care professions in general. Mortality statistics are often 
the measure used to judge success of health care programs. While there 
has been change regarding ideas about the definition of life, and 
regarding the assumption of unquestioned benefit from postponing death 
in all cases (see Chapter II), in general, a primary goal of medicine is 
still the preservation of life.
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One doctor, commenting on why it was so hard not to treat, said: 
"From the first day of medical school, we are taught how to save life.
It is very difficult not to save life." (Levin, Palmer and Ross 1984). 
The techniques that clinicians learn in their training are aimed at 
maintaining physiological functioning; there is little training relating 
to recognizing when efforts to continue life may not be appropriate.
Sometimes there may be conflicts between efforts to maintain life 
in the short term and long term. A procedure intended to promote long 
range functioning, such as open heart surgery, may engender unintended 
side effects such as risks to life from complications of surgery.
To Do No Harm
A final basic goal or tenet of medical practice is "to do no 
harm." Frequently, the maxim: Primum non nocere," above all, do no 
harm, is attributed to Hippocrates, however, it does not appear in the 
Hippocratic corpus. Rather, the following appears in the Hippocratic 
Oath: "I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and 
judgement, but never with a view to injury and wrong doing" (Reiser,
Dyck and Curran 1977:5), While intentionally causing harm by use of the 
medical arts is clearly prohibited, there is variation among clinicians 
as to how important they feel it is to avoid unintended harms as a 
result of treatment.
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While some clinicians feel that avoiding harm is a primary goal, 
others feel that a greater degree of risk can be tolerated in pursuit of 
the primary goals of saving life. These clinicians are more likely to 
display an activist stance that dictates that doing something is better 
than doing nothing. For example, such clinicians are willing to try 
highly experimental, invasive procedures, such as an infant heart 
transplant, if they think that there is a chance that it might work. 
Others feel that inflicting that sort of procedure on a baby now would 
be doing harm.
What is meant by avoiding harm depends a great deal on how harm is 
defined. For some, harm is narrowly defined in terms of an assault 
which lessens physiological functioning or decreases the probability of 
survival. For others, however, probably more often, a broader 
definition of harm is used. Such factors as pain and suffering 
(physical or emotional) and loss of autonomy may be seen as harms to be 
avoided in the practice of medicine. Christine, one of the attendings, 
believes it is better to save the life of a severely retarded child 
while another attending, Ruth, believes that it is doing harm to save 
such a life.
Iatrogenic harms, caused by the side effects of treatment, are 
among those of most concern to clinicians. Clinicians often seem to be 
most upset by those mistakes which they see as their fault because they 
occur as a result of treatment. When harm is done, either as a result 
of a mistake (e.g. IV infiltrate), or as a side effect of treatment 
(e.g. RLF), or because the intentional effect of the treatment (e.g.
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prolonging life) is later seen as a harm, clinicians often feel that 
they are responsible. Often they feel worse than when an equivalent 
condition occurs but is not felt to be a result of their actions.
For example, Harriet's mother's membranes had been ruptured for a 
while before she gave birth. In order to prevent infection, Harriet was 
given an antibiotic immediately after birth but a lumbar puncture (test 
of the spinal fluid) wasn't done to check for infection and drug 
sensitivity. A few days later she developed meningitis from a resistant 
strain of bacteria; the clinicians felt especially bad because failing 
to do the test had resulted in a serious condition which might have been 
prevented.
Another related area of concern is that there is seen to be a 
difference between "natural" events or "God's will" and "unnatural" 
events, seen as the result of "interference with nature." There is a 
somewhat fatalistic acceptance of unfortunate events that are not seen 
as directly caused by human actions. On the other hand, there is a 
feeling that those things that do occur as the result of human actions, 
could have been prevented and should not have occurred. There is 
sometimes a sense that interfering with "what was meant to be," even if 
it is bad, could be a harm. Individual clinicians, however, differ in 
their ideas about what was "meant to be."
The sense of it being wrong to try to treat what can't be helped 
is reflected in the writings of Hippocrates (Reiser, Dyck and Curran 
1977) and is also reflected in the modern discussion of the artificial
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and futile preservation of life (DHHS 1985). On the other hand, to 
bring about death, even when the patient would die soon anyway, is also 
seen as doing harm. Sometimes clinicians talk about "tragic choices" 
and say they feel stuck "between a rock and a hard place." Many 
clinicians fear causing death even more than they fear prolonging dying; 
therefore, in general, a choice is made to preserve life.
Other Goals
There are other types of goals, of a different order that also may 
inform clinical decision making. For example, other goals are to 
discover more about the causes of disease and their cures, to educate 
health care professionals or to gain status or prestige. These may 
influence clinical decision making in some circumstances. In general, 
these are satisfied by the same treatment choices as those made to meet 
the first four goals.
While many decisions are made to try new techniques, procedures or 
substances, these are virtually always done because of the belief that 
they will promote cure, improve care, or preserve life. When a 
particular treatment is not given, because the patient is part of a 
clinical trial, it is generally believed that the benefits of treatment 
are uncertain. At times, a procedure thought to have little chance of 
success for a particular baby may be tried because it is believed that 
it will help future babies with the same or a similar condition.
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In the popular conception, there is concern that a child may be 
kept alive or given a treatment just for "experimentation" or for 
"teaching material." This is very rarely the case. I did not observe 
any decisions which would fall in this category, except to the degree 
that the aggressive ethos generally guiding intensive care, led 
clinicians to attempt to cure, care, or promote survival in cases which 
probably had little chance of success.
One example of a case where clinicians performed an extremely 
aggressive treatment, which was very experimental, occurred when 
physicians in Loma Linda, California, transplanted a baboon heart into a 
baby known as Baby Fae. Although critics felt that far too little 
previous experimental work had been done with animals to justify the 
procedure, the clinicians who cared for her evidently thought that there 
was a chance that she would survive; therefore, the procedure was 
justified for this baby with a lethal heart defect.
In rare cases, aggressive treatment may be given for teaching 
purposes, as in the case discussed before concerning a baby who was 
resuscitated in the emergency room. Although she was thought to be 
dead, she was treated so that a resident could practice intubation 
techniques. In that case, the resuscitation was successful.
Presumably, in other cases, such acts have been performed and have been 
of no benefit to the baby or have been judged to be harmful. Such acts 
are thought to be morally questionable, but many clinicians feel that 
the gain, in terms of knowledge which can later be used to help other 
babies, outweighs the possible harm. I have heard of no cases, however,
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which resemble the cases of human experimentation at Willowbrook, in 
which children were intentionally given a disease or risky procedure 
purely for the purpose of research (Rothman and Rothman 1984). By the 
time I did my field work, there was consensus that such actions were 
morally unacceptable.
Another situation in which one baby may be treated aggressively 
for the benefit of another, is when the baby is a potential organ donor. 
A recent issue of the Hastings Center Report presented commentaries 
about using an anencephalic baby as an organ donor (1986). While there 
has been little demand for newborns organs so far, such a demand could 
increase significantly if infant heart transplant became an accepted 
procedure.
Other goals sometimes discussed in relation to clinician decision 
making are to make money or to avoid malpractice suits and to achieve 
professional status. Although such practices have been documented in 
other settings (e.g. P. Katz 1985), I don't know of any examples in 
neonatology. Such goals may help to form the context of decision 
making, and may in fact help to inform the general standards of care 
which guide decision making for all babies. At least when I did my 
field work in 1982, however, I don't think that it directly entered into 
decision making about the aggressiveness of treatment for particular 
babies.^
 ^ Pressures from rising malpractice suit rates, and economic 
pressures from changes in reimbursement policies may create changes, at
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Variation in Goals
In general, in a neonatal unit, clinicians are able to orient 
their behavior toward all of the primary medical goals at the same time 
—  the best treatment serves to cure, to provide care, to preserve life, 
and to do no harm. At other times, however, behavior is not possible 
which would maximize all of the goals at the same time. In that 
situation, clinicians may maximize one goal at the expense of others, or 
may try to find a balancing point in an attempt to maximize a set of 
goals.
In general, when cure is possible, it is seen as the primary goal
of treatment. When cure is not possible, providing good care may become
the primary goal for many clinicians. For example, articles are written
with such titles as "When you can't cure, care" (Thullen, 1977).  ^ For
least at some centers. So far, none that I know of have been 
documented.
It has been said that living, severely damaged babies bring higher 
awards in malpractice suits than do dead babies. Under a DRG type plan, 
shorter length of stay and less treatment could be less costly for the 
hospital. Potential pressures from changes could theoretically operate 
either to promote more aggressive treatment or lead to less aggressive 
treatment.
J While many of the treatments intended to promote cure fall under 
the province of physicians and surgeons, many of the care oriented 
treatments are under the province of nursing. The goals identified as 
the reasons for behavior, may differ more than the actual behavior. In 
the responses to the survey, there were no statistically significant 
differences in the treatment recommendations between physicians and 
nurses when other factors were controlled. There were, however, 
differences in what nurses and physicians identified as factors which 
should be considered as the most important in making treatment
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other clinicians, the preservation of life may be seen as the primary 
goal.
Some of the differences observed in decision making between 
individuals and institutions reflect differences in goals. For example, 
Tom usually recommends very aggressive treatment, such as maximum use of 
a respirator, because he feels it is necessary, above all, to preserve 
life. Another physician, Ruth, may recommend discontinuing aggressive 
treatments such as the respirator and also more ordinary treatments like 
blood transfusions because she feels that preserving life is less 
important than not doing harm. She believes that continuing such 
treatment for a baby who has almost no chance of leaving the NICU is 
doing harm. Yet a third clinician, Mike, feels that such a baby should 
remain at an intermediate level of respiratory support in an effort to 
do what he sees as neither talking life nor doing harm.
The fact that there are conflicting goals between saving life and 
doing harm is sometimes presented as a modern problem which results from 
recent technological advances. However, as discussed in Chapter II, 
such clinicians have dealt with such potential conflicts in goals for a 
long time.
Clinicians may also disagree in how they define a particular goal. 
For example, some clinicians may feel that any prolongation of
decisions. More neonatal nurses thought that prolonged pain and 
suffering should be an important factor. This may be because comfort 
has traditionally been more of the professional concern of nursing than 
of medicine.
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physiological life is worth striving for, while others may use a more 
social definition of life and only feel that life should be prolonged 
when there is some capacity for social functioning (Crane 1975).
Variation in interpretation and choosing among goals will be 
illustrated in the following section on norms for decision making.
Norms for Decision Making
In choosing treatments for the care of catastrophically ill 
infants, clinicians are guided by norms for relating goals to culturally 
defined characteristics of patient condition and of treatments. As 
discussed in Chapter II, and as will be discussed further in Chapter 
VIII, as technology has changed, and as other political, economic and 
social changes have taken place, the norms guiding the care of the 
critically ill have been changing. Unlike some other situations, in 
which human behavior in relation to a particular domain is guided by a 
relatively clear, consistent set of norms, at the present time there is 
a great deal of variation in the norms used to guide treatment choice.
In this section, I will discuss norms that appeared to be guiding 
treatment choice. I will illustrate the use of norms, including 
normative variation both among clinicians, and for different clinical 
situations.
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Proportionality
The overarching norm guiding clinical treatment choice is that 
treatments should be provided which are proportionate to the patient's 
condition in order to achieve treatment goals. This is conceptualized 
in terms of the characteristics of patient condition, treatments and 
goals as discussed above.
In general, to summarize, if there is a high degree of certainty 
that an infant will be severely impaired, and/or the infant has an 
impairment that is seen to diminish quality of life and a very critical 
condition, and/or there is little social value seen to treatment, it is 
more likely that treatments will be not be given. This is especially 
true for those treatments which are very aggressive, and those which are
seen as extraordinary, especially when treatments can be withheld and
that act can be thought of as passive euthanasia.
At one extreme, once diagnosed, an anencephalic baby (who does not
have a brain), may not be given even relatively ordinary procedures, 
such as blood transfusions or food. On the other hand, if a baby is 
likely to be able to enjoy a good quality of life, even if the baby has 
a very critical condition, then very aggressive, some might say 
extraordinary, treatments will be given. For example, Ari, a baby with 
a diaphragmatic hernia (a serious but usually correctable defect) was 
put on ECMO (a new, experimental, high technology device, something like 
a heart-lung pump) for a period of time in order to maximize his chances
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for recovery. It required round the clock, one to one attention from a 
pediatric surgeon and a neonatal nurse.
While the overarching norm of proportionality guides overall 
treatment behavior, subsidiary norms are used to take care of various 
combinations of conditions, and to specify more completely the details 
of behavior. I will outline norms used by clinicians for decision 
making here, and discuss them further below.
NORMS FOR CLINICAL DECISION MAKING
General Principles:
Start with aggressive treatment in order to stabilize the baby and 
assess the baby's condition. Determine if the baby might be cured. If 
not, determine if the baby is terminally ill. If not, determine the 
chances that the baby could have a decent quality of life.
In making treatment decisions, try to maximize all of the goals of 
clinical decision making. If that is not possible, emphasize goals as 
appropriate to the case.
In general, try to cure. If that is not possible, make treatment 
choices to preserve life unless such treatment would constitute doing 
harm.
In all cases, provide good care.
Active euthanasia (actions which cause death to occur) are not 
acceptable, but, in certain situations, passive euthanasia (actions 
which allow death to occur) may be chosen.
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If the Baby Could Have a Good Quality of Life:
If the baby can be cured or if future quality of life is not so poor as 
to be unacceptable, give aggressive treatments to promote survival.
Even if the quality of life is not likely to be acceptable, if there is 
a significant chance that the baby may be normal, treat aggressively to 
maximize the chance that the baby will survive.
If the Baby is Terminally 111:
Give ordinary treatment to provide good care (keep the baby 
comfortable), but do not treat aggressively by giving extraordinary 
treatments.
If a terminally ill baby is expected to die within a fairly short period 
of time, in general, do not start new treatments but continue treatments 
already started. If new treatments would provide care, they may be 
given. If already started treatments would prolong dying, they may be 
withheld.
If the Baby Will Not be Normal and there is a High Probability that the
Infant Will Die or be Severely Impaired;
Withhold more aggressive treatments. Choose the level of aggressiveness 
of treatments according to the following considerations:
In most such situations, continue treatments which are ordinary
and/or those which are already started (in order to continue 
providing care and to allow death to occur).
If it is likely that the baby would survive for a significant
period of time, and the baby's life during that time would be of
poor quality, then a level of aggressiveness of treatment may be 
chosen to make it likely that the baby will die relatively quickly
(in order to avoid doing harm by prolonging the dying process).
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If the infant is probably terminally ill or the quality of life is 
likely to be very poor, but there is a fair amount of uncertainty, 
then a level of treatment may be chosen in which the outcome is 
uncertain (in order to avoid doing harm by either prolonging dying 
or causing death; "Allow the baby to declare him/herself," or 
"Allow God or nature to decide").
When Some Treatments would be Withheld:
Treat up to a certain level of aggressiveness, withhold other, more 
aggressive, treatments.
If the baby's parents want the baby's life preserved despite little 
chance of a good quality of life, treat aggressively.
For most cases, these norms provide clear guidelines for the the 
provision of treatment.^ Frequently, clinicians follow these norms in a
 ^ Somewhat different rules apply in a situation which is clearly 
considered experimental. In the early stages of development of a new, 
possibly risky treatment, if a baby is thought to have no chance without 
a treatment, but might have a chance with it, the baby may be given the 
treatment in a effort to cure and to promote survival, realizing that it 
might be likely to cause harm.
During a randomized or sequential trial, however, treatments that 
might be thought to promote cure, or even survival might be withheld, at 
least for a period of time, to test the protocol. (Babies not given the 
treatment initially may be given the treatment later if the clinicians 
have an option.)
In choosing subjects for testing a new experimental, very 
aggressive procedure, with limited availability, only those babies who 
are seen as the best candidates for successful treatment will be 
selected. This may mean that infants with other known anomalies will be 
excluded. Characteristics of the family, their ability to understand 
the experimental nature of the procedure, and their ability to carry out 
follow up care, may also be considered.
In 1986, such highly experimental aggressive procedures include 
ECMO (an external oxygenation system similar to a heart/lung pump^ the 
Norwood procedure for hypoplastic left heart surgery, and infant heart 
transplants. In making decisions about these modalities, other factors
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preattentive manner (see Chapter IV); treatment choices are made without 
conscious reevaluation of categorizations in each case. In other cases, 
clinicians consciously evaluate how a particular baby's condition and 
treatment options should be categorized and which norms should apply. I 
will illustrate treatment decisions below with a discussion of a number 
of cases.
While this framework is generally accepted by clinicians providing 
neonatal intensive care, there are many disagreements about what 
constitutes appropriate care in particular situations. This is largely 
due to disagreements about how particular characteristics of patient 
condition, treatments and goals are to be categorized in particular 
cases. There is also some disagreement about the appropriateness of 
some norms to guide treatment choice. For example, some clinicians feel 
that a distinction between ordinary and extraordinary treatments is not 
significant and that both can be withdrawn in some circumstances. Norms 
and variation in decision making for babies when 1) the quality of life 
is expected to be good, 2) they are terminally ill 3) and when the 
quality of life is not expected to be acceptable, will be discussed. 
Issues relating to change over time will be examined in more detail in 
the following chapter.
may be considered beside those usually weighed in the decision making 
process.
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Decisions When the Quality of Life is Expected to be Acceptable
As discussed earlier, in the vast majority of cases, it is felt 
that the characteristics of the patient condition justify whatever 
treatments are thought to be necessary to promote cure and survival; 
aggressive treatments will be given. For example, consider the case of 
Wesley, a premature baby admitted to the NICU in respiratory distress.
By NICU standards she was not very small (1250 grams, a little under 3 
lbs.) not very young (30 weeks, two and a half months premature) and 
there were no other major problems (e.g. no significant bleeding in the 
brain), none of the clinicians would consciously consider the issue of 
non-treatment at all in such a case.
Even if, in another case, for a baby who is critically ill, and it 
is thought the probability is high that the baby will die, if there is 
felt to be a significant chance of saving the baby, and the baby is not 
likely to be severely impaired, the level of treatment will be 
aggressive. For example, Timmy was admitted to the unit in 1978 with a 
diaphragmatic hernia, a condition in which a hole in the diaphragm- 
during fetal development led to the growth of the intestine in the chest 
cavity, which interfered with the formation of the lung. Even though it 
was thought to be unlikely that the infant would survive, surgery was 
performed. The baby did very well and has no lasting problems. The 
most aggressive treatments, like ECMO, will often be used first for 
babies like these, who, if they survive, are expected to be normal.
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Many of the critically ill infants with potentially correctable 
defects have cardiac conditions. For example, Roxanne was admitted with 
a complex cardiac lesion. Although, again, the feeling was that it was
unlikely that the infant would survive, surgery was successful. In many
other cases, however, treatment is not so successful. For example, 
although plans were made to use ECMO for Paul, another baby with a
diaphragmatic hernia, he died before he could be moved from the
transitional nursery.
Many babies have conditions such as low level spina bifida 
lesions, that cannot be completely ameliorated, however, the prospects 
for an acceptable future quality of life are thought to be high enough 
that aggressive treatments are given in order to do everything possible 
to preserve life. Even when clinicians would not recommend treatment 
themselves, if parents want aggressive treatment such treatment will be 
given. This can be illustrated by discussion of the case of Gerald and 
by discussion of the responses about the Baby with Down's syndrome on my 
survey.
Gerald was born with Down's syndrome and also had a serious heart 
lesion (AV canal complete and an interrupted aorta). After discussion 
with the baby's parents, plans were made to do a closed heart procedure 
soon, to be followed by open heart surgery when the baby was a little 
older and the risks from surgery would be less.
Although there now appears to be a consensus to treat an infant 
with Down's syndrome and relatively easily correctable defects, there is
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less consensus about more aggressive treatments such as open heart 
surgery for infants with Down's syndrome. For example, in response to 
the questions about the baby with Down's syndrome in the survey, almost 
nine out of ten respondents replied that they would recommend relatively 
simple intestinal surgery for such an infant, assuming that the parents' 
views were the same as their own. On the other hand, only about six out 
of ten respondents would have recommended open heart surgery form an 
infant with Down's syndrome. (See the appendix for information on the 
survey, and Chapter IV for some of the results.) The clinicians in the 
unit supported the decision about surgery for Gerald, especially because 
the parents were very clear about the fact that they wanted surgery.
Unfortunately, Gerald had a very rocky post operative course 
involving an episode with a severe lack of oxygen which led to renal 
shut down, destruction of part of the intestine, and imbalance in the 
acidity of the blood. He was now in a very critical condition. Many of 
the clinicians now felt that it would be better to allow him to die 
because of the likelihood of death and the small chance that he could 
have a good quality of life. It was probable that both the Down's 
syndrome and his currently very critical condition which led the 
clinicians to consider non-treatment.
Although few clinicians would probably have wanted to stop 
relatively aggressive treatment with either the Down's syndrome alone, 
or the baby's present condition alone, with the combination of 
conditions a number of clinicians would have recommended treatment be 
stopped if the parent's wishes were the same as their own. When asked
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about kidney dialysis for a baby with Down's syndrome on the survey, 
only a little more than a quarter of the respondents said they would 
recommend kidney dialysis.
Gerald's parents, however, did want everything done to preserve 
the baby's life. When discussing plans for the baby's treatment,
Julian, one of the neonatal fellows, asked "Why dialyize?" indicating 
that he thought it was a disproportionately aggressive treatment. The 
resident caring for the baby said "That's not a good question, the 
mother wants it." Because of the wishes of the parents, preservation of 
life was the primary goal. Because the baby had high social value for 
the parents, aggressive treatments were not seen as disproportionately 
aggressive. The baby was given powerful drugs to maintain blood 
pressure, antiseizure medications, a tube was surgically implanted in a 
vein in the baby's chest, respiratory support was increased, drugs to 
regulate the baby's heart rhythm were given, and the baby was put on 
kidney dialysis.
Despite the fact that these very aggressive treatments were given, 
it became clear that Gerald was going to die. Lane, his attending 
physician, was called; he called Gerald's parents. All the treatments 
were continued until his parents arrived. Then the IV was stopped and 
the respirator settings were turned down (leaving the baby still 
attached to the respirator by a tube to the trachea). The baby's 
physician said that was continued so that there wasn't any sudden change 
and it wouldn't be too uncomfortable psychologically for the family and
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clinicians. Gerald died in his parents arms, despite all the aggressive 
efforts to save him.
Decisions for Terminally 111 Infants
As illustrated by the case of Gerald, even when babies are 
terminally ill, and it is known that no treatments will enable long term 
survival, clinicians must still make decisions about care. Although 
some treatments were withdrawn, other treatments were still given even 
when he was dying. For terminally ill babies, the goals of cure and of 
preserving life for a long time are clearly not applicable. Sometimes, 
however, clinicians may make decisions to prolong life for a period of 
time or to try to ameliorate some particular condition if the baby will 
survive for a while. The other goals, of providing good care and doing 
no harm, are usually the primary goal guiding treatment choice for the 
terminally ill.
In some situations, clinicians will realize immediately upon 
examination that a baby has a condition which is so severe and so 
clearly recognizable as a particular condition, that it is immediately 
known that the infant is terminally ill. For example, some babies are 
born anencephalic, sometimes indicated by lack of closure of the skull, 
protrusion of cerebral tissue and lack of the forebrain. Such a 
condition is always fatal, usually within a few hours or days. In such 
an extreme case, clinicians may not do anything which they consider 
treatment for the baby. In the survey only about one out of eight of
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the respondents would have recommended resuscitation in the delivery 
room and only a few respondents would recommend an arrest page for an 
anencephalic baby. While about three quarters of the respondents 
recommended feedings by mouth if the baby could suck, only about half 
would recommend tube feedings if the baby couldn't suck and only one 
third would recommend antibiotics.
When I first started doing research in neonatology (1977), if an 
infant was born so premature that the baby's eyes were fused shut 
(indicating a gestational age of less than 24 or 25 weeks), it was taken 
as a sign that the baby was not yet viable and no respiratory support or 
other treatments were given. When I returned in 1982 to observing care 
delivered immediately after birth, because of the perceived improvement 
in the technological capability, that was no longer a sign of lack of 
viability. Babies with fused eyes were sometimes treated very 
aggressively.
In most cases, however, when infants are first found to have 
problems, the nature of their condition is not certain. Aggressive 
treatment is given while their condition is stabilized and tests are 
done to establish the diagnosis. For example, Sarah was born in 
respiratory distress with a number of congenital anomalies. From the 
initial exam, it seemed likely that she had a lethal condition, known as 
trisomy 13, caused by having three of chromosome thirteen, instead of 
the normal two. Aggressive support was continued while tests of the 
chromosomes were done to confirm the diagnosis. After the diagnosis was 
confirmed, additional aggressive treatments were not started when
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Sarah's condition deteriorated, but treatments which were already 
started were continued. For example, antibiotics were continued, even 
though the usual reason for their use (control of infection to promote 
long term survival), was no longer applicable.
In response to questions about a baby with trisomy 13 in the 
survey, respondents answered that if a baby was diagnosed as having 
trisomy 13, about six out of seven would continue nutrition and fluids, 
and six out of ten would recommend continuing antibiotics. However, 
only about one fourth would put such a baby on a respirator, and only 
one out of ten would do an arrest page if the baby's heart stopped.
Similar decisions used to be made for infants with hypoplastic 
left heart, a condition which was considered uniformly fatal until 
recently. Now some clinicians believe in treating infants with a 
hypoplastic left heart with a new surgical procedure or an infant heart 
transplant. Other clinicians feel that those treatments are not yet 
advisable.
Gary, a full term baby, first appeared to have respiratory 
problems and was put on a respirator and transferred to the unit. Upon 
examination, the neonatologists realized that he had a cardiac 
condition, they gave him aggressive support and sent him for cardiac 
catheterization for diagnosis. The tests showed that he had a 
hypoplastic left heart. He remained on the respirator, but no 
aggressive means were used when his condition started to deteriorate. 
Sometimes such a baby may live days, sometimes weeks before dying.
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I think that when treatment is continued in such a situation it is 
done because of the social value of treatment for the parents and/or 
clinicians. Some parents and/or clinicians feel that they are providing 
better care by supporting the infant and they are not prolonging dying 
because they are not starting new treatments. They are able to feel 
more comfortable than they might if they withdrew treatments, for they 
feel that they are doing nothing to bring on death and, therefore, they 
are "doing no harm."
In other cases, treatments are withdrawn when an infant is
diagnosed as having a lethal condition. For example, in one case I
observed, after a baby was diagnosed as having trisomy 13, the settings 
on the respirator were turned down; the baby died soon after.
Treatments can also be discontinued in a way that addresses the social 
value of treatment and non-treatment for an infant. Different 
perspectives on management for social value are illustrated by the case 
below.
Pedro was delivered in another hospital. He seemed to be healthy 
and was discharged home. The next day he turned blue and his parents 
rushed him to the emergency room. After the doctors there resuscitated 
him, they transferred him to the NICU. He was sent for tests and was
diagnosed as having a hypoplastic left heart. Mike, the attending, told
Pedro's parents that he was dying. He talked to them about the baby's 
condition and asked if they would want to have the baby taken off the 
respirator and hold him while he died. They said that they wanted him 
to be baptized first. They were joined by the baby's aunt, uncle, and
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grand parents. He was baptized. A nurse set up a screen to allow the 
family some privacy, and brought over a rocking chair which the mother 
sat in, holding her baby. Although he was taken off the respirator, his 
IV was left in. Mike said he did that so Pedro wouldn't be so 
uncomfortable. Mike believed the parents would feel better if they 
didn't feel that Pedro had been on a machine when it would be of no 
benefit and he felt that they would be able to adjust better to his 
death if they had been able to hold him while he died. Mike had thought 
that he would die within an hour or two, but he lived for seven hours. 
The nurses on the day shift, and those who came on in the evening were 
very supportive.
Mike stayed with the family for a few hours but had to leave in 
the evening. Another attending, Rita, was covering for Mike and took 
over the vigil when he left. She didn't agree with the way the case had 
been managed. She would have continued the respirator for 12 to 18 
hours to give the parents more time to adjust to the fact that their 
baby was dying. She said
I don't think it's a good idea to hand the baby to the parents to 
die anyway. It's good for some people, but they are the 
exception, not the rule. For Pedro's family, coming in from home 
with a well baby, it was too much for the parents. For a baby who 
was sick for a period of time it would be different.
She thought that Mike might have taken the baby off the respirator right 
away out of frustration.
Not that he meant to be mean or anything, but he was so frustrated 
at not being able to do anything and therefore, since he couldn't 
do anything in a long term sense, he just stopped treating.
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Dorothy, one of the nurses who had been with the parents when the baby 
died, disagreed with Rita. She felt that it probably had been very 
meaningful for the parents, and that adjusting to the death of their 
baby, especially because they had brought him home, was going to be 
difficult anyway.
A final situation in the care of a terminally ill infant occurs 
when it has been thought that an infant might survive, but after the 
baby's condition becomes very poor, clinicians feel that survival will 
be impossible. For example, when caring for a very premature baby, very 
aggressive efforts may be made to treat the baby. If, however, the 
clinicians feel that treatment has become futile, aggressive efforts 
will be stopped.
Sherry was born after only 27 weeks gestation. She was a second 
twin, born at 1300 grams with barely a heart beat (Apgars of 1 and A). 
When the transport team arrived they felt that they had a chance to save 
her and started aggressive treatment. A few hours after they returned 
to the NICU, the clinicians realized that the baby's prognosis was very 
poor. She had bad bleeding in the brain, her kidneys were not 
functioning, she was seizing and she seemed to have heart, lung, and 
intestinal problems. They continued treating aggressively, awaiting a 
meeting with the parents, but they felt that she would probably die. 
Karen, the attending, said they could maintain blood pressure for a 
while but not indefinitely. Sue, the resident, was instructed to try to 
put in another IV line, but Karen said, "if you can't, you can't." (For
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another baby, with a good prognosis, a resident would keep trying to put 
in a line, or would call someone else for assistance.) In that type of 
case, although no conscious decision is made to allow the baby to die, 
further very aggressive treatment may be judged to be futile.
Decisions When the Quality of Life is 
Not Expected to be Acceptable
Most discussions of ethics and values of decision making have been 
about those cases in which an infant might live, with treatment, but 
decision makers feel it is quite certain that the infant will have a 
poor quality of life.5 in those situations, some suggest that treatment 
should be withheld. There is a wide range of variation in cases in 
which the future quality of life is likely to be poor. They vary along 
all of the characteristics of patient's condition including the severity 
of and the nature of the impairment, the degree of uncertainty, the 
nature of the critical condition and the social value criteria. In 
addition, there is also variation in the characteristics of the 
treatments which could be given. In this section, I will discuss norms 
for decision making when the quality of life is not expected to be good.
5 As was discussed previously in Chapter V, both conceptions about 
quality of life and uncertainty depend on value considerations. There 
is variation in how individuals evaluate particular outcomes. For the 
purposes of this discussion, the assumptions made by the clinicians 
making the choices in the cases examined, will be assumed for the 
analysis and discussion of norms.
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As discussed above, an overarching norm guiding decision making is 
that treatments should be given that are proportionate to the patient 
condition. When the outcome is expected to be bad, the more aggressive,
extraordinary treatments may not be given. In general, treatments are
provided up to a given level of aggressiveness, while more aggressive 
treatments are withheld. While clinicians vary in which specific 
treatments they feel are appropriate, decisions generally cluster around 
a given level of aggressiveness.^
A number of factors may influence the level which is chosen. In 
many situations, there is no specific decision about whether the baby 
should live or die. Rather, treatments are given which seem to be at an
appropriate level of aggressiveness for the condition. In other
situations, a level of aggressiveness may be chosen which it is felt 
will insure death. Finally, in some situations, a conscious decision 
may be made to put the level of treatment at a point which will neither 
insure death nor survival.
The decision making process is very similar to decision making for 
terminally ill infants. In fact, as was discussed in Chapter V, it is 
often difficult to know if a baby is terminally ill, and, in many cases 
the probability of death is high. The difference here, however, is that 
the assumption is that the baby would be able to live with treatment. 
Whereas with the treatment of terminally ill babies, like Pedro, there
° In the survey, treatment choices seemed to form a normal curve 
around the most frequently recommended treatments when the treatments 
were ranked by degree of aggressiveness.
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sometimes is a desire to avoid prolongation of the dying process, here 
there is fear that treatment will lead to a long lifetime of suffering. 
While there is fear of causing death to occur sooner for a terminally 
ill child, here there is fear that treatment choice could lead to death 
for a non-dying child. In a particular situation, however, it may be 
difficult to draw the line.
For example, in a single case, one clinician may feel that he is 
choosing not to treat because the baby is dying anyway, while a second 
clinician, involved in the care of the same baby, may feel that she is 
choosing not to treat because even though it might be possible to save 
the baby, the quality of life would be so poor. The occurred in the 
case of baby Vivian, a very premature baby.
Vivian's mother, a "DES daughter" (her own mother had taken DES 
during pregnancy and, as a result, Vivian's mother had a malformed 
uterus) went into labor after 23 weeks of pregnancy; everyone thought 
that she was probably having another miscarriage. When the baby was 
born, however, she had a heart beat and spontaneous movements. The 
neonatal team had been called in case the baby was viable. An 
attending, a fellow, a resident and a nurse stabilized her immediately, 
and rushed her to the transitional nursery. She weighed about one and 
one third pounds (560 grams).
At first she did all right, but then her respiratory condition 
deteriorated. I asked Mike, an attending who was caring for her, if he 
would put her on a respirator if her condition got worse. He said that
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he couldn't. She was so premature and so small, and the tubes were so
big that it was not really feasible to do it for a baby that size.
Later, I talked to Mark, a fellow who along with Mike was caring for 
her. He said that she could be intubated (have tubes put in to attached 
her to a respirator), but that it wouldn't make sense to do it in her 
case because it was almost certain that if she did survive, she would be 
severely impaired. Both clinicians agreed that it was not appropriate 
to use a respirator, but these two clinicians who were working together 
on the same baby had different ideas about why they weren't doing it in 
this case. She died after 16 hours.
Decisions Where the Outcome is Known to be Death
In many cases only the most aggressive treatments will be 
withheld. For example, one baby who had a severe heart lesion had 
suffered severe brain damage with massive bleeding in the brain. The 
baby was having uncontrolled seizures and had a severely abnormal EEG 
(test of brain activity). The physicians decided not to do heart 
surgery, but they continued other aggressive treatments because the 
parents wanted the baby to be treated. There was no explicit discussion 
about the reasons for withholding the heart operation; it was obvious to 
all the clinicians that it would not make sense to do heart surgery for 
this baby who would surely die. On the other hand, if parents wanted 
aggressive treatment, the baby would not be taken off the respirator.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Similarly, after the neonatal team stopped after trying 
unsuccessfully to resuscitate (start breathing and heart beat) for 20 
minutes after a baby's birth, there was no discussion about whether they 
stopped because there was no chance that the baby could survive, or 
because the outcome would be so bad even, on the unlikely chance, that 
the baby could survive.
Although the level of aggressiveness may be set at a point at 
which it is known that the baby will die with that level of care, it is 
generally felt important that the level of care be one which can be 
thought of as passive euthanasia, not active euthanasia. For example, 
consider the case discussed earlier (in Chapter VI, section on active 
and passive euthanasia) about Justin, a baby who had intestinal problems 
which had left him with too little intestine to ever be able to digest 
food normally. A decision was made to allow him to die. IV hyperal for 
nutrition was stopped but IV sugar water was continued. One nurse who I 
spoke to considered the hyperal to be "extraordinary treatment and would 
only prolong his suffering" and that stopping it would be passive 
euthanasia. She felt that stopping the IV fluids, however, would be 
murder or active euthanasia. Even when decisions are made that are 
known to bring about death, it is thought important that they are felt 
to allow death to occur rather than cause it.
Two management regimes which were practiced in the past, involving 
the withholding of food and sometimes fluid, have been much criticized. 
While the clinicians who practiced them probably felt that they were 
examples of passive euthanasia, some other clinicians considered them
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active euthanasia and therefore not acceptable. One involved infants 
with Down's syndrome, the second involved babies with spina bifida.
Although such decisions would probably not be made today (see 
Chapter VIII, section on the Baby Doe Regulations) in a number of
instances, in the past, at a number of institutions, decisions have been
made to withhold surgery from infants born with Down's Syndrome and a 
correctable intestinal defect. With such a condition, the infants could 
not be fed normally by mouth. No IV feedings were given, although, in 
at least some situations, IV fluids were given. The infants died slowly
of starvation over a period of days or weeks. Some clinicians felt that
withholding feedings, which would obviously lead to death, constituted 
active euthanasia. The clinicians who did it, however, probably felt 
that it was allowing death to occur because of the intestinal defect. I 
know of no case in which a clinician sanctioned the withholding of 
bottle feedings or tube feeding from an infant with Down's syndrome who 
could take feedings by mouth. I think that the presence of a life- 
threatening defect allowed the withholding of food to be seen as passive 
euthanasia while without the defect, withholding nutrition might be seen 
as active euthanasia.
The less aggressive the treatment withheld, the more likely 
clinicians are to see it as active euthanasia. Some of the strong 
reaction against the withholding of treatment from Baby Doe (the case of 
the infant born in Indiana in 1982, see Chapter II) might have been 
generated by the fact that not only nutrition but also fluids were 
withheld, so he was not only starving to death, but was also dehydrated.
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Most clinically socialized individuals, such as physicians and nurses, 
seem to hold death by dehydration with the total abhorrence.
Another situation in which a plan for the management of care was 
chosen to decrease the chances for survival occurred in the care of 
infants with spina bifida in England. When a decision was made not to 
do surgery to repair the primary lesion because it was thought that the 
quality of life would be so poor that it would be better to allow the 
infants to die, the infants were sedated. Then, they were fed only on 
demand. Since they were sedated, they didn't demand feedings 
frequently. Babies cared for under this regime almost always died 
fairly soon, while babies with unrepaired lesions, who were fed on 
schedule at other centers, often survived for a long period of time 
despite non-treatment decisions. While some clinicians, such as Lorber, 
who felt strongly that that active euthanasia was unacceptable, saw 
sedation and demand feeding as an example of passive euthanasia, some 
other clinicians considered such practices to constitute active 
euthanasia, since a practice which led to withholding food would clearly 
led to death.
In these cases, in which nutrition, and sometimes fluids were 
withheld, the quality of life would not have been likely to be as poor 
as for some other babies who were treated more aggressively. In 
examining why more ordinary treatments were withheld in these cases, it 
appears that the answer may depend on the degree of certainty about the 
babies' conditions. Down's syndrome and spina bifida can be diagnosed 
with a very high degree of certainty, and in all cases there are
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identifiable deviations from the norm. Although the quality of life 
would not be as poor as was likely in other cases, it appears that 
clinicians felt that it would be all right to choose a management plan 
where the outcome - death - was certain because there was equal 
certainty about the diagnosis, and about the fact that the baby would 
not be "normal."
Decisions with an Uncertain Outcome
In many cases, the level of aggressiveness of care which is chosen 
leaves the outcome - survival or death - uncertain. For example, such a 
choice was made in the case of Sal (Chapter V, section on 
aggressiveness), the first baby I observed for whom a decision was made 
to limit the aggressiveness of treatment. In that case, the baby was 
continued on CPAP, but a decision was made not to put him back on the 
respirator if his condition deteriorated. Also in the case of Ray, a 
baby with spina bifida (discussed in IV;Athe section on 
withholding/withdrawing treatment), a decision was made not to operate 
but to continue antibiotics for a full course of treatment.
One reason that treatment is sometimes put at an intermediate 
level, where it is neither certain that the infant will live or will 
die, is that it enables the clinicians who are caring for the infant to 
avoid taking responsibility for determining life and death. Sometimes, 
it is rationalized that the intermediate level of treatment will "enable 
the baby to declare himself." In other words, the assumption is that if
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the baby would do well in the long run, he will get better but if he 
gets worse and he needs more treatment, it indicates a poor long range 
prognosis.
Frequently, it is an appropriate assumption. For example, for a 
small premature baby like Sal, who has had bleeding in the brain, 
further respiratory problems may be associated with more serious brain 
damage or with chronic lung problems which will lead to years of 
dependence on the respirator and eventual death. In other cases, 
however, the development of problems needing additional treatment are 
unrelated to the long range prognosis.
For example, in Sal's case, he could have developed problems 
needing further respiratory support or cardiac resuscitation, yet had no 
severe cognitive or motor impairments which would have compromised his 
future quality of life. Therefore, he could have died despite the fact 
that he would not have been severely impaired. On the other hand, he 
could have had serious brain which damage that left him seriously 
impaired, and which could have led to a very poor quality of life. Yet, 
if his respiratory or cardiac situation did not deteriorate, and he 
didn't need the respirator, he would have survived despite the problems. 
As it turned out, Sal's respiratory status did not deteriorate and he 
never again needed the respirator or cardiac resuscitation. At the age 
of five, he had cerebral palsy which affected his lower limbs, but he 
had no other physical or mental impairments.
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I think that in situations like this, where there is a high level 
of uncertainty, clinicians are often uncomfortable with having to carry 
the weight of responsibility for survival with a poor quality of life or
for death. By putting the level of treatment at an intermediate level,
they can feel that they are not determining the outcome.
I once had a conversation with Peter, a senior neonatologist, who 
was caring for a very sick, very premature baby who he felt was
terminally ill. In discussing the care of the baby, I mentioned that in
my sample of fifty cases (see appendix), there were no babies who 
represented the "classic neonatal ethics case" of a baby who could 
survive but who had died because treatments had been withheld. Yet, I 
said, a number of the cases, particularly those involving the care of 
terminally ill babies, did present situations in which decisions had to 
be made for care which involved ethical issues. Peter agreed, and said, 
beyond that, you could say there were ethical issues involved in the 
care of every baby.
We continued to talk about the care of the terminally ill baby who 
he was then caring for. Peter said that he thought that it would be 
best to take the baby off the respirator. But, he said, the parents 
wanted the baby kept on the respirator "so a miracle could happen."
This very devout Catholic physician said that he felt it was the 
clinician's job to explain to the parents "that [being on the 
respirator] is not how miracles happen." He said that if there was 
going to be a miracle, it would happen whether or not the respirator was 
there. However, he felt that this baby's situation represented an act
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of nature, and that the baby would die no matter what choice was made 
about care.
A second neonatologist, Hal, had entered the room, and they 
continued the conversation about ethics and neonatology. Peter, who had 
earlier said that all cases involve ethical questions, now said, "we 
never really determine life or death for any of these babies." He felt 
that "God" or "Nature" really determined the fate of the babies, and the 
clinician's role was to help bring about what had already been fated to 
be.
Variants of both views, I believe, are very common among 
clinicians in neonatology. On the one hand, they feel that they 
shoulder a huge responsibility knowing their actions can lead to life or 
death for the babies. On the other hand, they often feel that 
ultimately the outcome is beyond their control. Some clinicians 
subscribe primarily to one view or the other, but it is not uncommon for 
clinicians to express both views on different occasions.
Although outsiders often talk about "Playing God in the Nursery" 
(e.g. there is a book by Lyons with that title about Neonatal Care), 
clinicians who work in the nursery generally don't feel that they are 
"playing God" a term usually used to indicate determining outcome 
inappropriately. Although they are proud to be able to save the lives 
of infants who will have a good quality of life, they do not feel that 
in doing so they have "played God." The term "playing God" is almost 
always used to refer to human actions which cause an outcome other than
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what the speaker feels was "meant to be." But, clinicians who work in 
the field of neonatology generally do not feel that they are going 
against fate. Rather, they have a well-developed world view which 
provides norms for appropriate treatment behavior. While in some 
situations it is seen as dictating every possible effort to save life or 
treatment choices which will surely lead to death, in other situations, 
it dictates a management plan which leaves the outcome uncertain or in 
the words of one mother of a child with spina bifida, "Up to God or 
Mother Nature" (Levin, Palmer and Ross 1984).
Treating Up to a Given Level of Aggressiveness
Even after a decision is made to withhold some treatments above a 
certain level of aggressiveness, other treatments up to that level of 
aggressiveness are usually given. For example, in the case of Sal, even 
though a decision had been made to withhold treatment for a cardiac 
arrest or the use of a respirator, all other, less aggressive treatments 
were continued up to that level of aggressiveness. For example, the 
CPAP, blood transfusions, and anti- seizure medications were continued.
Similar decisions were made in virtually all other cases in which 
treatments were withheld. Although I never heard it explicitly 
discussed, there seemed to be a strong clinical norm underlying 
treatment decision making that dictates: Once a decision is made to 
withhold a treatment of a given level of aggressiveness, all other less
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aggressive treatments are still given while more aggressive treatments 
are withheld.
Although the relative aggressiveness of treatments were not 
explicitly discussed, as explicated in Chapter VI (section on 
aggressiveness), the sense of ranking of treatments on this dimension 
seems to be widely shared by clinicians. As was discussed in that 
section, this ranking was reflected in the pattern of responses to the 
questionnaire conducted on neonatal decision making in the Spring of 
1983.
I think that this pattern of treatment choice enables clinicians
to feel that they are providing appropriate supportive care to infants,
even though they are not doing everything possible to preserve life. 
Sometimes, however, maximizing the goal of providing supportive care may 
be seen as having the unintended consequence of doing harm by sustaining 
a baby with a poor quality of life after a decision has been made that 
it would be better to allow the baby to die.
For example, when antibiotics and regularly scheduled feedings are
provided to infants with Spina Bifida they may die slowly or may survive 
for a long period of time despite a non-treatment decision. This is 
apparently what happened in the case of Jane Doe. Although I have no 
personal knowledge of the details concerning the decision making in her 
case, from reports in the media (New York Times 1983, 1984; Lyons 1985), 
it is possible to infer a number of things about the decision making 
process about the management of her care. I think that this famous case
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is a good example of a treatment decision in neonatology where a 
decision to treat up to a given level of aggressiveness, left the 
outcome uncertain.
Jane Doe was the first child a young, affluent Catholic couple.
She was born in a community hospital on Long Island in the Fall of 1983. 
Soon after birth she was transferred to Stony Brook Hospital. She was 
born with a spinal defect, L3 to L4 which would lead to substantial 
paralysis of her legs and incontinence of bowel and bladder. In 
addition she had hydrocephalus and microcephaly, indicating a high 
probability of severe mental retardation, a condition which prevented 
her from completely closing her eyes or from using her tongue properly 
to suck, spasticity of her arms, and a thumb abnormality that would 
prevent her from having full use of her hand. Shortly after birth she 
developed meningitis.
When she was born, her parents, in consultation with her doctors, 
decided against neurosurgery to close her spinal lesion or shunt the 
excess fluid from her brain. They believed that because of the multiple 
anomalies, she could only have a poor quality of life. Because of the 
level of the spinal lesion, they knew she would definitely have 
paralysis and incontinence. In addition, the brain malformations led to 
little uncertainty that there would be some developmental delays with a 
high probability of severe retardation. Without surgery her anomalies 
would be likely to lead to more bouts with of meningitis, urinary tract 
infections and uncontrolled hydrocephalus. It was reported in the press
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that without surgery, she would probably live for two years, while with 
treatment she could live for twenty.^
In addition to considerations about patient characteristics, Jane 
Doe's parents and clinicians considered treatment characteristics in 
making decisions about her care. While neurosurgical procedures were 
withheld to close her back lesion and shunt the excess fluid from her 
brain, they did give antibiotics to treat her meningitis. They also 
presumably provided such "treatments" as a sterile environment by 
putting her in an isolette and covering her lesion with a sterile 
dressing. It is likely that Jane Doe's caretakers considered 
neurosurgery to be extraordinary treatment which could be withheld, but 
felt that antibiotics constituted ordinary treatment and may have 
believed it was mandatory (especially after the prospect of legal 
intervention was raised). It is also possible that the antibiotics had 
been started soon after birth, and that her caretakers believed that 
once started, the treatment had to be continued (see Chapter VI, section 
on withholding/withdrawing).
The decision to continue the antibiotics was probably crucial for 
Jane Doe's survival. Without the antibiotics, she probably would have 
died quickly from meningitis. She recovered from the meningitis and 
remained in the hospital for about six months. Her back lesion closed
' Although these figures were repeated numerous times in the press, 
some knowledgeable clinicians felt that the time estimates had no real 
physiological basis. They said that without treatment she could 
certainly die sooner and with treatment she could live longer than 
predicted.)
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spontaneously, reducing the chance of a subsequent infection. When her 
hydrocephalus progressed and caused discomfort, her parents agreed to 
neurosurgery to shunt fluid from her brain. After the surgery her 
parents brought her home. Her neurosurgeon says that he sees no reason 
to revise his original prognosis; he thinks she will be severely
O
retarded and will remain bedridden for her whole life.
In some situations, clinicians and parents may feel that they are 
almost marking time waiting for an event to occur which will lead to 
death. If death does not occur, given the chosen treatment choices, new 
choices may be made to change the level of treatment.
For example, in the case of George, a badly asphyxiated baby with 
a serious heart lesion, clinicians continued all medications and kept 
the baby on the respirator while waiting for the baby to die. That way, 
they did not have to stop ongoing treatments nor withhold more ordinary 
treatments. In that way it is easier to think of the management plan 
allowing a natural death to occur than if decisions are made to withdraw 
treatments. After a few days, however, George, was still lying 
unconscious in his isolette, insensitive to pain. The care plan was 
reevaluated. Some of the more aggressive medications were now seen as 
prolonging his death and were decreased, allowing death to occur sooner.
8 The latest report on her condition that I heard, on 60 Minutes in 
the Spring of 1986, said that Jane Doe (now two and a half) doesn't walk 
but can sit by herself and say a few words and attends a special nursery 
program.
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Since clinicians may feel that only some treatments may be 
withheld in a given situation, if a baby doesn't die after a decision is 
made to limit a particular treatment, clinicians may feel that they have 
no option to withhold other treatments at a later point in time. For 
example, Tony, a full term baby was born without a heart beat (Apgars 
O/l) because of an abruption (separation of the placenta from the wall 
of the uterus); some might have considered him stillborn. Resuscitation 
attempts were started immediately, After a long period of time without 
oxygen he was resuscitated, but he was badly asphyxiated.
Very aggressive treatments were given in the beginning, when it 
was hoped that the baby might be able to have an acceptable quality of 
life. By the time the severity of the condition was appreciated (which 
left the baby unable to be conscious of his surroundings and having 
periods of violent uncontrolled seizures) his condition had stabilized. 
He was no longer on a respirator. Although he had arrested (his heart 
stopped a number of times) at the beginning, he no longer arrested.
Clinicians at the institution where he was being cared for felt 
that they had no options to withhold other treatments which would lead 
to his death. He suffered with five bouts of pneumonia. His attending 
physician said that before the Baby Doe regulations she would have 
withheld antibiotics but now she felt she had no choice but to give them 
whenever he needed them. He lived five months before finally succumbing 
to pneumonia, even with antibiotics. (See Chapter VIII, section on the 
Baby Doe regulations).
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Translating from Cultural Category to Behavior
When decisions are made about the care of catastrophically ill 
babies, they are generally made in terms of the culturally defined 
categories of patient condition, treatments and goals. As discussed 
above, there is wide variation in how these are interpreted. Not only 
does this affect how information is categorized about the patients, 
treatments, and goals to be used in the decision making process, but it 
also affects how decisions are translated into behavior.
For example, if a baby is born with severe anomalies, the 
attending physicians may meet with the parents and together they may 
decide to give "no extraordinary treatments." Those providing direct 
care for the infant must translate that decision, made in terms of the 
cultural category - extraordinary care - into choices about behavioral 
acts. There may be consensus that for such a baby "no extraordinary 
treatments" means no surgery and no resuscitation. There may be 
variation, however, in how clinicians interpret less aggressive 
treatments. For example, some may consider tube feedings or antibiotics 
as "extraordinary care" in such a situation, while others may not (see 
Chapter VI, section on extraordinary care). After the act of decision 
making takes place at the cognitive level, the meaning of the decision 
still must be translated in order for behavior, or the actual treatment 
choice, to take place.
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The implications for treatment behavior may not even be clear when 
decision making addresses a choice to give or withhold a particular 
treatment option. For example, in the case of George, the badly 
asphyxiated baby with a cardiac lesion discussed above, a decision was 
clearly made not to do open heart surgery. A note about the decision 
not to perform surgery was written in the chart.
The implications of the decision for other treatments however, was 
not absolutely clear. Although the attending physician, Hal, assumed 
that the baby would arrest (his heart would stop) and he would not be 
resuscitated, he had not written a DNR (do not resuscitate) order in the 
chart. One of the neonatal fellows said that if the baby had a cardiac 
arrest, he would try to resuscitate. Later, the attending wrote a note 
on the chart, and clarified the choice in regard to arrest status.^
Caring for a catastrophically ill infant often involves management 
choices about scores of possible medications, procedures, and tests for 
a single baby each day. While the major decisions, such as whether or 
not to do surgery or an arrest page, may be discussed explicitly by the 
parents and senior physicians in a unit, many of the seemingly more 
minor treatment questions may never be specifically addressed. While 
many of the decisions are obvious, following the general norm of 
treating only up to a given level of aggressiveness (e.g. if the baby 
has been taken off a respirator so that she may be allowed to die, no 
one would put in chest tubes, a very invasive procedure), other
The relative aggressiveness of the two treatments is unclear.
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treatment behavior reflects preattentive decisions, sometimes made by- 
more junior clinicians.
In some cases, such decisions may reflect the goals which guided 
the initial decision to withhold treatment. For example, further 
treatments may be withheld in an effort not to do harm by prolonging 
suffering. In other cases, the standard practices which guide treatment 
for the vast majority of infants in the unit, for whom the goal is to 
preserve life, are carried out for the infants for whom preserving life 
has been seen as causing harm. In some cases, such practices may be 
reexamined, in others they go unquestioned.
One example in which such standard practice was challenged only 
by a bit of black humor occurred in the case of an infant with a high 
level myelomeningocele. A decision had been made not to treat the baby 
with the presumption that he would die of meningitis (an infection from 
the open lesion). A sign had been placed on his isolette "Wear gloves 
for diaper changes!1 Someone had scribbled graffiti on the bottom of the 
sign asking "Why?" The usual practice for caring for a baby with an open 
lesion is to take measure to prevent infection. In this case, everyone 
was waiting for the baby to die of an infection. Sometimes no one 
questions the continuation of usual practices when the goals of 
treatment change.
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Summary
This chapter discusses the way that the goals of medical treatment 
- to cure, to care, to preserve life and to do no harm, are culturally 
defined. Material is also presented on how clinicians make decisions 
about how to treat, guided by the norms of decision making which 
indicate how one is to try to achieve the goals of treatment given the 
characteristics of patient conditions and treatments. Norms of decision 
making about giving treatment to infants who could have a good quality 
of life, who are terminal, and who would be expected to have a poor 
quality of life are discussed. Finally, the way in which decisions are 
translated into treatment behavior is examined. Numerous case examples 
are provided.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
RAPIDLY MOVING HISTORY: CHANGE IN CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF DECISION MAKING
FOR CATASTROPHICALLY ILL NEWBORNS
In Chapters V, VI, and VII, I have examined how clinicians 
conceptualize the question of treatment choice for catastrophically ill 
newborns, discussing some of the categories, goals and norms which guide 
treatment behavior. In this chapter, I will discuss change in the 
context of decision making, and the effects of change on the 
conceptualization of treatment choice and on treatment behavior. I will 
begin with a discussion of changes in the conceptualization of treatment 
for infants with two conditions - spina bifida and extreme prematurity. 
This will be followed by a discussion of the Baby Doe Directives and 
clinicians' interpretation of their meaning for treatment choice. 
Finally, this chapter concludes with a more general discussion of 
changes in the conceptualization of categorization of patient condition, 
treatments and goals, changes in norms, and changes in treatment 
behavior.
Changes in Treatment for Infants with Spina Bifida
Prior to the late 1950s, medicine was unable to provide many 
treatments which could be of benefit to most infants born with spina 
bifida. Most babies who had open lesions died from meningitis soon
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
after birth; others whose spinal lesions closed spontaneously usually 
developed hydrocephalus which led to death for some and severe mental 
retardation for others. Still others died from renal or other 
complications. Although some physicians attempted aggressive treatment 
(Ingraham and Hamlin 1943; Bluestone and Deaver 1953), most did not 
recommend surgery. Most physicians were guided by the norm that 
dictated that useless treatments should not be inflicted on hopelessly 
ill infants.
During the 1950s and early 1960s, developments in neurosurgical 
techniques, medical technology and antibiotic therapy enabled physicians 
to close the open lesion, shunt for hydrocephalus, and better manage 
renal complications. This change led to changes in the way clinicians 
thought about treatment for babies with spina bifida; they were no 
longer considered "unsalvageable" but were now "treatable."
Most of the literature on the treatment of children with spina 
bifida entailed debates about how to optimize medical management to 
assure survival and to increase functioning. Not all clinicians, 
however, felt that infants with Spina Bifida should always be treated 
aggressively.
For example, as early as 1960, a surgeon, Dr. Bucy, said of his 
ideas about the management of children with spina bifida "The difference 
of opinion between [himself and two other surgeons] is not one of 
neurosurgical methods but one of philosophy" (1962:65). He went on to
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give his view that
Modern methods have brought us new responsibilities. It is 
not sufficient that we merely sustain life with expert surgery and 
the use of blood transfusions, intravenous fluids, gastric 
intubation, tracheotomy, antibiotics, and with expert nursing 
care. We must sustain life with hope and human decency, not just 
life under any circumstances. We must whenever possible sustain 
life with a minimum of physical and mental suffering. The 
decisions related to such problems are difficult ones to make, but 
we cannot escape them nor solve them by falling back upon a rule 
of "life at any cost and under any conditions." In these various 
situations we must ask ourselves if we would want to live or see 
our children, relatives, or friends live under those 
circumstances.
(pp. 69-70)
for the next few years, however, there was little written questioning 
the benefits of aggressive treatment. In general, there was great 
optimism about the promise of the newly developed treatments. At many 
centers, such as Sheffield in England, babies with spina bifida were 
aggressively treated with the newly developed techniques (Sharrard, 
Zachary and Lorber, 1967). Although some centers did practice selective 
non-treatment during this period there was relatively little mention 
about such practices in the literature.
The first published exchange^ on withholding treatment from 
newborns that became part of a debate that developed in the clinical
 ^ There were a few articles and letters questioning the benefits of 
aggressive treatment for all infants with spina bifida (See Chapter III, 
section on withholding treatment).
2 This article, which does not cite any earlier articles discussing 
a position of selective non-treatment for "ethical" reasons, is the 
earliest article revealed by numerous computer searches on the topic.
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literature in the late 1960s and the early 1970s was written by R.B. 
Zachary, a pediatric surgeon at Sheffield England. The article, entitle 
"Ethical and Social Aspects of Treatment of Spina Bifida" appeared in 
The Lancet (Aug. 3, 1968, pp. 274-76). It some ways it is a strange 
first article, for it is an argument for aggressive treatment which 
presumably was the norm at the time. It reflects the fact, however, 
that the value of always treating aggressively was contemporaneously 
being questioned by a number of clinicians. In fact, at Zachary's own 
center, John Lorber, the first widely recognized advocate of selective 
non-treatment, was probably already discussing the criteria for decision 
making which he proposed in print three years later (see Chapter II and 
below). ■
In that first article, Zachary wrote that there are three 
alternative courses of treatment available following the birth of a baby 
with spina bifida:
(1) he should be killed. (2) he should be encouraged to die; 
whether by giving no treatment at all (e.g. no feeding) or by not 
treating complications (e.g. no treatment of infection by 
antibiotics; or (3) he should be encouraged to live.
(p. 274)
He goes on to state:
The ethical principle that direct and deliberate killing of a 
human being is wrong is widely accepted on a religious and 
philosophical basis, and has been the basis of medical practice 
since the time of Hippocrates, and even earlier. ... The second 
alternative has no better justification. To leave a child without 
food is to kill it as deliberately and directly as if one was 
cutting its throat. Even the prescription of antibiotics for 
infection, such as pneumonia, must now be considered as ordinary 
care of patients.
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Once the principle has been established that the child 
should be encouraged to live, we are in a position to consider 
which method of management gives the child the best chance to 
live, and secondly, which method of treatment will reduce the 
handicap to a minimum.
(p. 274)
In the next few pages, I will use the concepts developed in 
Chapters IV through VII to discuss the debate that followed Zachary's 
article.
At the time that Zachary published his article, John Lorber was 
conducting a follow up study, on the basis of which he was to propose 
criteria for selective non-treatment of some infants with spina bifida 
(1971). As in other fields of medicine (see Chapter II) physicians and 
others challenged the norm that a physician should always try to 
preserve life and that doing otherwise was to "do harm." This was 
evidenced in letters following Zachary's article in the Lancet.
R.C. Sanders called Zachary's ethical justification for treatment 
"shallow and cruel" and wrote:
...It is no longer acceptable that the preservation of life as 
such is the doctor's most important task. We have now considered 
the patients well being and happiness to be equally at stake. ... 
If long term survival entails many operations, much pain and 
disfigurement, no ability to lead a normal life because of 
incontinence and paraplegia and mental strain and distress to 
parents, should we always attempt it?
He was thus asserting that there is now acceptance of a new norm which 
allows physicians not to attempt to prolong life (Sanders 1968, p. 457).
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Zachary responded that Dr. Sanders missed the point of his paper. 
He reasserted that babies should not be "killed" (in his framework, the 
only alternative to treatment) and states that "the main purpose of 
treatment is not to save the child's life but to improve his function" 
which, he writes, the child with spina bifida "deserves." He also 
challenges Sanders negative evaluation of the "well being and happiness" 
of children with spina bifida by inviting him to see the children at the 
follow-up clinic (Zachary 1968a).
That exchange was followed by a subsequent letter by Ian G. Wickes 
in The Lancet (1968) which stated that there is another alternative 
beside "killing" and "treating" which he identifies as "to let nature 
take it's course." In terms of our analysis of cultural categories and 
norms, Wickes here asserted the existence of another category beside 
"killing" and "treating" He stated that without active intervention, 
over 90% of the untreated babies die within the first year. He ends the 
letter by stating:
One can argue that [surgery] is the baby's fundamental right, but 
have we forgotten that parents and their living children also have 
rights? Should they not also be considered and consulted?
Wickes not only proposed a new category, but also addressed another goal 
beside treatment for the good of the child in suggesting attention to 
the interests of other family members.
In a letter in the Oct. 12, 1968 issue of The Lancet, A. A. 
Fernandez-Serrats, A.N. Guthkelch and S.A. Parker criticized Wickes for 
not defining the phrase "letting nature take its course" which they
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characterize as highly ambiguous. By doing this they questioned the 
validity of the category, or, at least its applicability in some cases. 
They went on to challenge the benefit of Wilkes 90% mortality. They 
stated that even among the most severely affected, those with open 
thoracolumbar myelocele, with adequate surgical treatment 35% survive to 
the age of 16 and 70% of the survivors are of normal intelligence. Here 
they challenged the evaluation of Wilkes in placing patients in a 
category of having a poor outcome, and assert that the outcome is better 
than he suggests.
In the same issue, another letter, by P.F. Ellison Nash, 
criticized Wilkes for denying the neonates the right to a surgical 
opinion challenging the ability of individuals like Wilkes to make the 
evaluation of prognosis. He also stated that with treatment, the 
survivors would have been spared brain damage and paralysis which they 
did suffer without surgery. Pointing out that a decision not to treat 
may cause harm, not only by killing, he wrote that denying surgery 
causes those who do survive to have avoidable impairments. Finally, he 
tied this ideological dispute to another debated social issue by 
writing: "Dr. Wickes is extending the principles of social abortion into 
the neonatal period. This influence is unhealthy in the nurseries of 
maternity units.11
Already, in this first exchange on the issue of selective non­
treatment in the clinical literature, the range of responses in terms of 
changes in categories and norms have been illustrated. The participants 
in the exchange have debated about the appropriateness of
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classifications, proposed and questioned new categories, and justify 
their behavior on the basis of different goals and norms.
Since then, an extensive literature has developed in which 
clinicians, lawyers, philosophers, and others have continued the debate 
about social and ethical issues in the treatment of infants born with 
spina bifida (see Chapter III). As discussed on Chapters V, VI, and 
VII, there continues to be debate about the meaning of categories such 
as "a good quality of life" and about the importance of distinctions 
between such categories as "withholding care" and "killing" and whether 
or not quality of life considerations should be important in decision 
making about care.
Treatment decisions for infants born with spina bifida have varied 
widely in their level of aggressiveness. Some babies have received very 
aggressive treatment while for others, some treatments have been 
withheld. The ideological foundations of treatment decisions have been 
diverse as well.
It is difficult to say exactly what changes have taken place in 
the conceptualization of treatment choice for infants with spina bifida. 
There are no statistical data on treatment in large numbers of actual 
cases through time, nor even comparable surveys of attitudes. From 
talking to clinicians and discussions in the clinical literature, it 
seems that there have been some changes over the past two decade. This 
may be due to changes in attitudes about the possibilities for an 
acceptable quality of life with disabilities, partly as a result of the
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disabilities rights movement. It also may be due to changing 
conceptions of the acceptability of passive euthanasia in some 
circumstances.
Although similar arguments still take place about the definitions 
of categories, and the applicable norms, it seems clinicians are less 
likely to advocate the most extreme positions. Clinicians now seem more 
likely to think that it is possible for an infant to have a decent 
quality of life with a low level impairment. It also seems that 
clinicians are less likely to take a position arguing for everything 
possible to be done to preserve life in all cases. In the late 1960s, 
it seemed that many infants with low level lesions were not receiving 
surgery, while many with high level lesions and hydrocephalus were 
receiving surgery. It now appears that most infants with low level 
lesions are treated aggressively, while those with high level lesions 
and other serious impairments are less likely to receive treatment. 
Although there isn't consensus about treatment, there seems to be 
somewhat more agreement about treatment choice than in the years 
immediately after the new treatments were developed.
Treatment of Very Low Birthweight Premature Infants
Unlike the situation for treatment of infants with spina bifida, 
there have been very clear changes in the treatment of very low 
birthweight premature infants. Rapid improvements in the technology for
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the treatment of small premature infants have been followed by more 
aggressive treatment for smaller and smaller babies.
Whereas infants under 1500 or 1000 grams (450 grams = 1 pound) 
were rarely treated in the past, the lower weight limit thought to 
indicate the threshold for viability has dropped lower and lower. Now, 
aggressive treatment is routine even for infants of 700 or 800 grams, 
and is becoming more common for still smaller infants at many 
institutions.
A recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine (Hack, and 
Fanaroff 1986) documented changes in treatment practices during the 
period, July, 1982 to June, 1984 for infants at one neonatal unit. The 
study showed that during the first year of the study, no infants under 
700 grams were put on a respirator, during the second year, smaller 
infants, weighing as little as 400 grams were put on respirators. This 
change in treatment practice reflected a change in the categorizations 
of the infants' conditions. During the first year, the deaths of 
infants tended to be attributed to "immature lung development considered 
to be incompatible with extrauterine survival" (p. 662). Later, after 
such infants were treated and some survived, the infants were seen as 
viable; the deaths of infants in the same weight category came to be 
seen as due to disease related or treatment related causes.
Another change that took place during the past two decades has 
been changes in the conceptualizations about treatments. Such 
treatments choices as the use of respirators and heart surgery for
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newborns were fairly new and experimental at the beginning of neonatal 
intensive care. Since they are very invasive and costly, and were new 
and experimental, they were seen as very aggressive treatments and their 
use was considered fairly extraordinary when they were first used. As 
their use proved to be successful in preventing mortality and morbidity, 
and as they have come to be used routinely, their use has come to be 
seen as fairly ordinary. For example, while the use of respirators and 
intravenous feedings at first seemed extraordinary for small premature 
babies, their use now seems ordinary. While such treatments might have 
only been used in special circumstances at first, now they are used most 
of the time unless a conscious decision is made not to use them.
There also appear to have been other changes in the 
conceptualization of treatment choice for premature infants. While in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, the salvageability of the infant seemed to be 
the key factor guiding treatment choice, following the questioning of 
the aggressiveness of treatment for infants with well defined lesions 
such as spina bifida, clinicians came to question the benefits of very 
aggressive treatments for some premature infants. One of the important 
differences between premature infants, and many other infants for whom 
the benefits of treatment have been questioned is the degree of 
uncertainty about patient condition. While the range of impairments is 
more predictable for infants with conditions such as spina bifida, the 
range of possible defects are generally much broader for a premature 
infant. Some of the differences in treatment over time for premature 
infants, seems to have been associated with changes in beliefs about the 
predictability of impairment.
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One of the major problems for premature infants is that they are 
at high risk for having bleeds in their brains. Depending on a number 
of factors, including how extensive the bleeding is, and where in the 
brain it occurs, such bleeding is associated with mental retardation 
and/or cerebral palsy and other impairments. In the late 1970s, when I 
started my field work, such bleeding could only be detected at Columbia 
through the use of a spinal tap. If blood was detected in the fluid, it 
was inferred that there had been bleeding in the brain. The amount of 
bleeding and the location was not known. It was a neither a very 
reliable nor specific test.
The development of CAT scans and ultrasound equipment enabled the 
visualization of the bleeds in the brain, and the clinicians then had 
more knowledge about the extent and location of bleeding in the brain.
A system for scoring the severity of the bleeds was devised. Early 
follow-up studies indicated that infants with grade I or grade II bleeds 
had little impairment, but that infants with grade IV bleeds invariably 
had serious impairments if they survived.
With more certainty about the level of impairments, some 
clinicians now felt that they had more reliable information which could 
be used to predict future quality of life for some infants. With less 
uncertainty, they felt more comfortable recommending more aggressive 
treatment for infants who did not have serious bleeds, and for 
recommending the withholding of aggressive treatments from those who had 
grade IV bleeds. Later studies revealed that the association between
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the grade of the bleed and the level of impairment was not as strong as 
had previously been thought. In fact, some of the infants who had grade 
IV bleeds only had mild impairments. Again, with increased uncertainty, 
many clinicians have been more reluctant to withhold treatment.
Changes in the ability to treat very low birthweight infants, as 
well as changes in the ability to diagnose and treat second trimester 
fetuses before birth, are currently leading to changes in the way that 
infants/fetuses born before 28 weeks are conceptualized. Before the 
modern era of neonatal intensive care, babies born before 28 weeks of 
gestational age used to be classified as miscarriages and were not even 
thought to have lived. Now technological developments enable survival 
of many babies born after 25 to 28 weeks gestational age, and of some 
babies who are born even earlier. Currently, use of sophisticated 
technology, has brought the ability to sustain the life of prematurely 
born infants to very close to the 24 week threshold frequently used as 
an upper limit for legal abortions.
Refinement of the use of respirators will not lower the current 
threshold, because the use of a respirator depends on a level of lung 
development which rarely occurs before 24 weeks. There are, however, 
other types of technology which may enable the survival after even less 
time in utero. ECMO, an external oxygenation system is currently only 
used for infants over about 1500 grams. At the present time, technical 
problems prevent the use of ECMO for smaller infants. It is expected, 
however, that these technological problems will be overcome within the 
next decade (Weil, personal communication, 1986). Then, with the use of
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this very aggressive treatment, it will probably be possible to sustain 
the life of infants born before 24 weeks; it would probably be very 
costly in terms of economic costs and staff time and equipment, and the 
risk of death and of severe impairment would probably be very high.
This will lead to questions which are ethically difficult and 
complex concerning the management of both "wanted" and "unwanted" 
pregnancies/babies. Many will revolve around the conceptions of 
"viability." Viability is generally seen as occurring when a fetus is 
able to survive on its own. Viability has been seen as an important 
category in norms pertaining to abortion and refusal of fetal therapy. 
Technological developments which would lead to viability for the second 
trimester fetus would present problems with the use of current norms.
Viability is usually taken to mean the ability to survive outside 
of the mother. Currently, the type of support necessary to enable 
survival is not considered. Like old definitions of death, this 
definition of viability may prove problematic for treatment choice 
decisions. As there was a change in the conceptualization of death to 
include social as well as physiological criteria, a change in the 
conceptualization of viability may be necessary for the development of 
clinical norms to guide the management of the fetus/infant.
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The Baby Doe Regulations and Clinical Decision Making
Although widely discuss by clinicians and bioethicists, decision 
making for catastrophically ill newborns received little public 
attention until the early 1980s. It was, however, of concern to two 
political interest groups: The Right-to-Life movement and Disability 
Rights groups.
One staunch right-to-life activist, who had a special interest in 
the care of newborns, and who played a major role in bringing the issues 
wider public attention, was Surgeon General Koop. Before appointment to 
public office, Dr. Koop was a well known pediatric surgeon. Speaking 
against abortion in 1979 he stated:
The first domino to fall was abortion on demand, and it has split 
this country as no other social issue since the practice of 
slavery. The second domino to fall was infanticide. It fell 
silently because unlike abortion, which is a public issue, 
infanticide is practiced behind the shielding facade of the
hospital. The third domino is euthanasia: it has been struck and
is falling.
(Brozan 1979)
After publicity about Baby Doe (see Chapter III), a child with 
Down's syndrome who died in 1982 because relatively routine surgery had 
been withheld, at the urging of Dr. Koop and others concerned with the 
care of newborns, the Reagan administration issued a directive stating 
that "Discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infants
... is prohibited by federal law [in institutions receiving "federal
financial assistance"] (Department of Health and Human Services 1982). 
The regulation was based on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
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1973, civil right legislation designed to protect the right of the 
handicapped to education and employment.
For this regulation, the administration took a broad view of 
federal law in order to deal with an issue usually considered to be 
either under the jurisdiction of state governments or not subject to 
government interference (see Chapter III), by defining Medicaid and 
Medicare funds to hospitals as "federal financial assistance" and 
withholding treatment as "discrimination" (a position which had been 
advocated by some Disability Rights activists).
During the first year, this regulation received relatively little 
notice from clinicians, bioethicists, and other who had been concerned 
with the treatment of newborns. It did however, receive much support 
from some people involved in the disability rights and the right-to-life 
movements. In 1983, the President's support from many in the Right 
Wing, especially those concerned with the abortion issues, had fallen.
He had been elected to office with a promise to outlaw abortion. As the 
tenth anniversary of the Roe v Wade Supreme Court decision approached, 
he had made little progress on the issue. In March of 1983, at a 
national meeting of Evangelicals, President announced that he planned to 
enforce rules to prevent the withholding treatment from handicapped 
newborns. He announced that a "Baby Doe Hotline" would be set up to 
facilitate the reporting of cases in which treatment was withheld. All 
hospitals would be required to post signs informing people about the 
Baby Doe Hotline (New York Times 3/9/83:A18).
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Political alliances surrounding the regulations have cut across 
traditional political boundaries. Not only were these "Baby Doe 
Directives" applauded by Right to Life and Disability Rights advocates, 
but also by some members of Civil Liberties organizations. They felt 
that this interpretation of the law would oblige hospitals to abide by 
all other civil rights statutes as well. Most health care 
professionals, bioethicists, people active in the women's health 
movement and some civil liberties activists, however, opposed the 
Directives. They were seen as an infringement on the privacy of the 
physician/patient relationship, on the right to refuse treatment, and on 
the ability of parents to make decisions for their children. Opposition 
to the Directives also came from some conservatives. They feared that 
the broad interpretation of the law would require the federal government 
to become involved in investigating other alleged instances of 
discrimination in other institutions (Russell and Barringer 1983), and 
also feared further encroachment on the State on the private decision­
making of its citizens.
Later in March, the administration issued regulations 
establishing the Baby Doe hotline, requiring signs, and authorizing the 
federal investigation of instances of possible non-compliance. The 
regulations included the following requirement:
Under section 504 it is unlawful for a recipient of federal 
financial assistance to withhold from a handicapped infant 
nutritional sustenance or medical or surgical treatment required 
to correct a life-threatening condition if: (1) the withholding is 
based on the fact that the infant is handicapped; (2) the handicap 
does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance medically 
contraindicated.
(DHHS 1983)
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Many commentators believed that the regulations required the 
provision of all possible treatments to sustain life without regard to 
the baby's condition, including very aggressive treatments for very 
seriously impaired babies and terminally ill infants (Murray and Caplan 
1985), Many clinicians, however, interpreted the directives differently. 
Because of the conceptual model they used to understand treatment 
choice, they did not interpret the regulations as meaning that all 
treatments had to be given without regard to the baby's condition. 
Rather, many believed that the regulations would require giving more 
treatments than they would recommend, but that even under the 
directives, it would be possible to withhold the most extraordinary 
treatments. They used both characteristics of patient condition and 
characteristics of treatments in making decisions about which treatments 
they felt it would be permissible to withhold under the Baby Doe 
directives.
The influence of the clinicians' conceptual model on their 
interpretations of Baby Doe Directives was evidenced on the responses to 
the survey which I distributed in the Spring of 1983, soon after plans 
to enforce the directives were first announced. For every treatment 
choice, respondents were more likely to think it would be required by 
the directives than they were to feel it would be best for the baby.^
Paired t-tests between treatments recommended and thought required 
were significant for every treatment option; p < 0.05, for most 
treatment options, p < 0.01.
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TABLE V I I I  -  1
TREATMENTS RESPONDENTS WOULD RECOMMEND 
AND TREATMENTS RESPONDENTS THOUGHT WERE REQUIRED 
BY THE BABY DOE DIRECTIVES - SPRING 1983
n = 2A94
CONDITION AND TREATMENT WOULD THOUGHT
RECOMMEND REQUIRED
% %
BABY WHO IS ANENCEPHALIC
Feedings by mouth 76 90
Tube feeding 56 82
Antibiotics 32 75
Resuscitation in the delivery room 13 63
Cardiac catheterization 3 31
Arrest page 2 A7
Open heart surgery 2 26
BABY WHO HAS MULTIPLE ANOMALIES 
(BEFORE CHROMOSOMAL ANALYSIS)
Nutrition and fluids 90 97
Antibiotics 81 96
Resuscitation 76 95
Respirator 65 91
BABY WHO HAS MULTIPLE ANOMALIES 
(AFTER CHROMOSOMAL ANALYSIS 
INDICATES TRISOMY 13)
Nutrition and fluids 85 93
Antibiotics 60 83
Respirator 2A 68
Surgery for cleft palate 1A 57
Cardiac catheterization 13 A9
Arrest page 10 51
Open heart surgery 8 A6
4 For the Baby with trisomy 13, and for questions on resuscitation 
in the delivery room and an arrest page for the anencephalic baby, n = 
119; actual base varies slightly depending on the number of ineligible 
answers (in all cases, ineligible answers less than 5% of total n).
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TABLE VIII - 2 (continued)
CONDITION AND TREATMENT
A SMALL PREMATURE BABY WITH 
AN IVH
Nutrition and fluids 
Suctioning
resuscitation in delivery room
Increased respiratory settings
Pressors
Arrest page
Kidney dialysis
A BABY WITH DOWN'S SYNDROME 
AND DUODENAL ATRESIA
Intravenous feedings 
Antibiotics
Surgery for intestinal defect 
Cardiac catheterization 
Open heart surgery 
Kidney dialysis
WOULD
RECOMMEND
%
93
92
64
53
39
26
13
91
88
87
71
59
28
THOUGHT
REQUIRED
%
98
96
78
88
66
55
42
98
95
90
76
69
57
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This disparity ranged from 3 to 45% (see Chapter VIII, Figure 1). 
Twenty-one percent of the respondents felt that every treatment would be 
required in every case. However, most respondents thought that even 
under the directives, some treatments would not be required. In 
general, there was consensus (more than 75% agreement) that the 
treatments rated most ordinary would be required but there was 
controversy (less than 75% agreement) about the treatments rated more 
extraordinary. For no treatment was there consensus (more that 75% 
agreement) that it would not be required by the directives. However, in 
all cases except that of the baby with Down's syndrome, more than half 
of the respondents felt that some treatments could be withheld.
Opinions about which treatments would not be required varied from case 
to case. Almost three quarters of the respondents did not think that 
cardiac surgery would be required for an anencephalic baby, and only 11% 
thought that it was definitely required.
Many respondents indicated that they were confused about the 
proper interpretation of the directives by circling that many treatments 
were "probably" as opposed to "definitely" required or not required.
Not only were they unsure whether the Baby Doe Directives would require 
treatments that they would not recommend, but, in addition, some 
respondents were not sure about whether they would be required to give 
treatments that they would personally recommend. For example, about 
half of the respondents were not sure that cardiac surgery would be 
required for a baby with Down's syndrome.^ This included 24 respondents
5 Includes respondents who circled "probably" required, "probably 
not" required and "definitely not" required.
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who thought that surgery would not be required, even though they would 
recommend it as best for the baby.
In general, respondents were likely to think that all treatments 
that they themselves would recommend would also be required by the 
directives. In addition, most felt that some of the more aggressive 
treatments, which they would not personally recommend, would also be 
required. The pattern of responses reflected the same ranking of 
treatments according to aggressiveness as discuss above in Chapter VI.^
Later versions of Baby Doe Regulations
The original Doe Regulations were over turned by a Court decision 
in April of 1983. Since then, there have been a number of revisions of 
the Baby Doe directives based on antidiscrimination statutes (Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act). Each revision, in turn, has been 
rejected by the Courts. Most recently, in June 1986, the Supreme upheld 
a lower Court decision, rejecting the regulations (Bowen v American 
Hospital Association 1986).
At the same time as regulations were developed based on Section 
504, proponents of federal involvement in neonatal decision making also 
were attempting to have regulations passed in Congress specifically
® The Guttman scores for the treatments thought required in each
case were all above 0.95. The correlation of the aggressiveness of 
recommended treatments and aggressiveness of treatments thought required 
was significant (p < .001).
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aimed at regulating the withholding of treatment from newborns. Efforts 
to tie requirements for treatment directly to health care legislation 
failed. As part of a compromise, most supporters and opponents of the
original Section 504 regulations agreed to support an Amendment to the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act defining the withholding of 
medically indicated treatment as child abuse. The act stated:
The term 'withholding of medically indicated treatment1 
means the failure to respond to the infant's life-threatening 
conditions by providing treatment (including appropriate
nutrition, hydration, and medication) which, in the treating
physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, will be 
most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such 
condition, except that the term does not include the failure to 
provide treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or 
medication) to an infant when, in the treating physician's or 
physicians' reasonable medical judgment, (A) the infant is 
chronically and irreversibly comatose; (B) the provision of such 
treatment would (i) merely prolong dying, (ii) not be effective in 
ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening 
conditions, or (iii) otherwise would be futile in terms of the 
survival of the infant; or (C) the provision of such treatment 
would be virtually futile in terms of the survival [sic.] of the 
infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be 
inhumane.
(U.S. Congress 1984:4)
The amendment also stated that the Department of Health and Human 
Services should publish guidelines
to encourage the establishment within health-care facilities of 
committees which would serve the purposes of educating hospital 
personnel and families of disabled infants with life-threatening 
conditions, recommending institutional policies and guideline 
concerning the withholding of medically indicated treatment ... 
from such infants, and offering counsel and review in cases 
involving disabled infants with life-threatening conditions.
(U.S. Congress 1984:6)
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While the language of the new Amendment is fairly strong, the 
enforcement mechanism is quite weak. The harshest penalty is that 
states that fail to comply will lose relatively small amount of Federal 
money targeted for Child Abuse agencies. These already overburdened 
agencies are unlikely to take a very active role in seeking to expand 
their responsibilities into an area which many feel ill-equipped to 
handle.
The comprise was acceptable to almost all parties because it 
addressed many of the concerns of each faction. One objective of the 
Reagan administration was to accomplishment something that could be seen 
as a positive step by the Right-to-Life movement. The Baby Doe 
regulations enabled him to take a strong ideological stance on a Right 
to Life issue and to claim victory.
Many of the Right to Life and Disability Rights advocates were 
pleased. The issue of discriminatory non-treatment of newborns had 
gained national prominence. Much of their concern had always been non­
treatment of newborns with mild to moderate impairments, specifically 
treatment for infants with Downs' syndrome and surgically correctable 
intestinal defects. There is evidence to suggest that at least the 
public positions of many bioethicists and clinicians had shifted; many 
now state that, of course non-treatment of such newborns would be 
unacceptable. I think that it would probably be difficult for such 
treatment decisions to be made today.
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The associations of health care professionals and many civil 
liberties advocates could also accept the revised regulations. Their 
main concern was that the original Baby Doe Regulation would have made 
it difficult to withhold aggressive treatments from critically ill 
infants with complex medical conditions. The ambiguous language of the 
current regulations which permit the withholding of "virtually futile 
treatments" are seen by many as allowing the withholding of 
inappropriate treatments.
Finally, opponents were also pleased that the new regulations 
situated review and enforcement of decisions at a more local level.
While in the past, many clinicians had opposed defining the withholding 
of treatments as child abuse, many now saw such a vehicle as a better 
alternative than direct federal intervention. The concept of hospital 
based review committees, also previously opposed by many clinicians, was 
now endorsed as a means for keeping review within the institution.
Since the committees are established by hospitals, and are usually run 
by physicians from the neonatal intensive care units who appoint the 
members, in many ways they reinforce rather than challenge the clinical 
model of decision making.
The implications of the recent Supreme Court decision for the 
political struggles around Baby Doe Regulations are unclear. The Court 
affirmed the right of parents stating, "In broad outline, state law 
vests decisional responsibility in the parents, in the first instance, 
subject to review in exceptional cases by the State acting as parens 
patriae ,n Although the Court did not specifically review the child abuse
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amendments, in reviewing the regulations based on section 504, the Court 
did use strong language in stating "State child protective services 
agencies are not field offices of the HHS bureaucracy, and they many not 
be conscripted against their will as the foot soldiers in a federal 
crusade" (Bowen v American Hospital Association 1986:30). Following the 
Supreme Court decision, there will likely be renewed efforts by 
supporters of federal involvement to develop a clear federal 
justification for intervention; opponents to government intervention 
will continue efforts to limit the government role.
Effects of the Baby Doe Regulation on Clinical Decision Making
It is difficult to document the effects of the Baby Doe directives on 
both the conceptualization of treatment choice and treatment behavior. 
Some clinicians claim that adhering to the Regulations would involve 
practicing bad medicine and claim that the regulations have affected 
neither their thinking nor their behavior. Numerous reports, however, 
of very aggressive treatment for infants who previously probably would 
not have received such treatment suggest that the regulations did affect 
treatment in many cases.
It appears that the both the regulations themselves, and the media 
coverage surrounding them and some of the non-treatment cases, have led 
to some changes in the way that some clinicians conceptualize treatment 
choice for catastrophically ill infants. There appears to have been 
some shifts, so that at least some clinicians, who might have supported
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withholding relatively non- aggressive treatments from infants with mild 
to moderate impairments a few years ago, no longer will do so. For 
example, although some had previous thought that parents should be able 
to withhold intestinal surgery from infants with Down's syndrome, now 
virtually no clinicians publicly advocate such a position. In addition 
to the fact that many clinicians now feel that it would not be politic 
to advocate such a position, it appears that many have truly changed 
their opinions about the quality of life for infants with Down's 
syndrome and some other disabilities.
Another change that seems to have occurred during the past few 
years has been a change in some of language used to discuss treatment 
decisions. The term "best interest of the baby," which was used in the 
President's Commission Report (1983), seems to have replaced "quality of 
life" as the term most often used in discussing the rationale for 
treatment decisions (Arras, forthcoming). In part, this may be due to 
the fact that some versions of the directives specifically state that 
decisions based on "quality of life" criteria are not acceptable. It 
also seems to reiterate the importance of considering the value of 
treatment from the perspective of the infant rather than the value of 
treatment to others.
It appears that some clinicians who always felt uncomfortable 
withholding treatment are using the directives as an excuse to justify 
aggressive treatment in some circumstances. Sometimes, clinicians have 
used the directives as a means to compel parents and other clinicians to 
accept their definition of the boundaries of acceptable choices.
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There has been a definite trend towards more aggressive treatment 
since the announcement of the Baby Doe directives (NEJM editorial 
3/6/86) but it is hard tell to what extent, if any, that represents an 
acceleration of the trend toward more and more aggressive treatment of 
infants which has characterized neonatology since it's inception. 
Commenting on the New England Journal of Medicine editorial, a prominent 
pediatrician said that the "Neonatology imperative" has always been to 
"Do more and more of what you don't know how to do until you get better 
at it." He felt that the fact that almost all centers would now try to 
rescue a 500 gram, baby had less to do with the regulations than with 
the generally aggressive attitude. He claimed that directives do not 
force such treatment; he believed that if people thought they were 
treating because of the directives, they were over reacting (Bill Weil, 
comments made a Hastings Center meeting 3/17/86).
It is clear that both because of the directives themselves, and 
the general increased public awareness of the issue of decision making 
for catastrophically ill infants, clinicians felt that they were more 
likely to be prosecuted if they withhold treatment from infants.
Although some said that they do not let the possibility of prosecution 
change the way they practice medicine, there were clinicians who were 
clearly recommending treatments they would not have recommended a few 
years before.
Although the Supreme Court decision does not actually change the 
law, since the Baby Doe regulations had already been overturned, it
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seems likely to led to changes in clinicians conceptualization and 
treatment practice. Many clinicians had continued to believe that they 
had to provide aggressive treatments as a requirement of federal law. 
Now, some clinicians seem to feel that as a result of the Supreme Court 
decision, such treatment is not longer required. One might speculate 
that many clinicians will be more likely to withhold treatment than 
during the previous three years. The increased public awareness and 
widespread discussion of decision making in neonatology, however, will 
probably make clinicians more somewhat more cautious in their decision 
making than in the pre-Baby Doe era. The affects of increased parental 
awareness of the issues involved in neonatal decision making, if any, 
are not yet know nor are the affects of the presence of ethics 
committees.
General Changes in Conceptualization and Treatment Behavior
Since the late 1960s, when the issue of withholding life saving 
treatment from catastrophically ill newborns was first discussed, there 
seem to have been a number of changes in the way that relevant factors 
have been conceptualized and some changes in norms and treatment 
behavior.
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Changes in Categorization of Patient Condition
There have been some changes in the conceptualization of patient 
condition characteristics. Many clinicians seem to have changed their 
view concerning the implications of some impairments on future quality 
of life. This probably reflects at least two factors. First, there 
appears to be both a general change in attitudes about the capacity of 
people with impairments and of knowledge of programs and opportunities 
for independent living, for employment for people with disabilities. In 
the early literature, the assumption was often made that people born 
with spina bifida would not be able to marry or find employment. One 
rarely hears clinicians making such statements in discussions of 
decisions for non-treatment today. There also have been changes in 
views of the capacity of people with Down's syndrome and other 
conditions causing mild to moderate retardation. With
deinstitutionalization and special education, and the resultant increase 
in capabilities of people with developmental delays, the view of their 
quality of life has changed as well.
In addition, I think that there has been a shift in what 
capacities many clinicians see as necessary to permit a acceptable 
quality of life. In the beginning of the debate, the standard of 
comparison was often the "normal" individual, and impairments which 
caused limitations in particular functions were all seen to detract from 
a good quality of life. It was a type of deficit model, each deficit 
took away from the capability to have a good quality of life. Now, 
clinicians seem more likely to focus on what the infant will be able to
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do which will enable the infant to have life satisfactions. The focus 
is now more on the capacities that the baby will have that will enable 
the infant to derive benefit from continued life. There is greater 
realization that quality of life is more than a sum total ADLs 
(measurement of function based on "activities of daily living") or of 
the ability to perform specific functions.
I don't think that there has been a clear trend in either the 
amount of uncertainty or how clinicians feel about uncertainty. While 
increased diagnostic capability and better treatments has increased 
knowledge about diagnosis and prognosis with some conditions, new 
treatments for which there has not yet been much follow-up, and greater 
awareness of the range of outcomes with particular conditions, has 
increased uncertainty about others. Clinicians are still uncomfortable 
about making decisions in the face of uncertainty, yet such decisions 
continue to be unavoidable.
As clinicians have increased experience and better outcomes 
treating particular conditions, these conditions have come to be 
categorized as less critical. For example, while the condition of a 800 
gram premature baby may have seemed very critical 15 years ago, and 
giving certain very aggressive treatments may have seemed to be 
optional, the condition of such a baby no longer seems so critical and 
many treatment would now be felt to be mandatory. On the other hand, 
there may now be more willingness to recognize babies with some 
conditions as terminally ill, such as infant with trisomy 13 and 18, and 
there is therefore more willingness to withhold some treatments.
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Changes in the Categorization of Treatments
There have also been shifts in how clinicians feel about a number 
of characteristics of treatments. In general, there has been a trend to 
see many treatments as less aggressive than they would have been 
considered in the past. When treatments were new and were still 
somewhat experimental, they were more likely to be seen as aggressive 
than now when they have become accepted as part of standard practice.
For example, such treatments as respirators for small premature babies, 
TPN (total IV feeding) and some forms of surgery, such as a PDA 
ligation, are considered to be less aggressive now than they were in the 
past. Also, treatments have come to be seen as less aggressive relative 
to newer treatments which are considered more aggressive. For example, 
now, after the development of ECMO, the respirator seems less aggressive 
because it is no longer the most aggressive life support device for 
respiratory functioning. Some of the new treatments, however, such as 
ECMO and infant heart transplants, are considered to be more aggressive 
than any previous treatments.
There have also been changes in how clinicians categorize 
treatments as ordinary or extraordinary. Because some treatments are no 
longer seen as being as aggressive as they had previously been thought 
to be, there is a greater tendency to think of those treatment as more 
ordinary. On the other hand, clinicians appear to be more likely to 
categorize treatments as ordinary or extraordinary on the basis of the
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presumed benefit to a patient rather than because of the aggressiveness 
of the treatments. Therefore, clinicians may be more likely to 
characterize even less aggressive treatments as extraordinary in some 
cases. Although there is still disagreement among clinicians about how 
to categorize many treatments, there appears to be consensus among 
clinicians about categorizing the most aggressive treatments as 
extraordinary for some patients who are terminally ill or severely 
impaired, and those that are not very aggressive as ordinary, especially 
for patients with a chance at a good prognosis.
It appears that they has been a shift in the way that many 
clinicians feel about the distinction between withholding and 
withdrawing treatment. Clinicians seem more likely to see some changes 
in management, such as increases in respirator settings, or restoring 
treatments after diagnostic tests, as "new treatments," than previously. 
Therefore, not giving such treatments may be more likely to be 
categorized as withholding rather than withdrawing treatments.
There also appears to have been shifts in clinicians 
conceptualization of active and passive euthanasia. Most important, 
clinicians seem to be more aware that many decisions they make affect 
the nature and timing of death for their critically ill patients. 
Therefore, they are more likely to see treatment choices as instances of 
passive or active euthanasia that would have previously been thought of 
as patient management decisions. Also,, many clinicians are now more 
conscious of the criteria they use to distinguish between active and 
passive euthanasia.
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Clinicians are more often now aware of decisions as affecting the 
course of life and death for their patients. This occurs for two 
reasons. First, with more powerful medical technology, clinicians are 
more able to postpone the moment of death, either by providing 
treatments that will reverse a physiological process (e.g. performing 
surgery to close an open lesions and prevent infection), substitute for 
a physiological process by providing life support (such as a respirator 
or dialysis), or by resuscitating the patient and restarting a vital 
function which ceased. In addition, however, clinicians now appear to 
be aware that the use of biomedical means to prolong life, or the 
withholding of such means, reflects a decisions. In the past, 
clinicians frequently omitted providing possible treatments which they 
felt were inappropriate for patients with a given condition. Such 
decisions were usually seen as based on physiological criteria alone and 
death was seen as due to the "natural history" of the disease. Now 
clinicians are more likely to see such decisions as reflecting value 
criteria as well as physiological criteria. They are less likely to see 
the course of many diseases as reflecting the "natural history" of the 
disease, but rather, as having a course in part determined by treatment 
decisions.
When clinicians first became more conscious about the fact that 
their decisions were causally associated with death for their patients, 
many were disturbed. Although some clinicians felt that any decision 
which led to death was unacceptable, other clinicians wanted ways to 
distinguish acceptable from unacceptable decisions associated with
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
death. Some clinicians came to see decisions which allowed death to 
occur (passive euthanasia) as acceptable, while decisions which caused 
death (active euthanasia) as unacceptable. At first many clinicians 
felt confused about whether particular treatment choices constituted 
active or passive euthanasia. There was much disagreement between 
clinicians. There continues to be disagreement between clinicians, and 
many clinicians still feel conflicted about some particular decisions.
It appears that now, however, many clinicians feel more able to 
categorize treatment choices for themselves as passive or active 
euthanasia. Within the medical community, consensus seems to be 
developing that some treatment choices constitute passive euthanasia for 
patients with some conditions, while other choices would constitute 
active euthanasia.
Changes in Goals
Clinicians primary goal is still to cure their patients when ever 
that is a possible outcome. It appears that for some conditions, 
clinicians may now be more willing to acknowledge that cure is not 
possible. In other cases, however, clinicians may be more likely to use 
a wider definition of "normal," using functional rather than 
physiological criteria.
It appears clinicians are less likely to have solely the 
preservation of life as a primary goal for infants who are terminally 
ill and or so severely impaired that they will not have an acceptable
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quality of life. Clinicians are more likely to use a social rather than 
only a physiological definition of life (Crane 1975). Clinicians 
continue to try to "do no harm." Increasingly, allowing death to occur 
is less likely to be seen as a harm, and the use of very aggressive 
medical technology without compensating benefit is more likely to be 
seen as harmful.
Changes in Norms
Over the past two decades, there have been some shifts in the 
norms guiding neonatal decision making. Although some clinicians are 
guided by similar norms, others have made major shifts in the norms used 
to guide treatment choices.
Almost all clinicians now agree that passive euthanasia is 
acceptable in some circumstances. In cases in which infants are 
terminally ill, or will have a very poor quality of life, most 
clinicians are probably now willing to withhold at least some aggressive 
treatments. Some clinicians may limit treatment only for patients who 
are probably unsalvageable. Other clinicians choose to withhold 
treatment from infants who would be salvageable, but who have extremely 
limited capacities. It appears that fewer clinicians now feel that life 
with certain severe conditions or dying should be prolonged in order to 
uphold a principle of sanctity of life.
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At the same time, however, many clinicians seemed to have shifted 
their attitudes about the role of quality of life considerations. In 
the past, many clinicians were willing to accept a non-treatment 
decisions if they felt that the infant would have a moderate degree of 
impairment that would be thought to compromise quality of life. Now few 
clinicians are willing to consider non-treatment unless that they feel 
that the infant will probably have a very poor quality of life. Rather 
than comparing the quality of life of the patient to the quality of life 
of a child without impairments, clinicians now seem more likely to 
consider what they feel will be the "best interests" of the patient in 
making treatment decisions.
During the past two decades, there appears to have been a trend 
away from both giving and withholding treatment for the presumed benefit 
of others, and more focus on the "best interests of the baby!1 It seems 
that clinicians may be less willing to consider the possible problems 
which the life of the infant might cause for the family or costs for 
society; at the same time they seem to be less likely to feel that 
making choices to limit treatment would be harmful for families, health 
care professionals or to society.
Clinicians now seem more willing to give even more aggressive 
treatments than they previously did, especially if they feel that it 
will lead to a good or acceptable outcome. Some clinicians, however, 
seem more willing to withhold less aggressive treatments if they feel 
that they would be no benefit. An exception to this may occur in cases 
where the parents want very aggressive treatment that the clinicians do
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
not believe will be in the best interests of the baby. Clinicians may
now be more willing to agree to aggressive treatment if the parents want
it to be given.
Clinicians also now seem more willing to withdraw treatments which
are already started as well as withhold new treatments. Although
psychologically it still seems very difficult for clinicians to stop 
ongoing treatments, fewer clinicians seem to feel that there is a 
morally significant distinction between stopping and not starting a 
particular treatment.
While the majority of clinicians seem to feel that a distinctions 
between active and passive euthanasia is important, some clinicians now 
question the distinction. Some feel that when death is the desired 
outcome, it is all right to make decisions which lead to death and that 
proscribing actions which lead to more immediate death in critically ill 
patients is not useful. Although some philosophers have advocated 
active euthanasia using lethal drug injections, virtually no clinicians 
have advocated such means for infants. In saying that there should be 
no distinction between active and passive euthanasia, clinicians usually 
mean it should be possible to omit any treatment which would not be in 
an infant's best interest. They do not advocate using more active means 
to cause death.
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Changes in Treatment Behavior
It is clear that many more infants are receiving more aggressive 
treatments now than twenty years ago. It is, however, very difficult to 
judge the changes which may have taken place in the treatment of 
catastrophically ill infants during the past two decades.
A major reason for the more aggressive treatment of infants during 
the past twenty years have been the rapid development of medical 
technologies. This has involved the refinement and proliferation of 
some treatments, such as respirators and open heart surgical procedures 
for newborns, which were in use on a limited scale at first, as well as 
the development of new technologies such as ECMO and heart transplants. 
Improved outcome statistics with existing treatments has supported the 
spread of those treatments and fostered the development of yet more 
aggressive ones.
In addition, economic, political and social factors have also lead 
to more aggressive treatments. Changes in law which required third- 
party payers to finance the care of newborns, and the availability of 
government funds for the care of newborns, has fostered more aggressive 
newborn care. The fact that Neonatal Intensive Care Units have become 
show cases for the power of American Medicine have also promoted the 
development of still more aggressive treatments. Aggressive treatment 
was further encouraged by biomedical equipment and supply companies; 
with government supported research leading to the development of new 
products, and a ready market interested and able to buy continually
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updated equipment, companies selling biomedical supplies and equipment 
have promoted the acquisition of sophisticated biomedical technology by 
NICUs. Regionalization, involving the upgrading of facilities in both 
tertiary centers and outlying regional hospitals, and the transfer of 
infants with serious problems to regional centers, also led to more 
aggressive treatment.
Other factors which have promoted aggressive treatment include the 
growing involvement of the Right-to-Life movement, which has been 
advocating for the aggressive treatment of newborn infants as well as 
preventing abortion. The disabilities rights movement has had an effect 
both by helping to change conceptions of people with disabilities, and 
by advocating for aggressive treatment for the disabled. Together, 
these groups helped promote the Baby Doe Regulations. Many clinicians 
have felt compelled to give more aggressive treatment than they formerly 
would have either because they feel it is required by the regulations, 
or because they fear that Right to Life advocates will come and bring 
cases of non- treatment to the Courts or to the Media. Finally, 
professional and parent organizations that advocate for services for 
those with mental and physical disabilities have also encouraged 
treatment for newborns. These groups, with their political clout at the 
government level, as well as advocacy work in the health and social 
services sector, have promoted more aggressive treatment.
At the same time, however, there have been factors which have 
increased the ability for clinicians and caretakers to make decisions to 
withhold treatment in some circumstances. In addition to the conceptual
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changes in the clinical decision making model discussed above, these 
include other changes in laws and bioethical standards in society and 
increases in the awareness of parents and non- clinicians about the 
issue of withholding treatment.
Over the past two decades, there has been much public discussion 
of the issue of withholding treatments from critically ill patients. As 
discussed in Chapter II, there has been growing awareness and acceptance 
of the idea of withholding treatments in some circumstances. In part, 
this results from changes in attitudes about the use of technology, so 
that the use of technology is less likely to be seen as necessarily 
associated with progress, and more likely to be seen as involving 
serious risks. There also seem to be less adherence to a notion that 
human decision making to withdraw life saving treatment involves 
"playing god," and more of a sense that withholding treatment allows a 
"natural death" to occur.
Bioethicists have written much in support of patient's rights to 
refuse life saving treatment, and the right of surrogates to refuse such 
treatment for critically ill incompetent patients in some circumstances, 
(see President's Commission 1983) There have been a number of Court 
decisions, including those involving the care of adults such as Quinlan, 
Conroy, and Fox, as well as the case involving Jane Doe which have ruled 
that the withholding of life saving treatment is a legal option in some 
circumstances. There have been countless TV programs and articles in 
popular media dealing with withholding treatment. There have been 
changes in ideas about death and dying; a "Right-to-Die" movement has
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emerged with such advocacy groups as Concern for Dying. With public 
discussion of these issues, parents have become more aware of non­
treatment options and may be better able to choose or accept a non­
treatment decision. Many clinicians feel more able to openly discuss 
non-treatment decisions.
It is difficult to say exactly what effects these two sets of 
factors have had on the treatment of catastrophically ill newborns. It 
appears that open discussion of the issues and advocacy by supporters of 
various positions may have lead to the reductions of decisions that fall 
at either extreme. In general, it seems, that aggressive treatment is 
more likely to be given to infants with moderate impairments; infants 
with devastating conditions are less likely to be treated very 
aggressively.
Summary
Social, political, economic, ideological and technological changes 
in the context of decision making have led to changes in clinicians' 
conceptualization of treatment choice for catastrophically ill newborns. 
From the first published debate on selective non-treatment for infants 
with spina bifida, clinicians have demonstrated variation not only in 
the categorizations of patient conditions and treatments, but also 
variation in norms and goals. This chapter examines changes in the 
treatment of infants with spina bifida and very premature newborns.
These are seen to reflect both technological and social changes. The
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ability to sustain infants formally though to be non-viable are show to 
have implications that may effect other social issues, such as laws 
pertaining to abortion.
The history of federal efforts to regulate the treatment of 
newborns is examined. Political and ideological factors were shown to 
have contributed toward to promulgation of the Baby Doe Directives. The 
clinicians conceptualization of treatment choice were shown to have 
influenced the way that clinicians interpreted the regulations.
Political and social issues relating to the recent amendment to the 
federal child abuse act and the Supreme Court decision on the Baby Doe 
regulations are discussed.
Finally, general changes in the categorization of patient 
conditions and treatments, of goals and of norms are discussed. Some of 
the major changes appear to be higher expectations of an acceptable 
quality of life with mild and moderate impairments, and less importance 
vested in distinctions between ordinary care and extraordinary care and 
a distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatment. Clinicians 
may now be more willing to acknowledge that cure or preserving life is 
not possible in some cases. In those cases, clinicians may be more 
willing to accept passive euthanasia. In other cases, when clinicians 
feel that a baby may be able to have an acceptable quality of life, with 
more advanced technology available, clinicians may be more aggressive in 
treatment.
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CHAPTER NINE
TO TREAT OR NOT TO TREAT? THAT IS NOT THE QUESTION: 
CONCLUSIONS OF A STUDY ON DECISION MAKING 
FOR CATASTROPHICALLY ILL NEWBORNS
This chapter starts with a summary of the study including 
research findings. Next, conclusions of the study are presented. This 
is followed by a discussion of implications of the study for future 
research on decision making about the care of the critically ill and for 
questions of public policy.
Summary of the Study
The research question addressed in this dissertation is: How do 
clinicians conceptualize choices about limiting care in a Neonatal 
Intensive Care Unit (NICU) and what factors affect these 
conceptualizations. More specifically, how do clinicians choose which 
treatments to give and which to withhold from the range of possible 
treatments? How do material and social factors affect the way that 
clinicians think about treatment choices? The focus of the dissertation 
is the development of a model for use in elucidating treatment choice.
It was derived from observation of clinicians' behavior, including 
treatment choices and explanations of why those choices were made.
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This dissertation is based on data collected by a variety of 
methods. The principle source of data has been participant observation, 
mostly in the NICU at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center. In 
addition, a survey of attitudes about neonatal decision making was 
conducted and documents were examined from the clinical, bioethics, 
legal and popular literature.
Chapter II presents a general introduction to the issue of 
decision making about the withholding of treatment from the critically 
ill. It demonstrates that questions about the aggressiveness of medical 
treatment are not new phenomena brought about by mid-twentieth century 
developments in medical technology. On the contrary, healers in other 
cultures and in our culture through history have made choices about 
care, including decisions to withhold some treatments that would have 
been intended to prolong life.
Scientific advances and changes in practice in the 20th century 
did lead to an aggressive ethos in medicine. The development of life 
support technology, with the ability to prolong physiological life of 
questionable quality in some cases, along with concern about other 
bioethical issues, led to a questioning of the benefits of some medical 
treatments and a social concern with "the right to die." Clinicians, 
bioethicists, lawyers, and policy makers have addressed such issues. As
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
a result, the definition of death, and norms for the delivery of medical 
care have been changing.
Decisions in a number of legal cases have begun to delineate 
conditions under which it may be acceptable to withhold treatments. 
Research on clinical behavior shows that treatments are sometimes 
withheld, but that, in general, many aggressive medical treatments are 
given, even to terminally ill patents. Decision making about the care 
of the critically ill had been a major concern of bioethics.
Distinction between ordinary and extraordinary care, omission and 
commission, and withholding and withdrawing treatment have been used by 
ethicists to differentiate acceptable and unacceptable choices. 
Clinicians have established guidelines for decision making about the 
limitation of care; prominent have been guidelines concerning DNR 
(decisions not to resuscitate following a cardiac arrest). Surveys have 
revealed that most clinicians believe that decisions to withhold 
treatment are acceptable in some circumstances. While discussion has 
focused on which patients receive treatment (e.g. Crane 1975 ), there 
has been little investigation about which treatments are given and which 
are withheld.
The history of the care of newborns is discussed in Chapter III.
It presents a brief cross cultural and historical survey which suggests 
that other cultures have devised means to promote the survival of most 
infants, but that, through direct or indirect means, many cultures 
practice infanticide for some infants who are not socially acceptable
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
for a number of different reasons, m e  presence of impairment has been 
a reason for infanticide in some cultures, but not others.
Tne history of modern western care for newborns is traced showing 
the importance of social, economic, political, and technological factors 
from the earlier development of incubators and special care nurseries to 
the recent, very rapid, development of neonatal intensive care. During 
the first half of the twentieth century, improvements in the standard of 
living, preventative medicine, and the development of antibiotics led to 
dramatic reductions in the rate of post neonatal (more than 28 days) 
infant mortality but did little to improve the survival of newborns. 
Early post-war efforts to improve infant mortality led to the 
development of special centers for infant care. Aggressive experimental 
techniques were used in efforts to treat critically ill newborns; this 
prevented some mortality and morbidity but also caused iatrogenic 
problems.
Since the 1960s, efforts at prevention have done little to reduce 
the rate of infants born at risk. There has, however, been a dramatic 
reduction in the infant mortality rate. This is a result not only of 
rapid development of increasingly sophisticated medical technology, but 
also social changes. These include government and other third party 
payments for increasingly expensive care, regionalization, and special 
training for physicians, nurses and other health professionals. During 
the last few decades, survival rates have increased and impairment rates 
have decreased for smaller and smaller premature babies and infants with 
cardiac and other anomalies.
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While parents and caretakers have always made private decisions 
about the aggressiveness of care for some catastrophically ill infants, 
decision making about the care for newborns has only recently become a 
social issue. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when many babies with 
similar problems were brought together in regional centers, and 
technological developments had enabled dramatic increases in the ability 
to prolong the lives of critically ill newborns, decision making for 
newborns emerged as an issues of concern to clinicians and bioethicists.
Since the early 1970s, ethical issues relating to the treatment of 
newborns have been examined extensively in relation to such issues as 
the rights of children, the rights of parents, and the use of 
technology. While there have been a number of legal cases involving the 
withholding of treatments from newborns, the legality of many practices 
remains unclear. Clinicians, lawyers, philosophers and others have 
debated how decisions should be made; they have focused on such 
questions as Which babies should be treated? and Who should decide?
There have been a number of studies concerning the withholding of 
treatments from some newborns. Surveys have investigated attitudes, 
background characteristics, and recommendations and behavior pertaining 
to the treatment of newborns. A few studies based on qualitative 
research also document aspects of decision making practices. These 
studies show agreement to withhold treatment in some circumstances, but 
controversy about other treatment practices. As with the studies of the
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treatment of critically ill adults, they have focused more on decisions 
about which patients to treat, rather than on which treatments to give.
My research in a neonatal intensive care unit shows that decision 
making about the treatment of newborns rarely involves a single clear 
cut decision "to treat" or "not to treat" but rather reflects a complex 
process in which clinicians, and sometimes parents, make decisions about 
which treatments are appropriate to give at a particular point in time. 
The clinician's conceptualization of treatment choice is very important 
in determining how decisions are made. Such decisions reflect 
consideration of characteristics of treatments, as well as 
characteristics of patient condition, goals and norms for treatment 
behavior. These are discussed in more detail in Chapters IV through 
VII.
Decision making for newborns was not a salient public issue until 
the 1980s when there was much media coverage of an alleged decision to 
withhold feedings and treatment from Siamese Twins in Danville, Illinois 
in 1981, the death of an infant with Down's syndrome, know as Baby Doe 
in 1982, after his parents refused consent for corrective surgery, the 
announcement of the Baby Doe Directives and a decision to withhold 
surgery from a child with spina bifida, known as Jane Doe in 1983.
In Chapter IV, after a brief review of the literature on medical 
decision making, a general model for examining decision making was 
outlined. The importance of culture in determining aspects of 
perception and categorization was discussed, with an examination of
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types of categories and sources of variation. Then the roles of goals, 
norms, and context in the process of decision making were examined.
Chapter IV includes an introduction to the use of the model for 
the analysis of decisions about the aggressiveness of treatment for 
newborns. It outlines steps starting with the perception of data about 
the infant and possible treatments, the categorization of information 
into culturally defined categories pertaining to patient condition and 
treatment characteristics. Decisions are made by considering these 
characteristics in relation to goals and norms for treatment behavior. 
Then the decisions about treatment are translated into treatment 
behavior. The entire process occurs in the context of the 
technological, ideological, political, economic and social environment 
of the unit and of the society at large.
Chapters V, VI, and VII present the categories of patient 
condition, treatments and goals and the norms for decision making and 
explores their cultural construction. Although all are based, in part, 
on objective data, all are also determined by culturally defined 
evaluations. Examples are drawn primarily from participant observation 
and are supplemented by data from the literature and from the results of 
a survey. Areas of consensus and of controversy are discussed.
Chapter V discusses characteristics of patient condition. 
Clinicians consider a number of issues in relation to quality of life 
(benefits and burdens to the patient) including the degree of physical 
and mental impairment, the capacity to give and receive love, and the
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amount of pain and suffering. Such factors as concepts about the 
"normal," discrimination against people with disabilities and the social 
class of parents affect clinicians' categorizations about quality of 
life. Clinicians also consider the risk (known probabilities) and 
uncertainty (what is unknowable) about the chances that the baby will be 
normal, about the severity of impairment, and about the chances that the 
baby will die. Clinicians also consider the nature of the critical 
condition - what the infant needs to stay alive, whether the infant's 
condition meets traditional definitions of death, and whether or not the 
infant is terminally ill. Finally, social value (the benefits and 
burdens of treatment for others) for the family, for health care 
professionals and the health care system, and for society are discussed.
Quality of life was found to be one of the most important factors 
determining the aggressiveness of treatment. Uncertainty about the 
future condition of the infant, especially if the baby could be 
"normal," was also found to be important. While salvageability was also 
important, decisions are still made about the aggressiveness of 
treatment even for infants who are not salvageable. While the social 
value of treatment or non-treatment is frequently discussed, it was 
found to have a less important role in the decision making process about 
particular babies, except in those cases in which parents wanted 
aggressive treatment despite clinicians recommendations for less 
aggressive treatment. Social value, was seen as having a more important 
role in setting the parameters for acceptable treatment for all babies, 
than for decisions in individual cases.
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In Chapter VI, I present data on clinicians' conceptualization of 
characteristics of treatments. Even when clinicians withhold some 
treatments likely to prolong life, they provide other treatments which 
would also prolong life. Therefore they are distinguishing between 
characteristics of treatments as well as characteristics of patients, in 
making treatment decisions. This fact has received relatively little 
attention in the literature on clinical decision making.
One of the main ways in which clinicians categorize treatments is 
in terms of their aggressiveness. Treatments which have such attributes 
as a large physiological effect, which are experimental, which are not 
frequently done, which are invasive, involve the use of high technology, 
and/or which are costly in terms of staff time or monetary costs, and/or 
which are risky are ranked as more aggressive than other treatments 
which do not have those attributes to the same degree. Categorizations 
about the degree of aggressiveness are usually not explicit, and the 
dimension is not referred to by clinicians by a single consistent term. 
It does, however, appear to be a core concept shared by clinicians, who 
show a high degree of consistency in their conceptions about the 
relative ranking of treatments in making choices about which treatments 
to give and which to withhold.
Clinicians also categorize treatments as being ordinary or 
extraordinary. According to the original definitions of the terms, 
which evolved out of Catholic moral theology, the treatments were to be 
categorized on the basis of the potential benefit of the treatment for 
the patient. As the terms are currently used in the clinical setting,
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however, their use also encompasses notions dependent on the 
aggressiveness of the treatment. Clinicians also categorize choices not 
to give treatments as being instances of withholding or of withdrawing 
treatment. Although the difference may seem clear cut, this 
distinction, as the other characteristics of patient condition and 
treatments, is culturally defined.
The final characteristic found to be important in the 
conceptualization of treatment choice was a distinction between active 
and passive euthanasia. In some situations it has become acceptable to 
practice "passive euthanasia" or allow death to occur, but it is not 
acceptable to practice "active euthanasia" or cause death to occur.
Some clinicians consider withholding new extraordinary treatments as 
passive euthanasia, and the withdrawing of ordinary treatments as active 
euthanasia. There is not, however, either agreement about the 
definitions of these categories, nor about this definition.
In Chapter VII, I examine goals, norms, and treatment behavior.
The chapter starts with a discussion of the goals of medical treatment 
identified as to cure, to care, to preserve life and to do no harm. As 
with the characteristics of patient condition and treatment, there is 
disagreement among clinicians about the meaning of these concepts.
While for most infants admitted to NICUs, it is possible to choose 
treatments which will further all of these goals simultaneously, in some 
cases these goals are seen to as coming into conflict. In such 
situations, clinicians may try to maximize the attainment of a single 
goal or may try to choose behaviors which will balance a set of goals.
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Behavioral norms, which guide the choice of treatment for 
catastrophically ill infants, are discussed. In those situations in 
which the quality of life is expected to be acceptable, whatever 
treatments are necessary to preserve life are usually given. In those 
situations in which infants are terminally ill, as well as those in 
which the quality of life is not expected to be acceptable, choices are 
made about which treatments to give and which to withhold. Such 
principles as notions of proportionality, and a desire to neither 
prolong suffering nor to cause death are discussed. In some situations, 
decisions are made which are certain to lead to death; in other 
situations, choices are made which leave the outcome uncertain. In 
general, decisions about care can be characterized as decisions to treat 
up to a given level of aggressiveness, and then to withhold more 
aggressive treatments.
Finally, the translation of decisions about treatment choice in 
terms of culturally defined categories into treatment behavior is 
discussed. Since clinicians differ in how they interpret 
characteristics of patient condition, treatments, and goals, they differ 
in how they translate decisions into behavior. Therefore, clinicians 
who claim to share the same norms may differ in treatment behavior, and 
clinicians who claim to adhere to different norms may, in practice, make 
similar treatment choices.
In Chapter VIII changes in the conceptualization of decision 
making are discussed. The first published debate about selective non­
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treatment of newborns (Zachary 1968 and letters) are examined in detail. 
Variation in norms and goals as well as variation in categorization are 
found from the beginning of the debate.
Next, changes in technology and attitudes are shown to lead to a 
variety of changes in the conceptualization of treatment choice for 
infants with spina bifida. Advances in the technical ability to treat 
very premature infants are shown to lead to a clear trend toward 
treating very premature infants more aggressively. Further 
technological changes, which would enable the treatment of still more 
premature infants/fetuses, would create problems for the use of current 
norms for abortion and fetal therapy. In part this is due to a 
definition of "viability" as the ability to survive outside of the 
uterus. It is suggested that changes in the definition of viability, 
similar to changes in the definition of death, to incorporate social as 
well as physiological criteria, would be one way to handle the dilemmas.
Next, the Baby Doe regulations are discussed. Starting in 1983, 
the Federal Government, with the support of disability, Right-to-Life 
and some civil liberties groups, issued a series of directives designed 
to prevent the withholding of treatment on the basis of legislation 
designed to prevent discrimination against the handicapped. After 
objections from health care professions and others led to court 
decisions overturning the regulations, both sides agreed to compromise 
legislation defining the withholding of treatment from some newborns as 
child abuse, and recommending the establishment of hospital review
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committees. This Spring, the Supreme Court issued decisions supporting 
the lower Courts decision.
Data from the survey are presented on clinicians interpretation of 
the directives in 1983, very soon after plans to enforce the directives 
were first announced. The clinicians conceptualization of the problem 
of treatment choice was found to influence their interpretation of the 
directives. Clinicians did not feel that the regulation required the 
provision of all possible treatments. They did, however, feel that the 
regulations would require giving more treatments then they felt were in 
the best interest of some babies.
Finally, general changes in the categorization of patient 
conditions and treatments, in goals and norms are discussed. Some of 
the major changes appear to be higher expectations of an acceptable 
quality of life with mild and moderate impairments, and less importance 
vested in distinctions between ordinary and extraordinary care and in a 
distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatments.
There were also changes in the conceptualization of goals. In 
some cases, clinicians may now be more willing to acknowledge that cure 
is not possible, and they may be less likely to treat only to preserve 
life. In general, clinicians may now be more likely to give aggressive 
treatment when they feel that a baby could have a good quality of life, 
but, if not, they may be more likely to accept passive euthanasia. 
Clinicians also appear to be more likely to make their decisions based 
on the presumed best interests of the baby and less likely to consider
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the interests of other family members. Changes in treatment were seen 
to be associated with changes in treatment technology, attitude toward 
withholding treatment from older patients, attitude toward disability, 
and as a result of the public attention brought to the issue as a result 
of the Baby Doe Directives.
Major Conclusions of the Study
To summarize, the major conclusions of this study are:
- Decision making to limit the aggressiveness of treatment is not a new
phenomena of mid-twentieth century medicine, but rather reflects 
clinical practices which pre-date the recent technological 
developments.
- The modern debate about the treatment of newborns began to emerge in
the late 1960s (at least five years before the publication of Duff 
and Campbell 1973), starting with clinician attempts to devise 
standards for appropriate treatment.
-The treatment of catastrophically ill newborns is heavily influenced by 
the way that clinicians conceptualize the issues involved in 
treatment choice. Rather than an all or nothing decision "to 
treat" or "not to treat," the clinical model of decision making 
involves choices about which treatments to give and which to 
withhold from the range of possibilities. This is conceptualized
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in terms of making a decision about the "aggressiveness" of 
treatment.^
- In making treatment choices, clinicians make categorizations of
characteristics of patient condition, treatments, and goals, along 
a number of culturally defined dimensions:
Patient condition characteristics
Quality of life 
Uncertainty 
Critical Condition 
Social Value
Treatment characteristics
Aggressiveness 
Ord inary/Extraord inary 
Withholding/Withdrawing 
Passive/Active Euthanasia
Goals
To Cure 
To Care 
To Preserve Life 
To Do No Harm
Clinicians are guided by behavioral norms that prescribe the choice of 
treatments seen as commensurate with the characteristics of the 
patient's condition in order to achieve clinical goals.
1 This is an analytic model devised to account for clinicians' 
treatment decisions. It is not a model consciously used by clinicians, 
nor the only possible model which could be used to explicate such 
decisions. Likewise, the dimension of aggressiveness is not always 
consciously addressed in clinical decision making; the ranking of 
treatments on this dimension can be used to explicate treatment choice.
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- Although the categorizations on the dimensions of patient condition,
treatments and goals, are often considered dichotomous, the 
dimensions are, in fact, used as continua. For example, although 
clinicians often talk about treatments as "ordinary" or 
"extraordinary," they use the concepts as ranked entities; they 
rate some treatments as "more extraordinary" than others 
"extraordinary" treatments.
- Most clinicians use all of the dimensions discussed above in making
some treatment decisions. There is much variation, however, among 
clinicians in how particular conditions, treatments and goals are 
to be characterized, and in how important they believe each 
dimension should be, for individual cases.
- Over the past few decades, treatment for newborns has become more
aggressive. This primarily reflects the development of more 
sophisticated technology and practice which has enabled better 
outcomes for catastrophically ill newborns. There appears to be 
growing clinical consensus about norms to guide the limitation of 
treatment in some cases where treatment would prolong dying or 
would lead to a very poor quality of life. There is also growing 
consensus to provide certain treatments to infants with moderate 
impairments. Controversy remains about other treatment practices.
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- The clinical model of decision making affected clinicians'
interpretations of the Baby Doe Directives. Most clinicians have 
felt that the directives required more treatments than they would 
recommend, but believed that the regulations permit the 
withholding of some treatments that would promote survival. While 
some clinicians have not changed treatment practice, many 
clinicians have become more aggressive in treatment as a result of 
the Baby Doe Directives.
Issues for Future Research
This study raises many questions for future research on decision 
making about the care of critically ill in general and about the care of 
catastrophically ill infants in particular. Some of the questions 
involve ways to gain better understanding of the components of the 
cognitive model. Others involve questions pertaining to how the 
cognitive understanding is developed and used in the social context. 
Finally, questions are raised pertaining to the relevance of the model 
for understanding decision making in other settings.
Research on Components of the Model
In this research, the components of the conceptual system were 
derived primarily from observation of ongoing behavior and articles in
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the literature. The only categorizations studied directly using 
quantitative methods were categorizations of treatments as ordinary or 
extraordinary on the survey. Evidence for other categories, including 
quality of life and aggressiveness was inferred from the survey 
responses. Many questions remain about categorizations about patient 
conditions, treatments and goals which could fruitfully be studied by 
qualitative methods. For example: What are the components used in 
making categorizations on each dimension? What happens when a 
characteristic is categorized as high on one component but low on 
another? Is there much variation in the importance given to the various 
components. What happens with change over time? How much consistency is 
there in categorizations? Is there more consistency about some 
dimensions than other? I think that it would be particularly interesting 
to investigate categorizations on the dimensions of "aggressiveness" and 
"quality of life."
To what extent do such factors as cost, invasiveness, risk, or the 
fact that a treatment is still experimental affect the categorization of 
the treatments on the dimension of "aggressiveness". It would be 
fruitful to have informants rate treatments on each of these components 
and also on the overall dimension of aggressiveness in order to study 
the relationship of the various components. What happens when a 
treatment is experimental and expensive in cost and staff time but not 
very invasive (for example, a new monitoring device)? To what extent 
does the context matter? Is a drug which replaces an invasive surgical 
procedure seen as more aggressive than one which replaces another drug? 
How do conceptualizations change over time as a treatment is no longer
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experimental, as cost go up or down, or as people think of the condition 
as a medical rather than a surgical problem?
It would also be interesting to systematically investigate 
categorization about the components of quality of life. How do people 
rate various components such as such as particular mental or physical 
impairments, or functional deficits. To what extent do clinicians 
change their categorizations for a particular case according to the 
presence of other conditions or as mediated by the perceived level of 
support or services available from families or institutions? To what 
extent is there agreements among clinicians about the categorizations on 
various components, and overall on the implications of different 
conditions for future quality of life? Do clinicians feel fairly certain 
about the quality of life implications of most conditions? Is there a 
sharp threshold for most clinicians between those conditions that 
justify very aggressive treatments and a gray area where in which non­
treatment would be an option? Between the gray area and those conditions 
where prolonging life would not be seen as a benefit? Is the gray area 
small or wide?
It would also be interesting to use formal means to compare 
categorizations on different dimensions. For example, are those 
clinicians who perceive less uncertainty about patient condition, also 
more likely to be more or less aggressive in their treatments than those 
who perceive more uncertainty? Would there be more agreement among 
clinicians in their categorizations about "aggressiveness" and "quality 
of life" than about "ordinary/extraordinary care." Although one might
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think that there would be, because aggressiveness and quality of life 
are components of ordinary/extraordinary, it appears that there may no 
more variation, in fact, there may be less. Rather than being formed 
only by a summation of the component parts, categorizations such as 
those on the ordinary/extraordinary dimension, may serve an important 
role in providing means for the organization of diversity (discussed 
more below).
Research on the Development and Use of the Cognitive Model
A major area for research concerns how characteristics from 
clinicians' backgrounds and personalities affect their attitudes about 
factors which contribute toward the use of the model. Another major 
area for research concerns socialized into the clinical subculture of 
neonatal intensive care. Finally, one could look at many research 
questions concerning how clinicians use the conceptual model in social 
interaction with other clinicians, with parents, and others.
There are many questions about how characteristics of clinicians 
background affect categorization on the dimensions of patient condition, 
treatments, and goals. For example, are those clinicians who have had 
more contact with people with disabilities more likely to see the 
possibility of a good quality of life even with major impairments? Does 
education in biomedical ethics result in clinicians feeling that a 
distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatment is less 
important. What role do experiential factors play in the degree to
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which clinicians are invested in prolonging life or accepting death.
How does social background characteristics such as religion, ethnicity 
and social class, and personality characteristics such as 
authoritarianism or the capacity for empathy, effect categorizations on 
each dimension.
Much has been written about the socialization of medical and 
nursing students but relatively little has addressed socialization about 
many of the specific issues addressed in this dissertation. One issue 
that I find of interest concerns the development of the overall clinical 
model for approaching treatment decisions not as choices to treat or not 
treat, but as decisions about which treatments to give and which to 
withhold. From work with second year medical students who had not yet 
begun clinical work, it appears that their conceptualization of the 
issues is similar to that of people who are not clinicians. They 
expected babies to be treated and or not treated. They were surprised 
by decisions to give some treatments and not others. I distributed an 
early version of the questionnaire to pediatric residents on their first 
day of training. The pattern of their answers were very similar to 
those of more experienced clinicians - they recommended giving some 
treatments but not others depending on patient condition and treatment 
characteristics. Medical students must be socialized about the use of 
the model during their clinical years of training. It would be 
interesting to study the process of acquisition of this aspect of the 
subculture. Is the socialization process similar for nurses, and other 
health science students?
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Older clinicians tend to be less aggressive in their treatment 
recommendations (Levin 1985). What factors affect the conceptual system 
later in training and in practice? What role does first hand experience 
actually play? To what extent is there socialization from the 
institutional subculture where clinicians train or work? What learning 
is specific to neonatology and what reflects experience with other 
services (including pediatric follow-up)? What roles do lectures or 
reading in bioethics play? How does maturation and general life 
experience affect the conceptualization of treatment choice.
Although physicians and nurses did not differ significantly in 
their overall recommendations about treatment when other background 
characteristics were controlled (Levin 1985), they do differ in 
predictions about prognosis (Anspach forthcoming), and in the factors 
identified as the most important for making choices about treatment 
(Levin 1985). What contributions do differences in background, 
professional socialization, and work role make to inter- professional 
differences in the conceptualization of treatment choice.
The treatment of newborns in the NICU is not only determined by 
the cognitive system of the individual clinicians but is also a result 
of the social processes that take place among the infants' caretakers 
and the constraints of the larger social system. In addition to other 
types of research one could conduct, it would be interesting to examine 
how clinicians use the clinical model of decision making in negotiations 
about patient care.
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Parents usually know little about the conditions of their infants 
or about the options for treatment prior to the time that their infants 
are admitted to the NICU. They typically learn about their baby's 
condition and about the options for treatment from the clinicians caring 
for their baby. The condition and options are defined by the clinicians 
in terms of the clinical conceptual system. In presenting information 
to the parents, the clinicians present most treatments choices as 
mandatory, but may present some treatment choices as optional.
It would be interesting to study how parents develop an 
understanding of their baby's condition and of treatment options as 
these are presented by clinicians. To what extent do they accept the 
clinicians' presentation of the situation? To what extent do try to 
challenge these assumptions? One could examine the interaction between 
clinicians and parents who do not accept the clinicians framework 
according to the components of the model? Do they present alternate 
categorizations of they characteristics of patient condition, treatments 
or goals? Do they weight the importance of characteristics differently 
(for example, weighing more heavily the implications of a treatment 
choice for themselves or their other children)? Do they introduce new 
dimensions for consideration? Do they make decisions according to the 
norms guiding treatment choice for clinicians?
What happens when they use an different cognitive system. What 
happens when parents want to use different norms for decision making: 
what happens when they espouse norms which support an absolute sanctity
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of life position demanding all life saving treatment? What happens if 
they feel that the level of aggressiveness of treatment is irrelevant, 
believing instead that decisions should be made solely on the basis of 
the future quality of life for the child? One could examine how 
negotiations between the parents and the clinicians are affected by the 
nature of the differences in their cognitive models. Are clinicians 
more willing to accept alternate definitions of some categories, such as 
quality of life, more easily than others. For example, the nature of 
the critical condition? Are clinicians (or parents) able to manipulate 
the system to achieve the choice desired; for example, will clinicians 
stress uncertainty when parents are unwilling to accept recommendation 
for treatment choice based on predicted quality of life?
The conceptual system could also be used to study interactions and 
negotiations between members of the staff. One could examine the 
variations in the conceptualization of the case among clinicians caring 
for a baby? Are there differences in categorization of characteristics 
or goals, or in the norms used to guide treatment choice? What 
characteristics of clinicians (e.g. profession, status, age, location of 
training, religion, etc.) are associated with various positions? Are the 
clinicians aware of the differences? My research suggests that there are 
often striking differences among clinicians who are caring for a single 
baby in how they categorize patient condition and treatment options.
Yet, despite these differences, they will often agree on treatment 
choices.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
It would be interesting to investigate how and why the diversity 
in conceptualization exists, along with agreement on treatment choice.
It may be that through the experience of working together and observing 
choices made, clinicians develop expectations about treatment choice in 
particular situations. Most of the discussion in the unit focuses on 
the medical management of the infants, rather than on the value 
considerations underlying treatment choice; There is much more emphasis 
on learning and agreeing on what treatments are to be given. The 
"shared culture" of the unit may be primarily in terms of behavior 
because there could be strong sanctions against individuals who made 
inappropriate treatment choices. Yet, individuals rarely share the 
value defined reasoning behind treatment choice. In addition, even when 
views are shared, there is probably tolerance for divergent views as 
long as they don't result in behavior that is considered inappropriate. 
In this situation, in which there is diversity of ethical standards 
within the medical community and in society at large, variant 
definitions of a particular case may be tolerated as long as the 
behavior seems acceptable.
It would be important to gain an understanding of what takes place 
when divergent definitions of the situation would lead to different 
treatment choices. In those situations, how do clinicians negotiate 
with each other to make treatment choices. Do clinicians negotiate with 
each other to redefine the situation so that they can reach consensus.
If so when and how does that take place? Do senior clinicians exert 
power to force acceptance of choices that they feel are appropriate? If 
so, when and how? Are less senior clinician's able to appeal to outside
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standards or authorities to promote their choices? In particular, how 
does the possibility of appeal to outside authorities play a role in the 
decision making process?
It would also be important to investigate how, and to what extent, 
decision makers are limited by outside constraints, particularly by the 
threat of enforcement of hospital policies and of state or federal laws? 
Are parents and clinicians generally able to make the treatment choices 
that they feel are appropriate for the infants, or do they feel that the 
law compels them to provide treatments which they would not choose? If 
so, is this due to their desire to obey the law or does it reflect 
threat of action by hospital administrators, people who might inform the 
authorities, actual intervention from child welfare workers, district 
attorneys or others who might intervene to determine treatment choice?
Do clinicians, parents, or others use the threat of hospital sanctions 
or legal interventions in their negotiation about treatment choice? If 
so, how?
One could also investigate how the conceptual system of clinicians 
plays a role in the resolution of potential conflicts in such forums as 
ethics committees and the Courts. To what extent does the conceptual 
system, as defined by clinicians, determine the options considered in 
these forums? It appears that in most case the courts accept the options 
as defined by the clinicians. It would be interesting to study how the 
clinicians' conceptual system is communicated to judges, committee 
members and other non-clinicians, non-family participants in the 
decision making process. Are members of ethics committees able to
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maintain critical perspectives on decision making? How do their 
backgrounds affect their participation in the decision making process? 
Are they able to alter the way that clinicians define some situations?
If so, how?
Although the general clinician model seems to be used in virtually 
all intensive care units, there seems to be a lot of variation in how 
patient conditions and treatments are classified and in how important 
various characteristics and goals are considered in the decision making 
process. There also appears to be much variation in the degree to which 
diversity in the degree of aggressiveness of treatment is tolerated in 
the units, and the degree to which parents, nurses, the hospital 
administration, ethics committee members and others are able to 
participate in the decision making process. It would be interesting to 
investigate the factors associated with various practices.
Research could also be conducted on the communication process 
between individuals at different institutions. How and to what extent 
are clinician conceptualizations influenced by those of clinicians at 
other institutions? To what extent do changes in conceptualization take 
place because of direct communication between clinicians working at 
different institutions, through articles and/or editorials in 
professional journals, or as a result of positions established by 
professional organizations (e.g. positions taken by the American Academy 
of Pediatrics)? How are positions influenced by the movement of 
clinicians from institution to institution? To what extent do changes in 
conceptualization and practice at different institutions reflect
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independent adaptations to similar changes in technology and political, 
economic and social conditions as opposed to the diffusions of ideas 
from institution to institutions? Under what conditions is variation in 
practice tolerated and when is there pressure toward hegemony?
Perhaps the most interesting issues for future research involve 
investigation of ongoing effects of changes in the political, economic 
and social factors in the wider social context on the conceptualization 
of treatment decisions. For example, will changes in law or 
organization (e.g. HMOs) and/or financing of care (e.g. DRGs affect 
treatment decisions? How will changes in the conceptualization of 
treatment choice for catastrophically ill newborns be affected by other 
social issues such as those relating the disability, abortion, civil 
liberties, the use of technology, and the decision making about older 
children and adults who are critically ill?
Much of the recent debate on decision making for newborns has been 
a reflection of struggles around the abortion issue and disability 
rights. What factors lead to the linking of issues and the choice of 
positions by parties involved in these wider conflicts? What happens 
when alliances around one issue entail parties adopting positions which 
violate their usual stance on other issues? For example, what position 
will civil liberties organizations adopt on the parents role in neonatal 
decision making? What factors enable individuals or organizations to 
isolate issues and maintain positions which have implications which seem 
to conflict? How does debate about broader social issues affect the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
definition of characteristics of patient condition, treatments or goals 
and the norms of neonatal decision making?
Use of the Model for Research in Other Settings
The final topic I will discuss in this section on research 
implications is the use of the model developed for looking at decision 
making in neonatology for the study of decision making about other 
issues. First, I will discuss decision making for the care of other 
critically ill patients. Then I will discuss the use of the model for 
examining decision making about the care of other types of patients and
for additional questions concerning the use of technology. Finally, I
will discuss some general issues relating to the use of a decision 
making model for social science research.
It appears that the model of decision making developed for
elucidating the care of newborns has applicability for the study of 
decision making for the care of other critically ill patients.
Clinicians seem to consider the same characteristics of patient 
condition and of treatments in making decisions about the care of 
critically ill older children and adults. They appear to be trying to 
achieve the same goals and are guided by norms which prescribe 
treatments which are proportionate to patient condition characteristics.
It would be interesting to investigate whether clinician 
categorizations on the various dimensions and norms are similar or
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different when considering the care of older patients. For example, are 
the same criteria used for evaluating the future quality of life with 
similar impairments? Are similar standards used concerning the 
uncertainty? Are some treatments seen as more aggressive for either 
infants or older patients?
In some circumstances, it appears that clinicians would be more 
likely to conceptualize similar aggressive treatments as justified for a 
child or young adult who had an accident, than for an infant with a 
similar prognosis. Does this reflect a higher social value placed on 
the value of continued life for an individual who has formed more social 
attachments? In other circumstances, however, it appears that clinicians 
will be more aggressive in the treatment of infants. Do such decisions 
reflect the fact that even a very impaired newborn can perform the 
social role of being an infant, while an older person who suffers an 
accident might be unable to perform their accustomed social role? 
Clinicians sometimes withhold even very non-aggressive treatments from 
very elderly patients, especially those with limited mental capacity 
(Brown and Thompson 1979). To what extent does the
length of time of expected survival and/or the certainty of prognosis 
affect such decisions?
It would also be interesting to examine other factors affecting 
such decisions. For example, how does specialty training in internal 
medicine, geriatrics or pediatrics affect the aggressiveness of 
treatment? How does the setting affect the aggressiveness of care? What, 
if any, are the systematic differences in care provided in intensive
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care units, in other acute care settings, and in chronic care facilities 
such as residential treatment centers and nursing homes?
It might be useful to try to adapt the model for the study of 
other types of clinical decision making, beside the care of the 
critically ill. While the characteristics related to active and passive 
euthanasia would not be applicable, and the dimension of "critical 
condition" would have to be modified to something like the "potential 
for diminishing quality of life," the other dimensions would be 
considered in making other types of treatment decisions. Other 
characteristics might be added, or the existing categories might be 
elaborated. The components of the goal of "care" - functional 
improvement and relief of suffering - might be considered as separate 
goals.
For example, the model could be used to study decision making 
about the extent of rehabilitation services to offer a head trauma 
patient. One could examine the future quality of life possible with 
various physical and occupational therapy interventions, the uncertainty 
surrounding the effectiveness of those interventions, the potential 
fourth condition leading to diminished quality of life if the 
interventions are not given, and the social value of treatment for the 
patient's family, care givers and society. One could also look at the 
aggressiveness of the interventions, whether the interventions would be 
ordinary or extraordinary considering the aggressiveness and potential 
benefits for the patient, and whether the interventions had already been 
started. These could be considered in terms of the goals of improving
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functioning, relieving pain and suffering, and "doing no harm." Even 
for interventions which would not directly be related to preserving 
life, one could consider the potential of the intervention for 
preserving life under certain conditions (such as increased dexterity 
for a patient which could be advantageous for preventing accidents).
One could then try to identify the norms used by clinicians in making 
decisions about treatment choices. One could examine how clinicians 
behaved according to the patient condition and treatment characteristics 
and goals. In addition, one could study the relative importance of 
various dimensions.
The model could also be used for the study of other issues 
concerning the use of technology. One would have to identify the 
relevant characteristics of both the problems being addressed by the use 
of the technology and characteristics of the technology itself in 
relation to the goals of the actors. One could then identify the norms 
which guided the use of the technology.
For example, the model could be used for studying the introduction 
of computers to assist in performing various tasks in departments of 
hospitals. One might find it useful to consider such characteristics of 
the tasks as the nature of the changes in the tasks (e.g. speed or 
accuracy of task performance), the degree of uncertainty about the 
expected changes, the complexity of the tasks, the importance of changes 
in performance of the tasks for the functioning of the department, and 
the importance of changes in the provision of the tasks for other
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specific departments, for the hospital as an institution, or for the 
community served by the hospital.
The characteristics of the technology's use in the setting would 
also have to be considered. For example, one would want to look at 
costs, both financial and others. One would want to examine initial 
capital outlay and the costs of continued use. One would also want to 
look at costs in terms of training of personnel and perhaps other types 
of changes such as transformations in the nature of the work and/or the 
loss of information that might result from standardization. These could 
be considered in terms of the goals of the institution - such as patient 
care, teaching, research, and financial solvency. One could use such an 
analytic model in analyzing the norms prescribing the importance of 
various dimensions and the resultant guides for behavior. It could be 
used to explain, for example, why patient billing has often been the 
first department to rely heavily on computers.
A focus on decision making, like a focus on other analytic 
constructs, such as exchange or status and role, can orient research in 
many aspects of human behavior. It is particularly useful for it 
enables the researcher to integrate a dynamic aspect in studies of 
cognition and also allows consideration of cognitive aspects in studies 
of resource allocation. A major limitation, however, of a decision 
making approach is that it focus attention on the conceptualizations and 
behavior of individual and/or groups. A decision making perspective 
alone doesn't provide information on the factors which account for the 
larger context in which decision making takes place. The opportunities
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and constraints from the larger context are taken as given in studies 
focused on decision making. Research on decision making needs to be 
coupled with investigations using other theoretical perspectives to 
provide information on the larger social context.
Implications of the Study for Improving the Process of Decision 
Making and Devising Social Policy
The care of catastrophically ill infants presents difficult 
decisions for parents, clinicians, and others involved directly in the 
care of newborns and those involved in devising social policy. It is 
hoped that this dissertation will provide information and an approach 
for looking at decision making that will be useful both for case by case 
decision making and for the formation of social policy. In this 
section, I will discuss how the model developed in this dissertation can 
be used by decision makers in evaluating elements - categories and norms 
- used in the decision process. Finally, I will discuss the roles of 
ethics committees and the government in fostering better decision 
making.
A proposition underlying this discussion is that parents should, 
in general, be the primary decision makers about the medical care their 
children, including treatment for critically ill infants. At the 
present time, there is a diversity of opinion about the appropriate care 
of catastrophically ill infants in our society. Decision making about 
the aggressiveness of treatment for infants necessarily involves
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decisions based on value considerations. Parents generally are the 
people who care most deeply about the well-being of their children.
They may also be seen as best able to articulate the values that the 
infant would be likely to espouse if the infant had been raised and 
socialized by that family. Therefore, I believe that parents should be 
able to determine the course of treatment for their infants, except in 
those situations where their decisions clearly violate widely shared 
social values. The important issues therefore become devising means to 
enable parents to make decisions in accord with their own values, and 
developing criteria to identify poor decisions and develop processes to 
prevent poor treatment choices from being made.
Use of the Model for Clinical Decision Making
Since parents typically know little about many factors relevant 
for making decisions about the care of newborns prior to the birth of 
their child, they are very dependent on communication with clinicians. 
Clinicians, themselves, sometimes have little awareness of the 
assumptions and values that underlie decisions. The model of decision 
making developed in this dissertation can be used in making decisions 
about the care of individual newborns by facilitating discussions among 
clinicians, between parents and clinicians, and with other participants 
in the decision making process such as members of ethics committees. It 
can be used to critically evaluate the categorizations made on some or 
all of the dimensions and the norms used in making decisions. More 
awareness of the values and assumptions underlying decision making on
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the part of both clinicians and parents could help improve the quality 
of decisions.^
Frequently issues are discussed in terms that are too general.
This sometimes leads to problems in communication. For example, an 
indirect evaluation of physician/parent communication (using 
hypothetical cases) indicated that parents believed prognosis to be 
poorer than physicians though it would be based on the physicians' 
statements (Clyman 1979). Discussions of the specifics on each of the 
dimensions used in making decisions may be useful for ensuring an 
adequate information base for decision making.
The model may be used in focusing attention on issues involving 
quality of life considerations. In deciding the care of an individual 
baby, clinicians and parents should talk specifically about the 
likelihood of particular impairments and the possibility of specific 
causes of pain and suffering. Rather than saying that a child will 
probably be severely retarded, they should endeavor to be as specific as 
possible. For example, rather than saying an infant will have brain 
damage, clinicians should tell parents if they think the child will be 
able to perform simple activities but will not be able to read, or will 
never be able to recognize his/her caretakers.
 ^ This discussion is not meant to imply that decision makers don't 
often critically evaluate these categories and norms, nor that they 
don't frequently communicate well with parents. Rather, it is intended 
to focus attention on some problems that sometimes impede good decision 
making.
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Parents should be provided with as much good information as 
possible and be helped to evaluate the implications of various 
conditions for their infant's potential quality of life. Since so many 
people, including clinicians, have so little knowledge about the 
potential for people with impairments and many share general stereotypes 
and prejudices about life with disabilities, particular attention needs 
to be paid to providing information about the potentials for 
satisfactions for individuals with impairments. It is also important, 
however, to provide information on the negative consequences of 
particular conditions. Clinicians who are used to feeding tubes, 
chronic respiratory support, frequent operations, etc. may sometimes 
underestimate the effects of such interventions for the quality of life 
of the patient. Parents should be provided with as much information as 
possible on both negative and positive consequences of specific 
conditions.
One of the major problems, of course, is the degree of uncertainty 
about future prognosis. Currently there is much diversity among 
clinicians in predictions they would make for a given condition. 
Clinicians should be encouraged to share their uncertainty about 
prognosis with each other and with parents as fully as possible.
Efforts should be made to collect information on the likelihood of 
various outcomes with various conditions.
While clinicians may want to put the greatest emphasis on the 
chances for cure, or for a good outcome, other aspects of uncertainty 
should also be considered. Clinicians should be concerned about the
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best outcomes that treatment could offer. In making decisions about 
care, however, it is also important to consider the most likely, and the 
worst possible, outcomes. Following their values, some parents may 
choose to forego treatments in order to avoid a very poor outcome, 
rather than believing that they should necessarily treat if there is a 
possibility of a good outcome.
Similarly, parents and/or clinicians can discuss categorizations 
on other dimensions of the model. These discussions can focus on both 
the data and the criteria used to make evaluations. In addition to 
examining patient condition characteristics, they can examine treatment 
characteristics. For example, they can explore the criteria used to 
classify a treatment choice as passive or active euthanasia. They can 
also discuss whether a particular treatment choice will help to achieve 
a given goal. They can ask if an intervention which temporarily 
relieves acute suffering, but prolongs life which is characterized by 
chronic suffering truly furthers the goal of providing "care."
Decision makers may also want to use the framework to help 
identify the importance that is given to various criteria in making 
treatment decisions so that priorities about the relative importance of 
various dimensions can be evaluated. For example, some people feel that 
the best interests of the child, usually understood to be determined 
primarily by quality of life, should be the only criteria used in making 
a treatment decision [see In the matter of Claire Conroy (1985), for an 
example concerning the choice of treatment for an adult]. In some 
cases, however, when the potential benefit of treatment for the child
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may be very small, and the social costs of treatment are very high, 
decisions makers may want to consider social value considerations. If 
an infant is so severely brain damaged that the infant could only have 
minimal awareness of his or her surroundings, and the continued life of 
the infant would cause distress for the family and be very expensive, 
then it might be reasonable to consider withholding some treatments.
Identification of the norms used in clinical decision making may 
also be useful for challenging the way that decisions are made. For 
example, this dissertation has demonstrated that clinicians consider not 
only characteristics of patient condition, but also characteristics of 
treatments in making treatment decisions. Parents, policy makers, and 
others may want to question the moral relevance of treatment 
characteristics for decision making.
While looking at the history of decisions to withhold treatment 
and the evolution of medical ethics, it is understandable that 
clinicians make differentiations between treatments. It is not clear, 
however, that such considerations should be used to justify the 
provisions of treatment on the basis of any criteria other than those 
related to patient condition characteristics. It could be argued that 
the consideration of treatment characteristics is necessary to uphold 
certain traditional standards of medical ethics, or that certain 
treatments, such as the provision of warmth, nutrition or fluids must 
always be provided to show respect for human life. One could also 
argue, however, that such arguments are inadequate to justify the
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provision of treatments that are not warranted on the basis of patient 
condition characteristics.
The Role of the Ethics Committee for Improving Decision Making
One mechanism which has been suggested for improving decision 
making in neonatal intensive care has been the ethics committee (Pres. 
Comm. 1983, Fleischman 1986). It has been suggested that it can be a 
useful vehicle in four primary ways. First it can provide education 
about issues relating to neonatal decisions, usually to the staff of a 
neonatal unit, and sometimes to others such as members of the community. 
Second, the members of the ethics committee can work toward devising 
general principles to guide the decision making process and/or the 
substance of decisions. Third, it can serve as a forum for the 
discussion of difficult cases where perspectives can be presented by 
people with varied ideas. Finally, ethics committees can review the 
appropriateness of decision making in actual cases. (Typically, ethics 
committees do not themselves play a decision making function). I will 
say a little here about what my research suggests about the functioning 
of ethics committees.
One of the most important functions that an ethics committee can 
play is to be involved in educating the staff. As discussed in this 
dissertation, decisions about the aggressiveness of treatment are not 
only comprised of the major life and death decisions commonly identified 
as "ethical issue" but components play a role in many of the seemingly
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more minor decisions about the management of care. In the day to day 
work of treating infants, clinicians frequently choose treatments 
without consciously considering the basis of those decisions (see 
Chapters IV through VIII).
Time set apart for consideration of ethical issues, both in 
committee meetings, and sometimes in more widely attended ethics rounds 
or others forums, can increase the opportunity to examine assumptions 
underlying both the routine and major decisions. Hopefully, this
education will increase the awareness of clinicians as to a value base 
for a wide variety of decisions.
Together, members of the ethics committee and other staff members 
can begin to develop more general principles which can help guide the 
decision making process and substance of decisions. These principle 
should help to clarify the basis of many decisions which can continue to 
be made without individual reconsideration in each case. They should 
also help to identify decisions to be individually considered on a case 
by case basis. The committees could help to develop mechanisms to 
insure that certain types of decisions are discussed among members of 
the staff, with parents, and with members of the ethics committees.
The ethics committee can serve as a forum for the discussion of 
difficult cases. The perspectives brought to bear on these cases, of 
course, is dependent on the make up of the committees. A potential 
problem is that committee members are almost invariably chosen by the 
senior physicians and/or the hospital administration. In order to widen
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the breadth of perspectives presented about cases, it is important that 
members with a range of views serve on the committee and that the 
committee members are able to function independently rather than 
primarily as protectors of the physicians or hospital. Mechanisms 
should be developed to insure representation of individuals with varied 
views and to insure independence in committee function.
Review of difficult cases depends on identification of these 
cases, and depends on presentation of the cases for review. Frequently, 
only those cases which physicians recognize as difficult are brought for 
review. Mechanisms should be developed to alert parents and other staff 
members to the existence and role of the committee and to encourage them 
to present cases.
It may be difficult for the entire ethics committee to review all 
of the potentially difficult cases. Smaller multidisciplinary 
subcommittees of the larger ethics committee should be established which 
could quickly be called to help in the decision making process. Even a 
subcommittee, however, will not always be able to spend an adequate 
amount of time learning about the details of each case, discussing them 
with the parents and clinicians and exploring the complexity of cases.
It could be beneficial to identify one or two individuals in each unit 
who could serve as resource persons on decision making. Such a person 
could be a neonatal nurse, social worker or ombudsman with knowledge of 
the clinical and ethical complexities of such cases. Typically, the 
clinicians, social workers, and others working in a neonatal unit are 
too busy with their other responsibilities to be able to spend prolonged
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periods of time and be available to explore the value issues in all 
cases. If part of such a person's time was freed from other duties, 
that person could serve as a valuable resource to the parents and 
clinicians deciding the care in individual cases.
Another issue to be considered concerns the identification of 
cases for mandatory review. Frequently, the guidelines for ethics 
committees mandate that all cases should be reviewed in which life 
prolonging treatments are withheld. As discussed in this dissertation, 
life prolonging treatments are frequently withheld, most often from 
infants who are considered to be terminally ill. The categorization of 
infants as terminally ill, however, is not always clear cut, and, often 
depends on treatment choices. In other situations, in which infants are 
certainly or probably terminally ill but not immediately dying, there 
can be serious ethical questions about care. In some cases, with 
aggressive treatment, these infants could live for a substantial period 
of time, especially if very aggressive treatments are given (see Chapter 
V, section on the critical condition, and Chapter VII, section on 
decisions for terminally ill infants). It seems impractical for the 
ethics committee to try to directly review decision making in all of 
these cases. Mechanisms should be established, however, to monitor the 
process of decision making in such cases and identify problems which 
might arise.
While most of the attention has been paid to cases in which life 
saving treatments are being inappropriately withheld, situations also 
arise in which parents wish to provide treatments which are seen as too
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aggressive. (A number of cases brought to the attention of at least 
three ethics committees have been of this type.) Ethics committees can 
serve an important role in such cases by providing a forum where the 
problems concerning over-treatment can be presented and discussed. In 
some situations, the committee may be able to provide education and 
support to help parents make decisions to withhold overly aggressive 
treatments. In other cases, the committee may help the clinicians 
accept the parents' decision to continue treatment.
Finally, ethics committees can serve as forums for review to 
prevent the occurrence of clearly inappropriate treatment decisions. As 
I stated before, there is great diversity of opinion about what 
constitutes appropriate treatment choice. In general, I believe that 
parents ought to be able to make health care decisions for their 
children. In rare instances, however, parents make decisions which seem 
to clearly violate widely accepted standards for treatment. In such 
cases, if after discussion with the ethics committee no satisfactory 
resolution can be achieved, cases can be referred to the state 
authorities.
The Role of Government
There are a number of roles that the government can play in 
fostering better care for catastrophically ill newborns. Most 
important, the government should take measures to prevent the birth of 
so many high-risk infants. The government should play an important role
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in improving the quality of life of infants with disabilities and for 
their families. The government could also take a number of steps to 
promote good decision making.
Most of the infants admitted to NICUs, and many of the infants for 
whom decisions are made to withhold treatment are low birthweight 
infants who are born prematurely. As discussed in Chapter III, there is 
a strong correlation between the rate of birth of low birthweight babies 
and socioeconomic factors. The government could do much by establishing 
programs to eliminate the factors which lead to the birth of low 
birthweight infants by providing birth control programs for teenagers, 
better nutrition for low income children and particularly for low income 
pregnant women, and programs for better prenatal care. In addition, the 
government should increase funding for programs to identify and 
eliminate risk factors for the birth of children with congenital 
impairments.
The government should also increase funding to improve the quality 
of life for infants with disabilities and their families. One of the 
reasons that both parents and clinicians give for deciding not to treat 
some catastrophically ill infants aggressively, is that there are 
inadequate services to provide a decent quality of life for many 
children with impairments (Gliedman and Roth 1980). If clinicians and 
families felt that there would be adequate financial and social supports 
for these children and their families, they would feel that infants with 
disabilities would have a better quality of life and more would decide 
to treat.
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The government could also provide better information about 
treatment and prognosis for infants with impairments. The most recent 
version of the Baby Doe regulations called for the
establishment and operation of national and regional information 
and resource clearinghouses for the purpose of providing the most 
current and complete information regarding medical treatment 
procedures and resources and community resources for the provision 
of services and treatment for disabled infants with life 
threatening conditions.
(DHHS 1985)
So far, funds have not been allocated for these centers. The government 
could provide an important service by providing such information. It 
would also be valuable if the government sponsored more, and better 
coordinated, collaborative research studies to follow-up infants who 
have been cared for in the NICU and provide information on the medical 
and social outcome of care.
I believe that "Baby Doe" type regulations (see Chapter VII, 
section on the Baby Doe Regulations) are an inappropriate mechanism for 
a number of reasons. Here I will discuss two of the most important. 
First, the definition of cases in which treatment may be withheld is too 
restrictive. The latest revision of the regulations only allows 
lifesaving treatments to be withheld when an infant is chronically and 
irreversibly comatose, treatment is futile, or virtually futile in terms 
of survival. Many parents, clinicians, ethicists and others believe 
that there are other situations as well when aggressive medical
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treatment is not in the best interests of an infant, and that parents 
have a legal and a moral right to make decisions to withhold treatment.
Second, federal enforcement is neither an appropriate nor 
effective mechanism for regulating the care of the critically ill. 
Health care law has traditionally been under the jurisdiction of 
localities and the States (see Chapters II and III, sections on the law 
and withholding treatment). I believe that no compelling argument has 
been made to support federal involvement. Second, federal involvement 
has not been effective. While the Baby Doe Regulations were in effect, 
is was not demonstrated that federal involvement led to even a single 
case in which an infant who would not otherwise have been treated 
received life saving treatment (Bowen v. American Hospital Association) 
as the result of a federal investigation. There is, however, much 
anecdotal information suggesting that fear of federal intrusion did lead 
to inappropriate aggressive treatment for some infants (Shapiro and 
Rosenberg 1984).
Despite the fact that no physicians or parents have been been 
found guilty of a criminal offense as a result of withholding treatment 
from a catastrophically ill newborns, clinicians and parents sometimes 
feel compelled to provide more aggressive treatment than they believe 
is in the best interests of a baby because they fear criminal 
prosecution. Changes in law which would make "good faith decisions" to 
withhold treatment, with the approval of an ethics committee, exempt 
from criminal prosecution could free parents and clinicians to make what 
they consider to be appropriate decisions. State laws dealing with
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child abuse and with the conduct of medical practice should provide 
adequate enforcement to prevent inappropriate decision making.
Increased Awareness and Critical Examination of the Criteria for 
Neonatal Decision Making
Decision making about treatment for catastrophically ill newborns 
is very complex. Ultimately, I believe that better decision making for 
catastrophically ill infants depends on more awareness and critical 
evaluation of the factors involved. During the past two decades, 
clinicians, bioethicists and members of our society at large have become 
more concerned about both the power and the limits of medicine. There 
needs to be more awareness and discussion both about the basis for 
decision making for individual newborns and about the issues involved in
the care of the critically ill in general.
In gaining an understanding of the care of the critically ill, 
members of our culture are grappling with issues involving the role of 
families, professionals and the state, issues concerning the nature of 
human life, dependency and autonomy, the power and limits of science and 
medicine and the role of human action and of fate. All of these crucial
areas of concern for members of our culture are part of the debate on
treatment for catastrophically ill newborns.
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APPENDIX I 
METHODOLOGY
This appendix describes some of methodology of the research in 
more detail and supplements material in the introductory chapter. It 
starts with a discussion of preliminary research in the unit, discusses 
the systematic review of cases, other research activities, and document 
review.
Preliminary Research in the NICU
During the academic years 1977-78 and 78-79, while I was working 
for the Task Eorce on Ethics and Values in Neonatology, I observed in 
the unit, usually half a day a week; when there was an especially 
interesting case, I would spend more time. I concentrated on learning 
as much as I could about the general operations of the unit and about 
the care of cases identified by the clinicians as raising "ethical 
issues." After the task force ended, I continued to do informal 
observations in the unit, following cases of interest. In the Spring of 
1981, I presented "Treatment Decisions in Neonatology: Issues for 
Anthropological Research" at research rounds at the Division of 
Neonatology, formally announcing my intentions to do my dissertation 
research in the unit. At that time, I administered a pilot 
questionnaire to the eleven people present. That year, I also
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administrated a questionnaire to the twelve incoming pediatric 
residents, new fellows and new NICU nurses.
Project on Ethics and Values in Health Care
From 1978-1983, I worked for the Project on Ethics and Values in 
health care. The project was designed to developed curriculum materials 
for health science students and develop a short course in Ethics and 
Values in Health Care, which we taught at the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons for four years. Along with other projects, including a study 
in the adult medical ICU, I worked on an interdisciplinary task force on 
spina bifida. We conducted an in depth case study of a child with spina 
bifida, interviewed the child (then 6-8 years), her parents, her 
teachers, her nurses and her doctors. We explored issues about the 
decision that was made not to treat her when she was born, about 
subsequent care decisions, and about her life beyond the medical context 
for a written report and video tape (Aranow, et al. 1981-82; 1984;
Levin, Palmer and Ross 1984).
Systematic Case Review
In order to do a more systematic observation of decision making in 
neonatology, I followed the care of 50 babies admitted consecutively to 
the acute section of the NICU in the Fall of 1982. That series was 
somewhat atypical of the 668 babies admitted to the unit that year for
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it included almost forty percent of the smallest premature infants. 
Infants with lethal heart defects were probably also over represented. 
There was only one baby with a serious neural tube defect. Hissing from 
the sample were any babies who became chronic NICU patients, unable to 
be discharged from the unit for more than one year. (Babies have been 
in the NICU at Columbia for more than three years.) The range of 
conditions represented, however, was fairly typical of infants admitted 
to the unit.
Thirty four of the fifty babies in the sample were premature (born 
before 37 weeks of the normal 40 weeks of gestation) and thirty eight 
were "low birth weight" (under 2500 grams or about five and one half 
pounds). Twenty seven of the babies were "very low birth weight" (under 
1500 grams or about 3 and a third pounds), most born before thirty 
weeks. All of the premature babies above 1500 grams survived. Of those 
under 1500 grams, nine died, all born before 30 weeks. The smallest 
only weighed 540 grams (about one pound, three ounces) and was only 23 
weeks. In addition to prematurity, one of the premature babies hao( a 
serious heart defect, one had intercerebral bleeding, another had 
pulmonary and vascular abnormalities, one had hydrocephalus, and 
another's mother tested positive for syphilis. Some of the babies 
suffered complications of prematurity including RDS (respiratory 
distress), IVHs (bleeding in the brain), NEC (destruction of part of the 
intestine), and BPD (chronic lung disease), infections including 
meningitis, and some needed closed heart surgery for a PDA (a problem 
with cardiac circulation).
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The other large category was infants with heart conditions. 
Columbia probably attracts an unusual number of cardiac infants because 
it is a major center for cardiac surgery. Eight babies, including one 
who was premature, had serious cardiac conditions. Five died; one was 
the premature baby, two had hypoplastic left hearts (the then lethal 
condition later to be made famous by "Baby Fae" and "Baby Jesse"), one 
had complex heart disease and had also suffered a long period of time 
without oxygen, one had an AV canal, complete, and one, in addition to 
the heart defect, also had Down's Syndrome. Two of the babies who 
survived had transposition of the great vessel, another had complex 
heart disease associated with a number of other congenital anomalies.
The other babies, who all survived, had a variety of conditions. 
Five had respiratory problems, one had a fractured skull, one had 
myelomeningocele, one had an abdominal pseudocyst with perforation and 
peritonitis, a final baby who had a low fetal heart rate spent a few 
hours in the acute section, waiting for space on the semi-acute side.
In each of these cases, I followed decision making about major and 
minor decisions closely. The possibility of non-treatment was raised in 
a number of these cases, however, none led to the "paradigmatic ethics 
case" in which treatment was withheld, and an infant died who otherwise 
would have survived. Nevertheless, the series was crucial to the 
research for through it I realized the importance of many minor 
decisions, and the extent of decision making about the care of 
terminally ill newborns.
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Questionnaire on Neonatal Decision Making
I had intended to distribute a questionnaire to the staff of the 
NICU in the Spring of 1983 in order to use quantitative methods to test 
some of the hypotheses I had developed about neonatal decision making. 
When the Baby Doe Regulations were announced (see Chapter VIII), I was 
concerned about collecting data on withholding treatment from 
respondents who worked in a single unit. Fortunately, I had the 
opportunity to distribute the questionnaire at a Conference, ’’Which 
Babies Shall Live: Humanistic Dimensions of the Care of Imperiled 
Newborns" presented by the Hastings Center and Montefiore Medical 
Center. This conference, held in New York City on April 6 , 1983, 
attracted people who worked at NICUs throughout the Metropolitan area 
and some from other places. It was also attended by non-clinicians 
interested in neonatal decision making. Questionnaires were distributed 
to the 251 people who attended the conference. (For a copy of the 
questionnaire, see below.)
At the conference, I was invited to distribute the questionnaire 
at a Columbia Department of Obstetrics Retreat. Having collected data 
from staff at other centers, as well as Columbia, I agreed to distribute 
a slightly modified version of the questionnaire to the 52 participants 
at the retreat, and also obtained permission to distributed it to the 
129 physicians, nurses, and other professional staff who worked in the 
NICU at Columbia.
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The first portion of the questionnaire, based on the work of Diana 
Crane (1975), presented hypothetical vignettes of cases of newborns with 
four critical conditions —  Down's syndrome with duodenal atresia, 
anencephaly, trisomy-13, and extreme prematurity (25 weeks gestational 
age). For each case, respondents were presented with a list of 
treatment choices, each of which they were asked to assume would 
increase the baby's chance of survival if given and they were asked to 
assume that the parents' views were the same as their own.
Next respondents were asked to indicate: if they thought it would 
be best to give or to withhold a number of treatment options for each 
baby by circling whether they would either definitely, probably, 
probably not, or definitely not recommend each treatment, (2) whether 
they thought the treatments would be required by the Baby Doe 
Directives, and (3) how they would rate each of the treatments on a 
scale from one (ordinary) to five (extraordinary).
Another portion of the questionnaire consisted of multiple choice 
questions concerning how decisions should be made for individual 
newborns, how policies should be set, and which factors should be 
important in making such decisions. In addition, there were questions 
requesting background demographic and other information on respondents. 
The questionnaires maintained the respondents' anonymity.
In total, 249 of the 432 questionnaires distributed were returned: 
130 from the Conference, 97 from the NICU, and 22 from the Obstetrics
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and Gynecology Department Retreat. The return rates from the response 
groups were 52, 75, and 42% respectively.* Although
this is not a sample of a defined population, it does provide a set of 
responses from a number of people, most of whom are very knowledgeable 
about treatment decisions for catastrophically ill newborns. The NICU 
subsample does provide a survey of an entire population. The responses 
of the conference and Columbia respondents were similar when responses
of members of each occupational group were compared. Unless otherwise
noted, all responses are combined and reported together.
Of the respondents to the questionnaire, 30% were neonatal nurses, 
18% were other nurses, 13% were neonatologists, 14% were other 
physicians, 18% worked in other occupations or settings related to the 
delivery of health care (medical social work, hospital clergy, hospital 
administration and so on) and 6% worked in law or journalism (most with 
a special interest in health) and special education. Three percent 
worked at other occupations or their occupations were unknown. Seventy- 
six percent of the respondents had professional experience working with 
catastrophically ill newborns.
Respondents ranged in age from 21 to 73 years, with an average age
of 37. Seventy-four percent of the respondents were female, 26% male.
Only the Columbia respondents were asked about religion and religiosity. 
Of these, 28% identified themselves as Protestant, 41% as Catholic, 17%
* In addition, four respondents returned questionnaires in both the
first and third response groups; their responses were tallied only in 
the second subsample.
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as Jewish, 7% as other, and 7% as none. Eleven percent characterized 
themselves as deeply religious, 60% as moderately religious, 26% as 
indifferent to religion, and 3% as opposed to religion. The response 
rate per item was generally high. Reported percentages are based on 
answers from at least 240 responses, unless otherwise noted.
Following Crane (1978), there is said to be "consensus" when 
there is agreement of at least 75% of the respondents to "’yes' or 
'probably yes'" or to '"no1 or 'probably no'." Controversy or lack of 
consensus is said to exist when less than 75% of the respondents were in 
agreement. Some of the results from the survey are reported in the body 
of the dissertation. (For a more complete and concise report, see Levin 
1985.)
Other participant observation research activities
I also visited four other NICUs in New York, units in three other 
cities in the Northeastern United States and one unit in Canada. I 
interviewed clinicians who worked in at least eight other units across 
the country. In order to maintain anonymity, cases discussed in this 
thesis are draw from these other locations as well as Columbia.
In this complex process of studying a subculture of my own 
culture, where the "natives" are themselves interested in analysis, and 
I am to some extent being socialized into the subculture* the lines 
between the object of study and the process of study are often hard to
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draw. Over the years, I have attended numerous conferences on neonatal 
decision making. Typically, these were helpful both because they 
presented an academic analysis of decision making (that helped to inform 
my own analysis), and were, themselves, occasions to research the 
perspectives developing on decision making both by clinicians and 
others.
Similarly, I have been very fortunate to have been able to be a 
participant in the Hastings Center Research Group on Ethics and the Care 
of Newborns. This group, with participation of some of the nation's 
leading and most knowledgeable philosophers, lawyers, physicians, nurses 
and others concerned with neonatal decision making, has been exploring 
the complexities of the issues and working toward developing a social 
policy statement. In addition to providing colleagues who are also 
studying this issue, it has presented an extraordinary opportunity both 
for observation and informal interviews of some of the actors who are 
involved in making individual care decisions and in establishing 
national policy.
The same type of merging of research and observation has occurred 
as I have presented papers on my own work. In the Spring of 1983, at 
research rounds in the Division of Neonatology, I presented my "research 
subjects" with the preliminary version of my analysis including the 
conceptual framework I had developed to understand neonatal decision 
making. Their acceptance of the model affirmed its ability to mesh with 
their understanding of decision making. I have heard that my 
observations have even been referred to in the process of discussing the
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management of cases. Numerous times, when I have presented at other 
forums, clinicians have come up to me afterwards and told me that they 
had never thought of it in quite the same way, but that what I presented 
described what happens in their clinical setting and would often provide 
case illustrations. This, of course, itself, is research material.
Since 1983, I have followed occasional cases in the NICU but have 
not done systematic field work. In the Winter of 1983-4, I was invited 
to be one of the founding members of the Neonatal Bioethics Review 
Committee for the NICU at Columbia. Initially I tried to be both a 
researcher and a participant on the committee; finding too much role 
strain, I have opted to be primarily a participant. Nevertheless, the 
committee meetings have provided some additional data used in this 
dissertation.
Document Review
In addition to participant review, I tried to learn as much as I 
could about neonatal decision making from a review of the clinical, 
legal, bioethics, and popular literature. When I began this research in 
1977 there was relatively little written on neonatal decision making and 
social issues in neonatology. I was able to obtain most of the books 
and articles I had heard about, not only on ethical issues in neonatal 
intensive care but on the experience of parents and staff in the NICU.
I conducted a number of computer searches of the literature.
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In the past few years there has been an explosion in the number of 
books and articles on the topic, especially in the three years since the 
announcement of enforcement of the Baby Doe Directives. Since then I 
have tried to concentrate on articles of particular relevance to my 
research interests.
I was especially interested in books and articles describing 
clinical cases, in order to see if I could find any which indicated that 
other clinicians made treatment choices in ways that were very different 
than the clinicians I was studying. I was particularly interested in 
books and articles by clinicians, social scientists and others such as 
Anspach (forthcoming), Bell (1975), Bogden, Brown and Foster (1982), 
Colon (1981), Crane (1975), Duff and Campbell (1973), Guillemin and 
Holmstrom (1983), Gustaitis and Young (1986), Lorber (1973), Lyon 
(1985), Magnet and Kluge (1985), Marshall, Kasman and Cape (1982), Shaw 
(1972), Shelp (1986), Stinson and Stinson (1983) and Weir (1984), among 
others that described clinical practice. Although, clearly some 
clinicians made decisions which differed dramatically in substance and 
process from those made by the clinicians I was studying, they all "made 
sense" in my analytic framework.
I also systematically sought articles on a few particular 
categories. These included those which discussed differentiations 
between treatments (see Chapter VI), articles published before Duff and 
Campbell (1973) (frequently mentioned as the first major article on this 
topic), and articles written by social scientists (see Chapter III).
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I also read the literature with a desire to understand the larger 
context in which decision making about newborns was taking place. I 
followed the popular media on decision making in neonatology, 
particularly the coverage of "The Baby Doe" issue. I read articles on 
legal issues pertaining to neonatology and closely read the Baby Doe 
regulations and many of the related legal decisions. I examined follow- 
up studies on the graduates of neonatal intensive care and on the costs 
and structure of NICUs.
Although not . able to survey other topics as comprehensively, I 
also examined the literature on withholding treatment from older 
patients, medical decision making, reproductive decision making 
(especially prenatal diagnosis), decision making about the care of 
children, the use of medical technology, and general issues in 
biomedical ethics.
As with the "other research activities," the literature provided 
both analytic background and was, itself, research material.
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QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTED IN THE
NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE UNIT
SPRING 1983
See description of the survey methods, Appendix, pages 434 - 437.
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PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER WHICH CORRESPONDS TO YOUR CURRENT POSITION (CIRCLE TWO IF APPLICABLE)
1 Attending Neonatologist 4
2 Fellow in Neonatology 5
3 Pediatric Resident 6
NICU Nurse
Perinatal Nursing Student 
Midwifery Student
7 Other
pleese specify
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING FOUR VIGNETTES. FOR EACH ONE ASSUME THAT:
—  THE PARENTS’ VIEWS ARE THE SAME AS YOURS.
—  EACH TREATMENT, IF GIVEN, WOULD INCREASE THE BABY’S CHANCE OF SURVIVAL.
—  YOU ARE ASKED TO RECOMMEND WHAT YOU THINK WOULD BE THE BEST TREATMENT DECISIONS FOR EACH 
BABY.
PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER WHICH MOST CLOSELY RESPONDS TO YOUR -OPINION FOR EACH TREATMENT.
(Please disregard numbers at the far right margin which are for coding purposes only.)
QUESTION ONE— THE CASE OF BABY "A”
Baby "A" is born with Downs syndrome (Mongolism). Soon after birth, the baby is also found to 
have duodenal atresia, an intestinal defect which can be corrected by routine surgery. Without 
surgery, the baby cannot drink milk or other fluids by mouth.
WOULD YOU RECOMMEND:
1. Intravenous feedings? ..................
2. Surgery to correct the intestinal defect? .
3. Antibiotics, if it is suspected that the
baby also had an infection? ...........
Suppose the baby w b s  also fo u n d  t o  have a heart 
defect, WOULD YOU RECOMMEND:
4. Cardiac catheterization— -an invasive
diagnostic procedure? .................
5. Open heart surgery (for VSD)?.........  .
6. After heart surgery, suppose the baby
developed chronic kidney failure, would 
you recommend maintenance dialysis? . . .
DEFINITELY PROBABLY PROBABLY DEFINITELY
YES YES
~ ~ T ~
NO
— y
3
3
NO
T
4
4
The Department of Health and Human Services recently issued a directive stating that hospitals 
must post signs saying 'discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infants in this 
facility is prohibited by Federal law." No specific guidelines were issued to aid in interpreting 
the directive. A decision by a Federal district judge struck down the new rule. The Department 
of Health and Human Services has appealed the decision.
B. IN INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL DIRECTIVE, DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING TREATMENTS WOULD BE 
REQUIRED OR NOT FOR BABY "A"?
DEFINITELY PROBABLY PROBABLY DEFINITELY
YES
1. Intravenous feedings.................
2. Surgery to correct the intestinal defect
3. Antibiotics..........................
4. Cardiac catheterization .............
5. Open heart surgery ..................
6. Kidney dialysis ......................
YES
T
2
2
2
2
2
NO NO
4
4
4
4
4
4
ON A SCALE FROM 1 (ORDINARY) TO 
ABOVE FOR BABY "A"?
5 (EXTRAORDINARY), HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE TREATMENTS LISTED
ORDINARY
1. Intravenous feedings...................  1 2 3 4
2. Surgery to correct the intestinal defect . 1  2 3 4
3. Antibiotics..........................  1 2 3 4
4. Cardiac catheterization...............  1 2 3 4
3. Open heart surgery..................... 1 2 3 4
6. Kidney dialysis......................  T 2 3 4
EXTRAORDINARY
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QUESTION TWO; THE CASE OF BABY "B"
At birth, Baby "B" is found to be anencephalic (lacking the cerebrum, cerebellum, and the flat 
bones of the skull), which indicates that the baby could have no upper brain function. Most 
anencephalic babies die within the first few days of life; all die within the first few weeks.
WOULD YOU RECOMMEND:
DEFINITELY PROBABLY PROBABLY DEFINITELY 
YES YES NO NO
1. resuscitation— trying to start respiration 
if the baby isn't breathing— in the delivery
r o o m ? ................................. 1 2 3 4
2. feeding by mouth if the baby can suck? . . .  1 2 3 4
3. gavage (tube) feeding if the baby can't
s u c k ?      1 2 3 4
4. antibiotics if it is suspected that the
baby also has an infection?........ .. 1 2 3 4
Suppose the baby was also found to have a heart 
defect, WOULD YOU RECOMMEND:
5 cardiac catheterization— an invasive
diagnostic procedure?  1 2 3 4
6. open heart surgery (for V S D ) ?   1 2 3 4
7. an arrest page— restarting the heart if it
stops beating    1 2 3 4
B. IN INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL DIRECTIVE, DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING TREATMENTS WOULD BE REQUIRED
OR NOT FOR BABY "B"?
1. resuscitation in the delivery room
2. feedings by mouth . . . . . . . .
3. tube feedings . . . . . . . . . .
4. antibiotics ...................
3. cardiac catheterization .......
6. open heart surgery ............
7. an arrest page . . . .  .........
DEFINITELY
YES
PROBABLY
YES
— z—  
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2
PROBABLY
NO
 3---
3
3
3
3
3
3
DEFINITELY
NO
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
C. ON A SCALE FROM 1 (ORDINARY) TO 5 (EXTRAORDINARY), HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE TREATMENTS LISTED
ABOVE FOR BABY "B"?
1. resuscitation in the delivery room
2. feedings by mouth .. .........
3. tube feedings . . . .  .........
4. a n t ib io t ic s  ...............................................
5. cardiac catheterization .......
6. open heart surgery . . . . . . . .
7. an arrest page . . . .  .........
ORDINARY
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
EXTRAORDINARY
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
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QUESTION THREE; THE CASE OF BABY "C"
Baby "C" was born with multiple congenital anomalies— low set ears, 8kin folds around the neck, a 
cleft palate, and cardiac enomolies— suggestive of trisomy 13, a chromosomal anomaly which is 
always associated with severe mental retardation and severe physical impairments. Host of these 
babies die within the first few months, almost all die within the first year. If Baby 
doesn't have trisomy 13, he may have only correctable physical defects or he nay have uncorrec­
table physical and/or neurological defects.
A. WOULD YOU RECOMMEND:
2.
3.
4.
resuscitation— trying to start respiration
— in the delivery room?.................
nutrition and fluids? ....................
putting the baby bn a respirator if he can't
breathe for himself? ....................
antibiotics, if it is suspected that the baby 
has an infection?  ................
DEFINITELY
YES
1
1
PROBABLY
YES
2
2
PROBABLY
NO
3
3
DEFINITELY
NO
4
4
Now suppose that after resuscitation in the delivery room Baby "C" was breathing on his own and 
was admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit for evaluation. Two days later, chromosomal 
analysis indicated that he does indeed have trisomy 13.
WOULD YOU RECOMMEND:
DEFINITELY PROBABLY PROBABLY DEFINITELY 
YES YES NO NO
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
nutrition and fluids? .......
surgery to correct the cleft palate? 
antibiotics, if it is suspected tha1
baby has an infection?.......
putting the baby on a respirator if
breathe for himself? .........
cardiac catheterization? ........
open heart surgery (for VSD)? . . 
an arrest page— restarting the heart if 
it stops beating?...............
the
a •  •  •
he can't
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
IN INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL DIRECTIVE, DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING TREATMENTS WOULD BE REQUIRED 
OR NOT FOR BABY "B"?
DEFINITELY PROBABLY PROBABLY 
YES_______ YES_______ NO
1. resuscitation in the delivery room....  1 2 >
Before chromosomal analysis
2. nutrition and fluids..............  1 2 3
3. respirator...................    1 2 3
4. antibiotics  ...........................  1 2 3
After chromosomal analysis
5. nutrition and fluids
6. surgery to correct the cleft palate
7. antibiotics ....................
B. respirator ......................
9. cardiac catheterization .........
10. open heart surgery ...............
11. an arrest page ...................
DEFINITELY
NO
4
4
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
C. ON A SCALE FROM 1 (ORDINARY) TO 
ABOVE FOR BABY "C"?
5 (EXTRAORDINARY), HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE TREATMENTS LISTED
1. resuscitation in the delivery room . 
Before chromosomal analysis
2. nutrition and fluids .............
3. respirator ......................
4. antibiotics....................
After chromosomal analysis
5. nutrition and fluids .............
6. surgery to correct the cleft palate
7. antibiotics....... ............
8. respirator ......................
9. cardiac catheterization .........
10. open heart surgery...............
11. an arrest page ...................
ORDINARY ... 1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
EXTRAORDINARY
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 4 6
QUESTION FOUR: THE CASE OF BABY "D"
Baby "D" was born at a gestational age of 25 weeks (15 weeks before the end of a full tern 
pregnancy) weighing 560 gins. (1 lb. 3 oz.). He was born-vaginally. His apgar score at birth was 
1—  a score which indicated that he had probably suffered from lack of oxygen, his eyes were 
fused— indicating that he was very premature. He wasn't breathing on his own but did have a alow 
heart beat.
A. WOULD YOU RECOMMEND:
1. Resuscitation— trying to start
respiration— in the delivery room?
DEFINITELY PROBABLY PROBABLY DEFINITELY 
YES YES NO NO
Suppose Baby D "  was resuscitated and put on a respirator? The following day, ultrasound— a . 
diagnostic test— revealed that he had a grade III— IV IVH— a large amount of bleeding in the 
brain. He therefore has approximately a 50% chance of survival. If he survives, he probably has 
less than a 50% chance of being normal. Deficits could range from moderate to severe mental 
retardation and/or neurological impairments (such as cerebral palsy).
WOULD YOU RECOMfCND:
DEFINITELY PROBABLY PROBABLY DEFINITELY 
YES YES NO NO
3.
4.
5.
6. 
7.
increasing respirator settings— giving 
the baby more oxygen? .............
IF NOT, WOULD YOU:
(a) leave the baby on the respirator?
or
(b) take the baby off the respirator?
nutrition and fluids? ...............
auctioning to remove excess fluid from
airways? ........................
pressors— powerful drugs to maintain
blood pressure? ...................
an arrest page to restart the heart? . 
kidney dialysis if the kidneys failed?
A
B
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
B. IN INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL DIRECTIVE, DO YOU THINK THAT THE FOLLOWING TREATtCNTS WOULD BE 
REQUIRED OR NOT FOR BABY "D"?
DEFINITELY PROBABLY PROBABLY DEFINITELY
YES_______ YES_______ NO_______ NO
1. resuscitation in the delivery room . 1 2 3 4
2. increased respirator settings 1 2  3 4
3. nutrition and fluids 1 2  3 4
4. auctioning 1 2  3 4
5. pressors 1 2  3 4
6. an arrest page 1 2  3 4
7. kidney dialysis 1 2  3 4
C. ON A SCALE FROM 1 (ORDINARY) TO 5 (EXTRAORDINARY), HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE TREAT1CNTS LISTED 
ABOVE FOR BABY "D"?
ORDINARY EXTRAORDINARY
1. resuscitation in the delivery room 1 2  3 4 5
2. increased respirator settings 1 2  3 4 5
3. nutrition and fluids 1 2  3 4 5
4. auctioning 1 2  3 4 5
5. pressors 1 2  3 4 5
6. an arrest page 1 2  3 4 5
7. kidney dialysis 1 2  3 4 5
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QUESTION TIVE
A. HOW DO YOU THINK THAT DECISIONS ABOUT TREATMENT FOR IfOIVIDUAL CATASTROPHICALLY ILL MEt®ORNS
SHOULD BE HADE? Assume that disagreements could be referred to the Courts. (Please circle
the one statement which best describes your view.)
By the physicians caring for the baby .; ........................................  1
By physicians, nurses, and other professionals caring for the baby ................  2
By the baby's parents with the advice of professionals caring for the b a b y .........  3
By a joint decision by parents and professionals with disagreements referred to a
Hospital Ethics Committee ...................................................  4
By a Court in all cases..............     5
No decisions should be made on a case by case basis, all should reflect specific
policies .............................. . . . . .    6
Other ___________    1
ip lease specify)
B. HOW DO YOU THINK THAT POLICIES SHOULD BE SET REGARDING TREATMENT FOR CATASTROPHICALLY ILL 
NEWBORNS? (Please circle the one statement which best describes your view.)
Specific guidelines set by hospital ethics committees .............................  1
Broad guidelines set by hospital Ethics Committee . . . . .  ......................... 2
Specific guidelines set by State legislatures .................................  .. 3
Broad guidelines set by State legislatures ......................................  4
Specific guidelines set by the Federal Government.................................. 3
Broad guidelines set by the Federal Government  .................................  6
No policies should be set, all decisions should be made on a case by case basis . . . .  7
No policies should be set, all newborns should always receive all treatments ........ 8
Other ®
(please specify!
QUESTION SIX
A. WHICH FACTORS DO YOU THINK SHOULD BE IMPORTANT IN MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT WITHHOLDING CARE 
FROM CATASTROPHICALLY ILL NEWBORNS? (A) Please circle the number corresponding to each 
factor which you think is important.
severity of physical impairment . . . . 1 feelings of ataff caring for baby . 13
severity of intellectual impairment . . 2 if treatments are already started . 14
amount of prolonged pain and if non-treatment would be active
15suffering...................... euthanasia . . . . . . . . . . . .
capacity to give and receive love .’. . 4 cost of neonatal intensive care . . 16
uncertainty about the extent of long term costs of caring for
17impairment .................... disabled child and adult.......
impact, on parents................. availability of resourses for
1Bimpact on siblings ............... . 7 other sick children ...........
ability of parents to have other availability of resources for
healthy children ............... . B other medical care ............. 19
financial burden to family ....... danger of lessening the "value of
20parents' wishes .................. life" . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
if treatments are heroic ......... . 11 availability of resources for other,
if chance of successful treatment non-medical, social needs . . . . 21
is small ...................... Other (please specify) ........... 22
B. Please list the numbers of the three factors (listed above) which you think are most important
number; number:    number;
(most important! Und most important) (3rd most important)
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QUESTION SEVEN
UNDER CURRENT LAWS. AN ABORTION MAY BE PERFORMED FOR ANY IIOICATION UNTIL THE 24TH WEEK OF 
GESTATION. AFTER THE 24TH WEEK, ABORTION IS ILLEGAL. DO YOU THINK THAT ABORTION SHOULD BE LEGAL 
FOR THE FOLLOWING INDICATIONS? If so, circle "YES" end indicate up to which week following tte 
last menstrual period an induced termination of pregnancy should be legal. If not, circle "NO. 
Please give an answer for each indication.
1. contraceptive failure ........................  ■
2. economic hardship ............................
3. unmarried mother ............................
4. r a p e ..................................... .
5. incest........... .........................
6. risk to mother's psychological health (eg. severe 
depression) .................................
7. risk to mother’s physical health (eg. uncontrolled
diabetes) ...................................
e. bilateral polycystic kidneys— a lethal condition 
involving non-functioning kidneys . . . . . . . .
f. thorasic spina bifida— physical defect involving 
paraplegia and incontinence of urine and stool
PLEASE CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE
YES______wks. NO
YES______wks. NO
YES_____ wks. NO
YES wks. NO
YES_____ wks. NO
YES  wks. NO
YES wks. NO
8. risk to mother's life (eg. eclampsia)  ......... YES______ wks. NO
9. prenatal diagnosis of:
a. baby of the undesired sex . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Downs syndrome (see quest. 1) ...................
c. anencephaly (aee quest. 2) . ...................
d. trisomy 13 (aee quest. 3 ) ............. .
YES______wks. NO
YES_____ wks. NO
YES______wks. NO
YES wks. NO
YES______wks. NO
YES wks. NO
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 4 9
FINALLY, A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR BACKGROUND: (please be specific)
1. OCCUPATION: ____________________ _________________________________________
2. TITLE OF POSITION: ___________ ______________
3. SPECIALTY: _________________________________
4. SEX: (Please circle) M F
5. AGE: __________
6. DO YOU HAVE CHILDREN? (Please circle) YES NO
7. EDUCATIONAL DEGREE(S) AND SPECIALTY TRAINING (Please specify fields and dates.)
8. HOW LONG HAVE YOU WORKED IN A NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE UNIT? (please count rotations by 
aonth)
never.....................................................   1
under 3 months........................    2
3 months- 1 year ..........................................  . . . . .  3
1-3 years .........................................  . . . . . . . . .  4
3-5 years.....................................................   5
5-10 years......................  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
10-15 years..........................................      7
over 15 years . . . . .  ..........  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
9. HAVE YOU WORKED IN A RELATED AREA (e.g. obstetrics, pediatrics)?
never.....................................  1
under 3 months......................     2
3 months-1 year.....................................   3
1-3 years.......................................................   4
3-5 years.................................      5
5-10 years ...........  . . . . . . . . . . . .    6
10-15 years...........................      7
over 15 years............................................   8
10. IF THE ANSWER TO QUESTION 9 as 2-8, PLEASE SPECIFY AREA
11. HAVE YOU HAD ANY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH CATASTROPHICALLY ILL NEWBORNS? 
(Please circle) NO YES (If so, please describe briefly)
PLEASE CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE
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BACKGROUND QUESTIONS (Continued)
12. RELIGION:
A. Protestant    1
(denomination)
Catholic...................................    2
Jewish: • • • ............   3
Orthodox, Conservative or Reform
None...........................    4
Other    5
Please specify
B. DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF (please circle):
deeply religious . . .  .................................  1
moderately religious . . . . .  ............... . . . . . .  2
largely indifferent to religion .......................... 3
basically opposed to religion . . . ' .......................  4
-13. IN YOUR POLITICAL VIEWS, DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF (please circle):
radical left................ ..........................  1
liberal ..............................................  2
middle-of-the road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    . 3
conservative.........   4
radical r i g h t ...........   3
14. HAVE YOU RETURNED ANY OTHER QUESTIONNAIRES WHICH WERE PART OF THIS STUDY?
(please circle appropriate nos.)
distributed in the unit, Spring 1981   1
distributed to 1st year residents, July 1981*^............   2
distributed in the unit, April 1 9 B 3 .....................  3
distributed at the "Which Babies Shall Live" conference,
April 1983 ..........................................  4
distributed at Arden House, April, 1983 .................. 5
N o .................................................... 6
15. ARE THERE ANY COMfCNTS THAT YOU WOULD- LIKE TO HAKE?
(If any of the questions were particularly difficult to answer, please indicate which ones 
and why.)
Thank you very much for your cooperation.
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